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Abstract 
 
Asset prices offer useful information for monetary policymakers in the short-
term, yet their significant relationship to primary policy-indicators is debated. In 
one view bubbles are difficult to recognise and central banks should act just 
against the adverse consequences of their unwinding. The opposite view 
advocates ‘pre-emptive’ monetary policy as financial imbalances accumulate 
aiming to forestall such consequences. After reviewing the debate, we evaluate 
‘pre-emptive’ monetary policy when financial stability is an explicit objective 
replacing the output-gap. Modelling a game between a central bank and the 
financial sector similar to Barro and Gordon (1983), we examine monetary policy 
under commitment and discretion. In contrast to the relevant literature, we 
conclude that pre-emptive monetary policy succeeds in better controlling 
inflation, anchoring inflation expectations and imposing more discipline to the 
financial sector when committed to a rule. The model is extended to incorporate 
incomplete information about the policy objectives. We evaluate the effect of 
vagueness about the central bank’s preferences for financial stability in the 
behaviour of the central bank and the financial sector, and how reputation-
building affects the conduct of discretionary policy. Finally, we discuss the 
relevance of our conclusions in the light of the global financial crisis initiated in 
August 2007. 
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 C H A P T E R  1  
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
 
The period since the early 1980s has been decisive for the evolution of monetary 
theory and practice. As far as the practice is concerned, the crucial factor has been 
the very success of several central banks to actually acquire and maintain credibility 
for low inflation, and improve for several years the stability of inflation and output 
relative to potential. Indeed, it is accepted that central banks can and should primarily 
use monetary policy in order to maintain low inflation over time. Such commitment 
to price stability renders monetary policy more successful in stabilizing employment 
over the business cycle. Moreover, greater transparency is also accepted to enhance 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. With respect to the theory, the decisive 
improvement has been the introduction and wide acceptance of rational expectations 
in models of monetary policy, as it mainly enabled the incorporation of forward-
looking elements of aggregate demand and price-setting in the latter, which also 
enabled the understanding of the success of monetary policy in practice. 
However, different views have been expressed about the various specific channels 
through which monetary policy actions are transmitted to the real economy (in 
particular, into changes in real GDP and inflation), which are complicated and still 
imperfectly understood. Therefore, a relatively clear knowledge of this transmission 
process is vital for the appropriate conduct of monetary policy.  
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 Chapter 2 begins with a broad overview of the main channels of the transmission of 
monetary policy proposed in the extant literature, followed by a discussion of the 
factors that may alter these transmission channels or affect their relative importance. 
Furthermore the analysis is followed by a concise, penetrating, analytical 
presentation identifying the channels of monetary transmission mechanism.  
Monetary policy can have an impact on asset prices and exchange rates because of 
the effect it has on financing conditions in the economy, especially due to its impact 
on expectations. Interest-rate and financial asset-price changes influence saving, 
spending and investment decisions of households and firms. A fall in asset prices 
tends to cause strong effects on spending when the consequent change in debt-to-
asset ratios hampers debt repayment for households and firms. Similar effects can 
arise when general sentiment deteriorates about the ability to service debts in the 
future. It has been argued, however, that certain direct effects of monetary policy on 
aggregate spending are not captured by the transmission via the traditional interest-
rate or exchange-rate channels, and they, consequently, focus mainly on the critical 
role credit markets have in the transmission of monetary policy actions.  
As emphasized in most of the surveys cited in Chapter 2 (according to the so-called 
lending view), monetary policy actions create two effects, namely one that focuses 
on bank loans and another on borrower balance-sheets. In both, capital market 
imperfections that enable certain firms to obtain financing instead of others actually 
determine the effectiveness of monetary policy. Since changes in credit conditions 
are not reflected only in interest-rate levels, it is important to understand the ways in 
which credit-market imperfections determine the macroeconomic equilibrium, as 
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 well as the channels of the transmission of monetary policy decisions to the real 
economy. 
Chapter 3 gives a review of the nature and origins of the key elements of the current 
consensus, i.e. the considerable convergence in theory and practice of monetary 
policy in the last thirty years. The latter includes an account of the components of the 
consensus theory of monetary policy, reflecting the emergence of the explicit interest 
rate policy. Then follows a concise presentation of the prevailing model of monetary 
policy that constitutes the main workhorse model most central banks use as a guide 
to monetary policymaking.  
The stability of the financial system promotes the smooth functioning of the payment 
systems and the effective transmission of monetary policy, thus, ensuring that the 
primary monetary policy objective of achieving and maintaining price stability is 
reached. Furthermore, a robust financial system enhances the resilience of the 
economy to shocks of various sources, having also an effect on the overall 
performance of the economy.  
It is necessary to discuss to what extent risk can be shouldered by a central bank 
while ensuring its asset soundness, although a specific evaluation of risks attached to 
individual assets goes beyond the scope of this thesis. It has been pointed out, 
however, that when the public sector and a central bank shoulder private-sector 
credits in an extremely large amount, as it may be the case in facing the current 
serious financial crisis, such behaviour might be at quite a substantial social cost that 
would erode the mechanism of capitalism (Oda and Okina (2001), p. 334). 
6 
 Thus, Chapter 4 explores the relationship between financial stability, deflation, and 
monetary policy. The discussion starts by reviewing major issues concerning 
financial stability/instability, then addressing financial stability and price stability 
and continues to analyse monetary policy, asset prices and the consequences of 
financial distress for asset price fluctuations and banking crises.  
Bubbles in asset prices create distortions to nearly all economic decisions. Wealth 
effects create rapid expansions in consumption followed by vast collapses. Increases 
in equity prices enable firms to finance new projects, causing a boom in investment, 
followed by a bust. In addition, fiscal revenue rises in a booming economy, and 
encourages, thus, cuts in taxation and increases in expenditure. After the consequent, 
inevitable, slump in asset prices such fiscal policy actions are politically difficult to 
reverse. Therefore asset price bubbles can create volatility in consumption, 
investment, financial intermediaries’ solvency, and fiscal policy.  
Furthermore, the flow of information may be disrupted, and price discovery may be 
impaired during periods of financial distress. The increased uncertainty that 
characterizes the disruption in the information flows results in high risk spreads and a 
reluctance to purchase assets. It is, therefore, of particular importance for 
understanding financial instability to investigate the entailing risks.  
In addition, shocks interfering with the flow of information in various parts of the 
financial system span from higher interest rates to problems in the banking sector, 
and increases in uncertainty to asset-market effects on balance-sheets.  The recent 
economic turmoil gives credence especially to the last two. Financial instability, in 
the absence of any remedial action, can produce a severely adverse impact not only 
7 
 for the functioning of financial markets but also for the overall prospects of a 
country’s economy. 
To sum up monetary policy authorities face the central concern of finding and 
evaluating ways to prevent financial instability. In this endeavour one needs, first, to 
understand the nature of financial instability and the effect it may impose to the 
macroeconomy. In particular, severe boom-and-bust cycles can lead to severe 
destabilisation in both inflation and output in an economy. Consumption is affected 
as well as investment, fiscal policy, and the health of financial intermediaries. Most 
importantly, the down-side risks that they pose are significant. Since central bankers 
undertake a form of risk-management of the economic and financial system, they are 
bound to address these risks. This is the purpose of Chapter 5, namely to search the 
extant literature and to provide a coherent way for understanding all these intricate 
issues that did not appear to be so widely and obviously alarming, or even dramatic, 
five years ago when I first started to undertake PhD research dealing intensively with 
this subject. 
In connection to this chapter (Chapter 5) the following Chapter 6 concentrates on 
whether and how monetary policy should respond to asset price bubbles. The 
appropriate response, if it is considered appropriate to give any response at all, has 
been a matter of extensive debate during the last fifteen years (initiating roughly 
during 1994-2000 with the U.S. stock market boom and expanding with the 
subsequent recession). It is vital, however, to make the distinction that both 
academics and central banking practitioners agree that in the aftermath of a bursting 
of a bubble monetary policy needs to be conducted in a way that counters the adverse 
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 consequences brought forward. Therefore, we do not address the important issue of 
how monetary policy can enhance the recovery of an economy that has already fallen 
into a post-financial-crisis recession, that is currently of major concern to both 
academics and policymakers in view of the current global financial and economic 
turmoil. 
As financial crises and economic contractions tended historically to follow periods of 
explosive asset-price growth, it is argued that monetary policy can restrain the 
adverse effects that financial instability may impose on the economy overall, just by 
attempting to defuse asset-price booms at a relatively early stage. However, how 
likely it is that asset prices eventually collapse leading also to a macroeconomic 
decline may depend on the underlying reason of their appreciation.   
According to the traditional view a reaction of monetary policy to asset-price 
misalignments is justified only when asset prices are known to provide useful 
information about the future course of inflation. In particular, so long as monetary 
policy maintains price stability, it promotes financial stability as well. This view 
holds that financial crises (or simply “financial imbalances”) need to be tackled by 
lender-of-last-resort practices or regulatory policies. Of course, any attempt to 
evaluate the appropriate monetary policy response to asset price bubbles should not 
fail to consider primarily the explicit objectives of monetary policy, and its ultimate 
aim to promote public welfare by fostering economic prosperity. 
However, the traditional view has been (at least partially) criticised by several 
economists. Since asset price movements lead to macroeconomic fluctuations 
affecting prices and employment, the monetary authorities are bound to be concerned 
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 with the former. Yet, several crucial issues need to be addressed before a monetary 
policy response. Chapter 6 analyses in a critical way such questions as whether 
monetary policy should react directly to asset prices or, even, if asset prices need to 
appear in some form in a reaction function a central bank uses as a guide for 
monetary policy. 
Furthermore, when policymakers face large fluctuations in asset prices but muted 
inflation expectations, it is considered whether inflation is measured accurately, as 
well as whether price stability is ensured. It is debated whether asset prices should be 
taken into account when defining price stability, and, generally, whether asset prices 
may play a significant role in the conduct of monetary policy. Additionally, even 
though it is widely accepted that asset prices offer (even partially) useful information 
to monetary policymakers in the short-term, views are mixed about whether they 
bear any strong link to the primary indicators of monetary policy (output gaps and 
inflation forecasts).   
The debate pins down to whether price stability is sufficient to foster overall 
financial stability, or whether a trade-off exists (at least in the medium-run). If the 
latter is the case, it is questioned whether monetary policy should exercise its 
influence in order to counter asset price bubbles when they grow (before forecasts to 
inflation are affected) or respond to their effects after they unwind. The conventional 
view accepts that asset price misalignments are difficult to recognise and that central 
banks should act just against the adverse consequences of a bubble unwinding. The 
opposite view advocates the merits of the so-called ‘pre-emptive’ monetary policy 
conducted as financial imbalances accumulate with the aim to forestall the potential 
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 adverse consequences in the aftermath of a crisis, especially since low and stable 
inflation is thought to possibly mask threats to the economy that weaken the financial 
system and which cannot be captured by an output gap measure. 
In line with the above debate, in Chapter 7 we address the second view as a policy 
option and evaluate pre-emptive monetary policy when a central bank considers 
financial stability as an explicit policy objective, yet replacing the output gap. 
Accepting that the effect of the policy instrument is transmitted through the financial 
sector, a central bank recognises that respective reactions from the latter can either 
enhance or hamper the implementation of monetary policy to the real economy. To 
capture that aspect – (to our knowledge) in contrast to the extant literature – we 
construct a simple model of the strategic interaction between a central bank and the 
financial sector in a closed economy in line with the tradition that started with the 
seminal work of Barro and Gordon (1983a). We examine monetary policy both under 
commitment to an instrument rule and under discretion, motivated, principally, by 
the concluding remarks in Bordo and Jeanne (2002) that “financial stability presents 
a direct challenge to the rule paradigm because it may require occasional deviations 
from simple rules – i.e. policies that are sometimes based in a complex way on 
discretionary judgment”. To our knowledge, the literature in favour of pre-emptive 
monetary policy against financial instability (as presented in Chapter 6) puts forward 
the conclusion that the monetary authorities should exercise their policy with more 
flexibility and over longer policy horizons. On the contrary, our analysis concludes 
that when a central bank addresses financial stability as a main and systematic 
component of its decision making process, namely as an explicit monetary policy 
objective, then monetary policy yields better results in terms of controlling inflation, 
11 
 anchoring inflation expectations and imposing more prudence to the operation of the 
financial sector when conducted under commitment to a rule. Therefore, we contend 
that the contribution is twofold. Namely, in terms of the method used and in terms of 
the results proposed.  
Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 8 aims to evaluate the effect of vagueness about 
the central bank’s preferences with respect to financial stability both in the behaviour 
of the central bank and the financial sector. The model in Chapter 7 is extended to 
incorporate incomplete information received by the financial sector concerning the 
objectives the central bank aims at; the two possible cases addressed are a central 
bank that may aim solely on price stability and a central bank that may be of the type 
analysed in the model of the previous chapter. In this context it is investigated 
whether central banks should state clearly their intention to conduct monetary policy 
pre-emptively against perceived financial imbalances, or in contrast exercise ‘strict 
inflation targeting’. This kind of extension is justified by the fact that central banks 
have in general been reluctant to publicize any explicit objective function used as a 
guide for policy, and also because even though central banks have serious concerns 
about the stability of the financial system, they fail (as of present – to our 
knowledge) to adopt and aim at financial stability as an explicit monetary policy 
objective. 
In this model since the financial sector is partially informed about the way the central 
bank conducts monetary policy, even a central bank that prefers to pre-empt financial 
instability may choose in equilibrium, for suitable levels of parameters, to mimic a 
‘strict inflation targeting’ central bank. The aim is to build its reputation as such in 
12 
 stead of behaving in a way that would reveal its identity by choosing the strategy that 
maximises its objective function. In this way, it manages to better control inflation 
expectations, and have a firmer guarantee of the stability of the financial sector. It is 
finally proven that only for considerably large shocks to inflation, is the ‘pre-
emptive’ central bank willing to reveal its identity and exercise more muted control 
to inflation in order to reinforce the safety of the financial sector. 
The thesis is organised in nine Chapters clustered in three Parts as follows: Chapter 
1 is the introduction. Then follows Part I, which presents an overview of the state of 
monetary policy and consists of two chapters, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Then Part II 
analyses and reviews critically the central banks’ assessment and reaction to asset 
price bubbles. It includes three chapters, Chapter 4, 5 and 6, and represents an 
extensive analytical review of the relevant literature. Then having built on the 
experience of exploring analytically the vast theoretical and empirical literature on 
Part I and Part II, in Part III , which includes Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, we present a 
game-theoretic model of monetary policy under risks to financial stability. In this 
part, Chapter 7 develops a simple model of the strategic interaction between a central 
bank and a financial sector in a closed economy in order to analyse the conduct of 
monetary policy pre-emptively against financial instability and Chapter 8 extends the 
previous model to incorporate uncertainty referring to whether the conduct of 
monetary policy is pre-emptive against financial instability or not. Finally, Chapter 9 
reports the main conclusions of the thesis as they have been analytically received in 
the previous chapters and discusses the relevance of our conclusions in the light of 
the current global financial crisis initiated in August 2007. 
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 C H A P T E R  2  
T H E  T R A N S M I S S I O N  M E C H A N I S M  O F  M O N E T A R Y  
P O L I C Y  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The design of monetary policy and the achievement of the mandated and implicit 
objectives of a central bank are, in essence, determined by the transmission process 
of the chosen monetary impulses to the economy under consideration; in the case of 
the design of monetary policy, in forecast terms and in the case of the 
implementation in actual time. Even deciphering the past is vital for the monetary 
authorities, as the majority of empirical work is undertaken by using methods based 
in variants of time series analysis. The vast amount, intensity, and uniqueness with 
respect to time and entity of the choices taken by economic agents, in addition to the 
strategic interaction between the latter, are some of the factors that increase the 
complexity of the context that monetary policy is penetrating in order to have a 
desired effect on the economy. This chapter begins with an overview of the monetary 
transmission mechanism followed by a discussion of the main channels of the 
transmission of monetary policy proposed in the extant literature. 
  
2.2 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism  
Economists have not reached a consensus about the ways in which monetary policy 
affects the economy. Several specific channels through which monetary policy works 
15 
 have been proposed and different observers apply different weights of importance on 
each of those channels. In fact, views diverge even about the monetary transmission 
process. However, it is vital to the design and implementation of monetary policy 
that the policy authorities have a clear (even to a certain degree) grasp of the 
transmission process. Furthermore, central banks need to be alert to the impact of 
structural change, and in particular need to execute the strenuous task of 
continuously reinterpreting the channels of transmission of monetary policy. This is 
necessitated by the fact that changes in the structure of the economy, such as changes 
in financial sector technology and institutions, in balance-sheet positions, or in 
expectations concerning future policy, alter the economic effects of a given monetary 
policy measure (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack (1998), p. 5). 
After accepting the effect of structural change, we need to point out, however, that 
monetary policy transmission is seldom analysed as regime contingent and that as 
Leijonhufvud (2001) stresses most of the literature reads as if in pursuit of a 
‘general’ theory. Yet the prevailing view among monetary economists of how 
transmission works and the degree of effectiveness of monetary policy has changed 
repeatedly over time (for a comparative account see Leijonhufvud (2001)). He 
further concludes that, in retrospect, it seems obvious that these permutations of 
transmission theory have been largely driven – with some time-lag – by successive 
regime changes in the economic system under study (see Leijonhufvud (1990), and 
Leijonhufvud (2001) p. 15). 
Nevertheless, during the last decade, the practice of inflation targeting has gained 
broad acceptance among central banking practitioners and academics, emphasising in 
16 
 essence price stability as the sole objective of monetary policy and eschewing 
consideration of other goals, as for example growth or employment. Such consent 
does not emphasise price stability as more important a goal than growth or 
employment. The rationale behind it is that an activist monetary policy, undertaken 
in order to offset a cyclical downturn, rather than the pursuit of medium-term price 
stability, will over time give rise to the reverse effects. In addition, the desire to focus 
on a single objective for monetary policy is based on the fact that both economists 
and policy-makers consent that the long-term growth of the economy cannot be 
affected by monetary policy.  
Efforts to stimulate growth above its potential rate merely lead to higher inflation 
and, consequently, monetary policy can at most only moderate short-run fluctuations 
in output 1 . Doubt is even cast on whether discretionary monetary policy can 
effectively moderate economic fluctuations. A stream of issues makes it difficult to 
time policy actions accurately enough to accomplish such moderation. These include 
the very agreement on the existence of business cycles, the prompt timing in the 
                                                 
1 In the short term, there is a positive correlation between unexpected inflation and growth. An 
inflationary monetary shock can stimulate activity only when its inflationary impact is unexpected. In 
this case, the authorities need to convince the public that their policy is non- inflationary, while it 
actually is. This effect though cannot last long and, as illustrated in Graph 2.1, the Phillips curve itself 
moves to higher levels of inflation for a given rate of growth. In the longer-term, activity cannot be 
affected through channels of competitiveness or confidence. Nevertheless, monetary policy can 
actually have a positive impact on activity when the policy stimulus is seen to be fully consistent with 
price stability. 
Graph 2.1  
Inflation
Unemployment
Short – term
Phillips curve
Long– term
Phillips curve
 
Source: Rey (1999), p. 24. 
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 effective recognition of the turns in a cycle, in addition to subsequent lags in the 
response of the economy to changes in monetary policy. Moreover, as is pointed for 
example by Kamin et al. (1998), while many central banks may in practice continue 
to attempt to stabilise output, they abstain from such statement in their public 
mandate and yet restrict the latter to price stability alone, since this renders them less 
vulnerable to any political pressure for expansionary policy (Kamin, S., P. Turner 
and J. Van’t dack (1998), p. 6). 
 
2.3 A Concise Account of the Channels of Monetary Transmission 
This section starts with the illustration of the main channels of monetary policy 
transmission in a simplified form, as in Chart 2.12, followed by a brief explanation. 
The following section (2.4) gives a more thorough presentation and analysis of the 
main four channels as classified by the relevant literature on the theories of the 
monetary transmission mechanism.           
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy can be defined as “the process 
through which monetary policy decisions affect the economy in general, and the 
price level in particular. The individual links through which monetary policy 
impulses (typically) proceed are known as transmission channels” (ECB (2004), p. 
44). 
                                                 
2 A detailed comprehensive analysis is provided, for example, by Sinclair (2005a) (especially pp. 16-
21), where he examines how and why policy rates changes take place and discusses key initial aspects 
of the transmission mechanism for policy rates, such as their impact on other interest rates, other asset 
prices, and the major components of aggregate demand, consumption and investment (Sinclair 
(2005a), p. 39). In addition, Sinclair (2005b) examines the next stages of the transmission mechanism 
on how a change in the level of aggregate demand translates into changes in output and prices and 
labour markets. 
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 Chart 2.1: A stylised illustration of the transmission mechanism from interest rates 
to prices  
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Source: ECB (2004), p. 45.  
The transmission mechanism is actually a long chain of cause and effect that links 
monetary policy decisions with the price level and starts with a change in the level of 
the official interest rates3 set by the central bank on its own operations4. Since the 
                                                 
3 An examination of what prompts changes in official interest rates, important though it is, is not 
accounted for as it lies beyond the scope of this chapter. Sinclair (2005a) identifies four main 
influences. Namely, that there are “current levels or forecasts, of inflation; current levels or forecasts 
of the output gap (i.e. the difference between the economy’s level of real income, and its estimated 
potential); the market’s expectations of future policy rates (if available); and official interest rates 
abroad” (Sinclair (2005a), p. ). Then Sinclair (2005a) analyses all four influences and provides 
econometric evidence for the messages given by interest rate data for a large sample of 37 countries. 
4 These operations typically account for the central bank’s providing funds to the banking system (see 
for example ECB (2004) Chapter 4, for a detailed account of the instruments of monetary policy in the 
Eurosystem). The banking system demands money issued by the central bank in order to meet the 
demand for currency from the public, meet the reserve requirements of the central bank, and clear 
interbank balances. 
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 central bank has a monopoly over the creation of base money, it can fully determine 
the interest rates on its operations. As it affects in this way the funding cost of 
liquidity for banks, banks are inclined to pass on these costs when lending to their 
customers (ECB (2004), p. 44).  
The central bank can, thus, steer money market interest rates by exerting, through 
this process, a dominant influence on money market conditions. Changes in money 
market rates in turn affect other interest rates, yet to varying degrees. They have, for 
example, an impact on the interest rates on short-term loans and deposits that are set 
by banks. Furthermore, expectations of future policy rate changes have an effect on 
longer-term market interest rates, since the latter reflect expectations of the future 
evolution of short-term interest rates. Yet, the impact of money market rate changes 
on interest rates at very long maturities (as for example long-term bank lending rates, 
10-year government bond yields) is not direct enough to be estimated. Those rates 
depend to a large extent on market expectations for long-term growth and inflation 
trends in the economy. Therefore, only if the changes in the official rates are to lead 
to a change in market expectations concerning long-term economic trends, can they 
affect the longer-term rates (ECB (2004), p. 45).  
However, the conventional model of the monetary transmission views a shift in 
policy as steering a change in the money supply that, for a given money demand, 
results in a change in money-market interest rates. The changes in the official and 
interbank rates lead, in turn, to changes in bank loan rates for borrowers and in 
deposit rates. The former tend to affect investment decisions and the latter the choice 
of consumption between the present and the future. 
20 
 A principal issue in this channel of transmission is the extent to which a policy-
induced change in the official rate affects all short-term money market interest rates, 
and spreads, in turn, to the entire spectrum of interest rates, having an effect in 
particular to the long-term interest rates that are most relevant to investment 
(including housing) or to purchases of durable goods. In fact, several factors affect 
the propagation of monetary policy actions along the term structure, including the 
organisation of financial markets and the state of expectations. 
As Kamin et al. (1998) point out, since the present value of durable goods is 
inversely related to the real interest rate, a lower rate of interest increases the present 
value of such goods and thus increases demand. They further note that, “in this 
framework, changes in the marginal cost of borrowing affect interest-rate-sensitive 
spending. Changes in interest rates also lead to changes in average rates on 
outstanding contracts, and these changes increase over time as old contracts come up 
for renegotiation. Similarly, marginal adjustments in deposit rates will over time 
change the average deposit rate. These changes in average interest rates will affect 
the income and cash flow of borrowers and lenders. Policy-induced movements in 
average interest rates could thus lead to cash-flow-induced changes in spending (akin 
to income effects) that could be as important as – or more so than – the substitution 
effects associated with changes in marginal interest rates. In particular, balance-sheet 
positions would determine the relative importance of marginal versus average 
interest rate effects” (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack (1998), p. 10).  
For a distinction between the effects of marginal and average interest rates, it is 
important to distinguish between real and nominal rates. Kamin et al. (1998) further 
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 define that “the real interest rate affects the marginal cost of borrowing that 
determines spending and saving decisions. While a rise in nominal interest rates that 
reflects higher inflation expectations – so that the real rate remains constant – will 
not change the perceived marginal cost of borrowing, it will alter the cash-flow and 
balance-sheet positions of borrowers as it changes the average rate of interest. It does 
this because the portion of interest payments associated with the inflation premium 
represents a prepayment of the real part of the debt, so that changes in inflation alter 
the effective maturity of loans” (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack (1998), p. 10). Such 
cash-flow effects may affect aggregate demand to a great extent. 
Monetary policy can have an impact on other financial variables such as asset prices 
and exchange rates because of the effect it has on financing conditions in the 
economy, especially due to its impact on expectations. In economies where long-
term fixed interest bond markets are important, higher short-term interest rates may 
lead to a decline in bond prices. This channel of transmission may, in fact, be 
strengthened as such markets develop. Interest-rate and financial asset-price changes 
influence saving, spending and investment decisions of households and firms 5 . 
Furthermore, changes in official interest rates may also affect the supply of credit6. 
Furthermore, movements in asset prices may affect consumption and investment via 
                                                 
5 For example, ceteris paribus, higher interest rates make it less attractive for households or firms to 
borrow in order to finance their consumption or investment. In addition, in this case it is more 
attractive for households to save their current income instead of spending it, since the return on their 
savings is increased (ECB (2004), p. 45). 
6 For example, after an increase in interest rates, a number of households or companies that are willing 
to borrow will face a higher risk of not safely repaying their loans such that banks will not grant them 
a loan. Consequently, such borrowers would be forced to postpone their consumption or investment 
plans (ECB (2004), p. 45). 
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 income and wealth effects7. Asset prices can also affect aggregate demand via the 
value of collateral that allows borrowers to get more loans and/or to reduce the risk 
premia demanded by lenders or banks. The amount of collateral tends to influence 
lending decisions as when its value falls, loans will become more expensive and even 
difficult to obtain at all, with a resulting decrease in spending (ECB (2004), p. 45-
46).  
Another theory that explains the way asset price changes induced by monetary policy 
can affect aggregate demand is the so-called q theory of investment proposed by 
Tobin8.  
As q is the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its physical 
assets, with an easier monetary policy stance, equity prices may rise, increasing thus 
the market price of firms relative to the replacement cost of their capital. This will 
lower the effective cost of capital, since newly issued equity can come at a higher 
price in comparison to the cost of real plant and equipment. Therefore, even though 
loan rates charged by banks react little, or with a longer lag, to the policy easing, 
monetary policy can still affect the cost of capital and, thus, investment spending. 
Asset-price changes induced by policy may also have an effect on the net worth of 
households and enterprises and, hence alter demand. Such changes will tend to 
trigger a revision in income expectations and make households adjust their 
consumption. Similarly, policy-induced changes in the value of assets that are held 
                                                 
7 For example, households owning shares, as equity prices rise, become wealthier and may choose to 
increase their consumption, or the opposite might hold when equity prices fall (ECB (2004), p. 46). 
8 See Mishkin (1995) pp. 6-7 for a concise presentation.  
23 
 by firms will alter the amount of resources available to finance investment (Kamin, 
Turner, and Van’t dack (1998), p. 11).  
A fall in asset prices tends to cause strong effects on spending when the consequent 
change in debt-to-asset ratios hampers debt repayment for households and firms. 
Similar effects can arise if fears arise about the ability to service debts in the future. 
If, for instance, stock and bond prices decline, the value of liquid assets available to 
repay loans will be reduced. Since households and firms become, thus, more 
vulnerable to financial distress, they may attempt to rebuild their balance-sheet 
positions by decreasing spending and borrowing.  
As is stressed by Kamin et al. (1998), “the effects of monetary policy actions on 
aggregate demand, working through asset prices and balance sheets, may become 
amplified as the pace of economic activity begins to respond”. They contend that, for 
example, increases in interest rates that lower asset prices and weaken balance-sheet 
positions may lead to an initial decline in output and income. This initial decline in 
economic activity leads to a reduction in the cash flow of households and companies, 
further increasing their vulnerability to financial distress, and leading to an even 
further decrease in expenditure. Changes in the monetary stance may, in this way, 
lead to prolonged volatility in economic activity, even if the initial monetary policy 
action is promptly reversed (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack (1998), p. 11). In fact, 
changes in consumption and investment altering the level of domestic aggregate 
demand for goods and services relative to domestic supply, with a resulting upward 
pressure on prices, may eventually translate into tighter or looser conditions in labour 
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 and intermediate product markets, and these, in turn, can affect wage and price-
setting in the respective market (ECB (2004), p. 46). 
Turning the focus on the changes in the exchange rate, they normally affect inflation 
in three ways. First, movements in the exchange rate may have a direct impact on the 
domestic price of imported goods. If the exchange rate appreciates, the price of 
imported goods may fall, hence reducing inflation directly, insofar as these products 
are directly used in consumption. Second, if the imported goods are used as 
production inputs, lower prices for inputs might, over time, translate to lower prices 
for the final goods. Third, exchange rate effects tend also to feed to inflation through 
their impact on the competitiveness of the domestic goods on international markets. 
If an appreciation in the exchange rate makes domestically produced goods less 
competitive in terms of their price on world markets, this tends to constrain external 
demand and thus reduce overall demand pressure in the economy. An appreciation of 
the exchange rate, ceteris paribus, may therefore reduce inflationary pressures. The 
strength of the exchange rate effects depends on the relative openness of the 
economy to international trade. Exchange rate developments tend to be in general 
less important for a large, relatively closed currency area than for a small open 
economy (ECB (2004), p. 46).  
Financial asset prices depend on several other factors in addition to monetary policy, 
and changes in the exchange rate are also often determined by these factors. 
Imperfect information and contract enforcement problems that alter the means by 
which credit markets clear stand high in terms of importance. For example, when 
monetary conditions tighten, banks may wish not to rely exclusively on raising 
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 interest rates in order to ration available credit, as this would encourage riskier 
investment behaviour on the part of borrowers, as well as attract riskier borrowers as 
customers. Responding, thus, to increases in the cost of credit, banks will tend to 
raise interest rates on loans and also to tighten creditworthiness standards, leading to 
declines in the supply of credit along with increases in its price. As banks may be 
unable to distinguish fully between the borrowers whose creditworthiness has been 
adversely affected and those that has not, even the latter that are still creditworthy 
will face less favourable terms for their loans during periods of recession and at 
times of financial distress. Such credit rationing is likely to affect borrowers of 
smaller funds particularly hard because banks tend to face a higher cost of gathering 
information about them. Especially where financing sources other than bank lending 
are scarce or where access to them is limited to a few borrowers, the effects of credit 
rationing may amplify the conventional interest rate effects of restrictive monetary 
policy (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack (1998), p. 14).  
Furthermore, credit availability may be affected by shifts in loanable resources from 
one market to another. The view that a “bank lending channel” exists in addition to 
an “interest rate channel” (which are discussed in greater detail in the next section) 
mainly lies on the proposition that when monetary policy tightens, banks lose some 
of the cheaper sources of loanable funds. This rationale would apply particularly to 
smaller banks which depend primarily on deposits for funding and cannot access 
other sources of funds (as for example the international capital market) as easily as 
larger banks. Since certain firms depend heavily or exclusively upon bank financing, 
shifts in loanable resources from banks to other markets may amplify the effects that 
higher interest rates alone impose on aggregate demand. 
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 Finally, monetary policy can have a more direct impact on the availability of credit 
through effects on the value of assets of both borrowers and lenders. Changes in 
monetary conditions and the resulting changes in asset prices, may affect the value of 
collateral for bank loans, leading, thus, to changes in the access to credit for 
borrowers. Moreover, where a large part of bank assets is invested in equities or real 
estate, any declines in asset prices, lower capital/asset ratios and could force banks to 
tighten the supply of credit (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack (1998), p. 15). 
Monetary policy can influence price developments through other channels that 
mainly work by influencing the private sector’s longer-term expectations. If a central 
bank has established a high degree of credibility in pursuing its objective, monetary 
policy can exercise a powerful direct influence on price developments by guiding 
economic agents’ expectations of future inflation and thereby influencing their wage 
and price-setting behaviour. It is crucial though for a central bank to be credible 
about maintaining price stability in a lasting manner. It is only when economic 
agents believe in the central bank’s ability and commitment to maintain price 
stability that inflation expectations remain firmly anchored to price stability. This 
will consequently affect wage and price-setting in the economy given that, in an 
environment of price stability, wage and price-setters will not be induced to 
undertake upward price adjustments for fear of higher inflation. In this respect, 
credibility facilitates the task of monetary policy (ECB (2004), p. 46 - 47). 
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 2.4 Identifying the Channels of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
A number of surveys of the theories of the monetary transmission mechanism have 
appeared in the last decade including Bernanke (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), 
Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1997), Hubbard (1995) and Cecchetti (1995). Initially, the 
theories explaining the effect that interest rate changes have on the real economy 
share admittedly a common starting point. A monetary policy action begins with a 
change in the level of bank reserves. For this change to have any real effects it is 
necessary that nominal rigidities are present in the economy. Otherwise, there cannot 
be an impact on to the real interest rate from a change in the nominal quantity of 
outside money. 
However, the sources of nominal rigidities are considered as relatively unimportant 
for a discussion of the mechanism by which interest rate changes have short-run 
effects on output and prices, and so it is deemed as appropriate to move to a 
discussion of the theories of the transmission mechanism9. Seminal work includes 
Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 
1990). These authors distinguish between “the traditional money view”, according to 
which, as in Cecchetti (2001), “interest rate movements affect the level of investment 
and exchange rates directly, and the ‘lending view’, in which financial intermediaries 
                                                 
9 Longer-run considerations, such as the potential costs or benefits of modest levels of inflation, 
critically depend on understanding the sources of nominal rigidity. Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) 
and Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) for example, investigate whether small positive levels of 
aggregate inflation can, in the presence of an aversion to nominal wage declines, facilitate real 
adjustments, suggesting that the long-run goal for inflation might be positive. Feldstein (1996), 
however, contends that the tax distortions created by inflation reduce the level of output permanently - 
an argument suggesting even an optimal level of inflation that is negative. Overall, most economists 
now seem to agree that inflation leads to lower levels of real output and may even retard long-run 
growth. Feldstein (1999) gives a summary. 
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 play a prominent role in transmitting monetary impulses to output and prices” 
(Cecchetti (2001), p. 174). 
In essence, monetary policy and its effects can be described as follows. There is a 
central bank which has the ability to provide a monetary policy impulse: the central 
bank can, for instance, raise the short-term interest rate or reduce the quantity of 
central bank money in the economy (and will typically do both at the same time). 
This impulse has immediate consequences for the interest rate structure and the 
quantity of money (according to some specific definition of a monetary aggregate) in 
the economy and for the banking sector. To the extent that banks refinance 
themselves, or hold voluntary or compulsory reserves, at the central bank, they have 
fewer funds to offer to their potential borrowers and/or lending becomes more costly 
to them. The resulting change in the situation of the banking sector has, in turn, 
consequences for the real economy to the extent that the firms, households and 
government bodies that want to borrow from the banks have less credit available, or 
have to pay more for the funds borrowed from the banking sector. The restrictive 
monetary policy impulse thus works itself through the system and determines 
aggregate demand and ultimately output and income, and possibly the price level as 
well (Schmidt (2001), pp. 208-209). Essentially, some details of this process call for 
further discussion, but evidently it can be assumed that monetary policy is effective, 
at least in the short run.  
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 2.4.1 The classification of channels 
As the name suggests, a transmission mechanism is a conceptual or formal model of 
the ways through which monetary policy influences the real economy. According to 
Taylor (1995, p. 11) “it is the process through which monetary policy decisions are 
transmitted into changes in real GDP and inflation”. These ways are complicated 
and, as far as one can judge, still imperfectly understood. In the relevant literature10, 
however, four different transmission mechanisms or channels are distinguished:  
(a) the interest rate channel 
(b) the channel of relative prices 
(c) the exchange rate channel, and 
(d) the credit channel. 
The interest rate channel (a), the exchange rate channel (c) and to a certain extent 
also the channel of relative prices (b) are standard elements of what may be regarded 
as the traditional view of the transmission mechanism. The credit channel (d) has 
been proposed relatively recently and yet enjoys considerable acceptance in the 
literature.  
 
2.4.2 The interest rate channel and the channel of relative prices 
The traditional view stated above, which is largely the foundation for the textbook 
IS-LM analysis, is based on the notion that reductions in the quantity of outside 
                                                 
10 See for instance the articles by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Meltzer (1995), Mishkin (1995) and 
Taylor (1995) in the Journal of Economic Perspectives and the symposium on monetary transmission 
mechanism, and Goodhart (1989), Cecchetti (1995) for overviews. 
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 money raise real rates of return. This outcome has two effects, one from interest rates 
to investment and another through exchange rates. An increase in the interest rates 
renders fewer profitable projects available at higher required rates of return and, thus, 
reduces investment. A policy action, therefore, causes a movement along a schedule 
of fixed marginal efficiency of investment. The less close substitutes of outside 
money for other assets there are in the economy, the more powerful will the interest 
rate channel be. The exchange rate channel is also widely used in textbook analysis. 
In this case, an interest rate increase results in a real appreciation of the domestic 
currency, and in turn reduces the foreign demand for goods produced domestically.  
The interest rate channel and the exchange rate channel as models of the monetary 
transmission mechanism give no explicit role for banks. Both, in fact, are simple 
two-asset models, refraining from distinguishing between the other assets in the 
investors’ portfolios.  
 According to Cecchetti (2001) an important implication of the above ‘traditional 
model’ concerns the incidence of the investment decline. He asserts that with a lack 
of externalities or market imperfections, only the least socially productive projects 
(namely those with the lowest rates of return) will remain unfunded in the economy. 
Consequently, even though the capital stock is marginally lower, and given that a 
decline is going to occur, the allocation of the decline across sectors is socially 
efficient (Cecchetti (2001), p. 175). 
More specifically, the interest rate channel is actually based on the conventional 
Keynesian IS-LM model. According to this model, the central bank determines short-
term interest rates. With given and unchanged expectations about the inflation rate, 
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 this also has an effect on real longer-term interest rates, which determine the 
investment decisions of profit maximising firms, as the firms compare marginal 
internal rates of return on their investment projects with ‘the cost of capital’ when 
they decide whether to invest or not. Similar considerations apply to certain 
consumption decisions11, so that an unexpected change in that interest rate which the 
central bank can set influences aggregate demand and ultimately also output. Given 
that prices are inflexible only in the short run – not only by definition, but also in 
reality – an expansionary or restrictive monetary policy impulse provided by the 
central bank loses its effect on the real economy over the course of time when prices 
start to react. 
(a) In order for the interest rate channel to function, two conditions must be met: for 
one thing, monetary policy must not only affect short-term interest rates but also 
(real) medium to long-term rates, and, for another, investment decisions must be 
interest-elastic. Differences between financial sectors and, more generally, financial 
systems can translate into differences in terms of the strength of the links between 
nominal short-term and real long-term interest rates and in terms of the strength of 
the links between these rates and investment and consumption decisions. The effects 
of monetary policy are stronger if financial contracts and, in particular, the terms 
over which interest rates are contractually fixed are shorter and thus more easily 
adjusted. Another factor which may influence the effectiveness of monetary policy, 
as its working is described in the interest rate channel view, is the extent to which 
central bank money is being used in the economy (Schmidt (2001), p. 211). 
                                                 
11 This is so especially to households’ decisions concerning the acquisition of homes and of consumer 
durables. 
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 Taylor (1995), for example, discusses that under rational expectations and nominal 
rigidity, a reduction in the short-term interest rates leads to a decline in the real 
interest rates at least in the short term, reducing the cost of capital, and, in turn, 
encouraging a rise in output.   
Following Shiller (1979) and Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983), equation 
(2.1) describes a process where factors such as the central bank’s targeting short-term 
interest rates and announcement with respect to policy stance determine long-term 
interest rates by affecting the formation of market expectations12 . The formation 
mechanism of nominal long-term interest rates treats expected inflation rate as 
given13.  
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     (2.1) 
Rt: long-term interest rates at time t (yield on risk-free long-term government 
bonds) 
rt: short-term interest rate at time t (yield on risk-free short-term government 
bonds) 
λt: risk premium 
wi: weight (constant regardless of interest rates)  
 According to the above equation long-term interest rates are determined by the 
weighted average of future expected short-term interest rates and a risk premium, 
which implies that there is an “arbitrage” transaction accompanying risk premium 
 
12 See Clouse et. al (1999) for some discussions based on equation (2.1) in the context of zero-
interest-rate policy. 
13 Even though we address a reduction in nominal long-term interest rates through monetary policy 
treating the expected inflation rate as given, it is deemed as necessary to mention that if changes in 
monetary policy in fact lead to some extent to an increase in the expected inflation rate, then the 
stimulative effects on aggregate demand through a decline in real interest rates will be more effective 
than those from a decline on a nominal basis. 
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 reflecting factors such as uncertainty with respect to the future expected short-term 
interest rates14. The risk premium may comprise the following: (i) uncertainty with 
respect to future short-term interest rates stemming from an unexpected economic 
shock (be it demand or a supply shock), (ii) uncertainty with respect to future short-
term interest rates stemming from the non-transparency of monetary policy 
management irrespective of the treatment of economic shocks as given), and (iii) 
effects of bond prices (long-term interest rates) being affected according to the 
supply of long-term government bonds because of market segmentation15. From the 
above three only (ii) and (iii) can be influenced by the monetary policy management 
(Oda and Okina (2001), p. 333-334). 
(b) The channel of relative prices, which is also sometimes called the ‘asset price 
channel’, which is presented in two different versions in the literature, namely the 
‘monetarist’ version and that developed by Tobin (1969), assumes that central banks 
influence the composition and/or prices of the assets which are held in the portfolios 
of economic agents. An unexpected monetary policy impulse disturbs the 
equilibrium composition of the portfolios and induces attempts to adjust their 
                                                 
14 In fact, as explained in Oda and Okina (2001) when, for example, the central bank announces that it 
will stick to a zero interest rate policy until deflationary concerns are dispelled, a deterioration in the 
economic outlook leads to an expectation of Et (rt+i) = 0 that zero rates will hold longer than 
previously expected, i.e., i will increase, and thus Rt will decline. Conversely, if strong expectations 
for economic recovery come into presence, the expected timing of the termination of the zero rate 
policy will be brought forward and increasing thus Rt, and eventually exerting downward pressure on 
demand. Monetary easing, in this case, has worked both by achieving zero interest rates and by 
influencing the interest rate channel through expectations about the duration of zero interest rates (Oda 
and Okina (2001), p. 333). 
15 Since doubt is cast by several empirical results (see Shiller (1990) for a survey) on the validity of 
the premise underlying the model in equation (2.1), which is the market segmentation hypothesis, for 
the point in (iii) to hold, it is assumed that the flow of funds model follows the preferred habitat 
hypothesis. Cuthbetson and Nitzsche (2004) concisely state the basis of the former to be the fact that 
“the term premia depend on the proportion of wealth held in long debt” and consider the latter based 
on the proposition that “since bonds that mature at dates that are close together should be reasonably 
close substitutes they tend to have similar term premia” (Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004), p. 497). 
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 composition. Ultimately, an expansion of the monetary base by open market 
operations leads to more demand for securities, to rising security prices and thus 
falling interest rates and possibly also to an increase in consumption and investment 
expenditure. The extent to which these effects on asset prices merely lead to price-
level changes, or also to real effects, depends on the rigidity of prices and the 
‘disturbances’ which may arise from changes in the expectations concerning the 
future monetary policy. The two versions mentioned above according to Schmidt 
(2001) “differ with respect to the asset categories which the agents try to bring into 
balance, and their respective rates of return and also as regards the extent to which 
the process of the restructuring portfolios directly affects the demand for real versus 
financial assets and thus investment decisions” (Schmidt (2001), p. 211-212). 
More specifically, let us suppose that a central bank increased the outright purchase 
of long-term government bonds16, increasing the supply of base money and reducing 
government bonds outstanding in the market with a medium to long term remaining 
period until maturity i.e. from one to ten years. This will result in the portfolio 
rebalancing for individual economic entities, leading to the decline in long-term 
interest rates following a fall in risk premium due to supply and demand factors and 
other effects on various asset markets17. Moving towards equilibrium, there would be 
                                                 
16 According to Oda and Okina (2001) referring to channels based on portfolio selection theory, not 
only the case where a central bank trades long-term government bonds but also cases where other 
types of assets such as corporate bonds, CP, stocks, and real estate are traded can be considered. If we 
are to evaluate the validity of such policies, we need to address the issue to what extent risk can be 
shouldered by a central bank while ensuring its asset soundness. Yet the specific evaluation of the 
risks attached to individual assets is beyond the scope of the thesis. Nevertheless, one needs to note 
that there might be quite a substantial social cost that would even erode the mechanism of capitalism 
when the public sector and a central bank shoulder private-sector credits in an extremely large amount 
(Oda and Okina (2001), p. 334). 
17 See Meltzer (1995, 1998, 1999).  
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 an increase in stock prices (Tobin’s q would increase18) and investment expenditure 
would be stimulated, since there would be a move in the stock market to convert cash 
into stocks. If we focus on the loan market and the corporate bond market, 
investment would be stimulated through a decline in credit premium and new loans 
would increase. There will be new demand effects in the real estate market and other 
markets through a similar mechanism. All these are transmission effects of medium 
to long term operations, where tightened supply and demand conditions in the bond 
market have an impact on several other financial markets, tightening respective 
supply and demand conditions, and resulting to a new equilibrium price and asset 
balance.  
Oda and Okina (2001) stress that “according to general equilibrium analysis, such 
effects can be expected to be obtained qualitatively. However, in order to consider 
over what time span and in what manner a new equilibrium might be realized in 
actual respective markets, several factors are important. First is the amount of 
outright purchase of medium- to long-term government bonds necessary for 
changing equilibrium to any significant degree. In order to consider this, we need to 
compare effects accompanying the operation and the potential costs. The second 
factor is the magnitude of portfolio rebalancing activity according to the risk-return 
profile of fund providers such as financial intermediaries and investors” (Oda and 
Okina (2001), p. 334-335). 
According to the proponents of the asset price channel, the main instrument of the 
central bank is its influence on the quantity of central bank money in the economy. 
                                                 
18 See Mishkin (1995), p. 6, for a concise presentation. 
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 This suggests that different procedures in which central banks operate in practice, 
and, in particular, differences in terms of the types of financial assets which are 
eligible as reserves, may lead to differences in the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
However, even also including the United Kingdom, the differences between the 
various economies in Europe which existed in these respects in the past, are giving 
way to a common approach 19 . Another aspect, and one in which the various 
European economies still differ considerably and which is important for this channel, 
is the extent to which the agents hold financial assets whose prices may vary in 
reaction to central bank policy. The larger the share of such financial assets in 
agents’ portfolios, the greater will be the likelihood that central bank impulses will 
work in the ways postulated by the advocates of the asset price channel20 (Schmidt 
(2001), p. 212). 
Naturally, it is money that lies behind the transmission mechanism outlined above in 
the sense that central banks use open-market operations (especially repurchase 
contracts) to influence the supply of reserves and as such provide the reserves 
demanded at the desired level of the instrument rate (an operating target), an 
overnight rate or a very short-term (two weeks for example) repurchase rate. 
Following this rationale it is suitable to think of the instrument rate as the central-
bank instrument and consider reserves to be demand-determined.  
However, as Svensson (2001) highlights “the direct money channel, is something 
different than supplying reserves to achieve a particular level of the instrument rate 
                                                 
19 See Borio (1997) for an exhaustive analysis of different monetary policy procedures and their recent 
convergence. 
20 See Meltzer (1995). 
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 and, in fact, it involves broad money rather than the monetary base” Svensson 
(2001), p. 283). Nelson (1999) and Meltzer (2001) give empirical support for a direct 
effect of real money on aggregate demand, in addition to the effect via the interest 
rate. Such an effect might be expected to show up as real money, in addition to the 
other variables (see Svensson (2001), pp. 283-289). Woodford (2003) underlines the 
extent that such an effect is interpreted as a wealth effect. As analysed in Nelson 
(1999), McCallum (1999), and Woodford (2003, Chapter 2) for a direct money effect 
to arise, real balances should enter the representative agent’s utility function and this 
utility function must not be additively separable in consumption and real balances 
but have a positive cross-derivative. Nevertheless, reasonable parameter values make 
any such effect small enough that it can safely be disregarded. Nelson (1999) and 
Meltzer (2001) stress that a direct effect of money may instead stand as a proxy for 
effects of asset prices and interest rates other than the short nominal interest rate, 
with particular mention to the long-term bond rates. However, if this is the reason for 
a direct money effect, it seems more satisfactory to include in a model explicitly 
those asset prices and interest rates (Svensson (2001), p. 291). 
 
2.4.3. The exchange rate channel 
Only a brief mention to the exchange rate channel is deemed appropriate since the 
focus of the thesis is not on an open economy. In fact, if the nominal exchange rate 
of the domestic currency can be depreciated through foreign exchange intervention in 
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 a stable manner, the real exchange rate will also depreciate21 given that in the short-
term prices remain unaltered, leading to a higher level of exports and stimulating, 
thus, aggregate demand. As pointed out by Oda and Okina (2001) “while there is a 
constraint in terms of foreign currency reserves when the authorities intend to effect 
the appreciation of their home currency, as long as they tried to see a depreciation 
there would be no constraints since, in principle, they can issue money in unlimited 
amounts to buy foreign currency”. Therefore, they contend that unless intervention is 
countered by intervention in the opposite direction from counterpart countries the 
domestic currency would eventually depreciate through portfolio rebalancing effects 
(see also Bernanke (2000)). Furthermore, market participants, noticing such 
intervention, would forecast the authorities’ target exchange rate and duration of 
intervention policy and, eventually, form their foreign exchange transactions based 
on these forecasts22 (Oda and Okina (2001), p. 338-339). 
 
2.4.4. The credit channel 
The credit view stresses the distinct role played by financial assets and liabilities.  
Rather than aggregate all non-money financial assets into a single category called 
bond, the credit view argues that macroeconomic models need to distinguish between 
different non-monetary assets, either along the dimension of bank versus non-bank 
                                                 
21 A broad survey of empirical studies is given by Froot and Rogoff (1995) on the extremely slow 
regression speed of the real exchange rate (namely the purchasing power parity [PPP] puzzle). They 
state that the consensus among major industrialized countries was that once real exchange rates 
diverge from PPP it takes about four years to recover half the divergence. It is, therefore, possible to 
assume, a case in which the real exchange rate is not thoroughly adjusted. For the PPP puzzle, see also 
Rogoff (1996).  
22 See for example Meltzer (1999), for a theoretical argument that an introduction of a temporary 
“fixed” foreign exchange rate system can have certain effects under a zero interest rate policy. 
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 sources of funds or along the more general dimension of internal versus external 
financing. The credit view also highlights heterogeneity among borrowers, stressing 
that some borrowers may be more vulnerable to changes in credit conditions than 
others. Finally, investment may be sensitive to variables such as net worth or cash 
flow if agency costs associated with imperfect information or costly monitoring 
create a wedge between the cost of internal and external finance.  A rise in interest 
rates may have a much stronger contractionary impact on the economy if balance 
sheets are already weak, introducing the possibility that nonlinearities in the impact 
of monetary policy may be important (Walsh (2000), p. 286). 
At the heart of the credit channel are those aspects which are largely left out by the 
two traditional channels. Because of the information and incentive problems which 
are widely discussed in the current corporate finance literature, financial systems do 
not function in a frictionless manner, and for many non-financial firms external 
financing is simply difficult to obtain and more costly that internal financing. The 
cost difference is called the ‘external finance premium’. In the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature this external finance premium is assumed to be not only an 
expense incurred in addition to the basic interest costs, but also a positive function of 
the interest rate. In other words, if the central bank raises or lowers’ the interest rate’, 
the external finance premium will also go up or down23. 
Indeed, there is a difference (which has been termed as above the external finance 
premium) between the cost of external financing (equity and debt) and that of 
internal financing (retained earnings), stemming from the existence of an agency cost 
                                                 
23 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Kashyap and Stein (1997b) give surveys of this channel 
and provide relevant empirical results for the United States.  
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 due to information asymmetry with respect to corporate management information 
within and outside a firm. After a fall in short-term interest rates, the external finance 
premium declines, facilitating thus corporate external financing, and giving rise to 
demand stimulating effects other than through the interest rate channel (Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995)). Considering, in turn, a decline in the external finance premium, 
we need to point that a fall in the interest rates improves a firm’s financial position, a 
central bank’s increased supply of reserves improves lending capacities of banks, and 
the private sector’s increased collateral value stemming from a rise in asset prices 
reduces premiums at the time of bank lending. With respect to lending capacity, it is 
a mechanism that functions when banks’ ability to provide funds from the market is 
constrained compared with fund demand. Yet, the asset price effect would intensify 
the policy effects through interest rate, portfolio rebalancing, and foreign exchange 
channels. So long as these channels function, the market is going to expect a rise in 
asset prices, and this shift in expectation would actually result in a rise in asset 
prices. However, the credit channel will function on its own unless we assume an 
extreme case24 where asset prices rise in a self-fulfilling manner (Oda and Okina 
(2001), p. 336-337). 
Another aspect which is highlighted in the credit channel view of the transmission 
mechanism comprises the availability of bank credit and the specific quality – i.e. the 
limited substitutability – of bank credit. Working in combination, the external 
                                                 
24 Be it a portfolio rebalancing channel or a foreign exchange channel, it is worth noting that if a 
central bank does not seize to implement additional measures on a massive scale, asset prices may 
possibly increase in a self-fulfilling manner to a level beyond fundamentals. In this case of a bubble 
generated, effects through the credit channel would be amplified compared to those in the normal 
case. It is needless to say though that it is impossible to control the size and timing of the generation 
and bursting of a bubble and, therefore, it is difficult to design monetary policy management in a 
manner that anticipates such effects. Further analysis on this follows in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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 finance premium and the availability of bank credit strengthen the effectiveness of 
monetary policy considerably, and it seems thoroughly plausible to assume that these 
two factors may differ much more between countries than those at which the 
traditional views of the transmission mechanism focus (Schmidt (2001), p. 213). 
Another distinction of the credit channel, similar to the above, often distinguishes 
between a bank lending channel and a broader financial-accelerator mechanism25. 
The bank lending channel emphasizes the special nature of bank credit and the role 
of banks in the economy’s financial structure. In the bank lending view, banks play a 
particularly critical role in the transmission of monetary policy actions to the real 
economy. Policy actions that affect the reserve positions of banks will generate 
adjustments in interest rates and in the components of the banking sector’s balance 
sheet. Traditional models of the monetary transmission mechanism focus on the 
impact of these interest rate changes on money demand and on consumption and 
investment decisions by household and firms. The ultimate effects on bank deposits 
and the supply of money are reflected in adjustments to the liability side of the 
banking sector’s balance sheet (Walsh (2000), p. 286). 
The credit channel, however, is usually analysed in terms of two separate but 
complementary channels. The first one, the broader of the two, is called the ‘balance 
sheet channel’, which focuses on the ability to borrow. The external finance premium 
for a given borrower is determined by its financial position, in particular by its net 
worth, and the value of the collateral which it can provide. The borrower’s financial 
position is influenced by the monetary policy and by the business cycle. A restrictive 
                                                 
25 A variety of surveys and overviews of the credit channel are available, see eg. Gertler (1988), 
Bernanke (1993), Ramey (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1994), Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995), Cecchetti (1995), Hubbard (1995), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996). 
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 monetary policy raises the interest rates, reduces the cash flow of firms and depresses 
net asset values of borrowers and the value of their collateral, and thus may severely 
restrict their financing options and raise the premium. The likely consequence is a 
reduction of investment and in particular of investment in working capital, which is 
typically financed by short-term bank credit. Owing to economy-wide accelerator 
effects, the impact of a monetary contraction may not only be stronger, it may also 
last longer than the traditional view suggests26 (Schmidt (2001), p. 213).  
The effects on banking-sector reserves and interest rates also influence the supply of 
bank credit, the asset side of the balance sheet. If banks cannot offset a decline in 
reserves by adjusting securities holdings or raising funds through issuing 
nonreservable liabilities, bank lending must contract. If banking lending is “special” 
in the sense that bank borrowers do not have close substitutes for obtaining funds, 
variation in the availability of bank lending may have an independent impact on 
aggregate spending. Key then to the bank lending channel is the lack of close 
substitutes for bank credit on the part of borrowers. Imperfect information plays an 
important role in credit markets, and bank credit may be “special” that is have no 
close substitutes, because on information advantages banks have in providing both 
transactions services and credit to businesses. Small firms in particular may have 
difficulty obtaining funding from non-bank sources so a contraction in bank lending 
will force these firms to contract their activities (Walsh (2000), p. 286). 
Thus, the other ‘branch’ of the credit channel is usually the more narrowly defined 
bank lending channel. Its proponents proceed from the highly plausible assumption 
                                                 
26 See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). 
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 that the central bank is in a position to limit the quantity of credit which the banking 
sector can provide to borrowers. A restriction or rationing of bank credit in turn 
restricts the scope of firm investment; and this is all the more likely the less bank 
credit can be substituted by other sources of funding at the bank and firm level. In 
claiming that bank credit is indeed difficult and in some cases even impossible to 
substitute as it provides a certain liquidity insurance, advocates of the credit channel 
of the transmission mechanism borrow heavily from the recent advances in the 
theory of financial intermediation which shows why ‘bank loans are unique’ 27 . 
Banks are specialists in lending to firms in those cases in which it is important to 
monitor the borrower carefully – or, in other words, in overcoming information and 
incentive problems (Schmidt (2001), p. 213).  
                                                
However, the broad credit channel is not restricted to the bank lending channel. 
Credit market imperfections may characterise all credit markets, influencing the 
nature of financial contracts, raising the possibility of equilibria with rationing, and 
creating a wedge between the costs of internal and external financing. This wedge 
arises because of agency costs associated with information asymmetries and the 
inability of lenders to monitor borrowers costlessly. As a result, cash flow and net 
worth become important in affecting the cost and availability of finance and the level 
of investment spending. A recession that weakens a firm’s sources of internal finance 
can generate a ‘financial-accelerator’ effect; the firm is forced to rely more on 
higher-cost external funds just at the time the decline in internal finance drives up the 
relative cost of external funds. Contractionary monetary policy that produces an 
 
27 For an overview see Freixas and Rochet (1997). More recent contributions include Rajan (1996) 
and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (1999). The quotation paraphrases the title of an influential article by 
James (1987). 
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 economic slowdown will reduce firm cash flow and profits. If this policy increases 
the external finance premium, there will be further contractionary effects on 
spending. In this way, the credit channel can serve to propagate and amplify an initial 
monetary contraction. Financial-accelerator effects can arise from adjustment of 
asset prices to contractionary monetary policy. Borrowers may be limited in the 
amount they can borrow by the value of their assets that can serve as collateral. A 
rise in interest rates that lowers asset prices reduces the market value of borrowers’ 
collateral. This reduction in value may then force some firms to reduce investment 
spending as their ability to borrow declines (Walsh (2000), p. 287). 
The balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel, moreover, interact in such a 
way that the effects of monetary policy on the ability of firms to borrow from banks 
and on the ability of banks to lend reinforce each other. This makes their relevance 
for the effects of monetary policy all the greater. As these brief explanations suggest, 
it would be wrong to consider the credit channel as an outright alternative to the 
interest rate channel. Instead, the effects of borrowing capacity and the availability of 
bank credit which this channel emphasises reinforce those effects which have 
traditionally been assumed to exist and to underlie the transmission of monetary 
policy into the real economy. But for practical monetary policy it is important to 
know more than merely that monetary policy has an effect. One needs to know why 
it matters and how it affects the real economy in order to be able to determine the 
direction and the strength of policy measures (Schmidt (2001), p. 214).  
For example, it is important to recognise that credit rationing is sufficient but not 
necessary for a credit channel to exist. A theme of Gertler (1988), Bernanke (1993), 
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 and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) is that agency costs in credit markets will vary 
counter cyclically. A monetary tightening raises interest rates, and generates a real 
economic slowdown resulting eventually in the deterioration of firm balance sheets, 
raising agency costs and lowering the efficiency of credit allocation.  
Changes in credit conditions are not reflected solely in interest-rate levels. Thus, the 
general issue is to understand how credit market imperfections affect macroeconomic 
equilibrium and the channels through which monetary policy actions are transmitted 
to the real economy (Walsh (2000), p. 288). 
Therefore, the credit channel also operates when shifts in monetary policy alter either 
the efficiency of financial markets in matching borrowers and lenders or the extent to 
which borrowers face rationing in credit markets so that aggregate spending is 
influenced by liquidity constraints. There are several definitions of non-price credit 
rationing. Jaffee and Russell (1976), for example, define credit rationing as existing 
when, at the quoted interest rate, the level of the loan supplied by the lender is 
smaller than the one that the borrower demands. Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990), however, 
emphasize that such a practice does not deviate from standard price rationing since 
larger loans face normally a higher default rate and, thus, are issued at a higher 
interest rate. They, instead, characterise “pure credit rationing” as the case when, 
among a group of apparently identical agents (households or firms), some receive 
loans and others do not. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) define equilibrium credit rationing 
as present whenever “either (a) among loan applicants who appear to be identical 
some receive a loan and others t do not, and the rejected applicants would not receive 
a loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; or (b) there are identifiable 
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 groups of individuals in the population who, with a given supply of credit, are unable 
to obtain loans at any interest rate, even though with a larger supply of credit they 
would” (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), pp. 394-395). Walsh (2000) views the “critical 
aspect of this definition” as the fact that “at the market equilibrium interest rate, there 
is an unsatisfied demand for loans that cannot be eliminated through higher interest 
rates” and that “rejected loan applicants cannot succeed in getting a loan by offering 
to pay a higher interest rate” (Walsh (2000), p. 287).  
In a more elaborate model presented in Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998), where the borrowing possibilities of some households 
and firms depend on collateral they give (their balance-sheet position), agents face 
marginal borrowing costs exceeding the real interest rate, by an ‘external-finance 
premium’ (as mentioned above). If the real interest rate falls, the value of the 
collateral will increase and thereby allow these agents to borrow at a lower external-
finance premium. Aggregate demand is, in this way, stimulated beyond the “pure” 
real interest rate effect discussed in Svensson (2001a), via a “balance-sheet channel” 
(Svensson (2001), p. 291). Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) emphasise that 
improving balance sheets in addition to higher credit flows may also have significant 
feedback and magnification effects, which they term the “financial accelerator”.  
Substantial empirical evidence highlights the importance of both capital market 
imperfections and firm dependence on bank financing. A summary of two streams of 
study is given by Kashyap and Stein (1997). The first describes banks as extensively 
relying on reservable-deposit financing and emphasises that a contraction in reserves 
leads banks to contract their balance sheets, reducing the supply of loans. The second 
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 highlights that a significant number of firms depend on bank lending and are unable 
to react to the fall in bank lending by accessing different sources of finance. Overall, 
recent research supports the existence of a lending channel28 (Cecchetti (2001), p. 
176). 
Non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) and capital markets constitute the main 
alternatives to banks. They need to be looked at if we wish to determine the extent to 
which firms and banks are able to circumvent the effects of a restrictive monetary 
policy which would be transmitted through the bank lending channel. Finally it 
would be important to look in detail at the sector of the non-financial firms and at the 
household sector to assess how the actors in these sectors are affected by monetary 
policy measures of the central bank (Schmidt (2001), pp. 214-215). 
The following Table 2.1 summarises the theoretical framework. 
                                                 
28 This does not contradict the presence of the traditional mechanisms, operating through interest rates 
and exchange rates. It is difficult though to isolate the individual importance of the various channels 
of transmission. 
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 Table 2.1: Main determinants of the transmission of monetary policy to output 
Interest rate channel  
Interest rate pass-through: A quicker and fuller pass-through from policy interest rates to market and 
bank lending rates increases the power of transmission.  
Interest sensitivity of production: A higher share of interest-sensitive sectors in GDP strengthens the 
effect of monetary policy.  
Price and wage rigidity: The more nominal price and wages are rigid, the larger the impact of any 
given demand fall on output. Real rigidities magnify the effect of nominal rigidities.  
Income effect: The impact of higher interest rate on disposable income depends on households’ debt 
position, the maturity of their interest-bearing assets and liabilities, as well as the pass-through from 
policy interest rates to average interest rates.  
Wealth effect: The wealth effect on consumption will be stronger in countries where households’ 
wealth is large and held in the form of assets with volatile prices. Given the weight of real assets in 
total wealth, the size and speed of the response of real estate prices to interest rate changes is also 
crucial. 
Exchange rate channel 
Openness to trade: More open economies experience a stronger reduction in output from a real 
exchange rate appreciation. In these economies, however, the exchange rate will also have a 
comparatively larger impact on prices (a positive terms of trade effect), and exports may have a higher 
import content. 
Credit view: Bank lending channel 
Impact of monetary policy on loan supply: A monetary policy tightening may reduce loan supply, 
especially if bank health is poor. However, banks which have large holdings of securities and or can 
acquire loanable funds (e.g. by issuing market securities) can keep their loan supply unchanged.  
Degree of bank dependence: A high share of bank loans in business financing and a large number of 
small firms (which have less alternative sources of finance) would point to a potentially strong bank 
lending channel. 
Credit view: Balance-sheet channel  
Size structure of firms: Smaller firms, more prone to suffer from information asymmetries, are likely 
to experience a larger increase in the external finance premium (the difference in the cost of external 
versus internal finance).  
Use of collateral: A monetary tightening that reduces the value of collateral will have a stronger effect 
where collateral is more extensively used.  
Firms’ leverage: Firms in financial distress (e.g. measured by a high ratio of interest payments over 
operating income), are more likely to suffer from the negative cash-flow impact of higher interest 
rates. A high leverage ratio may be an indicator of financial distress. On the other hand, it may also 
suggest ease of financing.  
Efficiency of legal system and contract enforcement: Credit rationing is more likely in countries with 
inefficient legal systems and weak enforcement of contracts. In such cases, a low level of outstanding 
credit would suggest liquidity constraints. 
Source: Suardi (2001), p. 8 
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 2.4.5 Factors Influencing the Transmission of Monetary Policy 
Addressing the speed and intensity of the impact of monetary policy to the real 
economy, we need distinguish two points.  
The first is the transmission from the instruments that are under direct control of the 
central bank, such as short-term interest rates or reserve requirements, to those 
variables that affect the non-financial sector most directly, such as loan rates, deposit 
rates, asset prices and the exchange rate. This relation is shaped primarily by the 
structure of the financial system. The other aspect is the relationship between 
financial conditions and the spending decisions of firms and individuals. A key role 
is assumed, in this case, to the initial financial position of banks, firms, and 
individuals including the extent of leveraging, the composition and the currency 
denomination of assets and liabilities, as well as the degree of dependence on 
external financing, in particular bank financing (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack 
(1998), p. 16) 29.  
 
2.4.6 Unresolved Issues in the Monetary Transmission Process 
Certain important aspects of the monetary transmission process still remain rather 
uncertain and disagreement among academics is present. These include: (i) the 
effects of monetary policy in high-inflation economies, (ii) the transmission of 
monetary policy actions to long-term interest rates and asset prices, (iii) the 
estimation of the tightness of monetary conditions, and (iv) the scope for monetary 
                                                 
29 For a further extensive discussion of these aspects see Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack (1998), pp. 
16-45. 
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 policy under fixed exchange rates and financial fragility. In all cases, it is the state of 
expectations that hugely affect the impact of monetary policy that gives rise to the 
uncertainties. At present brief reference is only made to (i) and (ii)30. 
Monetary policy in highly inflationary economies: Monetary policy in highly 
inflationary economies may have different effects from those in more stable 
economies mainly in two aspects: (a) the impact of monetary policy on aggregate 
demand and (b) the conversion of changes in aggregate demand into changes in 
output and prices. Considering the first monetary policy will not have as high an 
impact on aggregate demand in a highly inflationary economy as it would in an 
economy with low inflation. The level of the real interest rate is very uncertain when 
inflation is high and variable lessening in this way the importance of the interest rate 
channel of transmission. In addition, in such a regime, financial instruments tend to 
be issued in narrower terms to maturity and long-term, non-indexed assets disappear; 
consequently wealth and asset price effects of changes in monetary policy become 
much less important. Furthermore, in highly inflationary environments, reductions in 
bank deposits, as well as banks’ desire to match the maturities of assets and liabilities 
results in restricting the role of bank intermediation in financing consumption and 
investment to a great extent. As aggregate expenditure does not considerably depend 
on bank loans, it would not be hugely affected by marginal changes in monetary 
policy.  
                                                 
30 See Kamin et al. (1998) p. 47 for further analysis. 
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 Apart from the relation between monetary policy and the level of aggregate demand, 
high inflation regimes are distinctive with respect to the impact that changes in 
aggregate demand have on output and inflation. 
In industrialised countries that face low inflation, monetary policy changes are 
considered to have an impact on inflation initially by influencing aggregate demand 
and employment, and, in turn, result in changes in wages, costs and finally consumer 
prices. On the other hand, several emerging market economies that have quite recent 
histories of high inflation, do not give evidence of a positive link between economic 
activity and inflation31. Thus in some cases the short-term Phillips curve might be 
vertical or even have a negative slope (i.e. higher levels of inflation may result in a 
contraction in economic activity). According to Kamin et al. (1998) “the verticality 
of the Phillips curve in such circumstances arises from the hyper-sensitivity of 
inflation expectations and price determination to changes in the monetary stance and 
this hypersensitivity, in turn, probably reflects memories of recent episodes of high 
inflation and monetary instability” (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack (1998), p. 59). 
Long-term interest rates and asset markets:  The impact that changes in short-term 
interest rates induced by monetary policy have on long-term interest rates and asset 
prices is already mentioned as an important part of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. The expectations theory of the term structure defines long-term interest 
rates as the average of future expected short-term rates augmented by a risk 
premium, equity prices as the discounted present value of expected future earnings 
and real estate prices as expected future rents. The principle of uncovered interest 
                                                 
31 In Argentina, Mexico and Peru, during the 90’s, peaks in inflation rates were associated with sharp 
economic contractions, while disinflation programmes were linked to recoveries in output as reported 
in Kamin et al. (1998). 
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 parity postulates that exchange rates are determined by changes in international 
interest rate differentials. Short-term interest rate changes will, thus, affect long-term 
rates and asset prices depending upon how monetary policy influences the path of 
expected future short-term rates, earnings or rents.  
Actually, the effect of policy-induced changes in short-term rates to long-term rates 
and asset prices has been difficult to predict, even in industrialised countries. This is 
so as it depends on how the expected future path of short-term interest rates is 
influenced by a policy step. Much depends on how the action alters market 
expectations of the need for further measures32. In addition, asset prices are also 
defined through expectations of future macroeconomic performance which have an 
impact on future short-term interest rates, future earnings and rents. Since it is 
difficult to accurately predict future macroeconomic variables (not the least after 
undertaking a significant monetary policy measure), the response of long-term 
interest rates and asset prices to a change in short-term rates is uncertain indeed. This 
is, in fact, so since the causality between asset prices and macroeconomic 
performance runs in both directions (Kamin, Turner, and Van’t dack (1998), p. 47-
59). 
Another issue is that asset market behaviour frequently deviates from the basic 
expectations model, as, in practice, several asset price movements reflect changing 
risk premia, speculative bubbles or other factors not obviously related to expected 
                                                 
32 The Federal Reserve, for example, raised short-term rates in February 1994 which might have been 
expected to lower long rates on the grounds that it was aiming to contain inflation even before it had 
started to rise. Yet, long-term rates rose as the market (correctly) predicted further interest rate 
adjustments in the immediate period afterwards. 
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 future returns33. These issues contribute to the uncertainties faced with respect to the 
appropriate level of asset prices and the potential response of asset prices to 
monetary policy actions. These issues will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 
5 and 6. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
It appears plausible that monetary policy is able to have an effect on the real 
economy primarily because of interest effects and also, to a certain extent, because of 
asset price effects. however, the recent empirical literature argues that in reality the 
effects of monetary policy, in particular those of a monetary contraction, are stronger 
and of a different pattern than those which could be expected if the interest rate and 
asset price channels were the only relevant mechanisms, and also that they exhibit a 
different pattern than the effects one would expect to encounter if these were the only 
pertinent mechanisms34. At a theoretical level, the interest and asset price channels 
assume that the agents in the economy behave in an overly mechanistic fashion, and 
fail to address directly the question of how the financial sector, and, in particular, the 
banks, react to monetary policy impulses. These two weaknesses suggest that looking 
only at the traditional channels might prevent one from acquiring a deeper 
                                                 
33 Small groups of players can often have a huge effect in the market. Changes in asset market prices 
can increase by the raised supply of credit or other financing in the wake of financial reform. Market 
participants may also lack experience in asset-pricing methods, and even less access to timely and 
accurate information on the financial condition of firms seeking to raise funds. Moreover, several of 
these firms may be new, thus, without an extensive track record, which would make them inherently 
more difficult to price. With reference to several emerging market economies, the unpredictability of 
asset market responses may be magnified by the greater volatility of macroeconomic performance 
(including output and inflation) compared with industrialised countries. This increases the number of 
possible reactions to a given change in short-term interest rates (Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack 
(1998), p. 50). 
34 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for this argument. 
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 understanding of the implications of intercountry differences for a common monetary 
policy (Schmidt (2001), p. 212). 
Many economists, however, have argued that monetary policy has direct effects on 
aggregate spending that do not operate through traditional interest rate or exchange 
rate channels, and a large literature in recent years has focused on credit markets as 
playing a critical role in the transmission of monetary policy actions to the real 
economy. Money has traditionally played a special role in macroeconomics and 
monetary theory because of the relationship between the nominal stock of money and 
the aggregate price level. The importance of money for understanding the 
determination of the general level of prices and average inflation rates, however, 
does not necessarily imply that the stock of money is the key variable that links the 
real and financial sectors or the most appropriate indicator of the short-run influence 
of financial factors on the economy (Walsh (2000), p. 285). 
As emphasized in most of the surveys cited above, the lending view has two main 
aspects, namely one that focuses on the impact of policy changes on borrower 
balance sheets and another that focuses on bank loans. In both cases it is capital 
market imperfections, which make it easier for some firms to obtain financing than 
others, that determine the effectiveness of policy. Moral hazard problems and 
information asymmetries, together with bankruptcy laws, imply that a firm’s 
balance-sheet position has implications for its ability to obtain external finance35. 
Policy-induced increases in interest rates (both nominal and real) result in a 
deterioration in the firms’ net worth by reducing expected future sales and by 
                                                 
35 Kashyap and Stein (1994) point out that this statement applies to both financial and non-financial 
firms. 
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 increasing the cost of rolling over a given level of nominal debt. Moreover, when 
there is an asymmetry of information, in that borrowers have better information 
about the potential profitability of investment projects than do creditors (banks), as a 
firm’s net-worth declines, it becomes less creditworthy because it has extra 
incentives to misrepresent the riskiness of potential projects; an outcome that will 
induce potential lenders to increase the risk premium they require when making a 
loan. Thus informational asymmetry renders internal finance of new investment 
projects cheaper than external finance (Cecchetti (2001), pp. 175-176). 
An important aspect of the transmission mechanism is that some firms dependent on 
the banking sector for finance and that monetary policy affects the supply of loans 
from banks. A reduction in the quantity of reserves leads to a reduction in the level of 
deposits, which in turn has to be matched by a reduction in the level of loans. 
However, the latter will affect the real economy only if firms do not have access to 
alternative sources of investment funds. 
To sum up the process described in this chapter involves a number of different 
mechanisms and actions undertaken by economic agents at various stages. 
Consequently, the monetary policy actions need a considerable time to have an 
impact on the price developments. Moreover, the size and intensity of the effects can 
differ with respect to the state of the economy, which renders the estimation of the 
precise impact considerably difficult. Central banks, thus, are facing long, variable 
and uncertain lags in the conduct of monetary policy.  
A further issue that complicates the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is 
that, in practice, a large number of shocks from several sources influence economic 
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 developments. For instance, changes in oil, other commodity prices or in 
administered prices may have a direct, short-term impact on inflation, and so may 
developments in the world economy or in fiscal policies through an effect in 
aggregate demand. Similarly, financial asset prices and exchange rates are affected 
by several other factors in addition to monetary policy. Therefore, in addition to 
monitoring the monetary transmission mechanism central banks need also to 
consider all other developments relevant for future inflation so as to refrain those 
from having an impact on longer-term inflation trends and expectations in a way 
inconsistent with price stability (ECB (2004), p. 47). Monetary policy has always 
been dependent on the size, nature and duration of the shocks hitting the economy, 
and understanding the factors driving trends behind price developments in order to 
find the appropriate monetary policy reaction, has always been a challenge for 
central banks.  
As central banks face a complex environment of economic interactions, they often 
tend to consider some simple rules of thumb in order to guide or cross-check their 
action. 
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 C H A P T E R  3  
T H E  T H E O R Y  O F  M O N E T A R Y  P O L I C Y :  A  C O N S E N S U S  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The last three decades have been decisive for the evolution of monetary theory and 
practice. As far as the practice is concerned, the crucial factor has been the very 
success of several central banks to actually acquire and maintain credibility for low 
inflation, and improve for several years the stability of both inflation and output 
relative to potential. With respect to the theory, the decisive improvement has been 
the introduction and wide acceptance of rational expectations in the relevant models, 
as it mainly enabled the incorporation of forward-looking elements of aggregate 
demand and price-setting in the latter, which also enabled the understanding of the 
success of monetary policy in practice. 
Indeed, huge influence has been exerted to both the theory and practice of monetary 
policy by the disinflation period (effected in the US and other industrialised 
economies) in the 1980s and the stabilization of inflation that succeeded it36. The 
exchange of information and expertise among central banking practitioners and 
academic economists, in addition to the utilisation by both of the immense evidence 
accumulated during the ‘conquest of inflation’ constituted a major improvement in 
the process.  
                                                 
36 See Fischer (1994) and Blinder (2004), for instance, for extensive accounts.  
58 
 The shift in the several central banks’ focus and decision to act against inflation, has 
mainly been effected through the reception of monetarist theory and the evidence 
accumulated on money supply and demand, as well as on the relationship between 
money and inflation. The consequent success in stabilising and eliminating inflation 
at reasonable costs in relation to the subsequent benefits (that has been termed the 
‘Great Moderation’ – see eg. Bernanke (2004) for a concise account) effected 
without wage and price controls and supportive fiscal policy actions37, justified the 
messages postulated by monetarist theory. Yet, the subsequent reliance on interest 
rate policy seems to give no credit to the main monetarist teaching that ‘money must 
play a central role in the execution of monetary policy’. As pointed by Goodfriend 
(2005) “modern models of interest rate policy owe more to post-monetarist rational 
expectations reasoning and notions of credibility and commitment to policy rules 
born of the rational expectations revolution” (Goodfriend (2005), p. 243).  
Nevertheless, models of monetary policy currently in use are based on 
macroeconomic theory developed prior to the early 1980s. For example, the forward-
looking theory of consumption and investment remains at the core of the modern 
theory of aggregate demand, yet the concept of a permanent trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment is not currently accepted. Keynesian dynamic rational 
expectations sticky-price models of monetary policy that gained credence in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (pioneered, for example, by S. Fisher, G. Calvo and J. Taylor) 
still constitute the core of models of aggregate supply. The inverse relationship 
between the output gap and a change in inflation that had been predicted by 
                                                 
37 The policy against inflation during the 1960s and 1970s (especially in the US) placed the main 
weight on wage and price controls, in accordance to fiscal policy actions.  
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 Keynesian models had been confirmed by the severe recessions accompanying 
disinflations in several countries. The following success with respect to price 
stability has supported the rational expectations idea that when a central bank 
commits to having a priority of achieving and maintaining low inflation can actually 
anchor inflation expectations and improve the stability of both inflation and output 
relative to potential. 
 
3.2 The Evolution of the Theory of Monetary Policy in the Last Thirty Years  
A comprehensive review of stabilization policy is given by Tobin (1980) who 
provides an accurate and concise account of macroeconomic theory as it related to 
monetary policy, unemployment, and inflation at the time. He isolates five main 
points that constitute what he refers to as the consensus macroeconomic framework. 
These are the following: 
(1) “Prices are marked up labour costs, usually adjusted to normal operating rates 
and productivity trends…and rates of price and wage increase depend partly on their 
recent trends, partly on expectations of their future movements, and partly on the 
tightness of markets for products and labour. 
(2) Variations in aggregate demand, whether a consequence of policies or of other 
events, affect the course of prices and output, and wages and employment, by 
altering the tightness of labour and product markets, and in no other way. 
(3) The tightness of markets can be related to the utilization of productive resources, 
reported or adjusted unemployment rates, and capacity operating rates. At any given 
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 utilization rate, real output grows at a steady pace reflecting trends in supplies of 
labour and capital and in productivity. According to Okun’s law, in cyclical 
fluctuations each percentage point of unemployment corresponds to 3 percent of 
GDP (gross domestic product). 
(4) Inflation accelerates at high employment rates because tight markets 
systematically and repeatedly generate wage and price increases in addition to those 
already incorporated in expectations and historical patterns. At low utilization rates, 
inflation decelerates, but probably at an asymmetrically slow pace. At the Phelps-
Friedman “natural rate of unemployment,” the degrees of resource utilization 
generate no net wage and price pressures, up or down, and are consistent with 
accustomed and expected paths, whether stable prices or any other inflation rate. The 
consensus view accepted the notion of a non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU) as a practical constraint on policy, even though some of its 
adherents would not identify NAIRU as full, equilibrium, or optimum employment. 
(5) On the instruments of demand management themselves, there was less consensus. 
The monetarist counterrevolution had provided debate over the efficacy of monetary 
and fiscal measures, the process of the transmission of monetary policies to total 
spending, and the proper indicators and targets of monetary policy” (Tobin (1980), 
pp. 23-25). 
As highlighted in Goodfriend (2005) it is remarkable that a great amount of what 
Tobin (1980) recognised as a consensus is still a basis for modern mainstream 
models of monetary policy today (Goodfriend (2005), p. 244).  
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 Keynesian economists were considerably sceptical on whether disinflationary 
monetary policy alone could bring down inflation at an acceptable unemployment 
cost (as in Okun (1978) and Tobin (1980) for example). The views in Tobin (1980) 
are worth recalling as they represent a ‘pessimistic’ side of Keynesian economists 
thinking with respect to the power of monetary policy to control inflation, and they 
provide some contrast with monetarist views (see, for example, Friedman (1968), 
Meltzer (1963) and Brunner and Meltzer (1993)) that gained currency in the 
inflationary decades prior to the early 1980s.  
For instance, Tobin (1980) contended that the path of real variables would have been 
much worse if the path of nominal GDP growth had stuck to 4 percent per year since 
1960. He viewed “the inertia of inflation in the face of non-accommodative policies 
[as] the big issue.” Tobin’s opinion was that “the price- and wage-setting institutions 
of the economy have an inflation bias. Consequently, demand management cannot 
stabilize the price trend without chronic sacrifice of output and employment unless it 
is assisted, occasionally or permanently, by direct incomes policies of some kind” 
(Tobin (1980), p. 64).  Tobin further contends that it would be “recklessly imprudent 
to lock the economy into a monetary disinflation without auxiliary incomes policies” 
(Tobin (1980), p. 69). Monetarists led by Friedman, Brunner, and Meltzer advocated 
that central banks (and the Fed, in particular) had the power to use monetary policy 
alone to bring inflation down and should exercise it. At the core of monetarist theory 
and its policy recommendations was the quantity theory of money evidence from 
many countries showing that sustained inflation was associated with excessive 
money growth, and evidence that inflation could be stopped by slowing the growth 
62 
 of the money supply38. They gave support of the stability of the demand for money 
to a sufficient degree in the United States to enable the central bank to bring the 
inflation rate down by reducing the trend rate of growth of the monetary aggregates. 
And they advocated that, even though the introduction of money substitutes could 
adversely impact the stability of money demand in the short run, money demand was 
sufficiently stable and money supply controllable enough by a central bank over time 
that financial innovations will not impact the central bank’s power over inflation 
sufficiently. By providing a convincing body of theory and evidence that controlling 
money was necessary and sufficient for controlling inflation, and that central banks 
had the ability to control money, monetarists laid the groundwork for the several 
central banks to assume the responsibility for inflation and make considerable efforts 
to bring it down39.  
Nonetheless, both Monetarists and Keynesians projected that a disinflation would be 
costly. The results of the go-stop policies during the 1950s and 1960s made it clear 
that there was a short-run unemployment cost of fighting inflation.  
The temporary unemployment cost of a large permanent disinflation would tend to 
be much higher than the cost of previous temporary attempts to contain inflation in 
the stop phase of the policy cycle. Economists from both strands realised that the 
unemployment cost of permanent disinflation could be reduced greatly by the 
monetary authorities’ acquiring credibility for low inflation40. If disinflation were 
                                                 
38 See, Meltzer (1963), Friedman (1968) and (1989), Poole (1978), Sargent (1986), and the reports of 
the Shadow Open Market Committee led by Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer. 
39 For the case of the US and the shift in the Federal Reserve’s policy see Federal Reserve of St. Louis 
Review (2005), March/April, vol. 87 (2), Part 2. 
40 Fellner (1979), Sargent (1986), and Taylor (1982) discuss the role of credibility in minimizing the 
cost of disinflation. 
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 credible, money growth and inflation would slow together, with minor increases in 
unemployment41. 
Conversely, if disinflation were not credible, wage and price inflation would 
continue as before, and interest rates would be forced upwards and asset prices 
downwards as the public competed for increasingly scarce real money balances. 
Unemployment would, then, rise and fall again only as the disinflation became a 
credible policy, wage and price inflation slowed, interest rates fell, asset prices rose, 
and aggregate demand rebounded. 
The potential role for credibility was more trusted by monetarists as they saw a 
greater role for expectations in wage and price setting and a smaller role for inertia. 
Monetarists also saw monetary policy as more apt to exert influence over expected 
inflation than Keynesians did (Goodfriend (2005), p. 246-247).  
According to Goodfriend (2005) a convergence in the theory and practice of 
monetary policy has taken place since the early 1980s. On the theory side, New 
Keynesian models, alternatively called New Neoclassical Synthesis models of 
monetary policy incorporate main aspects from Keynesian, monetarist, rational 
expectations, and real business cycle macroeconomics. On the policy side, there is a 
widely accepted desirability and feasibility of central banks to use monetary policy in 
order to achieve and maintain low inflation over time and that such commitment to 
price stability enhances the power of monetary policy to stabilize employment over 
the business cycle. The focus on price stability emerged as a result of the practical 
                                                 
41  Ball (1994) remarks that a fully credible disinflation could, in fact, increase employment 
temporarily for some sticky price specifications. 
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 experience in conjunction with theory developed since the late seventies (Goodfriend 
(2005), p. 250). 
 
3.3  Towards a Consensus 
The modern ‘consensus’ macroeconomic model of monetary policy is a dynamic 
general equilibrium model with a real business cycle core and costly nominal price 
adjustment 42 . The model and the implications it has for monetary policy are 
presented, for instance, in Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
(1999), Woodford (2003), and Goodfriend (2004)43 from rather different outlooks, 
yet with an underlying convergence in thinking. The basis of the model is made of 
two equations that can be described as follows: 
a) A “forward-looking IS function” that describes current aggregate demand relative 
to potential output to be a positive function of expected future income and a negative 
of the short-term real interest rate. Resembling, though, the original Keynesian IS 
function, it differs on the inclusion of expected future income. Current aggregate 
demand depending on expected future income has been postulated early on in the 
theory of consumption proposed by Fisher (1930) and Friedman (1957).  
b) An “aggregate supply function” (termed also the price-setting function or the 
‘Phillips curve’) that describes current inflation to be inversely related to expected 
future inflation and the current output gap (the mark-up in Goodfriend and King 
                                                 
42 See, for example, for a survey Goodfriend (2004), (2005). 
43 Mankiw and Romer (1991) and the papers therein also give clear presentations of the relevant 
model.  
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 (1997)). This aggregate supply function can be derived directly from Calvo’s (1983) 
staggered price-setting model and is closely related to the pioneering work of Fischer 
(1977) and Taylor (1980)44. 
The very introduction of expected future income in the IS function and expected 
future inflation in the aggregate supply function accounts for the impact of rational 
expectations in macroeconomics as introduced, for instance, by Lucas (1976), 
(1981).  
The rational expectations theory and the relevant solution methods constituted a 
manageable and intuitive approach of modelling expectations. It also highlighted the 
critical importance for monetary policy analysis of the formation of expectations in a 
way that rationally reflects changes in the way that monetary policy is imagined to be 
conducted. 
Solving the IS function forward, one can express current aggregate demand relative 
to potential with respect to the expected path of future short-term real interest rates 
and future potential output. Price-level stickiness enabling monetary policy to exert 
leverage over the path of real interest rates, then current and expected interest rate 
policy actions can determine current aggregate demand. 
Solving the price-setting function forward, we can describe the current inflation rate 
to depend inversely on the path of expected future output-gaps. It is implied by the 
model that inflation will remain low and stable provided that monetary policy affects 
aggregate demand so as to stabilize the output gap, to keep the average mark-up at 
the profit maximizing mark-up. Monetary policy maintains price stability by 
                                                 
44 See Taylor (1999). 
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 anchoring expected future mark-ups at the profit-maximizing mark-up so that firms 
are reluctant to alter their prices. For monetary policy that stabilizes the mark-up at 
its profit-maximizing value the macroeconomy follows the underlying core real 
business cycle model with flexible prices. According to this viewpoint, “flexible 
price real business cycle models of aggregate fluctuations are of practical interest, 
not as descriptions of what aggregate fluctuations should be like regardless of the 
monetary policy regime, but as descriptions of what they would be like under an 
optimal monetary policy regime”45 (Woodford (2003), p. 410). 
Recalling the account of the ‘consensus’ in monetary policy and theory as in Tobin 
(1980), several aspects are still the same. According to Goodfriend (2005) “there is 
[still] the idea that prices are marked up over costs; that price trends depend on 
expectations and on tightness of labour and product markets; that variations in 
aggregate demand alter inflation by influencing the tightness of markets; that there is 
a natural rate of unemployment (where output equals potential) at which wage and 
price setters perpetuate the going rate of inflation (presumably at the profit 
maximizing mark-up); that inflation accelerates when output is expected to exceed 
potential (the mark-up is expected to be compressed); and that inflation decelerates 
when output is expected to fall short of potential (the mark-up is expected to be 
elevated)” (Goodfriend (2005), p. 251).  He further recognises the main advances 
since then to stem from “the proven power of monetary policy to reduce and stabilize 
inflation and inflation expectations at a low rate and, also, the progress in modelling 
expectations rationally to understand how monetary policy consistently committed to 
stabilizing inflation can achieve favourable results” (Goodfriend (2005), p. 251).  
                                                 
45 Goodfriend and King (1997) and Goodfriend (2004) and (2005) also emphasize this point. 
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 The final element of the model of monetary policy is a description of how policy is 
imagined to be conducted. According to the rational expectations theory the way 
monetary policy influences behaviour can only be described when modelled as part 
of systematic policy. Thus, it has to be specified in the model how policy is 
conducted. The two ways employed involve either the use of a rule guiding the 
policy instrument – the most common case being a Taylor-type interest rate rule (see 
Taylor (1993)) – or the choice of the central bank instrument each period using the 
maximisation of a welfare function (which can be derived to reflect household 
utility).  
Naturally, there are advantages and disadvantages in either way employed. A policy 
rule (set on an ad hoc basis) even though it is easy as a reference point and may be 
selected to approximate the reaction function of a central bank in practice, it is 
unlikely to be optimal in the model in question. Conversely, if the model is incorrect 
the results will not be optimal for policy in practice and even if it is not mis-specified 
it may still yield an optimal rule that will not be followed in practice46. As it was first 
emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1977), optimal monetary policy may be time 
inconsistent and monetary policy may be suboptimal unless the central bank commits 
to a specific rule47 (Goodfriend (2005), p. 250-251). 
McCallum (2005) briefly contrasts models that are currently being used for monetary 
theory and policy similar to the consensus model discussed above, with the ones that 
were used during the early 1980s and provides lessons to be learned from the 
advancements made since. A model that he uses so as to illustrate the broadly 
                                                 
46 See Svensson (1999a) and McCallum (1999a). 
47 See Barro and Gordon (1983a) and (1983b). 
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 approved views of the time is the one in McCallum (1980), which was designed to 
demonstrate the effects of introducing rational expectations into a mainstream 
macroeconomic model48 (McCallum (2005), p. 287). 
A number of researchers such as Lucas (1973), Fischer (1977), Sargent (1973), 
Taylor (1979), and McCallum (1980) conducted rational expectations analysis in 
order to derive the dynamic properties of several systems and alternative monetary 
policy rules. At the core of that analysis was whether, under rational expectations, it 
was the systematic components of monetary policy rules (rather that the random 
ones) that produce an effect on the cyclical properties of the real variables, including 
employment and the output gap (McCallum (2005), p. 287). 
Lucas (1972), (1973), Sargent (1973), and Sargent and Wallace (1975) argued that 
alternative monetary policy rules would leave the behaviour of the output gap 
unaffected, while Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979) advocated for the contrary. 
McCallum (1980) reached the conclusion each position could be supported by 
                                                 
(
48 He actually considers the following basic model (admitting the fact that it may still not be the most 
representative of the time) (taken from McCallum (2005), p. 287): 
)0 1 1 1                                     0,t t t t ty b b i E p v b+= + − Δ + <  (1) 
(2) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 1 2        0,  0,t t t t t t t tp E p y y y y uα α α α− − −Δ + − + − + > <Δ =  
( )(3) 0 1 1 2 1 1 2                           0, 0,t t t t ty y eμ μ μ μ μ− −+ + + − = > <
0 1 2 1 2                                      0, 0,t t t t tc c y c R c c
m m  
(4) m p η− = + + + > <  
(5) 0 1 1 1                                                     0.t t ty y aγ γ γ−= + + >  
Here the symbols are as follows: yt = log of output, ty  = log of natural-rate output, pt = log of price 
level, mt = log of money stock, it = one-period interest rate, and vt, ut, et, βt , at = stochastic shocks. 
Equation (1) is an IS function in which the rate of spending on goods and services depends 
(negatively) on the real rate of interest. Equation (2) is a “natural rate” type of Phillips curve or price 
adjustment relationship, with a unit coefficient on Et –1Δpt implying the absence of any long-run trade-
off, as in Fischer (1977) or Lucas (1973). In addition, (4) is a money demand (or “LM”) function of a 
standard type, while (3) represents monetary policy behaviour with the central bank adjusting the 
money supply each period in a way that responds to the current (or possibly a recent past) output gap. 
Researchers concerned with operationality, such as Andersen and Jordan (1968) and Brunner and 
Meltzer (1976), tended to use the monetary base as the instrument variable in policy specifications 
that would be represented by (3) in the model. The output gap refers to the fractional difference 
between output and its natural rate value, with the latter being generated (exogenously, for simplicity) 
in equation (5).  
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 plausible specifications. McCallum (2005) recollects that “most policy analysis 
conducted at the time was not of this type, focusing on properties of dynamic 
systems, but instead featured point-in-time exercises of the type that rational 
expectations analysis showed to be (in many cases) fundamentally misleading” 
(McCallum (2005), p. 287). Currently, the standard mode of policy analysis employs 
a comparison of the behaviour of target variables (such as inflation and the output 
gap) under different maintained policy rules, rather than point-in-time exercises49.  
According to McCallum (2005) there is another aspect in which current policy 
analysis has evolved in a different direction, besides the uncontested use of the short-
term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument and the neglect of the use of the 
monetary base. This is that recent models tend to employ optimisation-based general 
equilibrium analysis in an attempt to develop systems that are potentially structural 
and thus do not fall in the Lucas critique (as in Lucas (1976)) and also be specified 
quantitatively, either in terms of an econometric estimation or of careful calibration 
of their parameter values (the latter as emphasized in the real business cycle 
literature) (McCallum (2005), p. 288). 
Nonetheless,  a considerable number of vital issues concerning what we termed the 
‘consensus’ approach to modelling monetary policy actions still remain 
controversial. Those refer, for example, to the theory of monetary policy, inflation 
targeting, interest rate policy, and communications. A concise discussion of some of 
these is deemed necessary.  
                                                 
49 McCallum (2005) suggests that he would also include the design of optimal policy rules under the 
advances, despite various reservations mentioned in McCallum and Nelson (2004). 
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 The part of the theory of monetary policy that seems to give rise to the most 
significant controversies is the price-setting function as it defines the nature of the 
short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment 50 . Aggregate-demand 
shocks pose no problem with respect to the stabilisation of inflation around its 
objective and of output around potential (as the effort to counter the shock works 
towards the desirable directions). This does not apply to aggregate-supply shocks, 
however. To appreciate these issues, it is worth to address the price-setting function 
as derived from Calvo (1983), according to which the current level of inflation 
depends positively on expected future inflation and inversely on the current output 
gap.  
As it is emphasized by Goodfriend and King (1997), (2001), King and Wolman 
(1999), and Goodfriend (2002), in this baseline case, fully credible price stability 
(implying that current inflation equals expected future inflation and is consistent with 
a low inflation target) keeps output at its potential and employment at its natural rate. 
Even for aggregate-supply shocks, the function does not support the existence of 
short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Following this view, even 
those who care mainly about output and employment can opt for strict price stability 
(Goodfriend (2005), p. 254). 
However, opposing views refer to the baseline case as unrealistic and advocate that 
by incorporating other potential features of the macroeconomy into the model, one 
can discredit the result that price stability is always the welfare-maximizing 
monetary policy. Taylor (1999a), for example, (and the papers therein) presented a 
                                                 
50  The aggregate supply function that uses the Calvo (1983) staggered price-setting justification 
presents a small long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation which is, in fact, ignored in 
practical applications. 
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 trade-off in the long-run variance of inflation and output relative to potential in 
models of monetary policy that resulted from a short-run trade-off in the levels of 
inflation and unemployment. According to Goodfriend (2005) “any of the following 
modifications of the Calvo price-setting function produce a short-run trade-off in 
inflation and unemployment, i.e. adding (i) a “cost” shock that feeds directly into 
inflation irrespective of expectations or the current mark-up, (ii) lagged inflation that 
reflects structural inflation inertia in the price-setting process, and (iii) nominal wage 
stickiness to the baseline model, which otherwise presumes that wages are perfectly 
flexible” (Goodfriend (2005), p. 254). By carrying out any of the above 
modifications, to stabilize both inflation and output at potential is not always possible 
and, thus, monetary policy must create a shortfall of aggregate demand relative to 
potential output to offset the effect of a cost shock or inertial inflation on current 
inflation. In addition, nominal wage stickiness creates a trade-off with respect to 
productivity shocks even without modifications (i) and (ii)51 (Goodfriend (2005), p. 
254).   
Even though the above modifications seem realistic, their practical importance is still 
questioned52. Ball (2005) remarkably asserts that “it seems that economists were 
                                                 
51  To illustrate this, Goodfriend (2005) gives the example of a temporary negative shock to 
productivity in the baseline model. In that case, both output gap and inflation stabilization call for a 
contraction in aggregate demand to conform to the contraction in potential output. Nominal and real 
wages both fall with productivity, offsetting the effect of the negative shock to productivity on 
marginal cost and the mark-up. Thus, when wages are flexible, monetary policy can simultaneously 
stabilize the output gap and inflation. Yet, if nominal wages are sticky (see Erceg, Henderson, and 
Levin (2000)), monetary policy must steer aggregate demand below potential (to raise the marginal 
physical product of labour) to offset the effect of negative productivity growth on marginal cost in 
order to stabilize the mark-up and the inflation rate (Goodfriend (2005), p. 254). 
52 First, strictly speaking, a ‘cost’ shock cannot be included in the price-setting function marginal cost 
is already taken into account in the underlying theory. The statistical residual found in practice may 
only be the result of mismeasurement or noise in the modelling of expectations. If one argues that 
some costs flow directly to prices in a perfectly competitive sector, then theory suggests that the 
central bank should consider stabilizing only a ‘core’ index of monopolistically competitive sticky 
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 confused during the 1960s, as they believed in a long-run trade-off between output 
and inflation and advanced non-monetary theories of inflation and some, for 
example, suggested that inflation was caused by greedy firms and labour unions, 
whose behaviour could not be controlled by the monetary authority” (Ball (2005), p. 
263), (on the latter see Nelson (2004)). Friedman, though, advocated that ‘inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’. In Friedman (1968) he provides 
an explanation that the output inflation trade-off exists only in the short run, while in 
the long run, unemployment must eventually reach its natural rate. Friedman’s ideas 
controversial, though, they where when they were first expressed, they soon gained 
wide acceptance influencing policymakers in addition to academics. 
Friedman (1968), in particular, not only gave general principles about the economy, 
but also included a precise theory of the Phillips curve. Concisely the latter was 
presented using the statements that “there is always a temporary trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment and that there is no permanent trade-off” (quoted in Ball 
(2005), p. 263). The temporary trade-off is generated from unanticipated inflation, 
which means, in general, a rising rate of inflation. Ball (2005) gives the following 
equations to express Friedman’s verbal statements. The relation between 
unemployment and surprise inflation is described by the expectations augmented 
Phillips curve: 
                                                                                                                                          
prices. Second, as argued in Furhrer and Moore (1995), theory that justifies structural inertia in the 
inflation-generating process is controversial. Lags of inflation in an estimated inflation-generating 
function could reflect persistence introduced into the inflation rate by central bank behaviour, in 
particular in the case of measurement or other specification errors. Cecchetti (1995a) and Cogley and 
Sargent (2001), for example, give evidence that apparent inflation persistence is reduced when 
inflation is low and stable. Third, an inflation target of 1 to 2 percent along with productivity growth 
of around 2 percent produces nominal wage growth in the 3 to 4 percent range. Average nominal wage 
growth that is as high should keep the economy away from situations in which significant downward 
nominal wage stickiness, as opposed to slower nominal wage growth, is required to keep price 
inflation stable and output at potential (see Goodfriend (2005), p. 255). 
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 ( )1 ,t t t tE u uπ π α−= − −   
where u  is the natural rate of unemployment. The fact that unanticipated inflation 
and rising inflation come to employ the same meaning implies that expectations are 
backward-looking (i.e. 1t t tE π 1π −=− ). Inserting the latter relation into the previous 
equation, one yields the “accelerationist” Phillips curve, which relates unemployment 
to the change in inflation and has the following form: 
( )1t t tu uπ π α−= − − .  
According to Ball (2005), four decades after Friedman formed his theory, his Phillips 
curve is still the best simple theory of the unemployment-inflation trade-off” (Ball 
(2005), p. 264). 
Even though the introduction of rational expectations constitute a decisive 
advancement especially on the monetary theory side, implying a key role for central 
banks’ credibility as inflation fighters 53 , Ball (2005) questions the usefulness of 
rational expectations models for understanding inflation in the real world and 
projects several related reasons.  
He, first, considers the broad history of U.S. inflation since 1979 and claims that the 
accelerationist Phillips curve still seems the best tool for this job. That is, changes in 
inflation are well explained by short-run movements in unemployment. In fact, the 
deep recession of the early 1980s caused inflation to fall sharply. Inflation rose a bit 
in the late 1980s as unemployment fell. And inflation fell moderately during the 
                                                 
53  In rational expectations models, an increase in credibility shifts the output-inflation trade-off 
favourably. A major goal for policymakers is, thus, to build credibility.  
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 recessions of the early 1990s and 2000s. Credibility being really important, shifts in 
inflation would not be explained by unemployment (or obvious supply shocks). In 
these episodes, changes in credibility would shift the short-run Phillips curve, which 
has not been the case in countries with moderate inflation. Ball (2005) recalls that 
“when Sargent (1983) looked for an example, he had to go back to France in the 
1920s - and even this case is disputed by historians. The concept of credibility is not 
useful for explaining the history of inflation” (Ball (2005), p. 264). 
The presence of credibility effects has been researched in various ways, albeit with 
negative results. Some examples include the following:  
• Inflation expectations in the U.S. consistently follow actual inflation with a lag. No 
unusual episodes can be explained by credibility effects. 
• In theory, greater credibility reduces the cost of disinflation, the sacrifice ratio. In 
practice, Ball (2005) claims that this is not the case. Sacrifice ratios are found by 
Debelle and Fischer (1994) to be higher for central banks that have a higher level of 
independence, and, are, thus, more credible. Sacrifice ratios are found to be 
especially high for Germany under the Bundesbank. Zhang (2001) finds the sacrifice 
ratio for the U.S. disinflation of 1990-94 was high compared to previous U.S. 
disinflations, despite the building-up of credibility by the Federal Reserve under 
Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan. 
• Past the adoption of inflation targeting by several central banks (during the last two 
decades), with the consequent increase in credibility and anchoring of expectations, 
cross-country comparisons still produce little evidence that inflation targeting 
changes the behaviour of output or inflation (see Ball and Sheridan (2005)). 
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 Currently, economists have converged on a specific model of the economy, which is, 
as stated above, “a dynamic general equilibrium model with a real business cycle 
core and costly nominal price adjustment”, and uses the Calvo (1983) specification 
of staggered price setting. The Phillips curve produced by the model is of the 
following form: 
( )1t t t tE uπ π α+= − −u
                                                
. 
This equation lies at the core of the New Synthesis model, yet for the purposes of 
monetary policy, the model faces the problem of being counterfactual54.  
Mankiw (2001) demonstrates that, in the model, a monetary contraction that reduces 
inflation also causes an output boom, which is the opposite of the common empirical 
result that reductions in inflation give rise to recessions. The source of the theoretical 
result lies in the fact that the Phillips curve includes current expectations of future 
inflation, not past expectations of current inflation. In any case, the model’s “absurd” 
predictions make it a poor tool for policy analysis (Ball (2005), p. 264). 
As Goodfriend (2005) discusses, researchers have tried to fix the New Synthesis 
model by, among other efforts, adding cost shocks or combining rigidity in wages 
and prices. In most cases, as Ball (2005) stresses, the trade-off between output and 
inflation still has the wrong sign. Apparently, the main thing that works is adding 
lagged inflation to the Phillips curve55, yet the New Synthesis model does not justify 
 
54 Kenlow and Kyvstov (2005), Golosov and Lucas (2005) and Gertler and Leahy (2006) provide 
recent formulations of the price-setting function different from the one proposed by Calvo (1983). 
55 Gaspar and Kashyap (2006) briefly summarise the findings of the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence 
Network and state that no evidence is found of mechanical indexation to past inflation, undermining 
thus, the inclusion of lagged inflation in the Philips curve (Gaspar and Kashyap (2006), p. 96).  
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 this term. Adding it, though, “is equivalent to ignoring the model and going back to 
the accelerationist Phillips curve” (Ball (2005), p. 277). 
It is worth recalling, though, that during the late 1960s and 1970s, “both academics 
and policymakers did not fully understand or appreciate the determinants of 
credibility and its link to policy outcomes, even though central bankers have long 
recognized at some level that the credibility of their pronouncements matters” 
(Bernanke (2005), p. 278). A seminal approach of these issues was provided by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977)56. They demonstrated that when policymakers credibly 
commit (or promise) to deliver certain aspects of their future policies, the resulting 
economic outcomes will be better. In their context ‘credible’ refers to the public’s 
believing that the policymakers will keep their promises, even if they face incentives 
not to. 
As Kydland and Prescott (1977) illustrate, it is advantageous for policymakers to 
publicly commit to policies for low inflation. When policymakers’ statements are 
believed, the public will expect inflation to be low and demands for wage and price 
increases should accordingly be moderate. Such behaviour by the public renders the 
central bank’s commitment to low inflation easier to fulfil. On the contrary, if the 
public does not believe the central bank’s commitment to low inflation, then its 
expectations will be higher than otherwise. High inflation expectations result in more 
aggressive wage and price demands, which make it more difficult and costly for the 
central bank to achieve and maintain low inflation.  
                                                 
56 Similar points to those in Kydland and Prescott (1977) can also be found in Calvo (1978). Yet, 
Barro and Gordon (1983a) extension of the “inflation bias” concept in the style of Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) proved highly influential. 
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 However, the critical issue that Kydland and Prescott (1977) did not address was 
how, actually, a central bank is supposed to obtain credibility in the first place. An 
attempt of an elaborate answer was provided by Rogoff (1985) who demonstrated 
analytically why even a President who is not particularly averse to inflation (not 
more than the general public on average), might find it advantageous to appoint a 
well-known “inflation hawk” as chairman of the central bank. Such an appointment 
will increase the inflation-fighting credibility of the central bank, which in turn will 
enable the achievement of low inflation at a smaller cost.  
However, as in Rogoff (1985), just to appoint such a director for the central bank 
may not suffice to guarantee credibility for monetary policy as it is also necessary for 
the central bank to be perceived by the public as being sufficiently independent from 
the rest of the government in order not to be affected by short-term political 
pressures. Therefore, the idea proposed was for both the appointment of central 
bankers that are averse to inflation and of measures warranting central bank 
independence, which were proven to be highly influential while supported by a huge 
amount of empirical work57. The credibility benefits of central bank independence 
have been widely recognized in the past and, in fact, shaped the design of central 
banking institutions58. 
                                                 
57 Walsh (2000, Section 8.5) provides a review of the relevant empirical research on the issue. A 
consistent result is that more independent central banks produce lower inflation without an increase in 
output volatility. 
58 Bernanke (2005) claims that “the benefits of central bank independence should not lead us to ignore 
its downside, which is that the very distance from the political process that increases the central 
bank’s policy credibility by necessity also risks isolating the central bank and making it less 
democratically accountable”, necessitating, thus, “communication with the public and their elected 
representatives”. In addition, “central bank independence does not imply that central banks should 
never coordinate with other parts of the government, under the appropriate circumstances” (Bernanke 
(2005), p. 279). 
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 Yet, the solution to the central banks’ credibility problems as proposed in Rogoff 
(1985) does come with certain limitations. First, even though enhanced credibility for 
monetary policy and lower inflation on average may be achieved by an inflation-
averse central banker, he might refrain from responding in a socially desirable way to 
various shocks hitting the economy59.  
Second, in practice, the policy preferences of a newly appointed central banker will 
be inferred by the public from policy actions. Realising that the public makes such 
inferences, the central banker may be tempted to misrepresent the state of the 
economy (see Canzoneri (1985)) or even to undertake policy actions that are 
suboptimal. He may, for example, feel compelled to tighten policy more aggressively 
so as to give proof of his determination to fight inflation. The necessity of such 
inferences by the public may even lead to economic instability, a proposition that is 
debated in the recent literature on the macroeconomic consequences of learning60.  
The above issues were addressed by Walsh (1995)  who puts forward the idea that 
the government or society could offer the head of the central bank a performance 
contract61, which would include explicit monetary rewards or penalties depending on 
the economic outcomes occurring with respect to his policy. Walsh (1995) 
                                                 
59 When, for example, an inflation-averse central banker faces an aggregate supply shock (e.g. a sharp 
rise in oil prices) will tend to react in an over-aggressive manner so as to offset the inflationary impact 
of the shock, paying less attention on the effect such policy may have on output and employment. 
Lohmann (1992) proposes a solution to the above as the government’s limiting the central bank’s 
independence by intervening at times when the supply shock becomes too large. Yet, it is vital, in this 
case, to clearly state in advance the circumstances under which the government is going to intervene, 
so that the central bank’s independence can be ensured. Such statements, though, may not be practical 
enough to deliver. 
60 A, now, standard reference on learning in macroeconomics is Evans and Honkopohja (2001). See 
also, for example, Erceg and Levin (2001) and Orphanides and Williams (2005) for applications of 
models of learning to US monetary policy analysis. 
61 For an influential analysis of the contracting approach see also Persson and Tabellini (1993) 
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 demonstrated that, in principle, a contract between the government and the central 
bank that may be rather simple, would lead to the implementation of both credible 
and fully optimal monetary policies.  
The contract permits the government to give the central banker a basic level of 
compensation and, then, to impose a penalty depending on the realized rate of 
inflation, namely the higher is the observed inflation rate, the greater the penalty will 
be. The contract would guarantee credibility, if the penalty imposed for inflation is 
large enough to affect central bank behaviour and if the public, actually, understands 
the nature of the contract62 . What is common in both Rogoff (1985) and Walsh 
(1995) is that when the central banks face imperfect credibility it is beneficial to 
assign to the central banker an objective function that differs from the true objectives 
of the society. Walsh (1995), however, also shows that binding central bankers with 
an optimal contract ameliorates the two problems with respect to Rogoff’s (1985) 
approach. This is so since, first, there are incentives for the central banker to achieve 
the target for inflation and respond to supply shock in a socially optimal way63, and, 
second, because the public can clearly infer the central banker’s preferences from the 
actual contract.  
In practice, one cannot find many incentive contracts for central bankers. The most 
famous one is a plan that had been proposed to the New Zealand legislature, which 
                                                 
62 Bernanke (2005) refutes an objection to this point by stressing that “although the central bank’s 
incentives are made clear by the contract, the public might worry that the government might renege on 
its commitment to low inflation by changing the contract. Those who discount this concern argue that 
changing the contract in midstream would be costly for the government, because laws once enacted 
are difficult to modify and because changing an established framework for policy in an opportunistic 
way would be politically embarrassing” (Bernanke (2005), p. 280). 
63 The assumption that gives rise to this result is that the central banker cares both about the state of 
the economy and the income yielded with respect to his incentive contract. 
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 yet was never adopted, that included clauses for firing the governor of the central 
bank if the inflation rate deviated too far from the government’s inflation objective, 
as pointed out by Bernanke (2005). But, as Bernanke (2005) asserts, incentive 
contracts as in Walsh (1995) best represent a metaphor rather than as an actual 
proposal. Even though the pay of central bankers may not depend directly on the 
realized rate of inflation, they tend to be affected by several other aspects of their 
jobs, like “their professional reputations, the prestige of the institutions in which they 
serve, and the probability that they will be reappointed”64 (Bernanke (2005), p. 278-
280). An additional practical issue of importance is accountability to the public as 
well as to the government, in that the central bank should explain regularly what it is 
trying to achieve and for what reasons. The papers mentioned above and the several 
subsequent ones provide the theoretical foundation supporting an explicit, well-
designed, and transparent framework for monetary policy, which states the objectives 
of policy and holds central bankers accountable for reaching those objectives (or 
even for giving a detailed explanation of why those objectives were not reached)65 
(Bernanke (2005), p. 281). 
                                                 
64 The analysis that originates in Walsh (1995) suggests that central bank performance might be 
improved if the government set standards for performance (as part of the institution’s charter or 
enabling legislation) and, consequently, regularly compared objectives and outcomes. Alternatively, 
macroeconomic goals might be set through a joint exercise of the government and the central bank 
since central banks tend to possess greater expertise in determining which economic outcomes are 
both feasible and most desirable. Several countries have, for example, established inflation targets and 
central bankers in those countries evidently make strong efforts to attain those targets. As is also 
reported in Bernanke (2005), even though “the Federal Reserve Act does not set quantitative goals for 
the U.S. central bank, it does specify the objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable 
employment and requires the central bank to present semi-annual reports to the Congress on monetary 
policy and the state of the economy” (Bernanke (2005), p. 280).  
65Of course, other factors that cannot be covered in this review, such as the central bank’s reputation 
for veracity as established over time, may also strengthen its credibility (Barro and Gordon (1983b), 
Backus and Driffill (1985)). But see Rogoff (1987) for a critique of models of central bank reputation 
(Bernanke (2005), p. 281). 
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 The efforts to tame inflation in the late seventies and the early eighties, the 
disinflation episodes, for example, in the US, the UK, Canada and other countries 
affected to a great extent the direction of monetary theory and policy towards 
assessing the benefits of central bank credibility and addressing the ways it can be 
obtained. During almost the past two decades, this new thinking stirred a great 
number of changes in central banking, in particular concerning the institutional 
design of central banks and the establishment of new frameworks in the conduct of 
monetary policy.  
For example, Taylor (1996), Fischer (1996) and Svensson (1996), King (1996) in 
Federal Bank of Kansas City (1996), all discuss inflation targeting with reference to 
a utility function of the form incorporating the two objectives of price and output-gap 
stabilisation. As shown in Svensson (1997a) and Ball (1997), concern about output-
gap stability translates into a more gradualist policy. Thus, if inflation moves away 
from the inflation target, it is brought back to target more gradually. Equivalently, 
inflation-targeting central banks lengthen their horizon and aim at meeting the 
inflation target further in the future (Svensson, (2001), p. 65).   
Considering the conduct of monetary policy under the prominent trend of inflation 
targeting, Blinder (2005) argues about the type of instrument the central bank should 
use in order to pursue its inflation target. He remarks that “no matter how much 
theoretical models try to pretend that it is, the inflation rate is not a control variable. 
Milton Friedman taught that the nominal interest rate is a bad choice; fixing it can 
even lead to dynamic instability. The real interest rate, we have learned in the 
Volcker and Greenspan years, is a far better choice” (Blinder (2005), p. 284).  
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 Greenspan, in particular, has focused attention on an update of Wicksell’s “natural 
interest rate” concept66 and, as Blinder (2005) remarks, more by his actions than by 
his rhetoric, he has called attention to the Taylor rule as a useful benchmark. The 
following gives the Taylor rule, in a simple form, as a guide for setting the nominal 
funds rate in a way that stabilizes both inflation and output, is the following:  
( ) ( ) ,i r y yπ α π π β∗ ∗= + + − + − ∗
                                                
 
where i is the nominal funds rate, r* is the neutral level of the real funds rate, π is the 
inflation rate, y is the (log) of output, and π* and y* are the targets for inflation and 
output, respectively. In this way, one can think of monetary policy as “easy” when i 
< r* + π and as “tight” when i > r* + π. It is worth mentioning that the Taylor rule, 
proposed in Taylor (1993), was never intended to be a literal rule in the sense the 
Friedman proposed. Nonetheless, it constitutes a very useful way of thinking about 
monetary policy.  
Blinder (2005) applies focus on two aspects of the Taylor rule. The first is that both α 
and β are positive, implying that, for example, at times the central bank may find it 
appropriate to hold its interest rate below neutral even though the inflation rate is 
above target67. The other aspect is that α is positive meaning that the central bank 
should react to changes in the rate of inflation more than point for point. For 
example, for a choice of α equal to 1/2, each one-point move in the inflation rate 
would induce the central bank to adjust its policy rate by 150 basis points in the same 
 
66 Woodford (2003), (pp. 21, 49-55) provides an analysis on Wicksell’s notion of the natural real rate 
of interest, i.e. the rate of interest required for equilibrium with stable prices. It is also referred in the 
literature as the neutral or the equilibrium real rate of interest. 
67 Or, if y is high enough, and even if inflation is below target, the central bank will still want “tight 
money”. 
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 direction, implying, thus, that the real funds rate will move by 50 basis points in that 
direction. For α not being positive, the central bank would be allowing rising 
inflation to reduce the real federal funds rate, which is a potentially destabilizing 
policy (Blinder (2005), p. 285).  
Blinder (2005) admits that a lesson drawn from the Greenspan era that tends to be 
hardly ever mentioned is that “three times during the Greenspan era, the Fed 
demonstrated that doing nothing can constitute a remarkably effective, even bold, 
monetary policy” (Blinder (2005), p. 285). He comments, further, that if the central 
bank communicates its future policy direction with the markets, then the latter can do 
part of the work of monetary policy. In fact, if the markets believe that the central 
bank is about to raise (or lower) rates, then the intermediate and long-term rates will 
tend to rise (or fall), thereby tightening (easing) “monetary policy” before the central 
bank actually takes action. Letting, in this way, the bond market do part of the ‘work’ 
for the central bank has according to Blinder (2005) two interesting, and probably 
valuable, implications for monetary policy. These are that, “first, and less important, 
the central bank should not have to move its policy rate around as much, in either 
direction, as would be necessary without the anticipatory behaviour of the bond 
market, and, second, and more important, the lags in monetary policy should be 
reduced by the bond market’s reactions” (Blinder (2005), p. 286). He, further, notes 
that “not so many years ago, central bankers and economists viewed long rates as 
following short rates with a substantial lag – which slowed down the transmission of 
monetary policy impulses into the real economy,… [while] nowadays, many central 
bankers and economists see long rates as leading short rates” (Blinder (2005), p. 
286). This anticipatory process, however, can only work if the central bank 
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 effectively communicates its intentions to the markets68. Thus, greater transparency 
can enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, since transparency can influence 
the public’s expectations, which play an important role in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. Greater transparency may make monetary policy 
more efficient, help to build a monetary authority’s credibility, and reduces the 
inflation bias (Moessner, Gravelle and Sinclair (2005), p. 286). The old tradition at 
central banks has been to say little. Admittedly, according to Blinder (2005) “there is 
still far too much secrecy”. Nevertheless, the unmistakable trend for central banks 
around the world is the call for greater transparency (Blinder (2005), p. 286). 
 
3.4  The ‘Benchmark’ Model 
The prevailing model of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
incorporates the effect of monetary policy actions on short-term interest rates (and 
the exchange rate), that, consequently, affect the evolution of the output gap and 
inflation expectations, which in turn determine inflation. In essence, in a closed 
economy setting, the model contains an IS relationship between monetary conditions 
and the output gap, and a Phillips curve relating the output gap and inflation 
expectations to future changes in the rate of inflation. The above paradigm in 
combination to a formal representation of the optimal choice of a policy rate from the 
                                                 
68 See also Moessner, Gravelle and Sinclair (2005) that summarises the relevance of transparency for 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and presents a measure for quantifying differences in 
the transparency for monetary policy using financial and economic data. Their approach consists of 
studying the reaction of market interest rates to official interest rates decisions and surprises in 
macroeconomic data and news. 
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 part of the central bank, either in the form of a simplified or an optimally derived 
rule, can demonstrate the dynamic adjustment paths to a steady state.  
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), for example, analyse the optimal policy problem in 
two stages. In the first stage, they determine the optimal path of inflation and the 
output gap and, in the second stage, they work out the policy rate path, compatible 
with the optimal solution, determined in stage one, using a forward-looking IS curve. 
The resulting framework indicates how interest rates, inflation, and real output are 
jointly determined in a model that does not allow for endogenous variations in the 
capital stock, assumes perfectly flexible wages (or some other mechanism for 
efficient labour contracting), and also monopolistic competition in the goods markets 
where prices are sticky and are adjusted at random intervals in the process as in 
Calvo (1983) (Woodford (2003), p. 239). 
In particular, the model is a dynamic general equilibrium model that, first, presumes 
that the goods market is populated with a set of monopolistically competitive firms 
as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Second, this imperfect competition means that firms 
must set prices. As in Calvo (1983), firms commit to a fixed nominal price in 
advance of knowing the demand for that period. At the end of each period a fraction 
of the firms are allowed to adjust their price freely, while the remaining firms 
increase theirs’ based on the inflation rate observed in the period69. This so-called 
                                                 
69 Several variations have been proposed in the way in which the rigidities are modelled. These 
variations have very different implications for the dynamic effects of nominal shocks on real 
variables. The difference in the modelling strategies is based on differences in the timing of price or 
wage change decisions. Three basic propositions are used, which are based on Fisher (1977), Taylor 
(1980) and Calvo (1983). Each one gives rise to very different dynamic responses of real variables to 
nominal shocks. Fischer (1977), for instance, takes prices as predetermined, implying that at some 
time agents set prices for some number of future periods. In this case, the price-level that is set on the 
decision date may differ for the different periods before the next decision date. The impact of a 
nominal shock, in this model, lasts for only as long as it takes for all price setters to have a chance to 
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 partial indexation assumption is made so that the model’s predicted persistence in 
inflation will match that found in the data. Third, firms produce using labour under a 
marginal diminishing returns technology. Fourth, output is demand determined at the 
set price. Finally, the model allows for shocks that create a tension between price 
stability and output gap stabilization. For example, in the case of a positive “cost-
push” shock inflation rises and output falls relative to its natural level (Gaspar and 
Kashyap (2006), p. 96).  
Inflation in this framework is inefficient because firms have promised to meet 
demand at their fixed nominal price. Consequently aggregate inflation moves real, 
relative prices (which is inefficient). The model’s presumption of nominal price 
rigidity is appropriate since absent some sort of price stickiness monetary policy will 
be neutral; if prices can all adjust proportionally following a change in the quantity 
of money then no real quantities (including most importantly the real interest rate) 
will be affected by monetary policy (Gaspar and Kashyap (2006), p. 96). The source 
of the nominal rigidity that allows monetary policy to alter short-run real rates of 
return has been under debate for decades. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) 
give a comprehensive summary of this discussion, distinguishing three sets of 
theories: one based on sticky wages, the second on sticky prices and the third formed 
with respect to the notion of limited participation. The first two kinds of models built 
                                                                                                                                          
reset their price schedules. Taylor (1980) models prices or wages as fixed, implying that their nominal 
value does not vary between decision dates. Under fixed prices or wages, nominal shocks die out only 
asymptotically. In Calvo’s (1983) model, which is still widely used in the extant literature, price-
setters alter their prices according to a Poisson process, which leads to a variety of possible dynamics, 
(Cecchetti (2001), p. 191). One attractive aspect of Calvo’s model is that it shows how the coefficient 
on output in the inflation equation will depend on the frequency with which prices are adjusted. A fall 
in the constant probability that the firm will be able to adjust its price, which means that the average 
time between price changes for an individual firm increases, causes the coefficient on output to 
decrease. Output movements have a smaller impact on current inflation, holding expected future 
inflation constant. Because opportunities to adjust prices occur less often, current demand conditions 
are less important (Walsh (2000), p. 220). 
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 on the idea that nominal price and wage changes are effected with several costs, 
rendering adjustments rather infrequent. According to the limited participation 
models that have been introduced by Rotemberg (1984), households are unable to 
adjust their cash balances sufficiently rapidly as a response to changes in the 
environment; meaning that they have a ‘limited’ ability to ‘participate’ in the 
financial markets, and therefore have to restrict themselves to certain portfolio 
holdings for relatively long periods of time (Cecchetti (2001), p. 174-175).  
As is shown in Woodford (2003), under rational expectations, the standard 
assumptions lead to a Phillips curve of the form  
(1) ( ) ( )1 1t t t t t t ty y uπ γπ β π γπ κ ∗− +− = Ε − + − + ,t
)
,  
where π is inflation, ( t ty y∗−  is the output gap, β is the discount rate, κ is a 
convolution of the structural parameters, γ is the degree of indexation of prices, not 
optimally set each period, and u is a cost-push shock (assumed i.i.d.). Thus, in 
equation (1) inflation is determined by lagged inflation, inflation expectations, the 
output gap and the shock.  
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) show the IS equation of the following form:  
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1t t t t t t t t ty y E y y i Eα π∗ ∗+ + +− = − − − + v , 
which is obtained by log-linearizing the consumption Euler equation that arises from 
the household’s optimal saving decision, after imposing the equilibrium condition 
that consumption equals output minus government spending. It is stressed that the 
main feature is that higher expected future output is shown to raise current output. 
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 The reason behind this is that individuals prefer to smooth consumption and the 
expectation of higher consumption next period (in association to higher expected 
output) leads them to want to consume more today, which, in turn, increases current 
output demand. The negative effect that the real rate imposes on current output 
reflects intertemporal substitution of consumption. In this respect, the interest 
elasticity, α, corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Clarida et al. 
(1999), pp. 1665-66).     
Furthermore, up to a second order approximation, the (negative of the) period social 
welfare function (as also shown in Woodford (2003)) takes the form  
(3) ( ) ( )221t t t t tL yπ γπ λ ∗−= − + − y   
where λ is a function of the underlying structural parameters. The problem of 
minimizing the loss function in equation (3) subject to the linear constraint (1), given 
by the New Keynesian Phillips curve resembles the classic linear quadratic 
framework explored in the 1950s by Simon (1956) and Theil (1954, 1957). Simon 
and Theil extended the deterministic framework of Tinbergen (1952) to a stochastic 
set-up and showed that, in the linear-quadratic framework, both certainty equivalence 
and the separation of estimation and control held true. The main difference of our 
problem relative to the classical policy instrument choice framework is that 
expectations about the future are endogenous and influence the current state of the 
economy. Recently, Svensson and Woodford (2003) have identified conditions for 
these results to hold in models with forward-looking behaviour (Gaspar and Kashyap 
(2006), p. 97). 
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 Carlin and Soskice (2005) present a novel graphical approach of a simple version of 
the above model that demonstrates the forecasting exercise of a central bank and the 
adjustment of the economy to the new equilibrium as the optimal monetary policy is 
implemented. The model is not “forward looking”, i.e. does not incorporate 
equations that include expectations of future values of endogenous variables, and 
consists of a central bank loss function, an IS equation and a Phillips equation taking 
into account a one period lag on the effect of the real rate to output (IS equation) and 
demonstrating inflation inertia, namely that the current level of inflation is a function 
of lagged inflation and the output gap (Phillips equation).  
In a two-period case with periods numbered zero and one, their model takes the 
following form: 
( ) ( )221 1 TeL y y β π π= − + − ,   (Central Bank Loss Function) 
 ,    (Phillips Curve) (1 0 1 ey yπ π α= + − )
)S ,    (IS equation) (1 0ey y a r r− = − −
Where y1 is the level of output in period one, ye is equilibrium output, π0 and π1 the 
level of inflation in periods zero and one respectively, πΤ the inflation target set by 
the central bank, r0 the real short rate and rS the stabilising rate. The central bank can 
set the nominal short term interest rate directly, and since implicitly at least the 
expected rate of inflation is given in the short run, the central bank is assumed to be 
able to affect the real interest rate indirectly – as is postulated by the Fisher identity 
(Carlin and Soskice (2005), pp. 14-16). 
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 The interest rate rule is derived optimally from the minimisation of the central bank’s 
loss function subject to the Phillips curve. The resulting equation, which they term as 
the MR-AD equation (standing for monetary rule – aggregate demand equation), 
shows how output (chosen by the central bank through its interest rate decision) 
should respond to inflation. Consequently, by substituting for the output gap using 
the IS equation they derive the interest rate rule, the IR equation, which takes the 
following form: 
( ) ( ) (0 2 ,1 TSr r a )0
αβ π πα β− = −+    (IR equation), 
For ( ) ( )0 01,             0.5 .TSa r rα β π= = = − = −π
                                                
  
Their diagrammatic representation of the IS equation, the Phillips curve and the MR-
AD equation, showing the adjustment to equilibrium after an IS shock is as follows: 
The lower diagram depicts, first, the long-run Phillips curve, as a vertical line in ye, 
the level of equilibrium output, namely the level at which price and wage setters, in 
imperfect labour and product markets, will make no attempt to change the prevailing 
real wage or relative prices. The economy is in a constant inflation equilibrium at the 
output level ye and for the target level of inflation πΤ = 2%, point Z. The real interest 
rate required to produce a level of aggregate demand equal to the equilibrium output 
is the stabilising rate, rS, shown in the upper diagram, the IS diagram70. The short run 
Phillips curves are indexed by the inertial rate of inflation (labelled πΙ = π-1).   
 
 
70 The vertical axis in the IS diagram is labelled r-1 to depict the one-period lag on the effect from the 
real interest rate to output. 
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 Figure 3.1: How the central bank decides on the interest rate 
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Source: Carlin and Soskice (2005), p. 19. 
An aggregate demand shock shifts the IS curve to IS΄ and the economy is at point A 
in the Phillips diagram. In response to the new information, the central bank needs to 
make a forecast of the Phillips curve next period in order to set its policy rate. The 
tangency point, B, of the forecast Phillips curve ( )( )4PC π =I
                                                
with the relevant71 
central bank indifference curve define the desired level of output for period one, y1. 
The MR - AD line joins point B with Z. The next step is for the central bank to 
 
71  See Figure 3 for a representation of the central bank’s indifference curves. It depicts the 
indifference curves drawn for the central bank’s two-period loss function for different levels of β, i.e 
different degrees of inflation aversion. The loss declines as the graph gets smaller and when it shrinks 
at a single point (namely point ( ),T eyπ ) the loss is zero.  
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 forecast the IS curve for period one in order to set the interest rate corresponding to 
the desired level of output, y1, (Carlin and Soskice, (2005), p. 18). After the shock 
both inflation and output have been reduced and through a similar process the 
economy is led back to equilibrium. 
 
Figure 3.2: Central bank loss function: varying the degree of inflation aversion 
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(b) Inflation averse: β > 1 (c) Unemployment averse: β < 1(a) Balanced: β = 1
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Source: Carlin and Soskice (2005), p. 35. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
The ‘benchmark model’ (and the broad set of extensions) suggests a set of major 
conclusions about the role of monetary policy. A set of four main conclusions are  
emphasised by Goodfriend and King (1997): (1) “monetary policy actions can have 
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 an important effect on real economic activity, persisting over several years72, due to 
gradual adjustment of individual prices and the general price level73. (2) Even in 
settings with costly price adjustment, the models suggest little long-run trade-off 
between inflation and real activity. (3) The models suggest significant gains from 
eliminating inflation, which stem from increased transactions efficiency and reduced 
relative price distortions74. (4) The models imply that credibility plays an important 
role in understanding the effects of monetary policy (Goodfriend and King (1997), p. 
232). They find these issues to be consistent with monetary policymakers’ statements 
in several countries.  
In addition it is worth pointing that Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) distinguish that 
the policy rules proposed in the extant literature do in fact provide for the events of 
financial crises. A frequently cited reason that they recognise on why monetary 
policy should not adhere tightly to a simple rule is the need for flexibility in the event 
of a financial collapse. Following the U.S. stock market crash in October 1987, for 
example, the decision of the Federal Reserve Board to reduce interest rates gained 
firm support, which was based largely on instinct as there had been virtually no 
formal theoretical work to rationalise his kind of intervention. They finally contend 
that “concern about financial stability appears to be an important constraint on 
policy-making, and it is, in fact, one possible reason why central banks smooth 
interest rate changes” (Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), p. 1703). 
                                                 
72 This major lagged effect has been accepted to span over 18 to 24 months.   
73 This effect has been modelled in various ways with respect to the time-lags in the variables entering 
the IS and the price-setting function, i.e. respectively the time-lags from the interest rate to output and 
from output to inflation. 
74  Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001) assert that nominal price stickiness is the only distortion 
preventing the identity between the rational expectations equilibrium and the first best allocation of 
resources, and therefore, the optimal monetary policy aims at reproducing the allocation of resources 
which would occur under flexible price equilibrium.  
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 The model ignores the monetary and financial analysis that plays an important role in 
a central bank’s decision-making, as Gaspar and Kashyap (2006) point. A clear 
demonstration of this omission75 is Chart 2.1. showing the monetary transmission 
mechanism (presented in Chapter 2). The logic of the New Keynesian model can be 
traced through the left hand side of the Chart 2.1, which shows the link between the 
official interest rate, expectations and prices. The chart, however, also shows that 
policy is believed to operate by affecting bank and market rates, which are thought to 
influence prices independently. In Woodford (2003, chapter 4) this connection is 
precisely derived. In particular, he shows that the IS function can be of the following 
form: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1t t t t t t t ty y E y y E vη α ρ π∗ ∗+ + +− = − + − + t
                                                
 , 
where ρ is the interest rate that is relevant for spending decisions and ν is the 
aggregate demand shock. One of the points of Woodford (2003) is that the above 
equation is consistent with Wicksell’s view of the economy. Gaspar and Kashyap 
(2006) assert that though Wicksell himself presumed that a “loan” rate was the 
relevant one for spending, ρ can be refered to as a loan rate, while it could also be 
interpreted as the required return on equity or the corporate bond rate. In contrast to 
the Wicksellian approach, the convention in the recent literature is to equate ρ with 
the policy rate (Gaspar and Kashyap (2006), p. 102). They believe that the distinction 
between treating ρ as being perfectly and imperfectly linked to the policy rate is 
critical. One reason provided for considering an imperfect connection is that no users 
of this model believe that the short-term interest rate is the critical interest rate for 
 
75 In their analysis, such a conclusion is reached with respect to the ECB, yet it applies to a general 
extent. 
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 spending. Instead one presumably equates ρ with the policy rate because the 
appropriate longer term interest rate that belongs in the above equation is itself a 
stable function of the policy rate. The expectations hypothesis of term-structure 
determination might justify this simplification if there were no time-variation in any 
term-premia. However, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) (among others) document the 
considerable time-variation in term-premia. More importantly, the Fall 1998 and 
September 2001 episodes specifically suggest that policymakers are sometimes quite 
concerned about such variation (Gaspar and Kashyap (2006), p. 106). 
Therefore, while it is deemed crucial for the monetary authorities to monitor 
developments regarding the connections between the policy rate and market rates 
(and asset prices), the consensus model (and proposed extensions), to our knowledge, 
fails to provide a widely accepted structural representation of the monetary and 
financial system and of their role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
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  C H A P T E R  4  
F I N A N C I A L  S T A B I L I T Y  A N D  C E N T R A L  B A N K  
O B J E C T I V E S  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Since financial institutions are the issuers of the largest component of the money 
stock, from the beginning of their formation central banks have had a natural interest 
in maintaining financial stability. The stability of the financial system, in turn, 
promotes the smooth functioning of the payment systems and the effective 
transmission of monetary policy, thus, ensuring that the primary monetary policy 
objective of achieving and maintaining price stability is reached. Furthermore, a 
robust financial system enhances the resilience of the economy to shocks of various 
sources, having also an effect to the overall performance of the economy.  
A definition of the rather complex notion of financial stability has been considerably 
demanding, and eventually seen by most analysts as a ‘negative’ concept, namely in 
terms of avoiding financial crises. Financial stability, however, has a positive 
dimension, as “it is a condition where the financial system is capable of performing 
well at all of its normal tasks and where it is expected to do so for the foreseeable 
future… requiring that the principal components of the system – i.e. financial 
institutions, markets and infrastructures – are jointly capable of absorbing adverse 
disturbances. [Financial stability] requires that the financial system is facilitating a 
smooth and efficient reallocation of financial resources from savers to investors, that 
financial risk is being assessed and priced accurately and that risks are being 
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 efficiently managed” (ECB (2004a), p. 7). There is also a forward-looking dimension 
to the stability of the financial system as the inefficient allocation of capital and the 
mispricing of risk may render the system fragile enough to guarantee stability in the 
future and avoid wide-scale contagious effects to the economy as a whole. 
As Sinclair (2001) points out “without trying to understand such phenomena of risks 
and crises, whenever and wherever they occur, we have little hope of preventing their 
repetition”76 (Sinclair (2001), p. 1). Consequently, when assessing the stability of the 
financial system in order to determine the necessity of undertaking remedial action or 
not, the regulatory and monetary policy authorities can follow three broad steps as 
identified by ECB (2004a): “The first entails forming an assessment of the individual 
and collective robustness of the institutions, markets and infrastructures that make up 
the financial system. The second involves an identification of the main sources of 
risk and vulnerability that could pose challenges for financial system stability in the 
future. The third and final step is an appraisal of the ability of the financial system to 
cope with crisis, should these risks materialise” (ECB (2004a), p. 7). As the process 
of design and conduct of monetary policy incorporates the effects of main sources of 
risk and vulnerability to the financial system, the above refers to addressing sources 
of negative outcomes that tend to be considered as considerably unlikely, but 
possible to cause highly adverse impacts to the financial system and the economy 
overall. 
 
 
                                                 
76 For an analytical discussion refer to the twelve questions about financial stability presented in 
Sinclair (2001), p.7- 8 and the pertinent debate in Healey and Sinclair eds. (2001).  
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 4.2 Public Policy and Financial Stability 
A liberalised financial system is more apt to accommodate fluctuations in economic 
activity and even to reinforce them. In particular, in such a system, the participants’ 
varied perceptions of value and the willingness to undertake risk are vital factors 
driving economic activity, which are closely related to business conditions, stirring 
the potential of amplifying fluctuations in economic activity. From this viewpoint, 
credit, asset prices and indicators of the pricing of risk (as for example credit 
spreads) are justified as highly procyclical. Booms in economic activity may also 
give rise to self-reinforcing processes encompassing rises in asset prices, laxity in the 
constraints to external financing, possibly currency appreciations, further capital 
deepening, a rise in productivity and increase in measured profits. The reverse will 
take place during contractions. Even though the above processes are a natural part of 
business fluctuations, at times their intensity may be of such a high degree that the 
financial system’s inherent stabilisers may fail to protect it from becoming 
overstretched. Crockett (2003), among others, advocates that ‘financial imbalances’ 
and their associated distortions in the real economy would build up under a facade of 
benign economic conditions. When these imbalances eventually unwind, the effects 
can be acutely adverse, causing serious strains on the economy or in the worst case 
serious financial instability (Crockett (2003) p. 3). 
In general, the concept of financial stability typically refers to preserving the core 
economic functions of the financial system in order to enhance the unobstructed 
channelling of savings into investments and provide for an efficient and safe 
payment mechanism. Along these lines, Padoa-Schioppa (2002) suggests defining 
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 financial stability as “a condition where the financial system is able to withstand 
shocks without giving way to cumulative processes which impair the allocations of 
savings to investment opportunities and the processing of payments in the economy. 
In the jargon of central banking, this function used to be labelled as maintaining 
“orderly conditions” in the financial system” (Padoa-Schioppa (2002), p. 20). 
Safeguarding financial stability never failed to be a principal and fundamental 
concern of central banks. In this sense, a financial stability objective for central 
banks would be fitting. However, it would seem difficult to decide on the weight 
applied to the financial stability objective in comparison to the other objectives. In 
addition, it may prove considerably demanding to judge the degree of ‘activism’ 
exercised by a central bank while in pursuit of their financial stability objective. 
An additional crucial issue is an accurate and useful definition of financial stability. 
Most efforts have been made by addressing the issue as a ‘negative concept’ and 
defining, thus, financial instability, which according to Sinclair (2007) means that 
“none of our banks is in or near the brink of insolvency, and our currency is not 
lurching, or thought to be about to lurch, in extreme value” (Sinclair (2007), p. 2). 
Ferguson (2003), also, views a useful for a central bank concept of financial 
instability to involve some notion of market failure or externalities that may 
potentially influence real economic activity (Ferguson (2003), p. 7). The presence of 
market imperfections such as moral hazard and asymmetric information that can be 
widespread and of a significant level may pose a substantial threat to the functioning 
of an otherwise healthy financial system. The (isolated or combined) outcomes that 
may be in the form of bank runs, panics, bubbles in asset prices, excessive leverage, 
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 or inadequate risk management, reflected in sharp and prolonged shifts of financial 
prices from their fundamental level, credit conditions that are either too lax at certain 
periods or far too restrictive at others, as well as greater volatility in spending and 
real activity, tend to be highly undesirable from a social welfare viewpoint.  
By viewing financial instability as above, Ferguson (2003) distinguishes between 
two roles for public policy in the pursuit of financial stability, conducted by central 
banks and other authorities: the prevention of instability and the management of the 
consequences when markets become unstable. Addressing the first, he views that 
“the single most important thing a central bank can do is to foster a macroeconomic 
environment of low and stable inflation and sustainable economic growth” (Ferguson 
(2003), p. 7).  If this fails to be the case, the risks of the financial system becoming 
unstable are higher and the effects of the latter are more harmful. Nevertheless, 
central banks can and, in fact, have traditionally undertaken various activities in 
order to attenuate the risks of financial instability, such as impose effective financial 
regulations, strive for efficient bank supervision, as well as operating or overseeing 
properly functioning payment systems. Concerning the aspect of managing the 
consequences of financial instability converting into a crisis, central banks can utilise 
their basic tools so as to alleviate liquidity pressures and prop up public confidence. 
They can, for example, provide reserves via open market operations or lend directly 
to depository institutions through a lender-of-last-resort operation or via the discount 
window, in addition to possibly cutting reserve requirements or lower the policy rate. 
Therefore, it is vital from a social welfare perspective that central banks and other 
authorities strive to encourage and support private sector planning and investments 
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 that fully reflect the social value of contingency arrangements (Fergusson (2003), p. 
7-8). 
Nevertheless, it seems important to note that one should not lose sight of the 
remarkable efficiency and stability financial markets can at times exhibit. At the 
arrival of new information, financial asset prices are expected to respond promptly, 
justifying, thus, the occasional volatility in asset prices. Moreover, financial markets 
are both dynamic and evolving. The forces of competition, deregulation and 
globalisation, as well as the use of new technologies render some firms obsolete 
enough to cope with the evolving and more efficient business models forcing them to 
cease operation. Therefore, a challenging task for central banks and other authorities 
is to distinguish between the developments that truly represent market failures that 
necessitate public intervention, from those that reflect an unavoidable, warranted and 
benign turbulence in the dynamic market, what is commonly termed ‘a shift in 
fundamentals’ (Ferguson (2003) p. 8). 
 
4.3 Central Banks’ Interest in Financial Stability 
The foregoing discussion suggests that financial stability to some degree already is 
an important objective for central banks, even those that are viewed as concerned 
only with price stability. The vital issue then becomes the relative weight 
policymakers should apply to financial stability as an objective when they design 
their policy, rather than whether it should be part of the central objectives or not. The 
answer is not definitive neither shrank to a small set of alternatives. As Sinclair 
(2001) remarks, “financial stability impinges upon monetary policy and reacts to it. 
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 There are therefore powerful arguments for retaining responsibility for both within 
the central bank” (Sinclair (2001), p. 17). 
At one extreme, in a central bank focusing almost entirely on price stability concerns 
about financial stability arise only in the actual event of a crisis.  This is what 
Svensson (2002), for example, identifies as a strict inflation targeting regime. On the 
opposite side, a central bank may exhibit extreme sensitivity to signs of financial 
instability and, consequently, a willingness to conduct policy pre-emptively to 
counter the adverse effects of potential instability even at times when the near-term 
outlook for economic activity overall and price stability specifically do not warrant 
such actions (Ferguson (2003), p. 10-11). 
According to Ferguson (2003) there are three central issues referring to the degree of 
activism that central banks should adopt while in pursuit of a financial stability 
objective. The first issue is about the ways in which a financial stability objective can 
influence the central bank incentives and other policy goals. He also views a 
financial stability objective being accorded too much weight as giving rise, even at 
the margin, to the possibility of impairing the conduct of monetary policy in 
achieving macro ends. The second issue refers to the perception of the financial 
stability objective by investors and the public in general, highlighting, in particular, 
the possibility of an overly activist monetary policy in the pursuit of a financial 
stability objective giving rise to moral hazard behaviour. The final issue involves 
questions about whether a highly activist central bank approach with respect to 
financial stability may actually result in increasing the volatility of economic 
variables (Ferguson (2003), p. 11). Therefore, since these points suggest that a highly 
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 activist approach with respect to financial stability may prove to be rather 
problematic, it is of significant importance to determine how a central bank may 
include financial stability considerations into its policy design. In fact, it is also 
uncontested how considerably challenging it is for policymakers to determine the 
relevant policy over an extended horizon as it may demand complicated and difficult 
judgements concerning the short and long-run effects of alternative policy designs. 
Nevertheless, from the central bank policymaking perspective, concerns about 
financial instability are mostly weighed with respect to the effects on expectations 
about inflation and output. 
However, a central bank that is confronted with the prospect of financial instability 
may at times need to alter its policy to an extent greater than would be necessitated 
solely by the forecasts for inflation and output. According to Ferguson (2003) such 
an approach is “perfectly consistent with a central bank that conducts monetary 
policy using forecasts for key macro variables as its primary guideposts but also 
considers the risks to the forecasts for those key macro variables, as one might think 
of this as a process of stress testing by monetary policy decision makers in which 
they regularly assess not just the likely path of output and inflation in reaching their 
policy decisions but also the potential for adverse outcomes in light of recent or 
potential shocks” (Ferguson (2003) p. 13). 
Finally, bearing in mind that a generally accepted definition of financial stability has 
not emerged in the literature, and besides the tendency to define financial instability 
instead, there exists a clear distinction between definitions that refer to the volatility 
of directly observable financial variables and those that are based on a system 
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 approach. The latter tend to broadly follow Mishkin (1991), which can be adapted 
according to Issing (2003) to a broad, but intellectually convincing definition of 
financial stability as “the prevalence of a financial system which is able to ensure in a 
lasting way, and without major disruptions, an efficient allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities” (Issing (2003), p. 16). The degree of financial fragility can 
then be viewed as the proximity of the economy to the break point, exceeding that 
which would impair the efficient allocation of savings77 (Issing (2003), p. 16). 
 
4.4 Financial Stability and Price Stability 
More frequent in theoretical work tend to be definitions of financial stability that are 
more directly observable (even though less conceptually convincing than the one 
mentioned above) which refer to situations with asset price stability, the absence of 
banking crises, and relative to some benchmark for the policy rate, interest rate 
smoothness. Nevertheless, an appropriate standard for even this style of definitions 
has not yet emerged.   
If a definition of financial stability as interest rate smoothness is used, then following 
the result in Poole (1970) in the face of aggregate demand shocks there is a trade-off 
with price stability and, thus, the central bank needs to choose the degree of 
stabilisation of either interest rates or output and inflation. Therefore, a suitable 
                                                 
77 As this definition focuses on the resilience of the financial system, it would not give proof of 
financial instability with each individual bank failure or each large shift in an asset price. Conversely, 
large asset price volatility that may lead to bank and financial institution failures after the realisation 
of a strong real or financial shock, may even prove the inherent stability or the self-purifying powers 
of the system, provided that there is no impairment on the efficient financial intermediation and 
financing process. Issing (2003), views this definition as having “little practical guidance for any 
institution trying to maintain or to contribute to the goal of financial stability” (Issing (2003), p. 16). 
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 definition of financial stability is crucial with regard to the trade-off between 
monetary and financial stability (for a detailed discussion see Issing (2003)). 
However, the existence of a trade-off between price and financial stability is not 
widely accepted, since the conventional view regards inflation as a major cause of 
financial instability. Inflation renders misperceptions about future return possibilities 
more likely and it can deteriorate the asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers. As high inflation tends to be related to high inflation volatility, the 
problems of accurately predicting real returns become worse. Traditionally, the 
presence of high inflation in addition to a business cycle boom has been thought to 
give rise to real overinvestment and asset price bubbles. Excess liquidity that is 
provided by the central bank gives rise to inappropriately lax lending standards. 
Excessive credit growth (in view of realistic return expectations) tends to be a main 
factor for the development of financial instability. Therefore, price stability and the 
focus of monetary policy on such an objective are crucial for the stability of the 
financial markets (Issing (2003), p. 17).  
Proponents of the above, to one extreme, even view price stability as sufficient to 
guarantee financial stability (Schwartz (1995)), or from a less extreme perspective, 
they claim that financial stability tends to be promoted by price stability (Bordo and 
Wheelock (1998)). Issing (2003) finds it difficult to discredit the latter because, in 
the long run, price stability and financial stability reinforce each other, and also since 
there is sufficient empirical evidence that many financial crises were caused by 
major price-level shifts and since, historically, most banking crises occurred during 
the course of recessions that succeeded periods of high inflation (Issing (2003), 
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 p.17). In this way, the approach to monetary policy that considers price stability as 
the principal objective is also appropriate for the maintenance of a stable financial 
system. Therefore, the conventional view does not accept the presence of a general 
trade-off between the achievement of monetary and financial stability.  
Nevertheless, an environment of stable prices cannot always deter the build up of 
financial imbalances. The examples most commonly given are the United States 
during the 1920s and Japan during the late 1980s, which demonstrate that price 
stability cannot guarantee financial stability as well. At times, even when the only 
central bank objective is price stability (as defined over the relevant medium-term 
horizon), to consider financial imbalances while designing monetary policy may lead 
to a different stance than fixed-horizon inflation targeting (see footnote 78 for more 
on this point). 
In fact, research has recently indicated that achieving and maintaining low inflation 
leads to the creation of a “new environment” (as mainly stated in the relevant Bank 
for International Settlements research papers, see eg. Borio, English and Filardo 
(2003)), that does not reflect a maintenance of financial stability through the 
safeguarding of price stability. Views have also been expressed as radical as 
advocating the reverse of the conventional approach mentioned above78. The focus 
                                                 
78 Issing (2003) identifies initial signs of such a discussion can be found in the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) minutes of the 13.11.1996 meeting, a few weeks prior to Chairman Greenspan’s 
famous speech on “irrational exuberance”. During this FOMC meeting Governor Lindsay mentioned 
that he was preoccupied by the thought that central bank’s success in controlling inflation could 
produce an extremely optimistic outlook on the future course of the economy. People’s false sense of 
security could lead to asset valuations which could pose problems for the future. Additional arguments 
have been proposed since then trying to explain why low and stable inflation can increase the 
vulnerability of the financial system. The main reasons suggested are that “for quite some time 
inflationary pressure might not show upon inflation itself, due to (a) low pricing power of firms, (b) 
positive supply side developments and (c) well anchored low inflation expectations” (Issing (2003), p. 
18). 
108 
 that central banks tend to apply mainly on (consumer) price stability is claimed to be 
insufficient and the suggestion is to address the perceived financial imbalances 
directly. Such a direct response can be either in terms of prevention (or in the least 
control) of the building-up process or the smoothing of the adverse consequences 
when the imbalances are eventually unfolding. Still accepting that the central banks’ 
ultimate objective should be monetary stability, this “new environment” short-term 
conflict presents the build-up of financial imbalances as crucial enough, even 
constituting a potential, long-run threat to price stability (Issing (2003), p. 19).  
A necessary condition for any central bank intervention is the ability of the central 
bank to identify in real time the presence of a bubble in asset prices. Varied evidence, 
though, demonstrates that the developments in the (US for example) stock market 
during the late 1990s were not related to fundamentals to a great extent. This kind of 
information is available both to the central banks, as well as the market participants, 
but as the actual timing of the bursting of the bubble is highly uncertain and 
extremely difficult to predict, market participants tend to find it more rewarding to 
exploit the upward trend of the bubble than to bet against it. Issing (2003) finds this 
view in line with the literature on market efficiency, “which finds that returns are to 
some degree predictable, but the horizon over which this would be exploitable is too 
long to be sustainable for individual market participants and, thus the central bank 
might have a role to play in providing a noisy but unbiased opinion about 
equilibrium prices to the public” (Issing (2003), p. 19).    
If the financial market participants expect the central bank to support the stock 
market if it crashes, then relevant prices will most likely be increased, helping, thus, 
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 the excessive valuation of assets and inflating a bubble that may crash later. 
Certainly such a series of outcomes is what the central bank would rather avoid. The 
question raised is whether central bank should try to prick an asset price bubble in 
the effort to avoid the eventual collapse of the pertinent asset prices, which tends to 
be highly damaging to the economy. Ceccheti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani 
(2000), for example, give an affirmative answer, yet Mishkin and White (2003) find 
serious flaws in the above argument. Their principal claim is that it is very hard for 
central banks to determine with precision if a bubble is actually underway. This 
implies that the monetary authorities have no informational advantage over the 
private sector. Therefore, if the monetary authorities know of the development of a 
bubble that will eventually crash, then market participants must be aware of that as 
well, positioning themselves accordingly restricting the growth of the bubble. If the 
central bank has no informational advantage then it may well falsely predict the 
presence of a bubble (as the market may as well), pursuing, thus, the wrong monetary 
policy (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 76). 
By examining 15 episodes of stock market crashes in the US during the 20th century 
Mishkin and White (2003) basically conclude that “the key problem facing monetary 
policymakers is not stock market crashes and the possible bursting of a bubble, but 
rather whether serious financial instability is present” (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 
76). In particular, they demonstrate that the US stock market crash during the years 
1999-2000 affected interest-rate spreads to a minor extent, claiming, thus, that that 
episode of a stock market crash had not been related to financial instability. They 
further concluded that (at the time of publication) an ad hoc central bank response to 
the stock market decline was not warranted. They also finally advocated that a focus 
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 of the monetary authorities on financial stability as opposed to the stock market 
could result in an optimal response to stock market fluctuations, reinforcing, thus, the 
independence of the central bank (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 76). 
Chapter 2 discusses in some detail the transmission process which starts with a 
change in official interest rates. There still remains the issue at which level and how 
strongly a central bank should react to perceived misalignments in asset prices with 
respect to fundamental values. Accordingly, this issue is addressed in detail in the 
following two sections. 
 
4.5  Monetary Policy and Asset Prices79  
Even though typically the monetary policy instrument is an interest rate, other asset 
prices in addition to those on debt instruments also transmit monetary policy 
impulses to the economy. Therefore, it is crucial for the monetary authorities to 
identify the role that movements in these other asset prices are likely to play in the 
conduct of monetary policy. This section discusses the monetary transmission 
mechanism through these other asset prices and their role in monetary policymaking. 
4.5.1 Asset prices in the monetary transmission mechanism 
The three kinds of asset prices that provide important distinct channels of the 
monetary transmission mechanism, common in the extant literature, are the stock 
market prices, the real estate prices, and the exchange rates. A brief discussion 
follows on each case. 
                                                 
79 This section draws on Mishkin (2001). 
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 (a)   Stock Market Prices 
Monetary policy influences the stock market fluctuations, which strongly affect the 
aggregate economy. There are three types of monetary transmission mechanisms 
with respect to the stock market, namely i) the stock market effects on investment, ii) 
the firm balance-sheet effects, iii) the household wealth effects and iv) the household 
liquidity effects. 
i. Stock Market Effects on Investment. An important evaluation of the effects that 
movements in stock prices can have on the economy is given by Tobin’s q-theory 
(Tobin, 1969). Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of firms to the replacement 
cost of capital. For high values of q, the market price of firms is high relative to the 
replacement cost of capital, and therefore, the investment on new plant and 
equipment capital is cheap with respect to the market value of firms. Then the issuing 
of stock comes at a higher price relative to the cost of buying the new facilities and 
equipment. Therefore, high values of q lead to a rise in corporate investment 
spending.  
The important aspect of Tobin’s q-theory is the distinction of a link between stock 
prices and investment spending. Through an effect of monetary policy to stock prices 
the monetary authorities can, then, exert influence on investment spending and 
aggregate demand. In detail, expansionary monetary policy lowers interest rates 
rendering bonds less attractive than stocks and, thus, stirs an increase in the demand 
for stocks which raises their price. Since higher stock prices lead to higher 
investment spending, as explained by q-theory, higher investment results in higher 
aggregate demand and a rise in output. 
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 A different view of this mechanism, other than Tobin’s q-model, is by accepting that 
companies finance investment not only through bonds but also through equity (by 
issuing common stock). An increase in stock prices, through expansionary monetary 
policy, lowers the cost of capital. It renders investment financing for firms cheaper 
since more funds are produced for each share that is issued. Therefore, a rise in stock 
prices results in an increase in investment spending80.  
ii. Firm Balance-Sheet Effects. Asymmetric information problems in credit markets 
give rise to another transmission mechanism for monetary policy operating through 
stock prices. As it has been presented in Chapter 2 this mechanism is referred to as 
the “credit view”, and describes the effect of stock prices on firms’ balance sheets. It 
is often referred to as the balance-sheet channel81. 
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems become more severe as the net worth 
of firms declines. A decline in net worth implies that for loans made to a firm 
effectively less collateral can be given. Thus losses from adverse selection 
potentially increase, which, eventually, results in a decrease in lending to finance 
investment spending. In addition, a decline in the net worth of business firms makes 
the moral hazard problem more severe since it implies that firm-owners posses a 
lower equity stake, inducing them to undertake risky investment projects. As 
engaging in riskier investment projects increases the probability of default on debt 
issued on the firm, lower net worth results in a decline in lending and, thus, in 
investment spending.  
                                                 
80  Bosworth (1975) and Hayashi (1982) demonstrate that this alternative description of the link 
between stock prices and investment is equivalent to the Tobin’s q approach. 
81 Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Cecchetti (1995) Hubbard (1995, 2001) and Bernake, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999) give surveys on the credit view. 
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 A monetary policy expansion that leads to a rise in stock prices, as stated above, 
raises the new worth of firms that renders the moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems less severe, and, thus, increases lending. Higher lending, in turn, leads to 
higher investment spending and aggregate spending. 
iii. Household Liquidity Effects. Different balance-sheet channels of monetary 
transmission involve household balance sheets, in particular liquidity effects on 
consumer durables and housing expenditures82. According to the liquidity effects 
approach the balance-sheet effects work through their influence on consumer’s desire 
to spend rather than on lender’s desire to lend. Consumer durables and housing are 
considerably illiquid assets due to asymmetric information relative to their quality.  
If consumers were in need to increase their income by selling their consumer 
durables or housing, they would expect substantial losses since in a distress sale it is 
difficult to get the full value of these assets. On the contrary, if consumers posses 
financial assets (as for example stocks, bonds, or money deposited in a bank), it 
would be easy to sell them quickly and at their full market value. Therefore, if 
consumers more likely expect to find themselves in financial distress, they would 
prefer to hold more liquid financial assets and fewer illiquid consumer durable or 
housing assets. 
A consumer’s fair estimate of the likelihood of suffering financial distress can be 
drawn from the consumer’s balance-sheet. When, for instance, consumers possess a 
large amount of financial assets in relation to debt, they can estimate a low 
probability of financial distress and, hence, will be more willing to purchase 
                                                 
82 See Mishkin (1976, 1977). 
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 consumer durables or housing. After an increase in stock prices, the value of 
financial assets rises as well. In turn, expenditure in consumer durables will also be 
higher since consumers are in a more secure financial position and have a lower 
estimate of the likelihood of suffering financial distress.  
iv. Household Wealth Effects. An additional balance-sheet channel that operates 
through consumers involves household wealth effects. The life-cycle model 
described in Modigliani (1971) explains that consumption is determined by the 
resources that consumers acquire over their lifetime. A vital component of lifetime 
resources of consumers is their financial wealth, which tends to be mainly in 
common stocks. Therefore, a monetary policy expansion that leads to higher stock 
prices increases the value of household wealth, raising in turn consumers’ lifetime 
resources, that leads to a rise in consumption. This transmission mechanism has been 
estimated to be quite strong in the United States, yet the size of the wealth effect is 
still controversial83. 
(b)   Real Estate Prices 
Real estate prices also play an important role in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. They can affect aggregate demand in three ways, namely through i) 
direct effects on housing expenditure, ii) household wealth, and iii) bank balance 
sheets. 
i. Direct Effects on Housing Expenditure. Expansionary monetary policy that lowers 
interest rates leads to a decrease in the cost of financing housing expenditure and 
                                                 
83 See Modigliani (1971) and Lettau, Ludvigson and Steindel (2001). 
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 therefore increases housing prices. If housing prices are higher than construction 
costs, construction firms find it more profitable to build housing. The result is a rise 
in housing expenditure and, thus, an increase in aggregate demand84.  
ii. Household Wealth Effects. A monetary expansion raises housing prices, 
which are an important component of household wealth, which in turn affects 
consumption spending. Therefore a rise in housing prices, raises household wealth, 
which increases consumption spending and thus aggregate demand. 
iii. Bank Balance Sheets. According to the credit view of the monetary 
transmission mechanism banks play a special role in the financial system since they 
are especially well suited to solve asymmetric information problems in credit 
markets. Then certain borrowers may not be able to access the credit markets except 
from borrowing from banks85 . Banks typically undertake a large amount of real 
estate lending, using the value of the real estate as collateral. If expansionary 
monetary policy raises real estate prices, banks’ losses from default will be smaller 
increasing, thus, bank capital. A rise in bank capital induces banks to engage in more 
lending. As banks are ‘special with many customers dependent on them’, the result is 
a rise in investment and, subsequently, aggregate demand.  
The reverse of the sequence described above, namely when real estate prices fall, has 
been described as a “capital crunch”. This transmission mechanism had been 
operational in the United States in the early 1990s as described in Bernanke and 
                                                 
84 According to Mishkin (2001), this approach to housing expenditure is in fact a variant of Tobin’s q-
theory in which q for housing investment is the price of housing relative to its replacement cost. For 
an empirical analysis of a model of this type, see McCarthy and Peach (2001) and Mishkin (2001). 
85 See Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). 
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 Lown (1991) and according to Mishkin (2001) has been an important source of 
stagnation in Japan in recent years. 
(c)   Exchange Rates 
The two main mechanisms identified to operate through exchange rates are the 
exchange rate effects on net exports and the exchange rate effects on balance 
sheets 86 . The growing internationalisation of economies and the employment of 
flexible exchange rate regimes have drawn increasing attention on the effects of 
monetary policy to exchange rates that influence net exports and aggregate output, in 
turn. Under a fixed exchange regime this channel of monetary transmission 
disappears and its impact increases the more open an economy is. A monetary policy 
expansion influences the exchange rates because it lowers domestic interest rates 
and, thus, deposits denominated in domestic currency become less attractive to their 
foreign counterparts. Exchange rate fluctuations also have an impact on aggregate 
demand through their effects on balance-sheets of financial and non-financial firms 
when a large part of domestic debt is denominated in foreign currency as, for 
example, is the case in most emerging markets. Expansionary monetary policy in 
these countries may also adversely affect aggregate demand if it results in a 
depreciation of the exchange rate. 
To sum up, this section suggests that monetary policy works not just through its 
direct effects on interest rates, but also through its effects on other asset prices. Since 
other asset prices are an important element of the monetary transmission mechanism, 
it is important to evaluate how monetary policymakers can incorporate movements of 
                                                 
86 See Mishkin (2001) for an analysis on these issues and for related literature. 
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 these asset prices into their decisions about the conduct of monetary policy. 
Assessing, thus, the role of asset prices in monetary policy, it is worth to discuss how 
central banks might respond to fluctuations in the stock market prices.  
 
4.6 The Role of Monetary Policy under Low Inflation: Deflationary Shocks 
and Policy Responses87. 
This section develops two main points about the influence of the asset markets on 
monetary policy. The first is that equity prices can be a considerably misleading 
guide for interest rate policy actions over the business cycle88 . The second that 
several features of the conduct of monetary policy should be understood in order to 
reflect a central bank’s desire to protect market liquidity while maximizing its 
leverage over longer-term interest rates and aggregate demand89. 
4.6.1 Are equity prices a misleading guide for interest rate policy? 
Giving an affirmative answer to the question above, this subsection first presents two 
cases describing the end of a business expansion when the monetary authorities were 
not sufficiently pre-emptive. The first is the case of an inflation scare which can lead 
to a rise in long-term bond rates and give rise to expectations of contractionary 
monetary policy that will amplify the effects of a recession. In view of the latter 
equity prices will fall. However, in the effort to control inflation the central bank still 
                                                 
87 This section draws heavily on Goodfriend (2001) especially, p. 153-160. 
88 See Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Cecchetti et al. (2000), Bank for International Settlements (1998), 
Smets (1997), and Fuhrer and Moore (1992) for quantitative model-based analyses of this issue, and 
Gertler et al. (1998) and Goodhart (1995) for other points of view. 
89 Goodfriend (1998) discusses related issues. 
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 has to stir a rise in short-term real interest rates. This is the case of the go-stop policy 
cycle in the US during the period before the disinflation of the early 1980s, in 
particular the stop phase of it. 
Otherwise, the central bank can maintain its credibility for low inflation. However, 
labour markets may eventually tighten due to the business expansion, even to the 
extent that an increase in unit labour costs may squeeze firm profits.  The latter may 
trigger a fall in equity prices. In this case as well, contractionary monetary policy 
may be called for in order to control inflation. Yet, in this situation, firm cash flows 
will be reduced, collateral values will fall, and the equity cost of capital for firms will 
be less favourable, all leading to a fall in aggregate demand preventing, thus, the use 
of tighter interest rate policy. Nevertheless, it is the underlying macroeconomic 
conditions that will dictate the proper direction of interest rate policy, which, in none 
of the two cases above can be defined from the direction of equity prices. 
Another example is the case of rising structural productivity growth that gives rise to 
improved future income prospects leading households and firms to increase 
borrowing. With interest rates remaining unchanged, aggregate demand will 
accelerate in excess of current potential output, leading, thus, to increased 
employment in excess of the sustainable long-run trend. In turn, labour markets will 
tighten, and wages will grow faster. However, provided that productivity growth still 
rises, unit labour costs may remain stable or even fall. This implies that rising 
productivity may actually finance rising wages (not sparing profits). Therefore, 
inflation pressures may take time to build up making the central bank reluctant to 
raise real short-term rates, despite the rising equity values reflecting accelerating 
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 profits. When the rising trend in productivity growth stops, the ongoing competition 
for labour in tight labour markets will cause compensation to catch up to the higher 
productivity growth path. Then real wages need to grow faster than productivity 
growth, and, during this transition period, firm profits must grow more slowly. Profit 
growth slowdown is going to subdue the increase in equity prices, or lead them to 
decrease 90 . Yet, under these circumstances, the threat of inflation will be more 
intense than before since labour markets will be even tighter, and firms will not be 
able to finance further nominal-wage growth from rising productivity. In an effort to 
control inflation, the central bank may need to raise interest rates irrespective of the 
behaviour of equity prices. 
The above illustrations explain why equity prices can constitute a misleading guide 
for interest rate policy. 
4.6.2 Monetary policy, long-term interest rates and aggregate demand  
This subsection gives an outline of the way monetary policy operating procedures 
allow central banks to maintain liquidity in the financial markets, maximising at the 
same time the leverage over longer-term interest rates and aggregate demand. Central 
banks are primarily concerned about supporting liquidity in the financial markets. 
The main reasons are that a collapse of market liquidity can adversely affect not only 
asset markets but the economy overall and to a great extent and also because liquid 
markets are necessary in order to transmit the interest-rate-policy actions from the 
central bank to the economy.  
                                                 
90 Goodfriend (2001) indicates the point in Kiley (2000) that “in a production economy with an 
endogenous interest rate faster productivity growth ultimately lowers the ratio of the market value of 
firms to output along the new balanced growth path”  (Goodfirend (2001), p. 154).  
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 Monetary policy implementation employs either a “quantitative” policy instrument 
(like the monetary base or bank reserves) or an interest rate instrument (the overnight 
interbank offered rate). The preference that central banks have shown is for the use 
of the latter, since an interest rate instrument automatically smoothes short-term 
interest rates against short-run shifts in the demand for bank reserves and currency. 
This will always make the supply of bank reserves and currency equal to demand at 
the intended level of short-term interest rates. In fact, if a financial crisis triggers a 
sudden increase in the demand for bank reserves and currency, then this is 
automatically accommodated at the interbank interest rate target.   
Yet, aggregate demand makes a direct response only to long-term rate movements, 
not to movements of the overnight rates. Then, in fact, overnight rates are influenced 
by central bank policy with the aim of having eventually an impact on longer-term 
rates. Longer-term rates tend to be determined by the financial market participants as 
an average of the expected overnight rate over the relevant horizon (allowing for risk 
of default, and a term premium or liquidity spread). The way leverage is exercised 
over longer-term rates is described by the following illustration, regarding the pricing 
of a six-month bank loan. In order to back the issue of the six-month loan, the bank 
can raise funding from a six-month certificate of deposit (CD), or plan to borrow for 
the next six months from the overnight interbank market. The competition among 
banks and cost minimisation broadly equate CD rates to the average expected future 
overnight rate over relevant horizon. In turn, competition in the loan markets links 
the loan rates to CD rates. Finally, it is arbitrage that provides a link between other 
money market rates to CD rates of similar maturity.  
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 Central banks prefer to employ a minimum volatility on the overnight interbank 
offered rate in order to influence longer-term market rates in their aim to protect 
market liquidity further. The main underlying reasons are that sudden and large 
movements in interest rates may threaten liquidity in asset markets, and also that 
nominal interest rates cannot take a negative value. The overnight rate tends to vary 
in a highly persistent way and any change is seldom quickly reversed. As a 
conclusion any single change in the overnight rate affects the stream of expected 
future overnight rates and in turn longer-term interest rates as well. In other words, 
by anchoring what is termed as the “short end of the term structure of interest rates” 
to the overnight rate that is preferred by the central bank, the latter exerts influence 
on long-term rates with as minimum a volatility in short-term rates. 
According to Goodfriend (2001) this line of reasoning justifies two principles in the 
conduct of interest rate policy by central banks. The first is that “the interbank rate 
target is changed only when a near-term reversal is relatively unlikely to be desirable 
ex post”, while the second is that “a central bank is usually inclined to stick with a 
target change for a period of time, even if subsequent events suggest that the target 
change should be reversed quickly… one observes a degree of inertia in a central 
bank’s interest rate policy instrument” (Goodfriend (2001), p. 155)91.  
Furthermore, central banks tend to use discount rate changes92 and announcements in 
addition to changes in the interest rate target with the scope of reinforcing their 
                                                 
91 See Woodford (1999) for a theoretical model of monetary policy on this point. 
92 This point refers to the so-called “Lombard facility” issued for example by the Federal Reserve in 
the U.S. according to which the rate offered in the “discount window” (the discount rate) is higher 
than the interest rate target (a federal funds rate in the U.S.) (see eg. The Federal Reserve Bank 
Discount Window and Payments System Risk website). In this way banks have an incentive to resort 
to borrowing funds from the central bank after all other alternatives have been exploited.  
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 leverage over longer-term rates imposing the less volatility possible on short-term 
rates. These practices are intended to signal central bank preferences over several 
monetary policy stances.  
A central bank intensely concerned about economic conditions pointing at an 
increasing rate of inflation may raise the discount rate in addition to the overnight 
rate in order to anchor inflation expectations reducing thus the likelihood of a 
demand for wage and price increases. Conversely, a central bank may lower the 
discount rate in addition to the overnight rate in order to improve consumer and 
business confidence and, thus, avoid a decrease in production and spending. These 
dual changes may prove to be counterproductive if they result in the public 
misinterpreting the central bank’s intensions, and believing that the latter is more 
worried about recession or inflation than it actually is.   
In addition, communication may prove to be vital in stabilizing securities markets 
after the realisation of a financial shock that leads to a substantial level of default in 
the credit markets or a break in stock market prices straining market liquidity. 
In an effort to reverse this process a central bank can send signals of its commitment 
to support and stabilise the markets. 
A signal of the possible concern of the central bank is send, for example, by a small 
drop in the interbank-rate target taken relatively quickly, especially if it is 
accompanied by a discount-rate cut and a statement of concern. The cut in short rates 
enhances the stabilising of asset prices directly by causing a decline in longer-term 
rates, and indirectly by stimulating aggregate demand. A rate cut bears risks, 
however, because the central bank must be prepared to maintain it for awhile (see 
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 Goodfriend (2001) for the reasoning justifying such an attitude by central banks) 
even if markets bounce back rather quickly. This leads to higher chances of an 
outbreak of inflation if the economy is already at risk of higher inflation 93 . 
Furthermore, the central bank can make use of its discount-window facility, if a 
collapse of lending poses a threat of rendering a liquidity crisis wider and deeper. 
Goodfriend (2001) stresses on this point that “central bank lending would not 
undermine its interest-rate target if financed by selling Treasury securities” 
(Goodfriend (2001), p. 156).  
Nevertheless, by relieving financial distress overall, especially on market-makers, the 
central bank’s lending commitment may effectively counter an incipient market 
liquidity collapse. It is important to emphasise that lending can actually provide time 
to enable the market in redistributing liquidity. Extending the central bank’s lending 
commitment, however, bears risks. Goodfriend (2001) argues “excessive central 
bank support of market liquidity would cause banks, market makers, and other 
beneficiaries of central bank lending to take less care to self-insure themselves 
against financial distress. Enforcing prudential standards on banks and market 
makers would help to deter moral hazard. A central bank should limit its lending so 
that moral hazard does not increase risk in asset markets over time” 94 (Goodfriend 
(2001), p. 156). 
 
                                                 
93 Easy monetary policy in the aftermath of the October 1987 stock market break probably contributed 
to rising U.S. inflation in the late 1980s. 
94 For a lengthy discussion on how to counter this problem see Goodfriend and Lacker (1999). 
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 4.6.3 Monetary policy as a source of deflation and stagnation risk and at 
the zero bound on interest rates 
This section suggests how monetary policy might contribute to asset price volatility 
even under price level stability95. According to Goodfriend (2001) “[though] asset 
prices play an important role in amplifying and propagating shocks, they are a 
conduit rather than a source of deflationary forces” (Goodfriend (2001), p. 156). His 
analysis identifies monetary policy as a fundamental source of deflation and 
stagnation risk. He argues that “there are two problems for monetary policy that put 
an economy at risk of deflation and stagnation when inflation is low. First, a central 
bank can be fooled by its own credibility for low inflation into being insufficiently 
pre-emptive in a business expansion. Allowing a boom to go on too long creates the 
conditions for a bust and a recession after that. Second, although the economy may 
need low or negative short-term interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand 
subsequently, interest rate policy can be immobilized at the zero bound on nominal 
interest rates” (Goodfriend (2001), p. 156).  
A central bank may, thus, show a tendency to delay monetary tightening when the 
economy moves above a presumed level of non-inflationary potential output. The 
timing and magnitude of interest rate policy actions are rather difficult to determine 
in any case. Goodfriend (2001) contends that “pre-emptive interest-rate policy 
actions are difficult to justify to the public when there is little evidence of 
inflationary pressure… the public might come to believe that the economy has 
become less prone to inflation… [and] such optimism could support a boom in 
                                                 
95 See Shiller (1993), (2000). 
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 spending by households and firms, especially if the central bank exhibits a reluctance 
to raise short-term interest rates. The plausibly persistent increase in the economy’s 
non-inflationary productive potential would be reflected in a run-up in equity, real 
estate, and other asset prices” (Goodfriend (2001), p. 157). At some point, however, 
he notes that, if the economy continued to operate significantly above potential, the 
price stability credibility would self-destruct. The combination of a collapse in asset 
prices, open inflation, and declining real economic activity poses difficulties to the 
central bank. As interest-rate policy at the zero bound is immobilised, there is doubt 
about whether monetary policy can act against the deficiency of aggregate demand.  
Goodfriend (2001) gives a concise summary of the role of asset prices in the boom-
bust cycle. He states the following: “Prices of assets such as equity and real estate 
would exhibit considerable volatility, reflecting the wide range of variation in 
expected future income prospects. Asset price movements, in turn, would reinforce 
cyclical volatility by reducing the external finance premium in the boom and raising 
it in the bust part of the cycle. Asset price volatility, however, should be regarded as 
a symptom and not a cause of the boom-bust cycle. Rather than focusing on asset 
prices, central bankers should address the problems for monetary policy that give rise 
to the potential for economic instability” (Goodfriend (2001), p. 158).  
Then he concludes that, certainly, a central bank is not confronted with any good 
options when an unsustainable boom turns into bust.  It, thus, should make every 
effort in the first place not to be insufficiently pre-emptive during an economic 
expansion. In order to protect itself from such a possibility, a central bank needs to 
use a rule that has performed reasonably well in the past as a benchmark to its policy 
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 actions 96. It is also necessary that it positions itself to overcome the zero bound on 
interest-rate policy (Goodfriend (2001), p. 158). 
When inflation is low and stable, a potential problem for monetary policy is, notably, 
the zero bound on nominal interest rates 97 . When price level stability is fully 
credible, (annual) nominal short-term interest rates can average at 1 or 2 percent, 
which does not leave enough room to interest rates to fall in the event of a recession 
to stimulate aggregate demand. Once a central bank has lowered its interbank interest 
rate policy instrument to zero, conventional interest rate policy is immobilized. 
Goodfriend (2001), however, presents an analysis of the two mechanisms according 
to which monetary policy can still stimulate spending even when the interbank rate is 
at the cost-of-carry floor98. 
The immobilization of monetary policy at the zero bound would create pressure as to 
exploit fiscal policy in order to stimulate aggregate demand. However, as Goodfriend 
(2001) argues “it seems that fiscal policies might be costly, relatively ineffective at 
best, and counterproductive at worst”99 (Goodfriend (2001), p. 161). It has to be 
stressed at this point, though, that the above statements seem to overestimate the role 
of monetary policy in deflationary conditions, and perhaps underestimate the role of 
                                                 
96 See Taylor (1999a). In addition, Orphanides (1998) stresses that it is very difficult to measure the 
output gap in real time. His analysis suggests that central banks should respond mainly to inflation and 
downgrade the response of the interest-rate to the output gap in the policy rule. The argument in 
Goodfriend (2001) suggests that, “with credible price stability, responding only to inflation has 
problems of its own”, and “central banks need to respond to real measures of inflationary potential so 
as not to be insufficiently pre-emptive in a business expansion” (Goodfriend (2001), p. 158). 
97 See also Goodfriend (2000), (2001), (2003), McCallum (2000), and Fujiki et al. (2001) for a related 
discussion and analysis of the zero interest policy of the Bank of Japan. 
98 See Goodfriend (2001) for the analysis of the two mechanisms by which monetary policy can 
continue to stimulate spending when the interbank rate is at the cost-of-carry floor. 
99 See Goodfriend (2001) for the fiscal policy pitfalls and a distinction of three types of fiscal policy, 
namely debt-financed government investment in public capital, a debt-financed cut in taxes, and 
microeconomic interventions and regulations to support incomes in specific sectors. 
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 fiscal policy. According to White (2001) there is “no convincing empirical evidence 
that fiscal multipliers are less than one, much less zero” (White (2001), p. 171). 
Nevertheless, the way in which fiscal stimulus is conducted is certainly important. 
He, further, adds that if monetary and fiscal policies are crucial during a deflationary 
period, so is bank restructuring, as well. He contends that “arguably, deflation having 
negative implications for growth100 only occurs when financial instability is a major 
complicating factor. It could be added also that based on successful experience in the 
Nordic countries in the early 1990s, a prompt official response should also be 
definitive, free from political interference, and wholly transparent with respect to the 
burden of costs above all” (White (2001), p. 171). It is noted that in many countries, 
bank restructuring does not qualify for these requirements even to a minimum extent. 
Finally, as also Goodfriend (2001) states, “when it is the general public that refuses 
to face up to reality, then the public perhaps gets both the government and the form 
of bank restructuring which it deserves” (White (2001), p. 171). 
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
Bearing in mind that a generally accepted definition of financial stability has not 
emerged in the literature, and besides the tendency to define financial instability 
instead, there exists a clear distinction between definitions that refer to the volatility 
of directly observable financial variables and those that are based on a system 
approach. The latter tend to broadly follow Mishkin (1991), which can be adapted 
                                                 
100 See BIS (1999), chapter IV. Since the late 1800s, periods of deflation have also generally been 
periods of positive (if moderated) real growth. The principal exception to this was the first few years 
of the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
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 according to Issing (2003) to a broad, but intellectually convincing definition of 
financial stability as “the prevalence of a financial system which is able to ensure in a 
lasting way, and without major disruptions, an efficient allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities” (Issing (2003), p. 16). The degree of financial fragility can 
then be viewed as the proximity of the economy to the break point, exceeding that 
which would impair the efficient allocation of savings (Issing (2003), p. 16). 
Asset prices tend to exhibit considerable volatility, being a sign of the wide range of 
variation in expected future income prospects. Movements in asset make cyclical 
volatility more intense as they reduce the external finance premium during the boom 
phase and increase it during the bust. Nevertheless, asset price volatility seems to be 
a symptom rather than a cause of the boom-bust cycle, and, therefore, monetary 
policymakers need principally to address any monetary policy problems that may 
potentially create economic instability. 
Finally, this chapter explored the relationship between monetary policy, deflation  
and financial stability. After reviewing financial stability (or its negative 
counterpart), we discussed price stability and financial stability and provided a brief 
analysis of the relationship between asset prices, monetary policy, and the 
consequences of financial distress for banking crises or simply movements in asset 
prices. It is argued that equity prices, in fact, constitute a misleading guide for 
interest-rate monetary policy, in addition to the fact that monetary policy actions 
exercise significant protection to market liquidity and maximise a central bank’s 
leverage over longer-term interest rates and aggregate demand. Monetary policy is 
also argued to be a fundamental source of deflation and stagnation risk in a regime of 
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 fully credible price level stability. Two main issues of concern for monetary policy 
remain, though, namely that a central bank can be insufficiently pre-emptive in a 
business expansion, while being misled by its own credibility for low inflation. 
Monetary policy may face the constraint of the zero bound on nominal rates in its 
attempts to reduce real interest rates enough in order to forestall deflation and 
stagnation in the subsequent contraction (as discussed in Goodfriend (2001), (2003)). 
As White (2001) suggests it is crucial to answer the question of how a country enters 
into a deflationary situation. He suggests that “the answer can be succinctly 
expressed in two words, ‘boom’ and ‘bust’…” (White (2001), p. 167). Goodfriend 
(2001) stresses a simple but fundamental point referring to the problem arising in the 
‘boom’ phase of an economic cycle. It is concluded that “justified optimism can turn 
into excessive optimism; rational enthusiasm can turn into irrational exuberance. The 
“good news” of low inflation can blind both policymakers and market participants to 
emerging problems” (White (2001), p. 167). 
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 C H A P T E R  5  
A S S E T  P R I C E  B U B B L E S :  A N  O V E R V I E W  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Monetary policymakers are confronted with no other alternative but to encounter the 
risks caused by asset price bubbles. Bubbles in asset prices create distortions to 
nearly all economic decisions. Wealth effects create rapid expansions in consumption 
followed by vast collapses. Increases in equity prices enable firms to finance new 
projects, causing a boom in investment, followed by a bust. The overvaluation in 
collateral used to back loans leads to balance-sheet deteriorations for the financial 
intermediaries that issued the loans, after the prices collapse. In addition, fiscal 
revenue rises in a booming economy, and encourages, thus, cuts in taxation and 
increases in expenditure. After the consequent, inevitable, slump in asset prices such 
fiscal policy actions are politically difficult to reverse. Therefore asset price bubbles 
can create volatility in consumption, investment, financial intermediaries’ solvency, 
and fiscal policy. They, usually, have an impact on aggregate demand, since they 
cause inflation and output to increase during the boom and decrease during the bust. 
Therefore, monetary policymakers are faced with no other alternative but to address 
the issue of asset price misalignments – even when their primary objective is price 
stability. 
In the effort to evaluate the ways in which monetary policy (as well as public policy 
in general) should address bubbles in asset prices, one must first identify the ways in 
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 which asset prices influence inflation and aggregate economic activity. As those 
influences span through various channels, asset prices send signals with respect to 
profitable investments, influence household wealth, and affect the cost of capital for 
firms and households. Increases in equity prices, for example, irrespective of the 
source – be it bubble-behaviour like “irrational exuberance” or a shift in 
fundamentals like lower real interest rates or faster productivity growth, tend to 
lower the cost of capital, boosting investment, and to generate increased wealth, 
raising, thus, household demand. The resulting fluctuations in resource utilization 
lead to changes in inflation.  
Of course, asset price bubbles have additional implications for economic efficiency. 
Departures of asset prices from levels implied by economic fundamentals can lead to 
inappropriate investments that decrease the efficiency of the economy by diverting 
resources toward economic activities that are supported by the bubble (for example, 
see Dupor, 2005). For example, during the bubble in technology-stocks in the late 
1990s, there was overinvestment in some types of high-tech infrastructure. Similarly, 
the bubble in housing prices led to too many houses being built. Mishkin (2008), in 
particular, views these distortions to activity across sectors of the economy as a ‘drag 
on efficiency’ and hence a matter of concern above and beyond fluctuations in 
overall economic activity and inflation (Mishkin (2008), p. 8). In addition, he 
remarks that monetary policy is directly concerned with the effects changes in asset 
prices impose on inflation and demand through wealth and cost-of-capital channels. 
Bearing, though, in mind that asset price bubbles may vary (sometimes to a great 
extent), it is important to note that some types of asset price bubbles may fall beyond 
the direct responsibility (or circle of influence) of monetary policy but be more 
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 appropriately countered by the broader regulatory framework safe-guarding the 
financial system. He, finally, contends that some asset price bubbles may also stir 
financial instability, and as such raise further substantial concerns for the 
policymakers (Mishkin (2008), p. 1). 
The main function of the financial system is to channel efficiently funds from savers 
to individuals or corporations that present worthy investment opportunities. In the 
presence of shocks obstructing the flow of information that is vital for the smooth 
operation of the system, the latter may be disrupted giving rise to financial instability. 
The subsequent disruption in the credit flow may eventually threaten overall 
economic performance101. The efficiency in the operation of the financial system is 
based on the flow of information that is yet asymmetric in its nature. This asymmetry 
refers to one part in an investment project, which is typically the provider of the 
funds – the lender, being less accurately informed about the project than the other 
that will carry out the investment – the borrower. This type of asymmetry in 
information can give rise to ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’ that hamper the 
efficient operation of the financial system102 (Mishkin (2007a), p. 1-2).  
Financial intermediaries, and especially banking institutions, manage to reduce the 
above informational asymmetry by efficiently collecting information from borrowers 
and building a strong network with their clientele. The growth of financial innovation, 
                                                 
101 See, for example, Mishkin (1997) for a detailed account of the causes of financial instability and its 
effect on economic activity. 
102 Adverse selection describes the problem of financial intermediaries issuing loans to investors who 
are willing to assume excessive risk because they are unlikely to pay back their loans. Moral hazard 
describes the problem a borrower having incentives to undertake excessively risky investments in 
which the lender bears most of the cost in case of failure but the borrower gets a high benefit in case 
of success. See Milgrom and Roberts (1992) for a detailed discussion. 
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 either as new financial products and new types of institutions active in the markets, 
enabled the more efficient flow of information. The latter minimises the problems of 
‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’ and is principal in the ability of the 
participants in the financial markets to collect relevant information and properly 
evaluate the value of assets traded in the financial markets (termed as ‘price 
discovery’). 
However, the flow of information may be disrupted, and price discovery may be 
impaired during periods of financial distress. The increased uncertainty that 
characterizes the disruption in the information flows results in high risk spreads and a 
reluctance to purchase assets103.   
Moreover, during a recession, the deterioration of balance-sheets renders ineffectual 
the use of collateral as a remedy to the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
If a loan is backed by collateral, in the case of default, namely after the lender has in 
effect made an adverse selection, the lender obtains the collateral as compensation. 
Considering moral hazard, the collateral works as a penalty for the borrower in case 
extra risks are assumed that may jeopardise the project, reducing thus the problem of 
moral hazard. Yet as the overall economic outlook deteriorates, collateral values tend 
                                                 
103 In an effort to understand financial instability, it is vital to address two kinds of risk, valuation and 
macroeconomic risk. The first one reflects the difficulty that the market faces in assessing the value of 
a security, due to the inherent complexity of the security or the opaqueness of its underlying 
creditworthiness. According to Mishkin (2007b), “valuation risk has been central to the repricing of 
many structured-credit products during the [recent] turmoil … when investors have struggled to 
understand how potential losses in subprime mortgages might filter through the layers of complexity 
that such products entail” (Mishkin (2007b), p.2). In turn, macroeconomic risk refers to the increase in 
the probability that a disruption in the financial system will deteriorate the real economy to a great 
extent. Such episodes tend to give rise to a vicious circle as real economy deteriorations increase the 
‘opaqueness in the creditworthiness’ of the securities traded in the financial markets, financial 
disruptions lead to a decline in investment and consumer spending leading, thus, to a contraction in 
overall economic activity. This contraction leads to an increase in the uncertainty referring to the 
value of assets making the financial disruption more acute (Mishkin (2007b), p.2). 
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 to deteriorate as well, making the above two problems more acute. As lenders, in turn, 
show a relative reluctance to issue loans, a vicious circle may be in effect reinforcing, 
thus, the macroeconomic downturn.  
Shocks interfering with the flow of information in various parts of the financial 
system precipitating financial instability span from higher interest rates (that may 
give rise to credit rationing) to problems in the banking sector (as a weakening in the 
financial positions of several financial intermediaries), and increases in uncertainty to 
asset-market effects on balance-sheets. Financial instability, in the absence of any 
remedial action, can produce a severely adverse impact not only for the functioning 
of financial markets but also for the overall prospects of a country’s economy. This 
strong link between financial stability and the real side of an economy renders the 
former a principal concern for central banks. Monetary policy authorities face the 
central concern of finding and evaluating ways to prevent financial instability. In this 
endeavour one needs, first, to understand the nature of financial instability and the 
effect it may impose to the macroeconomy.  
As Mishkin (2008) points out, financial history shows a sequence of events that 
typically proceed in the following manner. Stemming from either excessive optimism 
about economic prospects or fundamental changes in the structure of the financial 
system, a boom in credit provision takes place, which leads to higher demand for 
certain assets and, in turn, to higher prices for those assets104. The latter raises the 
values of those assets, consequently, promoting further issuing of credit backed by 
those assets, which further raises demand and, thus, the prices of those assets. Such a 
                                                 
104 For a detailed account of this point see, for example, Kindleberger (2000) and Mishkin (1991). 
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 reinforcing mechanism can create a bubble. The latter can encourage lax credit 
standards since lenders rely more on the further appreciation of the pertinent assets 
(in order to shield themselves from potential loss) than on the borrowers’ ability to 
repay the debt issued to them. When the bubble (inevitably) bursts the mechanism 
described above works backwards. The drop in asset prices causes a decrease in 
supply of credit, and as the demand for assets continues to fall their prices drop 
further. Loan defaults and the slump in asset prices deteriorate the balance-sheet 
positions of financial institutions leading to a further decrease in credit supply and 
investment. Business and household spending shrinks as a result of the decline in 
lending. In turn overall economic activity deteriorates and macroeconomic risk in 
credit markets increases. Finally, “in the extreme, the interaction between asset 
prices and the health of financial institutions following the collapse of an asset price 
bubble can endanger the operation of the financial system as a whole” (Mishkin 
(2008), p. 2). 
 
5.2 Remarks on the Policymaker’s Reaction to Asset Price Bubbles 
Initially, it is useful to refer to Trichet (2003), who recognizes two main reasons 
explaining the growth in asset prices and wealth effects during the last fifteen years. 
The first is the dramatic change in asset valuations stemming mainly from the rise in 
the stock prices of the so-called “new economy” during the mid 1990s and their 
collapse in 2000105. The second refers to the effect that widespread share-ownership 
                                                 
105 Besides the United States (where the above is well documented) the rise in stock prices has been 
considerable even in Europe, where the influence of the “new economy” had been relatively modest 
(Trichet (2003), p. 15). 
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 in several industrialised countries has on the influence of the above changes in asset 
valuations to private spending relative to the past106 (Trichet (2003), p. 15). These 
issues raise the concerns of whether monetary policy should react to movements in 
asset prices. Large swings in asset prices may jeopardise the principal monetary 
policy objective of price stability and may also hamper financial stability, which is of 
major concern to central banks.  
Asset prices can play a significant role in the conduct of monetary policy. The role of 
asset prices in the monetary policy transmission mechanism has been discussed in 
Chapters 4. Briefly, the effect of changes in the policy rate may be transmitted to 
asset prices and asset valuation through several channels. Interest rate changes affect 
expectations about future economic prospects and consequently profit expectations. 
In addition, such changes alter the set of discount factors applied on profit 
expectations or used in order to determine the value of assets. Finally, monetary 
policy decisions may also result in changes in portfolio composition affecting the 
relative prices of the pertinent assets (Trichet (2003), p. 16).  
Furthermore, the wealth effects that changes in asset prices may create, and which 
exert a significant influence over consumption and investment, pass on to the 
economy through several channels. Briefly, these channels include a direct net-
wealth increase that raises consumption via intertemporal smoothing of consumption 
from households, changes in Tobin’s q that stimulate corporate investment, or higher 
collateral values that may lessen external financing constrains and boost spending. 
                                                 
106 For example, market capitalization as a percentage of gross domestic product in France increased 
from 28 percent to 110.5 percent during the 1990s. The share of household equity holdings in 
financial assets increased as well (Trichet (2003), p.15). 
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 Changes in asset prices may also trigger confidence or expectations channels that 
affect corporate and household spending decisions (Trichet (2003), p. 16).  
Asset price misalignments may also raise the risk of creating financial fragility that 
can give rise to adverse economy-wide events. Normally, financial innovation leads 
to more efficient risk sharing, in that risk is undertaken by the most able to bear it 
resulting, thus, in smoother consumption. However, more efficient risk sharing 
enhances the potential for concentration of risk to individuals willing to do so. 
According to Cecchetti (2005) risk concentration, in particular inside leveraged 
institutions can raise the potential of creating financial fragility. He further remarks 
that, “as the risk managers of the economic and financial system, policy makers are 
forced to care about bubbles” (Cecchetti (2005), p. 4). 
In the presence of acceptable evidence that asset price fluctuations do not correspond 
to fundamental levels and with the uncontested recognition of the potential damage 
asset price bubbles can cause to the economy, both policymakers and academic 
researchers fail to accept the proposition that bubbles should be ignored. Yet the 
crucial issue for policymakers is to devise a proper reaction. 
It seems illustrative enough to adapt a classification of possible policy reactions 
provided by Cecchetti (2005) who identifies five suggested responses: 
(i)   ‘Consider bubbles only if they influence forecasts of future inflation’. 
(ii)  ‘Act only after the bubble bursts, reacting to the fallout of the bubble’. 
(iii) ‘Include asset prices directly in the price index targeted by the central bank’. 
(iv) ‘Lean against the bubble, raising interest rates in an attempt to keep it from 
enlarging’. 
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  (v)  ‘Look for regulatory solutions both to keep the bubble from developing and to 
reduce the impact of a crash should one occur’ (Cecchetti (2005), p. 14).  
Each suggested response is considered in more detail below. Initially, it is essential, 
to stress that asset price targeting, namely, a policy response as in (iii), is rejected by 
both academics and policymakers as an inappropriate policy reaction. Cecchetti 
(2005) remarks that policymakers should not target asset prices per se, nevertheless, 
recognizing that “the proposal that interest rates respond to bubbles is completely 
consistent with inflation targeting or any other policy framework based on standard 
stabilization objectives” (Cecchetti (2005), p. 15). This is advocated also, for 
example, by Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003) who stress that: “It is our 
view that central banks can improve macroeconomic performance by reacting to 
asset price misalignments. We are not now saying … that policymakers should target 
asset prices” [emphasis is in the original] (Cecchetti et al. (2003), p. 428). As well as 
their further remark: “We want to emphasize that we are not advocating that asset 
prices should be targets for monetary policy, neither in the conventional sense that 
they belong in the objective function of the central bank, nor in the sense that they 
should be included in the inflation measure targeted by the monetary authorities” 
[emphasis is in the original] (Cecchetti et al. (2003), p. 429).  
Shiratsuka (1999) analyses the appropriate inclusion of asset prices in the price index 
and concludes that it is very difficult to construct such a price index. The main 
reasons he gives are first that the accuracy and coverage of asset price statistics are 
low, that several factors affect the changes in asset prices and, finally, that they are 
significantly influenced by economic and financial developments. A number of the 
principal conceptual and implementation-based issues against the inclusion of asset 
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 prices in a price-index relevant for policy (i.e. against asset-price targeting 107 ) 
present in the academic literature are also concisely given in ECB (2005). In 
particular: 
n, it has to determine the 
fundamental value of assets promptly and accurately108.  
 expected to 
stabilise asset prices, investors’ risk taking behaviour would increase109. 
. This 
may lead to inflation indeterminacy and potentially high inflation volatility 110. 
                                                
1. Two main reasons are identified against the use of asset prices as a proxy for 
future goods prices. First, in the case of the inclusion of asset prices in the pertinent 
price index, in theory, such an index should include all assets, comprising also the 
value of consumer durables and human capital. Second, movements in asset prices 
may not relate to future inflation expectations. Then, in a central bank’s effort to 
device the appropriate reaction to asset price inflatio
2. Asset-price targeting tends to establish a rather ‘mechanical’ policy response that 
may give rise to moral hazard problems. Since monetary policy would be
3. Asset-price determination and forward-looking monetary policy may give rise to 
‘inflation indeterminacy’. Inflation expectations can become self-fulfilling, under 
certain conditions, when central bank policy responds to asset price movements since 
asset prices are partly affected by expectations about future monetary policy
 
107 The term ‘target’ usually refers to an explicit central bank objective. However, Cecchetti (2005), 
for example, uses the term rather loosely to mean either an explicit or implicit objective. 
108 See, for example, Filardo (2000), as well as Diewert (2002) and Smets (1997). 
109 See Goodhart and Huang (1999). 
110 See Bernanke and Woodford (1997). 
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 4. The benefit of explicitly targeting asset prices which tend to be a ‘deficient’ proxy 
for future consumer prices seems unclear, if central banks credibly and successfully 
pursue their consumer price stability objective, stabilising, thus, future inflation 
expectations111. In fact, this may be considered as the monetary policymaker double-
counting consumer price pressures in its information set. 
hods used relate the shares to forecasting ability of future 
consumption prices. The resulting weights may vary considerably with respect to the 
method in use112. 
intless, making the presumption that “monetary policy cannot control the 
                                                
5. In order to construct a price index that includes asset prices it is vital to determine 
the weight given to prices of current consumption goods and assets. Traditionally, 
the method used focuses on expenditure shares, and the resulting weight of asset 
prices may be higher than 90 percent, leading to a highly volatile monetary policy. 
Some other met
6. Any attempt by the central bank to affect asset prices in a systematic way seems to 
be po
fundamental factors which affect asset prices in the long run” (ECB (2005), p. 56-
57). 
To sum up, severe asset price fluctuations can potentially destabilise inflation and 
output to a dramatic extent. More importantly, they pose substantial down-side risks, 
which cannot be ignored by central banks. However, a suitable monetary policy 
reaction to misalignments in equity prices, property prices or the exchange rate 
necessitates an accurate estimation of the relevant numerical size, which is not easy 
 
111 See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (2001), also Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2003). 
112 See, for example, Bryan, Cechetti, O’Sullivan (2003). 
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 to accomplish. Nevertheless, as argued by Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani 
(2003), not only is such measurement vital in forecasting inflation and growth, but 
also it is not more difficult than the critical (for policy design) estimation of potential 
GDP for example (Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003), p. 440). In addition, 
Cecchetti (2005) contends that “policymakers do not usually shy away from 
                                                
important issues just because the solution is difficult” (Cecchetti (2005), p. 20). It is 
important to address the proposed policy reactions in more detail. 
(i) React only if the bubble changes inflation forecasts: This proposition rests in the 
face of substantial evidence that a bubble may be in progress. Influential advocates 
of this proposition have been Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001). Their main point is 
that if monetary policy reacts to booms in asset prices directly, then it faces the 
possibility of destabilising real output and inflation. Therefore, they view an 
appropriate monetary policy response only insofar the forecasts to inflation are 
explicitly affected by the sharp fluctuations in asset prices. Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999) reach the conclusion that: “The inflation targeting approach dictates that 
central banks should adjust monetary policy actively and pre-emptively to offset 
incipient inflationary and deflationary pressures. Importantly, for present purposes, it 
also implies that policy should not respond to changes in asset prices, except insofar 
as they signal changes in expected inflation” [emphasis is in the original] (Bernanke 
and Gertler (1999), p. 78)113. However, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani 
(2000), Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003) and Cecchetti (2005) reject this 
conclusion on the grounds of the definition of monetary policy in Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999, 2001). In particular, they note that the latter address simple rules for 
 
113 This view has also been concisely presented in Bernanke (2002). 
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 monetary policy which do not contain the possibility of any responses of interest 
rates to output gaps, and that if, in fact, the number of possible monetary policy rules 
is expanded a reaction to asset price bubbles will tend to be stabilizing. Taking into 
account that monetary policy is essentially the adjustment of the policy instrument in 
response to shocks so as to reach the relevant stabilisation objectives, Cecchetti 
(2005) remarks that, in Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) framework (which is the 
same as in Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000)) “bubbles are just 
another type of shock to which interest rate policy should react, and as an empirical 
aturity of the bubble. The central bank increases the cost of 
maintaining a speculative position in the market in order to lead the most stretched 
positions to liquidation. 
policy), in the next phase, it may be the case that even marginal interventions may 
matter … reacting to bubbles over and above their impact on forecasts of future 
inflation yields more stable inflation and real growth” (Cecchetti (2005), p. 15).  
Any attempts of the central bank to “prick” the bubble, i.e. to intervene with a 
vigorous tightening of policy in order to counter speculation, would take place in a 
rather late stage in the m
Nevertheless, any such attempts have certain crucial shortcomings. According to 
ECB (2005), initially, “experience indicates that the market reaction to such an 
abrupt change in the prevailing monetary conditions is highly unpredictable” (ECB 
(2005), p. 57). Furthermore, they necessitate considerably large changes in interest 
rates, which, in turn, bare substantial economy-wide risks. Moreover, in the event of 
a bubble being resilient to initial corrective action (in terms of aggressive interest rate 
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 trigger a generalised sell-off, that may make the contraction even more intense114. In 
particular, ECB (2005) argues that “a policy of ‘pricking the bubble’ is not a viable 
netary tightening exists that 
option for a stability-oriented central bank” (ECB (2005), p. 57).  
(ii) Clean up after the bubble bursts: According to Greenspan (2002) monetary 
policy is inefficient before the bubble bursts and that the appropriate response can 
only be to eliminate the adverse consequences. In particular, he contends that a 
policymaker can be certain that a bubble did, in fact, exist only after it unwinds. He 
also remarks that “no low-risk, low-cost, incremental mo
can reliably deflate a bubble” (Greenspan (2002), p. 5).  
In response to this view Cecchetti (2005) argues that asset price bubbles can be 
identified both theoretically and in practice. He views, for example, large movements 
in the ratio of housing price sales to rental values or the ratio of market prices to 
replacement costs as an important signal that a bubble is underway115 (Cecchetti 
(2005), p. 15). Further support is given by Borio and Lowe (2003) who stress that 
other ‘financial imbalances’ tend to present in addition to bubbles in asset prices, 
such as high money-growth or build-ups in debt accumulation. Secondly, as 
mentioned above, Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003) point out that the 
appropriate measurement of asset price misalignments is not more difficult than the 
critical (for policy design) estimation of potential GDP for example (Cecchetti, 
Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003), p. 440). Finally, the experience in Australia during 
(roughly) 1999-2005, where increases in interest rates in addition to effective 
                                                 
114 White (1990), among others, attributes the persistence and intensity of the Great Depression to the 
US Federal Reserve System’s efforts to ‘prick’ an ongoing stock market bubble. 
115 According to Bean (2003) it would be erroneous to undertake ‘mechanical’ responses to changes in 
asset prices alone – irrespective of the fact that proportional changes in rents and earnings also take 
place. 
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 communication of the view that asset price increases (in this case housing) are 
sustainable, can be an example of effective policy response countering an asset price 
bubble. In this case the Reserve Bank of Australia managed to contain the increase in 
housing prices in early 2004 (which remained stable at least for the next two years) 
ion 116 . Cecchetti (2005) suggests that “targeting an index that includes the 
                                                
after an interest rate increase of ten percent for six consecutive years (Cecchetti 
(2005), p. 16). 
(iii) Include housing prices in the target index: A potential response to bubbles that 
may stem from the housing market may be the direct inclusion of housing prices in 
the price index targeted by the central bank. General arguments against asset price 
targeting are stated above. However, referring specifically to housing prices, Bryan, 
Cecchetti, and O’Sullivan (2003) propose that the value of existing homes must have 
a weight in the price index used by the central bank in order to measure aggregate 
inflat
acquisition cost of housing would change things dramatically” (Cecchetti (2005), p. 
17). 
(iv) Use interest rate policy to ‘lean against the bubble’: In this case, in response to 
accelerating asset prices the monetary policymaker adopts a more restrictive policy 
stance than under more normal market conditions and attempts in an early stage to 
 
116  Bryan, Cecchetti, and O’Sullivan (2003) argue that policymakers should be stabilizing the cost of 
lifetime consumption, instead of simply per period consumption, which implies that assets need to be 
taken into account as they are the prices of entire streams of lifetime consumption. Their analysis 
suggests that housing, for example, (i.e. giving housing services over a lifetime) must be included in 
the price index at its current market price (see also Goodhart and Hofmann (2000)). Their analysis 
builds on the seminal work of Alchian and Klein (1973) who accept that the change in the price of a 
given level of utility, which includes the present value of future consumption is a theoretically correct 
measure of inflation. In order to estimate inflation accurately, they argue, a broader price index is 
necessary than one consisting of only the prices of current consumption goods and services. They 
view that central banks should target a price-index including asset prices in order to incorporate the 
price of future consumption. Conversly, Filardo (2000) argues against the inclusion of housing prices 
in an index of inflation as it would not substantially improve economic performance (he refers to the 
US, but draws general conclusions). 
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 avoid inflating the bubble which would have been the case with accommodative 
monetary policy. Therefore, in the shorter term, the central bank may deviate from its 
ates, so as to lower the 
ts in asset 
prices influence aggregate demand, altering inflation and the output-gap in the same 
direction, then monetary policy can, in principle, neutralize these shocks.  
                                                
price-stability objective, so as to reinforce the prospects of price and economic 
stability in the future (ECB (2005), p. 58). 
Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2003) argue in favour of a policy of “leaning 
against the wind of an incipient asset-price bubble” similar to the policy adopted by 
the Reserve Bank of Australia in 2003. Among others, Dupor (2005) presents a 
sticky-price model where firm investment in physical capital exceeds the required 
level at the face of a bubble in equity prices117. In such an event, the most suitable 
reaction for the central bank would be to raise interest r
marginal product of capital, and, thus, depress equity prices. Such optimal policy is 
the one often referred to as ‘leaning against the bubble’118.  
Moreover, empirical evidence on this kind of policy is given by Cecchetti (2003) 
who shows that the U.S. Federal Reserve, in fact, modestly increased interest rates 
reacting to the stock-price boom of the late 1990s. Cecchetti (2005) argues that asset-
price bubbles simply present some “form of destabilizing shocks to which 
policymakers need to react” (Cecchetti (2005), p. 16). Since movemen
 
117 In his model nominal rigidities distort allocations within the economy for a certain specific time, 
yet equity bubbles distort saving and investment decisions over time. According to Dupor (2005), 
since the monetary policymakers possess a single interest rate instrument and face those two problems, 
the optimal policy needs to react to both distortions. 
118 According to Bean (2003), for New-Keynesian macroeconomic models this is a general result. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid credit crunches central banks would generally resort to increases in 
interest rates.   
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 ECB (2005) notes that “a policy of ‘leaning against the bubble’ would appear more 
attractive the higher the costs that the central bank ascribes to large, fundamentally 
unjustified swings in the valuation of assets and the more serious the risk that – if left 
unchecked – market movements would tend to gain momentum as time progresses” 
(ECB (2005), p. 58). This kind of policy bears limited risks when the underlying 
reason of the increase in asset prices is widespread optimistic expectations about 
future rises in productivity. If proven ex post that the optimistic private expectations 
were exaggerated, the prompt implementation of tighter policy at an early stage 
would be justified as capable of restricting the general unjustified optimism. If the 
monetary policymakers impose at an early stage tighter credit conditions, the 
increase in market valuations can be confined rendering the eventual collapse less 
rkets participants, 
disruptive for the economy. On the other hand, if the expectations are confirmed ex 
post, then the increase in productivity and the enhanced growth prospects will 
diminish the cost from the tighter policy (ECB (2005), p. 58). 
Symmetry is also a strong argument in favour of the ‘leaning against the bubble’ 
policy. In this case, the central bank does not create the expectation that it will 
support the economy when asset prices slump and abstain when prices rise, thus 
countering the possibility of systematic under-pricing of risk. This practice 
discourages speculation from the part of the financial ma
restraining the growth of the bubble. Symmetry also enhances the appropriate policy 
design after the bubble unwinds as the risk of the policymaker’s encouraging moral 
hazard behaviour in the future is minimised (ECB (2005), p. 59). 
However, Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2005) argue against the practice of ‘leaning 
against the bubble’. They show that this interest-rate policy response is impractical 
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 mainly because even though interest rates impose a direct effect to the bubble, they 
influence economic activity with a lag. Due to the latter, output falls following the 
bursting of a bubble, and the central bank would prefer to keep interest rates low for 
some period before a crash. However, the probability of the bubble bursting is 
reduced in response to lower interest rates, thus, increasing the bubble. They further 
demonstrate that for stabilization policy to be successful the central bank needs to 
identify the bubble in the early stages of its growth, which is extremely difficult to 
accomplish accurately. Gruen, Plumb and Stone (2005) remark that “there is no 
universally optimal response to bubbles, and the case for responding to a particular 
asset-price bubble depends on the specific characteristics of the bubble process” 
(Gruen, Plumb and Stone (2005), p. 3). Cecchetti (2005), nevertheless, points out 
that probably interest-rate policy is not the most suitable response to asset-price 
bubbles (Cecchetti (2005), p. 16).  
n when the later is gradual and over a longer time-horizon. Finally, 
ECB (2005) remarks that further disadvantages of such a policy may also be, 
initially, that in the case of asset appreciation being generated by actual structural 
imbalances, policies other than monetary policy may be appropriate to address the 
issue. Furthermore, markets tend to overreact even to a small extent to a policy 
intervention, eve
the policymaker runs the risk of encouraging the market participants to perceive that 
monetary policy reacts in a rather automatic way to asset price developments (ECB 
(2005), p. 59).   
(v) ‘Unconventional alternatives’: In addition to interest-rate policy alternative 
policies may prove to be helpful when bubbles are due to structural changes. ECB 
(2005) remarks that, in this case, it may be more relevant to implement prudential 
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 regulation measures or tax code changes, or an overhaul of government transfers and 
subsidies (ECB (2005), p. 59). Moreover, Cecchetti (2005) points out the presence of 
unconventional alternatives to counter asset price bubbles. He questions whether 
changes in the financial market structure are necessary. In particular, he argues of the 
following: “are primarily bank-based financial systems more prone to difficulties? 
Should we strive to increase the importance of secondary financial markets? Or, 
alternatively, move toward narrow banks? The problem with this is that financial 
ividuals to bid up the prices of existing homes and has the potential 
to create frenzies that result in booms followed by crashes – e.g. bubbles. The risk is 
innovation cuts both ways. By making it easier to trade risk, it means that risk can go 
both to those best equipped to bear it and to those willing to accumulate it” 
(Cecchetti (2005), p. 19). 
Furthermore, financial development is also viewed with caution despite its 
uncontested merits. The latter span from enhanced economic development to lower 
volatility of economic growth since it enables consumption and investment 
smoothing through enhanced risk-sharing in the event of higher volatility in income 
and sales. However, Cecchetti (2005) remarkably views the possible shortcomings 
when addressing housing bubbles as follows: “By providing households with a 
mechanism for increasing leverage, especially through mortgage lending, the 
financial system could be increasing the chances of catastrophe. Ready access to 
loans allows ind
that when the bubble bursts there will be a large number of defaults”119 (Cecchetti 
(2005), p. 19).  
                                                 
119 In fact, Cecchetti (2005) concludes that, with reference to housing bubbles, “interest rates are likely 
to be the wrong instrument for addressing the risks [this kind of] bubbles create” (Cecchetti (2005), p. 
19) and proposes two possible solutions that focus on the increase in credit provision that inflates the 
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 5.3 Theory and History of Asset Price Bubbles 
International experience gives several examples that demonstrate the interaction 
between financial stability, asset price bubbles, and the conduct of monetary policy. 
This is the focus of this subsection. The ‘Great Depression’ in the U.S. and the 
economic boom that preceded it are highly illustrative events120. The stock market 
boom has been attributed to lax credit control and rising speculation which ended 
with a panic-selling when the stock price progress reversed which triggered the 
‘Great Depression’ 121 . In this view, the U.S. Federal Reserve should have used 
restrictive interest-rate policy to prevent market speculation and withhold the rise in 
equity prices122. According to Mishkin (2008), at the time the US Federal Reserve 
not only erred on its attempt to burst the bubble directly, but also in failing to change 
the policy stance promptly after the collapse of the stock market and the problems in 
the banking system set in, in this way giving rise to deflation, which, in turn, lead to 
                                                                                                                                          
supe
view
bubble. These are either to use regulatory mechanisms in order to restain lenders, which would entail 
rvisory adjustments for risk-based capital requirements, or try to restrict borrowers. While 
ing the former as rather complex, Cecchetti (2005) argues on the latter as follows: “The 
alternative is to adjust borrower-loan qualification requirements to the environment. For example, the 
maximum loan-to-value ratio could depend on deviations in rent-to-sale price ratios from their lagged 
moving average (or on the rate of recent increase). Alternatively, income coverage tests could depend 
on long-term interest rates rather than short-term interest rates. There are many possibilities, and we 
need to explore them” (Cecchetti (2005) p. 19). 
120 The economic boom in the U.S. economy lasted during 1923-1929. It grew as collective optimism 
spread in the introduction of financial innovations, new technologies and improved business practices 
(Mishkin (2008), p.4). The stock market ‘Great Crash’ in 1929 ended the process. 
121 See, among others, Galbraith (1954) and Kindleberger (2000). 
122 However, Galbraith (1954) and White (1990a), for example, argue that the equity bubble only 
started in March 1928. Mishkin (2008) reports that the US Federal Reserve was highly concerned 
about the raising equity prices. In fact, Adolph Miller (member of the Board) heatedly advocated in 
favour of an interest-rate increase in order to restrain speculation and the subsequent rise in credit, 
while Benjamin Strong (Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) opposed it in fear of an 
adverse impact to the economy arguing that “…any effort through higher rates directed especially at 
stock speculation would have an unfavourable effect upon business…” (see Meltzer (2003a), p. 225)) 
(quoted in Mishkin (2008), p. 4). It was, in fact, the latter’s death in 1928 that gave way to a more 
restrictive monetary policy even though the economic deterioration became evident. This line of 
policy continued until August 1929 weakening the economy even further, and leading to the stock 
market crash in October 1929 (Mishkin (2008), p. 4). 
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 an extreme rise in real interest rates and further depressed growth (Mishkin (2008), p. 
4). 
A second well-documented example is the asset-price bubble in Japan during the 
1980s , when soaring land and equity prices, in addition to relatively low interest 123
rates substantially encouraged the financing of investment . As pointed out by 124
Mishkin (2008), “Japan's experience re-emphasizes the importance of regulatory 
policies that may prevent feedback loops between asset price bubbles and credit 
provision” (Mishkin (2008), p. 5), while Ito and Mishkin (2006) argue that after the 
bubble burst it was the slow response of the Bank of Japan to the deteriorating 
economic outlook and the falling inflation that triggered deflation125.  
Theoretical and empirical research has proposed several models explaining why 
bubbles form, and which also provide an understanding of their implications for 
policy. For example, Posen (2003) analyses the Japanese experience after the 1980s 
bubble. He provides cross-country evidence that asset-price booms do not necessarily 
follow periods of easy monetary policy, and also that sustained monetary policy ease 
does not always result in booms in asset prices. He, additionally, assesses the 
                                                 
123 Undoubtedly, during that period Japan was experiencing low unemployment, low inflation and 
high growth, while it operated a highly efficient business model. During that decade the rise in equity 
prices exceeded 600 percent, while the increase in land prices exceeded 400 percent (Mishking (2008), 
p. 5). 
124 The stance of monetary policy was relatively easy during the mid-1980s as the Bank of Japan 
attempted to contain the rapid appreciation of the yen following the Plaza Accord of 1985 and 
stimulated domestic demand to correct external imbalances. There was a surge in the ratio of bank 
loans to gross domestic product, and investment spending became the main driver of economic 
activity. Due to financial deregulation, there was in increase in banks’ risk-taking behaviour because 
they channelled more funds to real-estate-related sectors and to small firms, accepting property as 
collateral. Corporate restrictions on funding in the securities market were lifted in the 1980s, which 
reduced large firms' reliance on banks' loans. Moreover, interest rate ceilings on bank deposits were 
also gradually removed. See Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001).  
125 On this account, Mishkin (2008) highlights the slowness with which the imbalances in Japan's 
banking sector were addressed as another important factor leading to the weakening of the economy 
and deflation after the bubble burst (Mishkin (2008), p. 5). 
151 
 monetary policy in Japan during the boom phase and concludes that poor financial 
sector practices 126  rather than monetary policy had the defining impact on the 
bubble. Finally, his analysis shows that (CPI) deflation has not historically followed 
plummeting asset prices, and he does not find proof of the opposite either. In the face 
of this result and the fact that for a short period after the bursting of the Japanese 
bubble inflation was positive and the economy was in a modest recession, Posen 
(2003) concludes that even though Japan’s ‘Great Recession’ was not inevitable, it 
was the policy mistakes (taking place in the mid 1990s), as well as inherent financial 
                                                
sector weaknesses that mainly contributed to it.   
Moreover, Cochrane (2003) studies the price movements of NASDAQ technology 
stocks in the 1990s using a model of ‘rational behaviour with friction’, and advocates 
that the variation in these stock prices can be explained by a “convenience yield” 
referring to the velocity of trading and the availability of information. In particular, 
he argues that the demand for such stocks, even though their prices exceeded their 
‘fundamental values’, resembled the transactions demand for money rather than 
irrational beliefs about their future course. People were willing to hold shares of a 
certain stock for a short period, so as to enable short-term trading (which was intense 
during the boom-phase), despite knowing that the shares were overvalued. Due to 
market frictions, betting on the future of a company requires owning its stock. A 
firm’s shortage of shares outstanding gave it the “convenience yield”. When shares 
outstanding were substantially increased (due e.g. to initial public offerings, or 
 
126 Indeed, Mishkin (2008) remarks that “during the boom, Japanese regulations that allowed banks to 
count as capital unrealized gains from equities may have contributed to banks' appetite for equities 
during the stock market run-up and to financial instability as the stock market collapsed…  After the 
bursting of the bubble, policymakers did not quickly resolve the fragility of the banking sector, 
thereby allowing conditions to worsen as banks kept lending to inefficient, debt-ridden, so-called 
zombie firms” (Mishkin (2008), p. 5). 
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 expiration of ‘lock-up’ periods), the transaction value decreased, leading to a fall in 
the share price (Cochrane (2003), p. 175-176). His model suggests that policymakers 
need to improve their information in terms of quantity and quality, as well as 
transparency and that it is difficult to identify ex ante boom and bust cycles in asset 
regimes 
prices.  
Furthermore, Eichengreen and Tong (2003) estimate the volatility in equity prices 
using data from 12 countries spanning over more than a century. They study the link 
between equity market volatility and its underlying determinants, as, for example, 
monetary volatility, capital account openness, and the choice of an exchange-rate 
regime, and find the first of the three possible determinants to be the most important, 
which shows a positive correlation to equity-price volatility roughly in every country 
in the sample. The implication is that the ‘unstable’ monetary policy stance during 
the ‘Great Depression’, as well as the 1970s and 1980s may have contributed to the 
observed higher equity-price volatility of the time. Therefore, they reach the 
conclusion that shifts to more stable monetary regimes (inflation-targeting 
given as an example) may have lead to the reduced volatility in asset prices. 
De Bondt (2003) assesses the motivations driving the behaviour of individual 
investors and argues that Individuals derive knowledge, from experience, logic, and 
authority, which is applied to mental frameworks resulting in rather predictable 
patterns of behaviour. Renaud (2003), nevertheless, recognises that such behavioural 
models are rather difficult to test empirically, while they tend to disregard the 
dominance of institutional investors in the markets, since they tend to possess better 
information and professional skills than individual investors, and also have access to 
more sophisticated risk-management methods. DeBondt (2003) analyses the causes 
153 
 of predictable momentum and reversals in stock prices, where the most possible 
explanation given is that analysts and traders simply extrapolate past earnings trends. 
Modern finance has responded to these facts in different ways as it either reinterprets 
them as non-anomalous (for example, the abnormal profits compensate for time-
varying risk), it questions their pervasiveness and robustness (see, for example, Fama 
(1998)), or it argues that markets may yet be minimally rational, in the sense that 
markets fail to supply opportunities for abnormal profits. The most common 
counterargument is the presence of rational arbitrage, according to which is 
advocated that “even if we accept the notion that many investors misinterpret the 
news, a relatively few individuals sensitive to arbitrage may make markets work as 
the standard theory predicts” [quoted in DeBondt (2003), p. 211]127. According to 
DeBondt (2003), however, “there are no compelling reasons to give that argument 
                                                
decisive weight” (DeBondt (2003), p. 211).  
One way to think about the matter that DeBondt (2003) proposes is to ask for the 
minimal set of restrictions on heterogeneous beliefs and information sets that even in 
frictionless markets are necessary for the existence of rational, arbitrage-free 
equilibrium prices. Rusell and Thaler (1985) and others show that investors are not 
allowed to form different opinions based on the same substantive information. They 
must agree on the value implications of any conceivable state. When there is such 
divergence of opinion, rational prices may yet prevail if at some future time, the true 
mapping of events into value is revealed to all and if, in the meantime, only rational 
investors sell short. He views neither of these assumptions to apply to the stock 
market, while institutional factors, such as sales constraints or capital-gain taxes, are 
 
127 For a detailed discussion on this point see Brunnermeier (2001). 
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 likely to change the situation for the worse rather than for the better. In a world with 
nontrivial trading costs and heterogeneous beliefs, every individual not only chooses 
the size of his holdings in each asset but also in which assets to invest. Equilibrium 
involves the simultaneous determination of asset prices and the identity of investors 
trading in each asset. Some economic agents never reveal their information via trade, 
except by abstaining. As a result, market prices cannot reflect it (see Mayshar 
                                                
(1983)) 128 (De Bondt (2003), p. 211). 
Therefore, in an effort to identify the common behavioural elements in the various 
interpretations of asset price bubbles, Kindleberger’s (1978) scenario of a (typical) 
financial crisis seems useful. In the beginning of the crisis three stages are 
distinguished, an economic shock that reflects structural change outside the 
experience of most people and that objectively justifies higher prices (a “new era”), 
rising investor confidence, leading to the increased use of leverage and speculative 
instruments, and, finally, a herding effect, where demand increases because prices 
are increasing. Similarly when the bubble bursts, an outside shock first reduces 
demand. Next prices drop more as demand slows because even lower prices are 
expected in the future. The central puzzle is the excessive optimism and 
overconfidence that start the cycle, as well as the positive feedback trading that keeps 
it going. After the success stories have become widely known and accepted by the 
 
128 A pure arbitrage opportunity does not exist unless it is certain that share prices will eventually 
revert to their fundamental underlying values. However, to affect prices, investors with superior 
forecasting ability or with inside information must assume increasing amounts of diversifiable risk. In 
practice, arbitrageurs face financial constraints (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Second, it may be 
rational for these traders to ride the trend rather than to go against it. Third, the resilience of a bubble 
may stem from the inability of rational arbitrageurs to coordinate their selling strategies (see Abreu 
and Brunnermeier (2003)). Fourth, a market may rationally launch itself onto a speculative bubble 
with prices being driven by an arbitrary self-confirming element in expectations (Tirole (1982)). 
However, DeBondt (2003) states that there is no choice-theoretic rationale for singling out equilibrium 
price paths that do not suffer this extrinsic uncertainty (De Bondt (2003), p. 211). 
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 pubic, unrealistic hopes for rapid wealth accumulation draw many newcomers into 
the market. These players tend to naively duplicate strategies that produced high 
profits in the past. An interesting aspect of herding behaviour is the “illusion of 
universal liquidity”, that is, the belief of any individual trader that in a downturn he 
taking behaviour in asset markets (real-estate market). 
                                                
will be able to get out while others take losses129,130 (DeBondt (2003), p. 212). 
Another account to consider is Herring and Wachter (2003) who show that real-
estate prices exercise different behaviour than other asset prices. Their model gives 
explanations of the intense cycles of that market131, as well as the possible reasons 
justifying the banks’ exposure to such increasing degree of risk. These reasons are 
perverse incentives (high leverage, implicit insurance, herd behaviour, principal-
agent conflicts), disaster myopia, poor data, short-term entry of players, and 
inadequate analysis. Their analysis recommends that monetary policymakers should 
fail to encourage a rapid expansion of credit and that financial regulatory policies are 
necessary in order to restrict the seemingly irrational, but potentially hazardous risk-
 
129  One interpretation of this behaviour is excessive risk-taking or recklessness. Knight (1921) 
emphasizes, however, that the risk does “not relate to objective external probabilities, but to the value 
of judgment and executive powers of the person taking the chance ... Most men have an irrationally 
high confidence in their own good fortune, and that is doubly true when their personal prowess comes 
into the reckoning ... To these considerations must be added the stimulus of the competitive situation, 
constantly exerting pressure to outbid one’s rivals ... Another ... factor is the human trait of tenacity ... 
once committed, ... the general rule is to hold on to the last ditch,” (pp. 365-366). 
130  Surveying bubbles from the 17th century to the 1987 crash, White (1990)) concludes: “The 
principal factor that leads to [their] emergence … is that the … fundamentals of assets … cease to be 
well identified. Another feature … is the appearance of … inexperienced investors” [quoted in 
DeBondt (2003), p. 212]. Shiller (2000) also defends the feedback theory. He ascribes a prominent 
role to the mass media in the Internet bubble. Evidently, many other self-interested parties (top 
managers, auditors, investment bankers, analysts, brokers, lawyers, and politicians) stoked the fire 
(DeBondt (2003), p. 212). 
131 The cycle they, in fact, describe, refers to bank-dominated financial systems. In particular, bank 
credit issued to the real-estate sector expands rapidly and the value of real estate prices increases, in 
turn. The higher prices raise the perceived collateral-value of these assets to banks, which lowers the 
‘perception of risk’ banks’ hold for that market, therefore motivating them to issue more loans, at 
greater risk and at a lower cost to the borrowers.  
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 Bordo and Wheelock (2004) study stock-market booms in the US over 200 years and 
conclude that two seem to be the most important in terms of their length and rate of 
increase in market prices, the booms of 1923-29 and 1994-2000. They focus, first, on 
the role of asset prices in the monetary policy transmission, which, in fact, refers to 
the extent to which monetary policy may trigger an asset price boom, and, second, 
the appropriate response of monetary policy to asset price booms, which addresses 
the cases when monetary policymakers should attempt to defuse asset price booms. 
Their general conclusions are that “booms occurred in periods of rapid real growth 
and advances in productivity” and that “there is no consistent relationship between 
inflation and stock market booms, though booms have typically occurred when 
money and credit growth were above average” 132 (Bordo and Wheelock (2004), p. 
19).  
 
5.4 Recent Experience with Asset Price Bubbles 
The prolonged build-ups and sharp declines in asset prices in many markets (such as 
equity and housing markets) have been a distinctive feature in the last thirty years in 
both industrialized and developing countries, with serious adverse consequences for 
the macroeconomies of these countries. Such events have given rise to an intense 
debate in academic and policy circles (that has been intensified even further during 
the last two years in the event of the global financial and economic turmoil) in the 
effort to identify the appropriate monetary and regulatory response to such dramatic 
shifts. Identifying and analyzing lessons from this volatility that could be used to 
                                                 
132 For the link between inflation and stock-market booms see, also, Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001). 
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 prevent, or, at least, mitigate the magnitude of future financial crises has been of 
prime importance to the international community. In the aftermath of the credit 
crunches that took place in major industrialised economies in the last two years and 
the consequent economic turbulence, policymakers feel the urge not only to define 
and implement the best fitting remedial action, but also to gain insights about the 
varied causes and identify lessons from the relevant consequences of the events 
under consideration.  
Initially, as pointed out by Bean (2004), if asset price bubbles affected the economy 
only through conventional wealth effects on aggregate demand, monetary 
policymakers would not face a great difficulty in their effort to find the appropriate 
response. As changes in wealth affect consumer spending with lags similar to those 
necessary to feed changes in interest rates to consumer spending, if the impact of 
asset price booms and busts were via wealth effects on aggregate demand, monetary 
policy would be able to offset such impact. Therefore, he recognises that it is the 
broader set of symptoms that asset price bubbles tend to be associated with, which 
need to be addressed in each case by monetary policymakers (Bean (2004), p. 14). In 
addition to Bean (2004), Bordo and Jeanne (2002b), for example, as well as Borio 
and Lowe (2003), note that such symptoms typically include high investment and a 
built-up of debt.  
 An asset price bubble may be triggered by a positive supply shock. Asset values 
may appreciate due to excessive optimism about future returns, which, in turn, 
increases borrowing to finance further accumulation of capital. The higher asset 
values leads to higher collateral values and, thus, encourages debt accumulation. In 
the boom phase, balance-sheet positions give no signs of deterioration since debt 
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 accumulation is covered by the appreciation in asset values. These signs are 
projected when the bubble bursts, leading to acute deterioration in the borrowers’ net 
worth and a tightening in credit conditions, possibly to the extent of a credit crunch. 
Bean (2004) remarks that “such a credit crunch is likely to impact on activity more 
quickly than a conventional wealth effect and, moreover, temporarily reduce the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Neutralizing the macroeconomic consequences of 
such financial instability may, thus, be difficult to achieve”133 (Bean (2004), p. 14). 
Furthermore, Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003) note that even though gains 
and losses generated by asset price bubbles are well documented, research does not 
give definitive answers as to their causes and characteristics, let alone their typical 
behaviour. They contend that “by unravelling the factors that lead to and amplify 
asset bubbles, explanations can be given on why some bubbles result in greater, more 
prolonged losses and what policymakers can do to safeguard economies from these 
costly, destabilizing episodes” (Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003), p. xiii). 
In this respect, Allen and Gale (2000) study ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ asset price 
bubbles, and analyse their relationship to monetary policy. They identify the 
presence of positive bubbles when there is an ‘agency problem’ between banks and 
their borrowers stemming from the banks’ inherent inability to observe how the 
funds are invested. The agency problem refers to investors’ choosing riskier projects 
than they normally would, thus, bidding-up the relevant prices. In this way, asset 
prices may exceed their fundamental values. In this case, the greater the risk assumed 
                                                 
133  Bean (2004) points out the difficulty in devising an appropriate response also because he 
disapproves of the use of an augmented Taylor-type rule as a proposed solution. 
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 the more the bubble may inflate134. Allen and Gale (2000) notably remark that “it is 
not only the risk that is associated with real asset returns that can cause a bubble but 
also the financial risk associated with the uncertainties of monetary policy and 
particularly financial liberalisation. … The conclusion is that the central bank should 
keep such uncertainties to a minimum. The less is the uncertainty, the less the 
magnitude of the positive bubble will be” (Allen and Gale (2000), p. 26). 
Conversely, negative bubbles may be triggered by a banking crisis that leads banks 
to simultaneously liquidate assets. In this event, asset prices fall below their 
fundamental value due to a shortage of liquidity. Since this type of bubble can be 
very detrimental to the economy, they recognise that the central bank needs to 
interfere so as to restrain the downwards movement in asset prices by injecting 
liquidity, as well as by lending against the banks’ assets. In this respect they note that 
“the central bank has a complicated task to prevent both types of bubble” and that “it 
is important for it to correctly identify which is the relevant problem and the 
appropriate policy to solve it otherwise the situation will only be exacerbated” (Allen 
and Gale (2000), p. 26). 
Simon (2003) asserts that a bubble is an asset-market event where prices rise, 
potentially with justification, rise further on the back of speculation, and then fall 
dramatically for no clear reason when the speculation collapses. Furthermore, he also 
contends that they typically occur in an environment of general optimism, for 
example, at the end of a long expansion. Commonly associated with these price 
changes, but not necessarily, are an easy availability of credit, new technology, and 
an increase in company formation (Simon (2003), p. 18). 
                                                 
134 See also Richards and Robinson eds. (2003). 
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 Within the bubble literature there is a branch that deals with the possibility that 
bubbles could be perfectly rational (an early influential account is Blanchard and 
Watson (1982)). This theory proposes that people are fully aware that the market has 
departed from fundamentals but still invest because the profits from being in the 
bubble outweigh the risk associated with it bursting. In addition, there are further 
accounts that bubbles in fact stem from fundamental changes, which, in essence, 
implies that there are no true bubbles (see, for example, LeRoy (2004) for a 
discussion). If any of the above were the true scenario, then there is less force to 
arguments that action of some sort (be in terms of monetary policy or prudential 
regulation) is required. If that were the case, then people are fully informed and are 
behaving rationally. White (1990) summarises this point in the following: “If stock- 
market bubbles are, for the most part, a reflection and reaction to underlying changes 
in the economy, then the correct policy is simply to let them run their course, 
however distressing this may be to individual investors” (White (1990), p. 240). 
Simon (2003) examines three asset-price bubbles in Australia, than were 
considerably different in type135, and shows that regardless of whether they were 
‘rational’ or fundamentally based, or not they had significant consequences. He thus 
concludes that “in this respect, it is not crucial whether bubbles are rational or 
fundamentally based, but the fact that they have significant consequences is reason 
enough for policymakers to be concerned” (Simon (2003), p. 38). 
Other regional experiences give historical perspectives on the development of asset-
price bubbles, as well as the types of policy environments that resulted in 
                                                 
135 These Australian bubbles are namely the land bubble in Melbourne in the 1880s, the Poseidon 
nickel bubble of 1969-1970, and the stock and property market bubbles of the late 1980s. 
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 exaggerating or mitigating the impact of collapses. Mishkin and White (2003) study 
15 episodes of U.S. stock-market crashes during the last century and provide a 
classification with respect to their impact to the financial system136. 
Mishkin and White (2003) suggest that “because stock-market crashes are often not 
followed by signs of financial instability, we must always be cautious about 
assigning causality from timing evidence, while certainly, one cannot make the case 
that stock-market crashes are the main cause of financial instability” (Mishkin and 
White (2003), p. 73). In fact, in several such episodes it is argued that the source of 
financial instability might have been caused by other factors, such as the collapse of 
the banking system or the severity of the economic contraction137. The theory of how 
stock-market crashes can interfere with the efficient functioning of financial markets 
                                                 
136 According to Mishkin and White (2003), this classification can be in the following four categories: 
(i) Episodes where the stock-market crashes did not appear to stress the financial system because 
interest-rate spreads did not widen substantially. These include the crashes of 1903, 1940, 1946, 1962, 
and 2000. (ii) Episodes in which the crashes were extremely sharp and which put stress on the 
financial system, but where there was little widening of spreads subsequently because of intervention 
by the Federal Reserve so as to maintain the functioning of the financial system. These include the 
crashes of 1929 and 1987. (iii) Episodes in which the crashes were associated with large increases in 
spreads suggesting severe financial distress. These include the crashes of 1907, 1930-33, 1937, and 
1973-74. (iv) Episodes in which the crashes were associated with increases in spreads that were not as 
large as in the third category, suggesting some financial distress. These include the crashes of 1917, 
1920, 1969-70, and 1990.  
They view that deciding which crashes go into categories 3 and 4 is somewhat arbitrary, and draw the 
following general conclusions: “First is the fact that many stock market crashes (category 1) are not 
accompanied by increases in spreads, which suggests that stock-market crashes by themselves do not 
necessarily produce financial instability. These episodes also are ones in which the balance sheets and 
the financial system are in good shape before the onset of the stock-market crash. Furthermore, in 
these cases where financial instability does not appear, economic downturns tend to be fairly mild. 
Second, very sharp stock-market crashes like those in 1929 and 1987 (category 2) do have the 
potential to disrupt financial markets. But actions by the central bank to prevent crashes from seizing 
up markets – not to prop up stock prices are able to prevent financial instability from spinning out of 
control. Third, situations in which financial instability becomes severe, when spreads widen 
substantially (category 3), are associated with the worst economic downturn” (Mishkin and White 
(2003), p. 72-73). 
137 Mishkin and White (2003) give more direct evidence that some financial markets were unable to 
function as a result of the stock-market crash only in the cases of the extremely sharp market crashes 
in 1929 and 1987 (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 73). 
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 suggests that the impact of a stock market crash will be very different depending on 
the initial conditions of balance sheets in the economy. 
Therefore, the monetary policy implications of their analysis of the stock market 
crashes are as follows. The first is that the major issue of concern to policymakers is 
not stock-market crashes but financial instability, irrespective of the fact that the 
former may reflect the unwinding of an asset-price bubble. If the balance sheets of 
financial and non-financial institutions are initially strong, then a stock market crash 
(bursting of the bubble) is unlikely to lead to financial instability. In this case, the 
effect of a stock market crash on the economy will operate through the usual wealth 
and cost of capital channels, only requiring the monetary policymakers to respond to 
the standard effects of the stock market decline on aggregate demand. In this 
situation, optimal monetary policy, which focuses solely on minimising a standard 
loss function, will not respond to the stock market decline over and above its effects 
on inflation and output (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 74). Indeed, a regime of 
flexible inflation targeting, which, according to Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and 
Posen (1999), is in essence what all inflation-targeters actually pursue, is consistent 
with this type of optimal monetary policy (Svensson, 1997). Also Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999) have shown that a regime of flexible inflation targeting is likely to 
make financial instability less likely and to be stabilizing in the presence of asset 
price bubbles. 
However, Mishkin and White (2003) contend that central banks may see the need to 
directly respond to a stock market crash when the crash puts stress on the financial 
system in order to prevent financial instability. We have seen exactly this response of 
the Fed in the crashes of 1929 and 1987, when the Fed had direct evidence that 
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 financial markets were unable to function in the immediate aftermath of the crashes. 
What is important about both these two episodes is the nature of the stress on 
financial markets. The source of stress had more to do with the speed of the stock 
market decline than the overall decline of the market over time, which has often been 
far larger with little impact on the financial system. Furthermore, in both episodes, 
the focus of the Federal Reserve was not to try to prop up stock prices but, rather, to 
make sure that the financial markets, which were starting to seize up, would begin 
functioning normally again (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 75). 
A focus on financial instability also implies that central banks will respond to 
disruptions in financial market is not a major concern138. Because of the disruption to 
the payments system, the liquidity needs of the financial system skyrocketed. To 
satisfy theses needs and keep the financial system from seizing up, within a few 
hours of the incident, the Fed made a similar announcement to that made after the 
crash of 1987, stating, “The Federal Reserve System is open and operating. The 
                                                 
138 For example, as described in Mishkin (1991), Brimmer (1989), and Maisel (1973), the U.S. Federal 
Reserve responded aggressively to prevent a financial crisis after the Penn-Central bankruptcy in June 
1970 without much concern for developments in the stock market even though the market had an 
appreciable decline from its peak in late 1968. In the aftermath of the Penn-Central bankruptcy, the 
commercial paper market stopped functioning and the Federal Reserve exercised a lender-of-last-
resort operation. The New York Fed got in touch with money centre banks, encouraged them to lend 
to their customers who were unable to roll over their commercial paper, and indicated that the 
discount window would be made available to the banks so that they could make these loans. These 
banks then followed the Fed’s suggestion and received $575 million through the discount window for 
this purpose. In addition, the Fed, along with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the 
Federal Home Loan banks decided to suspend regulation Q ceilings and the Fed supplied liquidity to 
the banks through open market operations. Similarly, in the fall of 1998, the Fed supplied liquidity to 
the system and lowered the federal funds rate sharply by 75 basis points even when the market was at 
levels that were considered to be very high by Federal Reserve officials. The Fed’s intervention 
stemmed from its concerns about the stress put on the financial system by the Russian crisis and the 
failure of Long-Term Capital Management. A spectacular lender-of-last-resort operation was also 
carried out in the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 
(Mishkin and White (2003) p. 74). 
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 discount window is available to meet liquidity needs”139,140  (Mishkin and White 
(2003), p. 75).  
These examples in Mishkin and White (2003) suggest the importance of having a 
central bank focus on the potential of financial instability per se. Too much of a 
focus on the stock market rather than on the potential for financial instability may 
lead central banks to fail to take appropriate actions as in 1970, 1998, and 2001, 
when the level of the stock market was not a primary concern. Too great a focus on 
the stock market also presents other dangers for central banks. Too much attention on 
asset prices (in Mishkin and White’s (2003) case common stock) can lead to the 
wrong policy responses. The optimal response to a change in asset prices very much 
depends on the source of the shock to these prices and the duration of the shock141.  
A second problem with the central bank focusing too much on stock prices is that it 
raises the possibility that the central bank will be made to look foolish. The linkage 
between monetary policy and stock prices, although an important part of the 
transmission mechanism, is still, nevertheless, a week one. Most fluctuations in stock 
prices occur for reasons unrelated to monetary policy, either reflecting real 
                                                 
139  “Economic Front: How Policy Makers Regrouped to Defend the Financial System”, The Wall 
Street Journal, Tuesday, September 18, 2001, p. A1. 
140 The Fed then proceeded to provide 45$ billion to banks through the discount window, a 200-fold 
increase over the previous week. When the stock market reopened on Monday, September 17, trading 
was orderly, although the Dow Jones average did decline by more than 7 percent (Mishkin and White 
(2003) p. 75). 
141 It is worth mentioning the very useful example of this pitfall of too much focus on an asset price 
given by Mishkin and White (2003), which is the tightening of monetary policy in Chile and New 
Zealand in response to the downward pressure on the exchange rate of their currencies in the 
aftermath of the East Asian and Russian crises in 1997 and 1998 (see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
2002). Given that the shock to the exchange rate was a negative terms of trade shock, it would have 
better been met by an easing of policy rather than a tightening. Indeed, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
responded in the opposite direction to the central banks of New Zealand and Chile, and eased 
monetary policy after the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997 because it was focused on inflation 
control and not the exchange rate. The excellent performance of the Australian economy relative to 
New Zealand and Chile’s during this period illustrates the benefit of focusing on the main objective of 
the central bank rather than on the asset price (Mishkin and White (2003) p. 75). 
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 fundamentals or animal spirits. The loose link between monetary policy and stock 
prices, therefore, means that the ability of the central bank to control stock prices is 
very limited. Thus, if the central bank indicates that it wants stock prices to change in 
a particular direction, it is likely to find that stock prices may move in the opposite 
direction, thus making the central bank look inept (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 75).  
A third problem with focusing on stock (or equivalently asset) prices is that it may 
make central banks seems as if they try to control a relatively vast amount of 
elements of the economy. Mishkin and White (2003) stress that the success in central 
banking practices during the ‘Great Moderation’ times is partly attributed to the fact 
that “they have narrowed their focus and have more actively communicated what 
they can and cannot do, … [that] specifically, [they] have argued that they are less 
capable of managing short-run business cycle fluctuation and should, therefore, focus 
more on price stability their primary goal” (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 76)142. In 
this way, in their effort to become independent they managed to gain public support. 
They, therefore, conclude in this matter that “extending their focus to asset prices has 
the potential to weaken public support for central banks and may even cause the 
public to worry that the central bank is too powerful, having undue influence over all 
aspects of the economy” (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 76).  
The fourth and final problem with too much focus on the stock market that Mishkin 
and White (2003) identify is that such focus may create a form of moral hazard. 
Knowing that the central bank is likely to support the stock market if it crashes, the 
markets are then more likely to bid up stock prices. This might help facilitate 
                                                 
142 Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), for example argue that a main element of the 
success of the Bundesbank’s monetary targeting regime was that it did not focus on short-run output 
fluctuations in setting monetary policy instruments. 
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 excessive valuation of stocks and help encourage a stock market bubble that might 
crash later, something that the central bank would rather avoid. If the central bank 
has no informational advantage, if it knows that a bubble has developed that will 
eventually crash, then the market knows this too. The bubble would, then, unravel 
and, thus, it would be unlikely to develop. Without an informational advantage, the 
central bank is as likely to mis-predict the presence of a bubble as the private market 
and, thus, will frequently be mistaken, thus, frequently pursuing the wrong monetary 
policy (Mishkin and White (2003), p. 76). 
A main conclusion of Mishkin and White (2003) is that the key problem facing 
monetary policymakers is not stock market crashes and the possible bursting of a 
bubble, but rather whether serious financial instability is present. They contend that 
“with a focus on financial stability rather than the stock market, the response of 
central banks to stock market fluctuations is more likely to be optimal and, therefore, 
support for the independence of the central bank can be maintained” (Mishkin and 
White (2003), p. 76). Their analysis also supports the general conclusion that it is 
considerably difficult for a central bank (let alone market participants) to identify the 
presence of a bubble ex ante.  
Similar conclusions can also be drawn from the unwinding of the asset-price bubble 
in Japan during the late 1980s, irrespective of the inherent differences. Okina and 
Shiratsuka (2003) examine the policies that the Bank of Japan implemented in the 
late 1980s after the collapse in asset prices triggered the economic downturn that 
spanned over more than a decade143.  A basic conclusion in their analysis is against 
                                                 
143 Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) evaluate the criticisms over monetary policy in Japan at the time, 
which have commonly been those of excessive monetary easing during the late 1980s, as well as a 
delay in monetary tightening. In addition, they recognize that it is considerably difficult for 
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 asset-price targeting because policymakers cannot extract sufficient information from 
asset prices so as to make ‘real-time judgments about future growth’. In this manner 
they conclude that ‘flexible interest-rate targeting’ may not be the correct guide for 
monetary policy and they recognise the need for alternatives. They assess that unlike, 
for example, the U.S. ‘tech-stock bubble’, the unwinding of the asset price bubble in 
Japan resulted in a long-term economic downturn, which was further cultivated by 
the fragility of the financial system. In the Japanese bank-based financial system, 
banks did not fail from lending to unprofitable firms in order to restrain further 
losses. However, bank capital was eventually eroded by failing firms, thus, rendering 
financial institutions unable to assume risks, which resulted in a credit crunch. 
Therefore, monetary policy easing was ineffective, and, in fact, monetary policy 
effectiveness was further hampered by the inability to issue new loans. 
In addition, Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001) argue that monetary policy is 
incapable of controlling the level of asset prices. They view that if this were the case, 
monetary policy would only result in amplifying economic fluctuations. However, 
they accept that asset prices influence monetary policy in several ways, such as 
influencing expenditures via wealth effects, or reflecting valuable information about 
expectations with respect to the future economic outlook. In particular they remark 
that if monetary policy extracts useful information from asset prices, it should not 
fail to recognise that asset-price changes not only reflect private expectations for 
inflation, but also other issues like phenomena similar to the bubble as well as 
                                                                                                                                          
policymakers to identify bubbles in early stages of their development. They view that several models 
assessing inflation and output gap in Japan during the late 1980s suggest conflicting policy responses 
which are, in fact, dependent on the underlying assumptions and the modelling choices, such as how 
to evaluate the fundamental value of asset prices and inflationary pressures, how to decompose the 
rising growth rate into cyclical and trend components, and how to identify the correct path for 
potential growth.  
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 structural changes in the economy144. They, finally, argue that changes in asset prices 
may hugely affect the financial system stability and, in due course, overall economic 
activity (Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001), p. 446).  
They also accept that it is vital for central banks to analyse asset price changes and 
evaluate the expectations that they reflect, in particular, whether, in view of the 
above conclusions, the latter are sustainable with the course of the economy as a 
whole. For example, during the boom phase of a bubble, money supply and credit 
tend to expand. However, they view that judgement on whether such expansion is 
compatible with sustainable economic growth cannot be made only by monitoring 
the growth rates of the money supply and credit. Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka 
(2001) draw a final conclusion that points towards the necessity of designing an 
appropriate institutional framework, since “monetary policy influences the decisions 
and behaviour of private economic agents through interest rates and liquidity, but the 
degree of influence depends on the institutional framework, such as the supervision 
of financial institutions, taxation, the regulatory framework, accounting system, and 
legal infrastructure”145 (Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001), p. 447). 
Furthermore, Saito and Shiratsuka (2001) study the case when liquidity constraints 
due to realised adverse shocks force financial institutions (institutional investors and 
                                                 
144 They recognise that useful information may, for example, be extracted from the derivatives and 
other financial markets as e.g. examined in Nakamura and Shiratsuka (1999). 
145 Referring to the Japanese bubble period and following this line of reasoning Okina, Shirakawa and 
Shiratsuka (2003) state the following: “If financial deregulation had progressed at an earlier stage, and 
if the regulatory and supervisory framework had been modified in line with the changes in financial 
markets, the behaviour of financial institutions would probably have been different to some extent. If 
taxation on land had not been biased toward accelerating an increase in land prices, the degree of 
increase in land prices would have been different. If the Bank of Japan had implemented reform 
measures with respect to the short-term money market and window guidance at an earlier stage, 
economic developments might have been slightly better” (Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001), p. 
448).  
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 intermediaries) to quit normally profitable financial practices, such as profitable 
investment opportunities, efficient market-making, and gainful arbitrage 
opportunities. This liquidity constraint may lead to a huge negative effect on asset 
pricing, and eventually dynamic-resource allocation (Saito and Shiratsuka (2001), p. 
255).  
Saito and Shiratsuka (2001) accept that borrowers’ liquidity constraints stem at least 
partially from the asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders. As 
analysed in Williamson (1987), extending Townsend (1979), the optimality of a 
simple debt contract rests on lenders’ inability to observe internal cash flows. As a 
result creditors charge a credit premium on such loan contracts as a compensation for 
default risk. Large credit premia might not be enough compensation for default risk, 
in the case of borrowers’ relying heavily on this form of outside financing. In 
addition, if the latter is the case outside lenders show a great reluctance to provide 
funds to such borrowers. This results in, for example, adverse technological shocks 
lowering profits and rendering firms even more dependent on outside financing, 
increasing the possibility of these firms to experience liquidity constraints. 
Apparently, a severe liquidity constraint imposes an immediate negative effect on 
corporate spending activity (Saito and Shiratsuka (2001), p. 257). The 
macroeconomic literature on credit channels gives a thorough analysis on this 
account (see for example Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).  
In the event of a financial crisis, financially-stressed financial institutions 
(commercial banks in their analysis) tend to face substantial difficulties with lending, 
arbitraging, and dealing. Consequently, policy-targeted interest rates or interbank 
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 overnight rates may fail to be transmitted to other longer-term interest rates. Saito 
and Shiratsuka (2001), therefore, argue that “it is important for a central bank to 
intervene in various financial markets to fix segmented markets, thereby recovering 
market liquidity and restoring the proper transmission mechanism. In that sense, the 
monetary operation motivated by the above consideration … should require not only 
the expansion of the aggregate amount of liquidity available in money markets 
through lowering short-term interest rates, but also the control of the allocation of 
liquidity among financial markets, thereby transmitting the policy-targeted short-
term interest rate to the returns on other financial instruments” (Saito and Shiratsuka 
(2001), p. 266). 
Furthermore, Collyns and Senhadji (2003) study the East Asia financial crisis during 
1997, and assess that excessive optimism resulted in large inflows of capital in 
several countries in the area, as well as in a rapid increase in domestic credit issued 
by an “under-regulated banking system”, and vast amounts of investment in property. 
The eventual reversal of the process with successive outflows of capital triggered 
excessive pessimism, investor flight, bank failures, and a collapse of the equity, 
housing, and debt markets. In addition to the effect the crisis had on the financial 
markets, real wages also plummeted, and unemployment rose to very high levels. 
Remarkably, rural credit evaporated and even becoming life-threatening. 
Collyns and Senhadji (2003) find that prior to the crisis the countries in East Asia 
demonstrated a close relationship between the under-estimation of risk, excessive 
optimism and increasing supply of credit (the real estate sector being the most 
prominent case), with the asset price inflation that followed. In particular, the real 
estate sector is a dramatic illustration of this cycle, since property values were 
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 rapidly increasing, and banks that issued collateral-based loans demonstrated an 
increasing willingness and capacity to lend. Collyns and Senhadji (2003) point out an 
“asymmetric response” of property prices to credit, as during periods of increasing 
real-estate prices such response is three times higher than the one during periods of 
declining prices. They view such asymmetry mainly as a result of the opaqueness in 
real estate markets, while they recognise that the unwinding of the bubbles in each 
country gave rise to varied results 146 . Overall, they conclude that “the Asian 
experience with property price booms and busts and the consequences for financial 
stability reinforce the critical importance of strong bank regulation [emphasis is in 
the original], both to reduce risks that a bubble will develop and to contain the 
disruptive costs when a bubble bursts. In particular, restraining the growth of bank 
credit to the property and related sectors discourages the development of real estate 
bubbles (Collyns and Senhadji (2003), p. 123).   
Herrera and Perry (2003) express similar issues in Latin America. They study 22 
episodes of asset-price bubbles in Latin America during the period between 1980 and 
2000, and show that 14 of the 22 episodes ended in crashes. Notably, these crashes 
lead to regional currency crises. Herrera and Perry (2003), finally, identify a set of 
common determinants, such as domestic factors including an accelerating expansion 
in credit and the volatility of credit growth and asset returns, as well as external 
factors, such as capital-flow changes due to changes in U.S. short-term interest rates. 
                                                 
146 Collyns and Senhadji (2003) highlight extreme property price cycles have not been a necessary 
neither a sufficient condition to trigger the subsequent crises that occurred in countries’ exchange 
markets and banks of their sample. For example, Malaysia, Hong Kong SAR, and Singapore survived 
the real estate fallout and minimized damage to the rest of their economies. They contribute these 
results to the fact that these countries possessed relatively sound banking regulatory frameworks 
before the development of the pertinent bubbles and policymakers did not fail to take immediate 
action to reduce and contain the adverse consequences of the bubbles bursting. Such episodes 
emphasize how vital strong banking regulation to safeguard a financial system from the damaging 
consequences that tend to rise after a bubble collapses. 
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 5.5 Asset Price Bubbles and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
Several views have been expressed about how monetary policy may lead to a boom 
in asset prices. According to Bordo and Wheelock (2004) a ‘traditional’ approach 
addresses the response of asset prices to a change in the money supply. According to 
this approach, added liquidity increases asset demand, therefore leading to an 
increase in their prices, stimulating, in turn, the economy. Another approach, 
advocated by Austrian economists during the 1920s and more recently by BIS 
economists, views a higher possibility of asset price booms arising in a regime of low 
and stable inflation. In particular, it is argued that monetary policy may encourage 
asset price booms through a credible stabilisation of the price level.  A final 
approach, expressed in the dynamic general-equilibrium macroeconomics literature, 
advocates that asset price bubbles can in fact be a result of the failure of monetary 
policy to credibly stabilise the price level (Bordo and Wheelock (2004), p. 19). 
Models of the traditional approach have a long history147. According to these models, 
central bank operations increase liquidity and in this way increase asset prices, which 
include equity and real estate prices, and consequently lower their returns. As the 
returns of the relatively more liquid assets decline compared to the less liquid ones 
the former are substituted for the latter. Expansionary monetary policy will affect the 
price of short-term government securities, then longer-term securities, then assets 
such as stocks or real estate, and commodities such as gold. Eventually, the effect 
will reach the overall price level. Therefore, according to this view rising asset prices 
                                                 
147 Metlzer (1951), for example, in addition to other early Keynesian IS-LM models, modelled central 
bank operations to directly affect stock prices. Models that followed, variants of which are presented 
in Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Tobin (1969), and Brunner and Meltzer (1973), incorporate a 
broader range of assets into the traditional Keynesian liquidity mechanism (Bordo and Wheelock 
(2004), p. 20). 
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 constitute a potential indicator of future inflation (Bordo and Wheelock (2004), p. 
20). 
The proponents of the Austrian view advocate that asset-price booms, irrespective of 
their fundamental cause, may progress to a bubble central bank inaction that 
encourages an expansion in bank credit that amplifies the boom. According to this 
view, a crash will inevitably follow a booming phase bringing forward the potential 
of a vast economic downturn, unless monetary policymakers try to defuse the boom. 
The ‘Austrian school’ economists typically equate increasing asset prices with 
general price inflation148.  
The recent discussion on asset price booms incorporates elements of the Austrian 
view. A first refers to the inclusion of asset prices in the price-index targeted by the 
central bank. A second concerns the issue of “financial imbalances”, which Borio 
and Lowe (2002) define as “rapid growth of credit in conjunction with rapid 
increases in asset prices and, possible, investment” 149 (Borio and Lowe (2002), p. 7). 
Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that when such financial imbalances build-up the risk 
of a financial crisis and macroeconomic instability increases considerably. They 
point out that low inflation can, in fact, promote financial imbalances, irrespective of 
the underlying initial cause of a boom in asset prices. They contend that “these 
endogenous responses to credible monetary policy [can] increase the probability that 
the latent inflation pressures manifest themselves in the development of imbalances 
                                                 
148 The Austrians viewed the period in US between 1923 and 1929 as one of rapid inflation amplified 
by lax monetary policy and excessive bank credit growth even though the level of US consumer prices 
was virtually unchanged (see Rothbard (1983)). Laidler (2003), (2006) and the references therein give 
more on the Austrian view. 
149 See also Borio, English and Filardo (2003) and Borio and White (2004). 
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 in the financial system, rather than immediate upward pressure in higher goods and 
services price inflation” (Borio and Lowe (2002), p. 30-31).   
Equilibrium rational expectations models have also studied extensively the likelihood 
of monetary policy in fact producing asset price bubbles. These models show that 
poorly designed monetary policies, like the use of an interest-rate rule without 
commitment to a steady long-run inflation rate, may lead to self-fulfilling prophesies 
and asset price bubbles. Woodford (2003) argues that these outcomes may not arise 
if monetary policymakers follow a clear rule in which the interest rate target is 
adjusted so as to stabilise inflation. Bordo and Wheelock (2004) remark that “the 
theoretical literature thus suggests that consideration of the monetary policy 
environment may be crucial to understanding why asset booms come about” (Bordo 
and Wheelock (2004), p. 21).  
 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks  
Kindleberger (1995) points out there are no rule-of-thumb practices to address asset 
price misalignments 150 . Bubbles in asset prices feed through wealth effects in 
household consumption. As perceptions about the future growth of incomes rise, the 
creditworthiness of households increases, on the one hand, and as the cost of new 
capital falls affecting in corporate investment, expectations rise about future growth 
                                                 
150 Kindleberger (1995), in particular, stressed that “when speculation threatens substantial rises in 
asset prices, with a possible collapse in asset markets later, and a harm to the financial system, or if 
domestic conditions call for one sort of policy, and international goals for another, monetary 
authorities confront a dilemma calling for judgement, not cookbook rules of the game. It is, I believe 
realistic” (Kindleberger (1995), p. 35). 
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 of earnings, and, eventually, greater perceived creditworthiness of firms, on the other 
hand. 
As Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003) note the collective experiences of 
many countries point towards the similarity in the challenges faced by policymakers 
around the world. Initially, it is difficult to identify bubbles in an early stage of their 
development. The possibility that asset price increases are a result of a favourable 
shift in economic fundamentals always seems tempting to accept. Nevertheless, the 
information that monetary policymakers have (during the early stages in the 
development of a bubble) tends to be incomplete and at times ambiguous. 
Policymakers are also subject to considerable public and political pressures. Second, 
in most cases, bubbles tend to follow rapid credit expansions. Third, when bubbles 
burst various outcomes arise in different countries. Notably, countries that have 
robust financial systems present relatively less systemic distress than countries with 
weak systems. Fourth, advanced economic development fails to protect an economy 
from the potential of an asset price collapse. Finally, attempts to prick a bubble may 
cause more harm than good (Hunter, Kaufman and Pomerleano eds. (2003), p. 17). 
The issue, therefore, remains of the appropriate role monetary policy should exert 
based on these experiences. Yet as Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003) 
remark it is generally argued that policymakers should strengthen regulatory and 
prudential policy to reinforce the financial system. Additionally, since credit booms 
tend to lead to asset bubbles, it is advocated that measures need to be taken so as to 
contain rapid credit growth (as, for example, higher collateral coverage), restrain the  
reliance on stocks and real estate collateral for the issuing of loans, and improve 
credit practices. An emphasis is also given to the introduction of more 
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 countercyclical loan-loss provisioning (Hunter, Kaufman and Pomerleano eds. 
(2003), p. 17). 
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 C H A P T E R  6  
H O W  S H O U L D  M O N E T A R Y  P O L I C Y  R E S P O N D  T O  
A S S E T  P R I C E  B U B B L E S ?  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The U.S. stock-market boom during 1994-2000 and the following recession 
generated an extensive debate over how monetary policy should respond to an asset-
price boom, if it is considered appropriate to give any response at all. It is vital to 
make the distinction that both academics and central banking practitioners agree that 
in the aftermath of a bursting of a bubble monetary policy needs to be conducted in a 
way that counters the adverse consequences brought forward. Therefore, the content 
of this chapter does not address the important issue of how monetary policy can 
enhance the recovery of an economy that has already fallen into a post-financial-
crisis recession, that is currently of major concern to both academics and 
policymakers in view of the current global financial and economic turmoil. 
As financial crises and economic contractions tended historically to follow periods of 
explosive asset-price growth, it is argued that monetary policy can restrain the 
adverse effects that financial instability may impose on the economy overall, just by 
attempting to defuse asset-price booms at a relatively early stage. However, as Bordo 
and Wheelock (2004) suggest, how likely it is that asset prices eventually collapse 
leading also to a macroeconomic decline may depend on the underlying reason of 
their appreciation. It has been proposed that so long as booms in asset prices are 
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 justified by fundamental behaviour, such as the presence of realistic prospects for 
future earnings growth, they do not constitute any threat to the outlook for inflation 
or overall economic activity. On the contrary, if booming asset prices are evaluated 
to reflect irrational behaviour, such as excessive optimism about future economic 
prospects, they may threaten economic stability and, thus, warrant a monetary policy 
attempt to encourage market participants towards more realistic asset price 
valuations (Bordo and Wheelock (2004), p. 21).  
 
6.2 Monetary Policy Responses 
According to the conventional approach a reaction of monetary policy to asset-price 
misalignments is justified only when the latter are known to provide useful 
information about the future course of inflation. In particular, so long as monetary 
policy maintains price stability, it promotes financial stability as well (see, for 
example, Schwartz (1995) and Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2002), (2003)). This 
view holds that financial crises (or simply “financial imbalances”) need to be tackled 
by lender-of-last-resort practices or regulatory policies (as in Schwartz (2002))151. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) express this view in the following concise way: “The 
inflation targeting approach dictates that central banks should adjust monetary policy 
actively and pre-emptively to offset incipient inflationary and deflationary pressures. 
Importantly, for present purposes, it also implies that policy should not respond to 
                                                 
151 This approach is famously proposed in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), (2001) in the context of a 
Taylor rule, as well as among others in Schinasi and Hargraves (1993), Bullard and Schaling (2002), 
and White (2004). 
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 changes in asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected inflation” 
[emphasis is in the original] (Bernanke and Gertler (1999), p. 78).  
The conventional approach, however, has been (at least partially) criticised by 
several economists. For example, according to Smets (1997) in the presence of 
‘irrational exuberance’ in the financial markets a monetary policy tightening is 
actually optimal. In a similar manner, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani 
(2000) suggest a monetary policy reaction to asset-price misalignments. However, 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) doubt whether policymakers are in fact capable of 
reliable judgement of whether asset price movements reflect “irrational exuberance” 
or that the possibility of a collapse in asset prices is substantial and imminent. 
Nevertheless, on this account, Cecchetti (2003) argues that the task of identifying 
promptly and accurately asset-price misalignments is not more challenging than 
other elements of policy-design, such as potential output. 
Bordo and Jeanne (2002a), (2002b) are in favour of a monetary policy reaction to 
asset price booms, as they view that pre-emptive actions so as to contain asset-price 
misalignments, in fact, provide insurance against the high economy-wide costs of 
lost output in the event of the bubble bursting. They argue that policymakers must try 
to defuse asset-price booms either when there is a high risk of a bust (and the 
consequences it may bring considerably damaging to the economy) or when the cost 
of such an attempt is estimated to be low in terms of foregone output. They point-out 
that the more optimistic investors get, the higher the risk of a market-sentiment 
reversal becomes. However, a higher cost is attached to monetary policy actions of 
‘leaning against the wind of investor optimism’. Therefore, they contend that 
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 monetary policymakers need to evaluate not only the probability of a crisis 
occurring, but also the extent to which monetary policy is capable of reducing this 
probability. 
Greenspan famously saw a conundrum in the attempts of monetary policymakers to 
defuse an asset-price boom. He argued that the likelihood of stock-market booms 
occurring is relatively high in low inflation environments:  
“…We have a very great difficulty in monetary policy when we confront 
stock market bubbles. That is because, to the extent that we are 
successful in keeping product price inflation down, history tells us that 
price-earnings ratios under those conditions go through the roof. What is 
really needed to keep stock market bubbles from occurring is a lot of 
product price inflation, which historically has tended to undercut stock 
markets almost everywhere. There is a clear trade-off. If monetary 
policy succeeds in one, it fails in the other. Now, unless we have the 
capability of playing in between and managing to know exactly when to 
push a little here and to pull a little there, it is not obvious to me that 
there is a simple set of monetary policy solutions that deflate the 
bubble.” (Federal Open Market Committee meeting transcript, 24th 
September, 1996, pp. 30-31). 
Driffill et al. (2005) analyse the argument that central banks tend to alter their 
interest-rate instrument gradually so as to protect banks from the vulnerability caused 
by sharp increases in short-term interest rates, and thus promote their 
macroeconomic objectives further than inflation targeting, such as that of financial 
stability. They prove theoretically that smoothing interest rates may lead to 
indeterminacy of an economy’s rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, they 
extend the analysis of determinacy of equilibrium as in Bullard and Schaling (2002) 
and by investigating the inclusion of futures prices, and the associated basis risk, in 
the central bank’s reaction function, they prove the existence of a trade-off between 
macroeconomic and financial stability. They, also, argue that this trade-off calls for 
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 caution, but does not necessarily imply that the central bank cannot smooth interest 
rates to reduce basis risk. 
Bordo and Wheelock (2004) survey US stock-market booms and find that “booms do 
not occur in the absence of increases in real economic growth and perhaps 
productivity growth” (Bordo and Wheelock (2004), p. 41). Their analysis does not 
support the proposition that excessive money or credit growth leads to a boom in 
asset prices. However, they report that most asset-price booms that took place during 
the 19th century occurred in times of monetary expansions. Notably, they strongly 
disregard the view that monetary policy can trigger speculation in the asset markets 
when it fails to control the credit supply. However, they present anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that at times the stock-market does rise above the levels justified by 
fundamentals. Bordo and Wheelock (2004) argue that “although one can offer 
plausible theoretical arguments for responding proactively to an asset price boom”, 
as their survey suggests, “policymakers should be cautious about attempting to 
deflate asset prices without strong evidence that a collapse of asset prices would have 
severe macroeconomic costs” (Bordo and Wheelock (2004), p. 41). 
Nevertheless, any attempt to evaluate the appropriate monetary policy response to 
asset price bubbles should not fail to consider primarily the explicit objectives of 
monetary policy (stabilising inflation and economic activity), and its ultimate aim to 
promote public welfare by fostering economic prosperity. Since asset price 
movements lead to macroeconomic fluctuations affecting prices and employment, 
the monetary authorities are bound to be concerned. It is also considered that if 
monetary policy manages to give a fitting and prompt response to the asset-price 
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 misalignments under consideration, the adverse macroeconomic consequences of the 
latter will be neither severe, nor long-lasting. In this line of argument, Mishkin 
(2008) advocates that “whether an asset price bubble is occurring or not, as asset 
prices rise and boost the outlook for economic activity and inflation, monetary policy 
should respond by moving to a more restrictive stance, [while] after a bubble bursts 
and the outlook for economic activity deteriorates, policy should become more 
accommodative” (Mishkin (2008), p. 2). He, nevertheless, makes the distinction that 
“… in most cases, monetary policy should not respond to asset prices per se, but 
rather to changes in the outlook for inflation and aggregate demand resulting from 
asset price movements, [which] implies that actions, such as attempting to ‘prick’ an 
asset price bubble, should be avoided” (Mishkin (2008), p. 2)152 .  
Nevertheless, Issing (2003) points out that the choice of the monetary policy strategy 
imposes a considerable influence on the stability of the financial system. He argues 
that if the primary objective of the central bank is to maintain price stability over the 
medium-term, then to pursue an inflation-targeting strategy with respect to a forecast 
of inflation spanning over one or two years may not be the optimal policy strategy at 
all times. He views that in a limited-horizon inflation forecast overall costs (that in 
terms of the central bank most commonly used tend to be future deflation that 
succeeds a financial crisis) may not receive the appropriate weight (see also Borio 
(2005) for further discussion on this point). Optimal monetary policy should, at 
times, under considerable strains in the financial system, accept deviations from the 
desired inflation rate over shorter periods so as to preserve price stability over the 
                                                 
152 Mishkin (2007c) and Kohn (2006) also presents similar views on the response of monetary policy 
to asset prices. 
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 medium to long run. Following this argument, one can also reach the conclusion that 
monetary policy decisions actually bear on the state of the financial system and may 
even enable the system to avoid a crisis and gain overall recovery. Equally, taking 
into consideration risk asymmetries, one can reach the same conclusions. Since a 
systemic financial crisis tends to produce rather substantial effects, optimal monetary 
policy may at times deviate by being considerably cautious, so as to reduce the 
likelihood of a crisis. Eventually, actual inflation will exceed expected inflation 
(optimally) for a period of time, due to the asymmetries involved, namely the very 
low probability of a very large loss (Issing (2003), p. 17). 
Following the above line of argument, Issing (2003) also expresses the robustness of 
the ECB stability-oriented two-pillar monetary policy strategy over inflation 
(forecast) targeting. He stresses that “explicitly focusing on monetary and credit 
developments in order to form a judgment on consumer price inflation in the medium 
to long run forces the ECB to take a sufficiently forward-looking perspective…. This 
longer perspective highlights risks to price stability stemming from financial 
imbalances,… [and, thus,] the optimal price stability-oriented policy reaction based 
on monetary and credit developments is likely to diminish financial imbalances” 
(Issing (2003), p. 17)153. Trichet (2003) also recognises that the first pillar of the 
monetary policy strategy of the ECB enables an evaluation of the amount of liquidity 
within the euro area (by monitoring the deviations of the broad monetary aggregate 
(M3) deviates from its reference value), as well as its allocation. Since, in this way, 
credit and loan developments in addition to portfolio shifts are carefully monitored 
                                                 
153 See also Issing (2002a) and (2002b) for a discussion on how the first pillar of the ECB monetary 
policy strategy can take into account financial imbalances. 
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 and scrutinised according to the relevant financial and economic developments, 
potential risks of a bubble formation are thought to be signalled (Trichet (2003), p. 
18).  
The pre-emptive role of the first pillar of the ECB monetary policy strategy is also 
identified by Borio, English and Filardo (2003), who argue that: “…policy 
frameworks in which monetary aggregates still play a prominent role can more 
naturally accommodate policies aimed at addressing the build-up of financial 
imbalances… No doubt, such frameworks can make it easier to justify interest rate 
increases even in the absence of near-term inflationary pressures as long as the 
corresponding monetary aggregates are growing fast. … Pillar I in the ECB strategy 
is rationalised precisely in terms of providing better signals about inflationary 
pressures beyond short horizons, complementing the assessment of more near-term 
inflation pressures based largely on real-side indicators under Pillar II” (Borio, 
English and Filardo (2003), p. 43)154.  
Therefore, the debatable issue still remains of whether monetary policy should react 
directly to asset prices or, even, if asset prices need to appear in some form in a 
reaction function a central bank uses as a guide for monetary policy. Trichet (2003) 
suggests that “we should remain cautious about it, perhaps because it would be like 
opening Pandora’s Box if we started setting our key policy rates according to asset 
price changes” (Trichet (2003), p. 16). He argues that extreme caution needs to be 
                                                 
154 Nevertheless, Borio, English and Filardo (2003) also accept that even though “responding to rapid 
monetary growth … foreshadows inflationary pressures … financial imbalances can also herald 
recessionary, and so potentially deflationary, pressures down the road. This could raise delicate issues 
of communication and transparency unless a broader set of potential outcomes was explicitly 
considered” [emphasis is in the original] (Borio, English and Filardo (2003), p. 43). 
185 
 exercised by monetary policymakers on this issue since it is considerably difficult 
both to assess asset price valuations and mostly to determine and measure 
fundamental asset-price values, which he views as highly hypothetical (Trichet 
(2003), p. 16).  Therefore, he remarks that any evaluation whether asset-price 
changes reflect deep fundamental change or not is a challenging task and gives the 
NASDAQ tech-stock bubble as an illustration155. Mishkin (2008) also shares the 
same view concerning the difficulty in accurately identifying asset price bubbles and 
argues that if a monetary tightening is exercised in order to restrain an asset price 
bubble that is falsely identified, the prospects of economic growth may substantially 
deteriorate. Furthermore, Bernanke (2002) points out that when the monetary 
authorities are not confident in their estimations about both the presence of a bubble 
and its amplitude, the monetary policy actions aiming to affect asset price 
developments may lead to a misallocation of resources.    
Nevertheless, Trichet (2003) stresses that a crucial issue is whether the central bank’s 
stance should be different in a reversal of expectations due, for example, to a 
reassessment of expected profitability asset prices decline, in the effort to foster 
monetary and financial stability (Trichet (2003), p. 17). 
It has been suggested that the monetary policy response to an asset-price bubble 
should be asymmetric in that when asset prices rise, central banks need not react 
provided there is no deviation from the price stability objective, while in the opposite 
                                                 
155 Trichet (2003), in particular, points out that even though during 1996 market participants were 
thought to act in “irrational exuberance”, capital spending increases due to the development of new 
technologies led to faster productivity growth that resulted in increases in equity prices. Relatively 
accurate asset valuations were difficult to undertake at the time due to uncertainties about 
fundamentals, even though central banks were actively concerned with the large movements in asset 
prices.   
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 case during the unwinding a possible reaction is justified if it is estimated that 
monetary and financial stability are endangered. However, this asymmetric reaction, 
especially if it is held is a systematic manner, bears the cost of giving rise to moral 
hazard (as explained in Chapter 5)156. Therefore, it is questioned if a symmetric 
(systematic) monetary policy reaction to asset price changes is the appropriate 
solution. Trichet (2003) does not share that view based on the opinion expressed 
above that central banks cannot accurately assess asset-price deviations from their 
fundamental value. He considers that if the monetary authorities do not diagnose the 
presence of a bubble, thus, not devising an appropriate reaction, they actually 
encourage market participants to undertake riskier projects based on their false 
perception of a sound financial and economic environment, bringing about a problem 
similar to “disaster myopia” (as in Guttentag and Herring (1986)), (Trichet (2003), p. 
17).  
Nevertheless, De la Dehesa (2002) expresses the opposite view. He argues that the 
above view that central banks may create moral hazard by cultivating expectations 
that remedial monetary policy action will be taken if a bubble bursts, probably stems 
from the fact that market-price changes are, actually, asymmetric. He suggests that 
“this perception may not happen or may be reduced if the central bank reacts to asset 
price movements in a symmetric and transparent way” and “the instrument that 
seems to be more adequate to respond to asset prices developments is the 
conventional interest-rate policy, [since] experience has proven that traditional 
                                                 
156 Research that analyses the incentive and moral-hazard effects that may arise by a central bank’s 
considerably aggressive response to a collapse in asset prices includes, for example, Miller et al. 
(2000), and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003).  
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 monetary policy is easier to implement and more effective than other alternative 
instruments such as the increase in margin requirements or policy signals to 
influence those movements” (De la Dehesa (2002), p. 2). 
Furthermore, when policymakers face large fluctuations in asset prices but muted 
inflation expectations, it is considered whether inflation is measured accurately, as 
well as whether price stability is ensured. It is debated whether asset prices should be 
taken into account when defining price stability, and, generally, whether asset prices 
may play a significant role in the conduct of monetary policy. The underlying 
concept is that since valuations of assets are computed in a forward-looking manner, 
eventually asset prices incorporate expectations referring to future inflation and 
economic growth. Nevertheless, Trichet (2003) remarks that this view is undermined 
by the fact that it has been difficult to establish wealth effects in a definitive manner, 
which although it seems not to apply to the U.S., it is probably the case in the euro 
area. Additionally, he expresses concerns about the observed divergence of asset 
prices from the CPI and points out the potential of an “internal conflict, if the 
objective of price stability is defined by aggregating the changes in the CPI and the 
changes in asset prices … since the nature of both types of prices is fairly different” 
(Trichet (2003), p. 18).   
Referring to the ECB monetary policy strategy, Trichet (2003) remarks that if 
monetary policymakers decide not to respond directly to asset price developments, 
after evaluating all the elements described by the indications of the first pillar 
(mentioned above), they certainly need to consider the consequences of these 
developments on aggregate supply and demand, as well as on the confidence and 
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 expectations of economic agents, as they may eventually exercise an effect on price 
developments (Trichet (2003), p. 18). 
Furthermore, Mishkin (2008) argues that actions aiming to “prick” an asset price 
bubble should better be avoided for (at least) three reasons. Initially, because he 
accepts that it is difficult to identify asset price bubbles accurately and promptly, and 
secondly, because he contends that even if this is not the case, still the effect that 
interest-rate policy can impose on asset price bubbles is highly uncertain. He stresses 
that tightening interest-rate policy may prove considerably ineffective in its effort to 
restrain the bubble, since “market participants expect such high rates of return from 
buying bubble-driven assets”157(Mishkin (2008), p. 2). Since he views bubbles as 
“departures from normal behaviour” he accepts that “it is unrealistic to expect that 
the usual tools of monetary policy will be effective in abnormal conditions” (Mishkin 
(2008), p. 2). Finally, he points out that since asset prices span over a large spectrum 
of assets trading in the relevant markets, and since in a single period a bubble may be 
present only in a segment of those assets, monetary policy actions may prove to be “a 
very blunt instrument in such a case, as such actions would be likely to affect asset 
prices in general, rather than solely those in a bubble”158 (Mishkin (2008), p. 3). 
Finally, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and 
Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2005) support the above view that monetary policy should 
not attempt to defuse asset price bubbles and only respond to changes in the 
                                                 
157 Greenspan (2002) also further discusses this point.  
158 An additional reason proposed has been that many crashes of asset prices which have become 
associated with asset price bubbles have had very limited effects on the economy (see the propositions 
of Mishkin and White (2003) in Chapter 5). 
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 prospects for inflation and aggregate demand as it is thought to lead to superior 
results even in the event of a bubble.  
 
6.3 Alternative Policy Responses 
Since certain types of asset price bubbles threaten the stability of the financial system, 
thus, creating adverse effects for the economy overall, it seems reasonable to 
evaluate whether government policies may be effective in addressing such asset price 
bubbles. An extensive discussion on this point, however, lies beyond the purpose of 
this thesis and, therefore, we only present a summary of some important issues raised. 
Mishkin (2008), for example, highlights the merits regulatory policy can bring. He 
contends that since interest-rate policy faces the difficult task of managing price 
stability and maximum sustainable employment, regulatory policies and supervisory 
practices should focus on strengthening the financial system, rendering it less 
vulnerable to booms and busts in asset prices. Nevertheless, certain feature of these 
policies constitute main aspects of a properly-functioning prudential regulatory and 
supervisory system, such as prompt corrective action, close supervision of financial 
institutions to enforce compliance with regulations, careful monitoring of an 
institution's risk-management procedures, adequate disclosure and capital 
requirements, and sufficient resources and accountability for supervisors. 
Mishkin (2008) suggests that additional elements of such policies should include 
regulations that are designed, first, with the aim to fix market failures, and, second, in 
a way that does not exacerbate the interaction between credit provision and asset 
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 price bubbles.  Kashyap and Stein (2004), for example show that an increase in asset 
values during a boom leads to higher capital buffers at financial institutions, 
encouraging further lending when capital adequacy requirements remain unaltered. 
When the bubble unwinds, there may be a sharp drop in value of this capital, even 
rendering a cut in lending necessary. Goodhart (2008) also supports this point. 
However, the role of bank-capital requirements in fostering financial stability, 
including whether capital requirements should be adjusted over the business cycle or 
whether other changes in the regulatory structure are necessary to ensure 
macroeconomic efficiency is still a matter of a growing research159.  
Mishkin (2008) also stresses that proper regulatory policies need to address the 
soundness of individual institutions, but notes that, at times, “risks across institutions 
become highly correlated, and we need to consider whether regulatory policies might 
need to take account of these higher-stress environments in assessing the resilience 
of both individual institutions and the financial system as a whole in the face of 
potential external shocks” (Mishkin (2003), p. 3). Notably, concerning the 
correlation of such risks in a global setting, propositions have also been put forward 
such as the construction of global central banking institutions (see for example Calvo 
(2008)).  
It is also recommended in Mishkin (2008) that the regulatory system should include a 
standard part comprising policies addressing the risks bubbles create to financial 
instability. Being standard, these policies should be operational irrespective of the 
                                                 
159Research to date has not reached solid conclusions. In addition to Kashyap and Stein (2004), 
Goodhart, Hofmann, and Segoviano (2005), and Gordy and Howells (2006) provide a discussion of 
the related issues. 
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 estimated presence of a bubble. Nevertheless, he does not fail to admit that “because 
specific or new types of market failures might be driving a particular asset price 
bubble, some future bubbles will almost certainly create unanticipated difficulties, 
and, as a result, adjustments to the specific policy stance to limit the market failure 
contributing to a bubble according could be very beneficial if identified and 
implemented at the appropriate time” (Mishkin (2003), p. 3). 
The above suggestion, though, fails on the problem created by the difficulty in 
identifying asset-price bubbles on the first place. However, Mishkin (2008) argues 
that for the case of stock-market bubbles, even though they are difficult to identify 
since they tend not to be driven by credit booms (which he views to render them less 
detrimental as their collapse is less likely to create financial instability), in the event 
of rapid asset-price increases co-existing with a credit boom, it may be more likely 
that asset prices do, in fact, deviate from their fundamental values, as looser credit 
standards may trigger the rise in asset prices160. Then, a bubble is more likely to be 
identified by financial regulators, in the face, for example of information about 
lenders weakening their underwriting standards and credit extensions rising at 
unusually high rates. This argument reinforces the suggestion that “a rapid rise in 
asset prices accompanied by a credit boom provides a signal that should lead central 
bankers and other financial supervisors to carefully scrutinize financial developments 
to see if market failures might be driving the asset price boom” (MIshkin (2008), p. 
4).  
                                                 
160 In particular, stock-market bubbles can do more harm if stocks are held by financial institutions 
and these institutions are allowed to include the market value of stocks in their capital base. According 
to Mishkin (2008), this practice was a feature of the Japanese bank regulatory system and he identifies 
it as one reason why the collapse of the stock-market bubble in Japan helped lead to fragility of the 
banking system and, as a result, was much more damaging to the economy (Mishkin (2008), p. 4).  
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 6.4 Empirical Dimensions of Asset Price Bubbles   
Theoretical models and their empirical applications suggest that even though it is 
widely accepted that asset prices offer (even partially) useful information to 
monetary policymakers in the short-term, views are mixed about whether they bear 
any strong link to the primary indicators of monetary policy (output gaps and 
inflation forecasts). Policymakers need to utilise a vast amount of, at times, 
conflicting information and imprecise indicators. In addition, they need to take real-
time decisions regarding prospective economic growth and prices, without the 
benefit of hindsight. 
Borio and Lowe (2003) examine the annual asset-price movements in 34 countries 
beginning in 1962, looking at 38 crisis episodes, only using data that available ex 
ante. They form an index of imbalances based on a credit gap (defined as credit 
growth deviations from trend), an equity price gap, and an output gap aiming in 
identifying incipient declines in asset prices, which may create significant real output 
losses. They argue in favour of the use of such an index as a guide for proactive 
monetary policy action. A similar index is used for the US during the 1920s by 
Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003), who show that it provides explanations of the 
severity of the Great Depression.  
The analysis of Borio and Lowe (2003) justifies the presence of two completed asset 
price cycles since the 1970s. They, thus, extract two main results, namely, first, that 
asset-price and credit cycles often progress concurrently, and, second, that cycles 
seem to increase in magnitude. They contend that low inflation generates optimism 
about the economic environment which may further inflate asset prices in response to 
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 an increase in productivity growth than will normally be the case. Equally, an 
increase in demand increases the likelihood of a rise in asset prices, in the case of a 
central bank being credibly committed to price stability. They argue that a credible 
commitment to price stability, in the short-run, renders product prices less sensitive 
to an increase in demand, the opposite holding for output and profits, while the 
absence of inflation may influence monetary policymakers to delay restricting 
monetary policy as demand pressures build. They reach the conclusion that asset 
prices provide useful information and that individual as well as aggregate asset prices 
should be used as a tool for conducting monetary policy. 
According to Filardo (2003), however, the suggestions in Borio and Lowe (2003) 
that a “leaning-against-the-wind” approach to policymaking may be the best policy, 
need further empirical research into robustness of their policy recommendations 
under alternative economic environments161. Filardo (2003), stresses that McGrattan 
and Prescott (2003) give an interpretation of 1929 which should be a cautionary tale 
for any monetary policy approach that stresses a “lean-against-the-wind” policy 
during a run-up in asset prices. In particular, McGrattan and Prescott (2003) propose 
a measure of capital stock and compare it to market capitalization in order to identify 
if an asset-price bubble is present. Using this measure, they conclude that during 
1929 the U.S. stock-market was, in fact, undervalued and that an asset-price bubble 
was not present. They argue that the subsequent stock-market crash was a result of 
the severely tightening monetary policy, but not the unwinding of a bubble. 
                                                 
161 However, according to Filardo (2003) Borio and Lowe (2003) “paint a picture of a very risky 
policy environment where financial instability is omnipresent and a natural consequence of economic 
success” and he recognises that this view reflects a long tradition in macroeconomics, as e.g. in 
Minsky (1982), (Filardo (2003), p. 295). 
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 In addition, Filardo (2003) suggests that further investigation into bank regulation 
may uncover some unintended adverse consequences of some of the policy 
recommendations given by Borio and Lowe (2003). For example, the authors offer a 
recommendation that regulators use tighter capital standards during an expansion in 
order to restrain unwarranted optimism. However, in such a situation, Filardo (2003) 
argues that financial funds would flow out of the regulated banking sector into the 
relatively unregulated nonblank financial markets. Not only would this artificially 
reduce the beneficial role that banks play in the provision of loanable funds, but it 
would also boost the size of the unregulated nonblank financial sector, which would 
presumably fuel further unwarranted optimism and asset price appreciation. Hence, 
according to Filardo (2003) in this case, a “leaning against the wind” policy may 
have the opposite effect on financial stability than policymakers would expect 
(Filardo (2003), p. 295-296). 
Detken and Smets (2004) study financial, real and monetary policy developments 
during asset price booms examining 38 boom periods in 18 OECD countries since 
the 1970s. Their results reinforce the findings of Borio and Lowe (2003) referring to 
the build-up of large real, financial and monetary imbalances, which may constitute a 
good indicator of potential financial and macroeconomic instability162 . However, 
                                                 
162 They find that “real GDP growth is particularly strong during the boom, which is mainly driven by 
total private investment and is also reflected in housing investment, in both cases both in terms of 
growth rates as well as gaps (i.e. deviations of the investment ratios to GDP from estimated stochastic 
trends), and … monetary policy is looser during boom periods than in normal times as is revealed by 
deviations from the Taylor rule, as well as money and credit conditions” (Detken and Smets (2004), p. 
31). In addition considering all booms, they find that in the boom phase inflation rates do not move 
substantially, despite rises in deviations from trend. They also find that those booms that preceded 
large recessions or even financial instability, tend to last longer and experience substantially greater 
real and monetary imbalances; they also tend to be characterised by a large boom and bust in the real-
estate market. Finally, they find that cases of ‘high-cost booms’ also present a relatively more positive 
inflation gap, namely greater deviation of inflation from its trend, after the boom, despite the large fall 
in investment and output. 
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 they do not provide an answer to whether ‘pre-emptive’ monetary policy tightening 
may be successful in preventing or alleviating subsequent asset price collapses 
without imposing a considerably high cost. 
Furthermore, Bryan, Cecchetti, and O’Sullivan (2003) argue that asset prices offer 
useful information for monetary policymakers and that the latter should avoid using 
measures of inflation that focus only on the current cost of current consumption. 
They mainly underline the importance of inter-temporal analysis, argue against 
policymakers’ relying to a great extent on current consumer price index prices, and 
point out the challenging task of capturing the changing prices of non-financial 
assets. Bryan, Cecchetti, and O’Sullivan (2003) point out that in periods of real 
interest rate fluctuations, price information may be biased.  
The key policy implication of Bryan, Cecchetti and O’Sullivan (2003) is that their 
new measure of inflation is higher than CPI inflation in the late 1990s, reflecting the 
rapid increase in asset price inflation. If the increase in asset prices was due to higher 
expected goods prices, then their method would lead the monetary authority tighten 
monetary policy and reduce the inflationary pressures. If, however, the increase in 
asset prices was due to an asset price bubble, then the Bryan, Cecchetti, and 
O’Sullivan (2003) method would generate an upward bias in their cost of life 
inflation measure and cause the monetary authority to pursue an unnecessarily tighter 
monetary policy, which could have scuttled the expansion and deepened the 2001 
recession163 (Filardo (2003), p. 292). 
                                                 
163  Filardo (2003) makes the association with Alchian and Klein (1973), and identifies that the 
problem then, similar to the one at the time of publication, was how best to incorporate observed 
future prices into a standard price index. Alchian and Klein (1973) solve this problem by constructing 
a hypothetical asset price that would be observationally equivalent to having the full set of future 
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 McGrattan and Prescott (2003) have developed a way to determine whether the stock 
market is overvalued or undervalued and applied it to the 1929 U.S. stock market. 
They found that the reason for the 1929 crash was not that the stock market was 
overvalued relative to fundamentals. Significant overvaluation of the stock market is 
a reason for concern, because if the market is overvalued, the likelihood of a crash is 
high, and a crash would result in large declines in net worth of people and 
corporations164. McGrattan and Prescott (2003) also raise the question if there are 
any consequences to the stock market being undervalued and give an affirmative 
answer. In particular, an undervaluation will lead to greater underinvestment in the 
corporate sector and lower economic efficiency. 
In the question whether the U.S. Federal Reserve should consider the consequences 
of its policy for the value of the stock market, their answer is negative. They stress 
that “the role of the Federal Reserve is to maintain an efficient payment and credit 
system, and it should not consider the effects of its policies on the value of the stock 
market, while the central bank should not try to prop up the value of the stock market 
as it did in Hong Kong and Taiwan or depress the stock market as the Federal 
Reserve did in the United States in 1929” (McGrattan and Prescott (2003), p. 274). 
                                                                                                                                          
prices. Bryan, Cecchetti and O’Sullivan (2003) propose an interesting method to try to approximate 
the Alchian and Klein (1973) hypothetical asset price by using a dynamic factor model. According to 
Filardo (2003) the authors have made a useful extension of the empirical methods to examine Alchian 
and Klein’s cost of life inflation measure but do not show how to resolve the bias induced by asset 
price bubbles. Additionally, he proposes that they construct a more unbiased estimator of the Alchian 
and Klein inflation estimate by trying to extract future price information with modern finance methods 
or by empirically controlling for asset price bubbles – which he admittedly views as neither 
particularly straightforward nor easy (Filardo (2003), p. 292-293).    
164 A stock market would cause state and local pension plans to suffer large declines in the value of 
their assets, and this would necessitate increases in taxes if promises were to be honoured. The same 
decline would occur for private defined benefit plans, which would further reduce the value of the 
stock market. People with individual retirement accounts would also suffer losses. In such situations, 
there is a danger that policies will be adopted that have adverse real economic effects (McGrattan and 
Prescott (2003), p. 274). 
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 Arguing on who should deal with stock market overvaluation or undervaluation other 
than the central bank, they accept that economists should convey to the public 
information about the degree of overvaluation or undervaluation. If the public has 
this information and acts on it, the problem of incorrect stock market valuation will 
not arise165. 
According to Filardo (2003), if McGrattan and Prescott’s study is correct in its result 
that there was no asset price bubble at the height of the market, then the 1929 crash 
and its aftermath is a good example of the costs of fighting an asset price bubble 
when a bubble is not really present, and such estimates can be used to calibrate 
models in which this type of cost is a parameter. Overall, Filardo (2003) suggests 
that policymakers should be sceptical about reacting to asset price movements that 
look like bubbles (Filardo (2003), p. 294).  
 
6.5 Implications of Asset Price Bubbles for Monetary Policy 
Even though asset prices are considered to convey useful information for monetary 
policy makers in the short term, it is still debated whether asset prices have any 
significant relationship to the primary indicators for monetary policymakers. 
                                                 
165 McGrattan and Prescott’s (2003) theory is that the crash was due in large part to the Federal 
Reserve’s reaction to the rising stock prices, which it viewed as reducing real investments in the 
corporate sector. Determined to stem investment in stocks, the Federal Reserve increased short-term 
interest rates dramatically (see McGrattan and Prescott (2001b) figures 5 and 6). By the middle of 
1930, stocks had recovered much of the ground lost in 1929. Perhaps the crash could have been 
avoided. This historical episode is strong evidence that Federal Reserve policy can create a stock 
market crash by disrupting the credit system. If stock market participants are subject to an unexpected 
credit crunch, a stock market crash is likely (McGrattan and Prescott (2003) p. 273-274). 
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 Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) examine the potential usefulness 
of a monetary policy reaction to changes in asset prices generalising the seminal 
analysis in Poole (1970), which indicates that “leaning against the wind” of interest-
rate changes is useful when disturbances originate in the money market. They allow 
for equity (or real estate) price movements in an economy where the stock market (or 
the housing sector) is crucial and for exchange rate changes in an economy where the 
external sector is particularly important. They show that monetary policy attempts to 
moderate asset-price changes tend to diminish economic activity fluctuations 
provided that the movement in an asset price is generated from a disturbance in the 
demand and/or the supply of the asset under consideration. If the change in asset 
prices is generated by disturbances in other markets (than the money market as in 
Poole’s analysis) the same rationale applies. In the case, for example, of a rise in 
equity prices due to positive productivity shocks, they suggest that “leaning against 
the wind” of the asset price changes is recommended. They contend that monetary 
policy should automatically react to asset-price changes, but point out the importance 
of separate evaluation of each situation before the relevant actions are undertaken.  
Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) also use the insights of Kent and 
Lowe (1997) that build a dynamic model, which explicitly qualifies for 
misalignments in asset prices, in order to demonstrate that asset price misalignments 
should be taken into account in the normal course of determining monetary policy, 
due to the impact they impose on expected inflation, and due to their potential of 
creating unnecessarily large business cycle fluctuations. Their conclusions are further 
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 confirmed by the results in the simulations presented by Ceccheti, Genberg and 
Wadhwani (2003)166.  
Although monetary policy actions may, under certain circumstances, be effective in 
affecting asset prices, Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2003) stress that such 
policy actions are considerably difficult to apply. They maintain that a build-up of 
asset price misalignments tends to result in misaligned exchange rates, 
macroeconomic imbalances, and lost competitiveness. In the face of shocks hitting 
the asset markets, monetary policy actions in an effort to “lean against the wind” of 
asset price changes are suggested as being more likely to balance outputs. After a 
modest monetary policy reaction to asset price misalignments macroeconomic 
performance has been improved, for the cases of financial shocks being the 
underlying determinants of theses misalignments. Yet when the latter are due to 
shocks to productivity or changes in fundamentals, the monetary policy reactions 
seem not to be useful. Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2003), thus, reach the 
conclusion that a mechanical monetary policy response to all asset price changes can 
eventually give rise to outcomes that are worse than those created when there is no 
response all. They further draw attention to certain factors that may weaken the 
effectiveness of monetary policy responses, like the role of the banking sector, the 
resilience of the financial system, and the openness of the economy. 
                                                 
166  They run simulation experiments of monetary policy responses to asset prices in three 
macroeconomic models. The first model studies the appropriate response to bubbles in the stock-
market and is a small closed economy model as in Bernanke and Gertler (1999). Their next model is 
as in Batini and Nelson (2000), namely a small open-economy model that highlights the role of 
changes in the exchange-rate. Their third model is similar to Taylor’s multi-country model built 
originally in order to examine international economic interdependence. 
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 Furthermore, Goodfriend (2003) also accepts that changes in asset prices convey 
useful information to monetary policymakers. However, he maintains that “the 
important point is that the unconditional correlation between asset price movements 
and real short-term interest rates generated by monetary policy geared to maintaining 
price stability could be either negative or positive” (Goodfriend (2003), p. 447)167.  
He argues that it may prove counterproductive to target asset prices, as well as that 
the downside risks of inappropriate monetary policy action exceed the benefits 
potentially created by useful intervention.  He recognises a number of practical 
problems that monetary policymakers face while addressing asset-price bubbles. 
Initially, he argues that the information extracted is not perfect as markets cannot 
capture all available information, monetary policymakers draw information from 
measurements that are not perfect, and different asset prices may produce 
contradictory signals. He contends that “monetary policymakers cannot hope to 
identify and address all inflation and output misalignments” (Goodfriend (2003), p. 
450). Goodfriend (2003) also points out that reputation and credibility which are 
crucial to central banks can be both put at risk by inappropriate, or poorly executed 
policy actions. Since the accurate identification of shocks as misalignments is a 
difficult task, the risk of implementing the inappropriate policy and losing credibility 
is considerably large. If credibility weakens, however, central banks become less 
capable in their efforts to foster financial stability. Finally, he is not convinced 
whether asset price information is useful to exchange-rate or interest-rate policy. 
                                                 
167 He, further, notes that “the direction and size of the unconditional correlation would depend on the 
size, frequency, and duration of aggregate demand and supply shocks, the central bank’s power to 
identify the shocks promptly, and the size and duration of the interest rate responses needed to 
maintain price stability” (Goodfriend (2003), p. 447). 
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 In addition to Goodfriend (2003), Friedman (2003) is also sceptical about the 
usefulness of “mechanical extrapolations” from asset prices, because he also accepts 
the significant risks of mis-measurement and misinterpretation. With reference to the 
experience in Japan during the late 1980s he stresses that asset prices did not provide 
useful information in real time. 
Friedman (2003) finds it useful to begin by asking what lies behind the great interest 
today in the potential implications of asset prices for monetary policy and suggests 
three separate motivations. First, despite the noteworthy success of monetary policy, 
both in the United States and elsewhere during the ‘Great Moderation’ era, there is 
always the challenge of seeking improvement. Second, he expresses the “acute” 
desire to draw all possible lessons from the Japanese debacle of the 1990s, since it is 
believed that the Japanese could have not been as negative if the Bank of Japan had 
taken account of the sharp rise and fall in the country’s equity and real estate markets 
in a different way than it did. Finally, he accepts that there is also at issue “a form of 
disguised reaction” against the increasingly narrow interpretation of what monetary 
policy is all about, especially in central banks outside the United States, including in 
particular the increasingly widespread adoption of “inflation targeting”168 (Friedman 
(2003), p. 459). 
Given the universal agreement that monetary policy should respond to asset prices if 
they do contain such information, the operative question for debate is what to do if 
asset prices do not contain such information. The view expressed in Goodfriend 
                                                 
168 A proposition, with which nobody today disagrees, as Friedman (2003) suspects, is that the central 
bank should take account of asset prices to the extent that asset prices bear incremental information 
about the macroeconomic goals of monetary policy, whatever they may be.   
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 (2003) is that if asset prices do not contain incremental information about the 
macroeconomic goals of monetary policy, the central bank should ignore them. 
However, because the central bank cares about the consequences of asset prices for 
the financial markets, it is generally argued that it should take asset price movements 
into account even if they do not directly contain incremental information about the 
macroeconomic goals of monetary policy. Greenspan (1999), for example, has 
argued, “ … that there is a form of asymmetry in response to asset rises and asset 
declines … Central banks do not respond to gradually declining asset prices … to 
gradually rising asset prices … to sharply reduced asset prices, which will create a 
seizing up of liquidity in the system” (Greenspan (1999), p. 143). Making reference 
to the damaging potential implications for the financial markets liquidity, Greenspan 
(1999) gives a logical explanation for why the central bank would plausibly react to 
asset prices even if they did not bear information that is directly useful for predicting 
future outcomes of the macroeconomic goals of monetary policy. 
Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003) give an entirely different reasoning from 
Greenspan (1999) to the same answer that the central bank should react to asset 
prices even if they do not contain incremental information about the macroeconomic 
goals of monetary policy. Their main argument is that central banks should respond 
to asset prices since they contain information about macroeconomic goals that a 
central bank has, and indeed ought to have, but either cannot or will not publicly 
admit to have. 
According to Friedman (2003), Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003) focus on 
“medium-run macroeconomic stability”, in other words, on the second moment of 
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 real economic outcomes. Medium-run macroeconomic stability, as defined in the 
latter, is accepted by Filardo (2003) as a plausible enough goal for monetary policy 
to pursue, presumably alongside the goal of low and stable price inflation. If asset 
prices provide useful information to the best available forecast of prospects for such 
medium-run macroeconomic stability, Filardo (2003) wonders why this is not simply 
a specific case of the general proposition on which everybody already agrees. He 
contends that the answer lies in the fact that Cecchetti et al. (2003) take as given 
(and, in fact, applaud) the monetary policymaking framework of “inflation targeting” 
(Friedman (2003), p. 460). 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) stress that a considerable debate on the appropriate role 
of asset prices in the design of monetary policy has sprung with contributions 
including, among others, Filardo (2000), Goodhart (2000), Batini and Nelson (2000), 
while  Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) seems to be the analysis 
most closely related to Bernanke and Gertler (2001). In fact, Cecchetti et al. (2000) 
employs simulations of the model used in Bernanke and Gertler (2001) 169 . In 
contrast to the latter, however, the results in Cecchetti et al. (2000) strongly support 
the inclusion of stock prices in the central bank’s policy rule 170 . They identify 
optimal policy only in the case of the central bank knowing with certainty when the 
bubble will burst and that the stock-market boom is, in fact, driven by non-
                                                 
169 In particular, they use the model in Bernanke and Gertler (1999) which is the same as in Bernanke 
and Gertler (2001). 
170 According to Bernanke and Gertler (2001) the difference in conclusions between their work and 
that of Cecchetti et al. (2000) stem’s from computing the policy rules by not accounting either for the 
probabilistic nature of the bubble or the possibility that shocks other than a bubble may be driving 
asset prices. In particular, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) disapprove the fact that the latter “optimize the 
policy rule with respect to a single scenario, a bubble shock lasting precisely five periods, rather than 
with respect to the entire probability distribution of shocks, including shocks other than bubble 
shocks” (Bernanke and Gertler (2001), p. 256). 
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 fundamentals, which are both highly unlikely. Conversely, Bernanke and Gertler 
(2001) show that even “if the central bank is certain that a bubble is driving the 
market, once policy performance is averaged over all possible realizations of the 
bubble process, by any reasonable metric there is no consequential advantage of 
responding to stock prices, and a too-aggressive response to stock prices can create 
significant harm in that scenario” (Bernanke and Gertler (2001), p. 256). They also 
remark that a deficiency in their approach is that the non-fundamental component of 
stock prices is treated as exogenous. A similar result is found by Batini and Nelson 
(2000) referring to real exchange-rate bubbles. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) posit 
that “the macroeconomic stability associated with inflation-targeting is likely to 
reduce the incidence of panic-driven financial distress that could destabilize the 
economy”, yet recognise the need for further research on the issue (Bernanke and 
Gertler (2001), p. 256). 
 
6.6 Booms and Busts in Asset Prices: Towards a Consensus 
ed to be those accompanied by high leverage and a large build-up in 
credit171.  
                                                
The experience of asset-price booms and busts has, historically, suggested that their 
impact on the real economy varies. The most costly episodes in social and economic 
terms tend
 
171 Additionally, according to Plender (2003) asset-price bubbles (in particular equity-market bubbles) 
create a further significant cost as they encourage over-investment in suboptimal projects. McKibbin 
(2003) further gives simulations from a ‘G-cubed’ model that support the conclusion that excessive 
investment creates the major, and at times very persistent effects of asset-price misalignments on the 
real economy. 
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 The discussion in Richards and Robinson (2003), for example, addressed the role of 
monetary policy during a boom in asset prices and their collapse. Economists 
generally advocate an aggressive monetary policy response to the contractionary 
effects generated by sharp declines in asset prices, especially if deflation risk 
becomes significantly high. Posen (2003), for example, clearly states the above even 
though he also highlights that fiscal policy should be utilised in addition to monetary 
policy, and policymakers need identify any form of fragility in the financial and 
corporate sectors. In view of this agreement with respect to the possible monetary 
policy response in the aftermath of asset-price booms, the debatable issue that remain 
is the role of monetary policy during the development of a boom in asset prices, in 
particular under qualified concerns that the latter may deviate from fundamentals.  
Richards (2003) recognises that a few years prior to the year of publication opinions 
were rather polarised on the problem of devising an appropriate monetary policy 
response to the development of an asset-price boom. One view (expressed, for 
example, by Bernanke and Gertler (2001)) maintained that monetary policy should 
not consider the developments in asset markets, unless they influence inflation 
forecasts in the horizon where the central bank targets inflation. The opposite view 
(as, for example, in Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2003)) held that monetary 
policy should respond pre-emptively by using tightening interest-rate monetary 
policy in an attempt to restrain asset-price misalignments in asset prices in their 
development. Richards (2003) stresses that “the debate has shifted towards the 
middle ground”, arguing that “monetary policy should not aggressively attempt to 
burst perceived asset-price bubbles, but should take account of asset-price 
fluctuations, to the extent that they provide information about the shocks affecting 
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 the economy, or have possible implications for output and inflation in the medium 
term, beyond the usual inflation-targeting horizon” (Richards (2003), p. 3). This 
implies that an inflation-targeting framework for the conduct of monetary policy 
needs to be exercised with greater flexibility172. 
nd), 
which, may have the inflation rate as their ‘first-level target, but face broader 
mandates which include paying attention to economic growth and employment. 
                                                
Bean (2003) is evidence of the above ‘shift to the middle ground’, as he argues that 
monetary policy that uses a forward-looking ‘flexible inflation-targeting 
framework in setting interest rates must consider the longer-run consequences that 
asset prices and financial imbalances create.  He expresses the view that asset prices 
may enter an optimal monetary policy rule, deriving from an objective function that 
minimises the output gap and deviations of inflation from its target, instead of 
considering whether asset prices should be directly incorporated in a Taylor-type rule 
or an inflation-targeting rule. Bean’s (2003) analysis suggests a broader role for 
monetary policy than advocated by the view expressed, for example, by Bernanke 
and Gertler (2001) since he argues that monetary policy should respond to asset 
prices provided that they signal changes in expected inflation or, additionally, 
activity. He also argues that this approach is consistent with the behaviour of several 
central banks, such as inflation-targeting central banks (like the Bank of Engla
Bean (2003) emphasises that even though a mechanical monetary policy response to 
any single asset price is not appropriate, monetary policymakers need to utilise 
information extracted from asset prices referring to the shocks affecting the economy 
 
172 Earlier evidence on this argument is found in Ball (1997) and the research in the conference on 
‘Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting organised by the Reserve Bank of Australia during 1997. 
207 
 and their implications for future inflation and growth. When the evaluation of such 
information gives a signal that the risk of potential financial instability is increasing 
by an overheating economy, monetary policymakers need to address the implications 
this may have for inflation and future activity. Therefore, an inflation-targeting 
regime needs to monitor asset prices and their implications for medium-term risks to 
the economy overall.  
Gruen, Plumb and Stone (2005) suggest that a central bank’s tightening of interest 
rates may cause a bubble to burst more severely, and, thus, increase the potential 
detrimental effects to the economy. They provide further evidence to support the 
view expressed by Bean (2003) that monetary policy cannot make a ‘single 
automatic response’ to asset-price developments. In particular, Gruen, Plumb and 
Stone (2005) study a model of an economy in which a bubble in asset prices results 
in increases in aggregate output and inflation, considering a bubble that in each 
future period either continues its development or bursts, with known probabilities. 
Since monetary policy can impose an effect to the economy only with a lag, the 
monetary policymaker faces two conflicting policy options, namely either to use 
restrictive policy in order to reduce inflation and output pressures (and possibly 
encourage the bursting of the bubble), or to implement accommodative monetary 
policy in order to prepare for the eventual unwinding of the bubble. In their model 
the optimal policy depends on the specific characteristics of the process that the 
bubble follows, as well as the nature of the costs created by its unwinding. Stockton 
(2003), however, commenting on an earlier version of the above, argues that since 
monetary policymakers are confronted with great uncertainty with respect to the 
existence of bubbles, even more about their stochastic characteristics, it is unlikely 
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 that the informational requirements for optimal policy in the model of Gruen, Plumb 
and Stone (2003) will be satisfied. They, yet, reach the conclusion that the 
appropriate monetary policy relies heavily on the policymakers’ judgment, as under 
certain circumstances the central bank should better “lean against the bubble”, while 
under others this policy response would be counterproductive. They, finally, point 
ontends that 
out that, given the information available, it may be difficult to distinguish in real time 
which of the above is the case. 
On the contrary, Cecchetti (2003) argues more fervently in favour of monetary policy 
reacting to asset-price misalignments so as to counter potential instability, yet 
exercising caution. He refutes the opposite view by pointing out three main points. 
First, he argues that even though equilibrium asset values are difficult to estimate, 
asset price misalignments still need to be identified by monetary policymakers, 
similarly to potential GDP, for example that is routinely measured irrespective of the 
difficulty in estimation. He, further, does not accept that monetary policymakers 
should ignore the possibility of the development of bubbles in asset markets expect 
them to be eliminated by efficient financial markets. Second, he stresses that a 
monetary policy reaction is justified even under the possibility that excessively 
activist monetary policy may be destabilising to the economy. He argues, in fact, that 
this rather necessitates considerable caution in the extent of the monetary policy 
action. Third, he points towards the existence of central-bank communication 
problems in an effort to justify a response to a potential bubble, but c
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 these no more severe than communication issues raised by normal interest-rate 
increases aiming at stabilising prices and growth in the medium term173. 
The results in Cecchetti (2003) show that the officials at the U.S. Federal Reserve 
had been more concerned in their discussions with asset prices when valuations were 
increasing during the 1990s, and discussing a possible adjustment of policy in order 
to “lean against the bubble”. Contrasting the results to his analysis to Federal 
Reserve officials’ public statements, Cecchetti (2003) concludes that not enough 
evidence has been given that monetary policy can be used to defuse bubbles and 
limit the destructive consequences when they burst. For example, Greenspan (2002) 
concluded that “it seems reasonable to generalize from our recent experience that no 
low-risk, low-cost, incremental monetary tightening exists that can reliably deflate a 
bubble. But is there some policy that can at least limit the size of the bubble and, 
hence, its destructive fallout? From the evidence to date, the answer appears to be 
no” (Greenspan (2002), p. 5). 
Notably, Shiller (2003) points out the difference in approach to research on asset 
price bubbles by stressing that “microeconomists still rarely cite macroeconomists, 
economists rarely site psychologists, and academics rarely cite news media stories.” 
Therefore, he further remarks that the research on asset-price bubbles, in general, 
yields fragmentary conclusions (Shiller (2003), p. 36). Hunter, Kaufman and 
                                                 
 Cecchetti (2003) also presents empirical evidence on the conduct of monetary policy in the U.S. by 
examining transcripts and minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) investigating 
references to be correlated with a measure of the equity-m
equity-market valuations were rapidly rising during t
173
references to keywords referring to asset-market valuations. He finds that the frequency of these 
arket overvaluation. His results show that as 
he 1990s, the frequency of discussion in the 
FOMC about the equity market increased to a great extent. He, further, estimates a policy reaction 
function for the US and provides evidence that the interest-rate levels during the period from 1990-
2003 showed positive correlation with a measure of overvaluation of the equity market and negative 
with a measure of banking-system stress. 
210 
 Pomerleano (2003) present a synthesis of the different strands of research in an effort 
to provide a comprehensive account of “what asset price bubbles are, how they might 
be identified, and – most importantly – what should be done to avoid or limit the 
destructive havoc they may inflict on the financial system and economy” (Hunter, 
Kaufman and Pomerleano eds. (2003), p. 13). 
Shiller (2003) remarkably points out that “there appears to be a fundamental 
disconnect in our thinking about asset price bubbles and, in fact, highly educated 
people seem to differ at fundamental levels” (Shiller (2003), p. 35). By a bubble, 
some seem to mean any period when asset prices rise and then fall – Mishkin and 
White (2003), for example, define a stock-market crash in this way. He, thus, 
contends that the challenging concept of a bubble requires more than the above 
definition presents. The traditional notion of a speculative bubble is according to 
Shiller (2003) “a period when investors are attracted to an investment irrationally 
There may be several different ways to analyse asset markets. As presented in 
Chapter 5, among others, for example, McGrattan and Prescott (2003) emphasise 
rational reactions in the markets to tax-law changes, while Allen and Gale (2003) 
refers to rational reactions to agency problems. Cohrane (2003) stresses the 
convenience yield of speculative assets, and DeBondt (2003) takes a different stance 
because rising prices encourage them to expect, at some level of consciousness at 
least, more price increases” (Shiller (2003), p. 35). A feedback develops – as people 
become more and more attracted, there are more and more price increases. The 
bubble comes to an end when people no longer expect the price to increase, and so 
the demand falls and the market crashes (Shiller (2003), p. 35).  
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 emphasising an array of psychological factors. This diversity is a reflection of the 
complexity of these markets. Shiller (2003) believes, though, that “the diversity is 
also a reflection of the diversity of intellectual traditions that may be applied to 
understanding speculative markets” (Shiller (2003), p. 36). 
Shiller (2000) presents a view of speculative markets that is in many ways an attempt 
to synthesise a lot of diverse information. In his model of speculative bubbles, he 
The amplification mechanisms that make a bubble grow strong are simply that 
increases lead to more price increases, through human psychology. Initial price 
increases attract investors’ interest and demand, and the new demand causes more 
price increases. A vicious circle can actually occur, whereby prices accelerate 
upward. The price increase cannot continue infinitely, and eventually the disruption 
of price increases damages the investors’ motivation to hold the highly priced stocks. 
At that point, the price increase may be sharply reversed, the bubble is burst, and 
there can be a downward feedback, leading to lower and lower prices. Shiller (2003) 
contends that this simple amplification mechanism is well known and has been 
distinguishes between precipitating factors for the bubble and amplification 
mechanisms that enhance the effect of these factors. Moreover, he considers the 
cultural factors that mediate the bubble and the psychological factors that provide the 
human substrate on which the bubble can grow. 
discussed for centuries, but, he points out that curiously it is rarely mentioned by 
economic research. He notes that “from this lack of discussion, one might easily 
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 assume that such amplification is discredited by some scholarly work, while, in fact, 
no such scholarly work exists” (Shiller (2003), p. 38)174. 
Shiller (2003) recognizes that the list of precipitating factors is even longer than the 
list he gave in Shiller (2000). It is, in fact, the bewildering variety of changes that 
affect the stock markets that makes it so hard for us to understand asset price 
bubbles. He believes, however, that there are certain things that we understand about 
speculative markets that incline them towards a large response to large price changes, 
notably the amplification mechanisms. Beyond this, we learn from the diverse 
A very different line of reasoning in given by Meltzer (2003) who argues that asset 
prices contain information about future inflation. In earlier work of his (as for 
example Brunner and Meltzer (1989)), he models asset prices to respond to monetary 
and fiscal policy actions, in addition to changes in the size of the capital stock and 
the expected return to real capital. He finds that “these general equilibrium models of 
money, bonds, and capital give no support to recent proposals urging policymakers 
arguments about the direction of the stock market a little humility in trying to predict 
its future movement (Shiller (2003), p. 36-37). 
to respond to asset price changes… these models can be consistent with the ‘fat tails’ 
found in most asset-price distributions” (Meltzer (2003), p. 31). 
                                                 
174 Shiller (2000) gives what he admittedly thought of as a long list of precipitating factors for the 
stock market bubble that began in 1982, (others define those events as individual bubbles) accelerated 
in the late 1990s and peaked in early 2000. In particular, he gives 12 factors: The advent of the World 
Wide Web and its psychological impact, triumphalism in the West as Western free market solutions 
and capital gains tax cuts, the baby boom from 1946 to 1966 and its delayed effect on the demand for 
stocks, expanded news media coverage of business news, a trend towards increasingly optimistic 
stock-market analysts’ reports, the rise of pension plans, the rise of mutual funds, the worldwide 
decline in inflation the lowering of transactions costs and the expanding volume of stock market trade, 
are adopted around the world, an emerging culture of business success, a Republican US Congress 
and the increasing public interest in gambling and the association of self-esteem with winning. 
213 
 Meltzer (2003) argues that asset prices in these models, and as he contends in reality 
as well, reflect anticipations of inflation. He notes that “the response of asset prices 
with low transaction costs typically occurs before there is an increase in the prices of 
many goods and most services, yet asset prices also rise for reasons not related to 
inflation” (Meltzer (2003), p. 31). He, thus, cannot accept that monetary 
policymakers possess a greater ability to extract the response of asset prices to 
monetary expansion or identifying inflationary and non-inflationary components as 
they arise. He hopes that future research develops techniques that will enable a 
reliable separation of the determinants of asset prices and remarks that the 
information contained in asset prices can be utilised in constructing more accurate 
inflation forecasts when research provides such a reliable rule. Meltzer (2003) 
stresses that “we are not there, we are not even close to having a useful model of 
asset prices that separates the various sources of change”175 (Meltzer (2003), p. 31).  
buyer and seller behaviour. He stresses that drops in asset prices, even large ones, are 
not necessarily followed by output price deflation or long-lasting and deep 
recessions. He notes that the U.S. stock market decline in 1987 and the NASDAQ 
decline in 2000 have not been followed by deflation or recessions, like the 
experience of the U.S. during the 1930s or Japan during the 1990s, and that such 
                                                
Finally, Meltzer (2003) argues that general equilibrium models do not support a 
monetary policymakers’ response to changes in asset prices. In addition, studies of 
the experiences during major bubble episodes do not provide a sound explanation of 
 
175 Meltzer (2003) highlights the need for research to provide solid alternative propositions to rational 
bubbles, or even irrational bubbles, as he believes that “those alternative hypotheses could do more to 
advance our discipline than continued work on empty propositions about rational bubbles or irrational 
behaviour” (Metzer (2003), p. 31). 
214 
 episodes suggest that expansive economic policies may compensate for any 
deflationary effect that asset prices impose on output prices. 
That asset prices can, should, and actually do play a significant role in the 
responsible conduct of monetary policy is a central point Mussa (2003), who makes 
two qualifications. First, prices of key assets including equities, bonds, real estate, 
and foreign exchange are important macroeconomic variables, and their behaviour 
generally has implications for what monetary policy is fundamentally concerned with 
– namely, the maintenance of reasonable price stability and, more generally, the 
Second, he argues that the behaviour of asset prices should not be targeted  as one 
of the key objectives of monetary policy or that monetary policy should seek to 
stabilize asset prices. Asset prices, especially equity prices, are highly volatile. The 
reasons for all of the asset price volatility that we observe are not entirely understood 
– although an important part of it relates to market responses to the receipt of new 
information. He argues that it is neither feasible nor desirable for monetary policy to 
suppress most asset-price volatility. He does not find it relevant for monetary 
                                                
stability and growth of the economy. In particular, he recognises that asset prices are 
among the leading indicators that help predict the likely future behaviour of the price 
level and the level of economic activity. Accordingly, he argues that the behaviour of 
asset prices should normally have some effect on monetary policy, along with that of 
other useful economic indicators. Nevertheless, he notes that other than their 
importance as macroeconomic indicators, asset prices need, in some cases, to exert a 
special influence on the monetary policy conduct (Mussa (2003), p. 41).  
176
 
176 As in Blanchard (2000). 
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 policymakers to “link adjustments in monetary policy is some mechanical way to 
movements in asset prices (i.e., to include asset prices as a determinant of monetary 
policy, as might be suggested by some extensions of the Taylor rule), [since] the 
issue is whether there are identifiable circumstances – not necessarily frequently 
occurring or always easy to describe precisely in advance – when monetary policy 
should adjust in the light of developments in asset prices” (Mussa (2003), p. 42). 
Mussa (2003) argues that there are such circumstances and that their occurrence is 
not so implausible as to be practically irrelevant, although their idiosyncratic nature 
is such that it is difficult to describe a rule to govern the appropriate monetary policy 
response177 (Mussa (2003), p. 42). 
duction of asset prices into the measurement of inflation or the 
definition of price stability. The reasons he presents are, first, that “the nature of 
goods and services on the one hand, and assets on the other hand, are quite different 
and so is the information contained in their prices … that asset prices are highly 
                                                
Trichet (2003) stresses that it does not seem appropriate to include asset prices into a 
rule for monetary policy that the central bank should commit to or into a central bank 
reaction function. He also questions which asset price would be more relevant for 
monetary policymakers to take into account, only stock prices, or include housing 
prices, exchange rates, the cost of capital as well. Trichet (2003) as well does not 
support the intro
 
177 After giving a brief account of the misconduct of monetary policy in Japan during the late 1980s to 
the early 1990s, Mussa (2003) concludes that the point of his criticism is that paying greater attention 
to the behaviour of asset prices (beyond the one normally accorded in the conduct of monetary policy) 
would have helped to avoid the serious errors made. He notes that if Japanese monetary policy had 
paid greater attention to the build up of the asset-price bubble in equities and real estate (and to its 
effects on the macroeconomy), there would have been good reason to start tightening more 
aggressively before clear signs of overheating finally showed up in consumer-price inflation. 
Symmetrically, if greater attention had been paid to the drop in equity values and the housing market, 
there would have been good reason to ease monetary policy more aggressively in anticipation of the 
usually lagged decline in consumer-price inflation (Mussa (2003) p. 49). 
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 volatile, much more volatile than other prices, especially in the current context of 
low inflation, [thus] it might be difficult to implement a sound monetary policy by 
focusing on highly volatile indicators. Finally, it is highly questionable that one 
could determine scientifically what an asset price equilibrium value is” (Trichet 
(2003), p. 22).   
Despite the useful role asset prices may have as a guide to monetary policy, Mussa 
(2003) raises the question of how this can be explained to the public. And even 
questions “why … central bankers generally appear so reluctant to admit that the 
behaviour of asset prices might influence their decisions about monetary policy when 
many (but not all) outside analysts of monetary policy suggest that there should be 
such an influence” (Mussa (2003), p. 49).  He argues that part of the answer lies in 
the fact that while consumer-price inflation is generally unpopular, asset price 
inflation is much appreciated by those who own the assets. He notes that a central 
bank that proclaims an effort to depress asset prices makes few friends and many 
enemies. Thus, aside from the legitimate substantive reasons to treat seemingly 
anomalous asset-price declines and asset-price increases somewhat asymmetrically 
(as discussed earlier), there are significant public-relations reasons why a central 
bank might want to explain these actions in somewhat different terms. Indeed, even 
an independent central bank needs to be politically responsible through some 
mechanism, and it needs to maintain public support of its general policy behaviour, if 
not necessarily for every individual policy action. The way to deal with this issue, 
ing to Mussa (2003) is not to focus on explaining the role of asset prices in the accord
conduct of monetary policy, but rather to emphasize the responsibility of monetary 
policy to contribute to general macroeconomic stability. If asset prices appear to be 
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 behaving in an anomalous manner, but this behaviour has no meaningful effect on 
the macroeconomy, then monetary policy should not be concerned. Of course, tying 
monetary policy to the broad objective of preserving macroeconomic stability will 
not necessarily make monetary policy popular178 (Mussa (2003), p. 49-50). 
The inability to identify asset price bubbles ex ante should be sufficient reason for 
policymakers to be cautious about taking pre-emptive actions to deflate an asset-
price bubble according to Krozner (2003), while the inability to identify asset price 
bubbles ex post not only reinforces this cautious approach but also “should cause 
policymakers to take pause about whether the rhetoric of asset-price bubbles is a 
useful concept for policy discussions” (Krozner (2003), p. 7). In order to answer the 
question of what other policies should the policymakers pursue in the light of the 
above inability to deflate a bubble, one should delve into the source of an asset price 
bubble, namely the mispricing of assets. A policy implication is that better 
information, easily accessible to all investors makes bubbles more difficult to form 
and to be sustained (Kroszner (2003), p. 7-8). He notes that “when a price seems to 
                                                
outstrip fundamentals, investors logically ask whether it is a bubble or whether they 
do not have access to important information about fundamentals, [therefore] it is 
 
d to restrain a 
popular economic boom. In this situation, escalations of asset prices may become a more valuable 
ee, for example, Battacharya and Thakor (1993)), (Mussa (2003), p. 50) 
178 People tend to like an economic boom, at lest up to the point that it begins to translate into higher 
consumer price inflation. When memories of relatively high inflation were fresh and inflation itself 
tended to begin to accelerate at a somewhat earlier stage of an economic expansion, it was possible for 
central banks to point credibly to the threat of reviving the demon of inflation as justification for 
timely tightening of monetary policy. However, if monetary policy remains generally successful in 
keeping consumer price inflation subdued and the tendency for inflation to give early signs of 
acceleration further ameliorates, people may come to doubt that there really is a demon. Then, it may 
well become more difficult for central banks to persuade a sceptical public of the nee
signal and symptom of growing macroeconomic imbalances that warrant a monetary policy response. 
If so, central banks will simply have to face up to the fact that their fundamental task is not to 
maximise their popularity. For evidence on the fact that banks play a special role in the financial 
system because of their capacity to monitor borrowers and reduce problems generated by information 
asymmetries (s
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 important that information is available not only to selected individuals, but to the 
general public”179 (Kroszner (2003), p. 7-8).  
Since several causes may trigger different asset-price booms, which, in turn, may 
lead to different consequences, the appropriate monetary policy response to an asset-
price boom is not a single type. Such and observation led economists to point out 
(see Richards and Robinson eds. (2003)) that there other types of policy may be 
relevant to counter the asset-price booms, such as tax and regulatory policies. 
Carmichael (2003) stresses that in the case of asset-market developments implying a 
rising level of risk in the financial system the financial regulator, in particular, must 
be concerned and make assessment of whether the capital held by banks needs to be 
increased. It is needless to say, however, that regulators need not be more apt to 
identify asset-price bubbles than others. De Brouwer (2003) also notes that monetary 
policymakers must be cautious of the fact that interventions in an effort to limit 
speculative activity in one class of assets may not simply move the problem 
elsewhere.  
The clear policy lesson to be drawn from this literature is the importance of 
improving transparency. Better public information diminishes agency problems, 
especially by reducing information asymmetry and uncertainty about the economic 
environment. With more accurate and complete information, heightened competition 
among intermediaries would enhance incentives to align the intermediaries’ interests 
                                                 
(2003), p. 8). 
179  Krozner (2003) notes that academic work suggests particular avenues through which public 
information can prevent bubbles from forming as for example, Allen and Gale (2003) building on 
their earlier work identify the agency relationship as a key transmission mechanism in the formation 
of bubbles. He remarks that the agency problem arises from an asymmetry of information (Krozner 
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 with those of their clients, individual investors, and, therefore, lead to a more 
successful assessment of the risks undertaken with their clients’ funds. Thus, as 
Krozner (2003) suggests better disclosure of information and clearer rules are 
warranted (Kroszner (2003), p. 9).  
The important issue then remains, according to Richards (2003), of the appropriate 
reference of an inflation-targeting regime to these risks, given the general objectives 
in terms of inflation and economic activity. The challenging issue is that the risks 
created by asset-market developments tend to be low-probability, medium-horizon 
vents that cannot be easily included in standard short-term forecasts. Richards 
(2003) contends that “the risk of a substantial asset-price correction may, in fact, be 
sufficiently low or hard to quantify as to be excluded from any central forecast, 
 
6.7 Concluding Remarks 
Finally, there is broad consensus, expressed, for example in Richards and Robinson 
eds. (2003) (see also ECB (2005) and the discussion in Chapter 5) that even though 
policy-makers should not attempt to target asset prices, they should also not ignore 
them. As suggested by Lowe (2003) monetary policymakers must focus on whether 
credit and asset-market developments create a substantially high financial-system 
risk, as well as broader macroeconomic risks.  
e
particularly at a horizon of only one or two years, but that does not mean that it can 
be ignored. These considerations, rather, highlight the need for monetary policy to 
maintain a medium-term perspective and to take into account an assessment of risks 
to the outlook, not just the central forecast” (Richards (2003), p. 6). 
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 Asset price bubbles are an especially difficult topic. They tend to be difficult to 
explain in part just as history is difficult to explain, since a huge variety of forces 
shapes historic events. Bubbles are also difficult to explain, relative to other historic 
events, since they involve a complex interaction in which people try very hard to 
outsmart each other.  
Notably, Shiller (2003) points out the difference in approach to research on asset 
price bubbles by stressing that “microeconomists still rarely cite macroeconomists, 
economists rarely site psychologists, and academics rarely site news media stories.” 
Therefore, he further remarks that the research on asset-price bubbles, in general, 
yields fragmentary conclusions (Shiller (2003), p. 36). 
Monetary policy actions affect the financial markets and the economy to a great 
extent. In this manner, monetary policy can be too blunt an instrument to respond 
only to a relatively narrow segment of asset markets. It is, thus, contended that for 
monetary policymakers to defuse (at least a significant part of the) volatility in asset 
prices using monetary policy should be neither feasible nor desirable. However, 
beyond the accepted general relevance of asset prices as macroeconomic indicators, 
Because of their potential effect on price and financial stability developments in asset 
prices are a serious cause of concern for monetary policymakers. Nevertheless, at 
Mussa (2003) suggests that even though it does not seem practical to link 
adjustments in monetary policy in some mechanical way to movements in asset 
prices (as for example including them in a variant of an augmented Taylor rule), only 
in exceptional times and circumstances, they should exert a special influence on the 
conduct of monetary policy (Mussa (2003), p. 42, 44).  
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 least two main reasons stand out against the introduction of asset prices into a central 
bank’s monetary policy reaction function. These reasons are that, asset prices are 
difficult to determine scientifically, and if they were to constitute indicators of 
monetary policy, since they are highly volatile, they would render the 
implementation of sound monetary policy very difficult. As Trichet (2003), for 
example, emphasizes, other than using monetary policy the functioning of the 
financial system can be improved through measures enhancing market transparency 
and reducing herding behaviour. Propositions include improvements on regulatory, 
accounting measures, tax rules and regulations, as well as of codes of good conduct 
and good practices.  
 to be disputed that a sharp decline in asset prices can be disruptive. In 
addition, for example, Bernanke (2000), and Kohn (2006) point towards a broad 
agreement that failure to deal decisively with financial system weakness was a major 
policy mistake. Yet, Gaspar and Kashyap (2006) remark that the issue of what to do 
when faced with a large increase in either equity prices or house prices still remains 
contentious. 
On this issue, Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003) cluster the potentially vital 
messages to monetary policymakers in their effort to devise a monetary policy plan 
of action, so as to protect against asset-price bubbles or mitigate their impact. They 
point out the following general conclusions: 
This chapter presented that a hotly debated issue for both policymakers and 
academics has been the relationship between asset prices and monetary policy. It 
does not seem
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 • It is very difficult for monetary policymakers to identify asset price bubbles when 
they develop, due to constraints of imperfect information, the downside risks of 
misusing instruments, limited effectiveness of policy instruments, and time 
constraints. 
• Even though crises follow a great number of asset-price bubble collapses, not all 
cases of the latter result in crises that create financial system instability. Financial 
systems, which operate (before the development of a bubble) under solid supervisory 
and regulatory institutions and macroeconomic stability have proven to be more 
• Weak macroeconomic policies, insufficient policy transparency and micro-
stem from the adverse 
consequences of a crisis, rather than attempts of an appropriate and prompt 
identification of asset-price bubbles. 
resilient to the unwinding of a bubble than systems not having the above features. In 
this respect, asset-price bubbles followed by costly crashes tend to be more frequent 
in emerging, rather than developed, economies where financial markets tend to be 
more opaque, supervision and regulation are rather poor, and lending is mainly based 
on collateral in stead of expected cash flow projections (as a result primarily of poor 
accounting standards). 
structural weaknesses encouraging the development of asset-price bubbles, tend to 
exist in economies that experience crashes that last longer, bear higher costs and are 
more destabilising. It, thus, points towards the establishment of an effective 
prudential regulatory regime to safeguard the financial sy
• Potential agency problems and information asymmetries are minimised by 
transparency. It is also important to enhance the development and enforcement of 
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 accounting and auditing standards, including the frequency and means of 
dissemination and the quality of disclosure. 
• More diversified financial systems tend to spread risks and counter the 
consequences of the unwinding of bubbles better than less diversified ones. It is, 
thus, important to encourage the development of risk-transfer instruments, like index 
funds, securitized assets, stock borrowing, lending, and short-selling regimes, and 
regulated futures and derivatives markets, in order to allow for heterogeneity in 
investors’ attitude and enable investors’ hedging against asset-price bubbles. 
Historical episodes justify the challenges bubbles in asset prices pose to monetary 
olicymakers, since they tend to evolve quickly and produce very high costs to the 
overall economy when they burst. However, as they are difficult to recognise 
promptly, they tend to be identified only ex post. Nevertheless, even though research 
provides several different tools enabling the early identification of asset-price 
bubbles, it is still vital for monetary policymakers to monitor movements in asset 
prices in an attempt to preserve consumer-price stability over longer horizons.  
 
 
• Since solid regulatory and supervisory institutions tend to be the ‘best line of 
defence’, it is important for a central bank to maintain its credibility and reputation in 
executing its core function of preserving macroeconomic stability (Hunter, 
Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003), p. 25). 
p
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 C H A P T E R  7  
T H E  C A S E  O F  C O M P L E T E  I N F O R M A T I O N 180  
 
7.1 Introduction 
By the mid-1980s, it was established that central banks should be responsible for 
controlling inflation, and over the next few years, progressively, most central banks 
in the developed world were made independent. Subsequently, the fight against 
inflation has proved successful, at socially acceptable costs. However, the ongoing 
financial crisis has focused attention on the central banks’ more historic role. It has 
been questioned “how well central banks have discharged their twin duties as the 
guardians of financial stability and as defenders of price stability” (The Economist, 
20th Oct 2007, Special Report, p. 3). 
More recently, the debate has been on whether price stability is sufficient to foster 
financial stability, or whether a trade-off exists (at least in the medium-run). If the 
latter is the case, it is questioned whether monetary policy should exercise its 
influence in order to address asset price bubbles when they grow (before forecasts to 
inflation are affected) or counter their effects after they unwind. The conventional 
view accepts that asset price misalignments are difficult to recognise and that central 
banks should act just against the adverse consequences of a bubble unwinding (see 
                                                 
180 This chapter is based on joint work with Mr. Richard Barrett and Professor Somnath Sen. We 
would like to thank Professor John Fender, Professor Indra Ray and participants at the Public Choice 
Society conference, held in San Antonio, Texas, in March 2008, for helpful comments. All the 
remaining errors are mine. 
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 eg. Greenspan (2002), Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Bean (2004)). The opposite 
view advocates the merits of the so-called ‘pre-emptive’ monetary policy conducted 
as financial imbalances accumulate with the aim to forestall the potential adverse 
consequences in the aftermath of a crisis, especially since low and stable inflation is 
thought to mask threats to the economy that make the financial system more 
vulnerable and which cannot be captured by an output gap measure (see eg. Borio 
(2005), Borio and Lowe (2002), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Cecchetti et al. (2003), 
White (2006)). 
In line with the above debate, we address the second view as a policy option and 
evaluate pre-emptive monetary policy when a central bank considers financial 
stability as an explicit policy objective, yet replacing the output gap. Accepting that 
the effect of the policy instrument is transmitted through the financial sector, a 
central bank recognises that respective reactions from the latter can either enhance or 
hamper the implementation of monetary policy to the real economy. To capture that 
aspect – (to our knowledge) in contrast to the extant literature – we construct a 
simple model of the strategic interaction between a central bank and the financial 
sector in a closed economy. 
Following the tradition that started with Barro and Gordon (1983a), we represent the 
central bank and the financial sector as playing a monetary policy game, yet in a 
context that accounts for the currently uncontested view that price stability promotes 
economic stability in the medium to long-run (see eg. Bernanke (2006), and Jordan 
(2006)) and, thus, not giving rise to the presence of an inflation bias (at least not in 
the same fashion) and the particular case of time inconsistent monetary policy that 
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 arises from it. We examine monetary policy both under commitment to an instrument 
rule and under discretion, motivated, principally, by the concluding remarks in Bordo 
and Jeanne (2002) that “financial stability presents a direct challenge to the rule 
paradigm because it may require occasional deviations from simple rules – i.e. 
policies that are sometimes based in a complex way on discretionary judgment”. To 
our knowledge, the literature in favour of pre-emptive monetary policy against 
financial instability (as presented in Chapter 6) puts forward the conclusion that the 
monetary authorities should exercise their policy with more flexibility and over 
longer policy horizons. On the contrary, our analysis concludes that when a central 
bank addresses financial stability as a main and systematic component of its decision 
making process, namely as an explicit monetary policy objective, then policy yields 
better results in terms of controlling inflation, anchoring inflation expectations and 
imposing more prudence to the operation of the financial sector when conducted 
under commitment to a rule. Therefore, we contend that the contribution is twofold. 
Namely, in terms of the method used and in terms of the results proposed.  
The organization of the chapter is as follows: the next section 7.2 presents the 
method used in the analysis and the assumptions made. Section 7.3 describes the 
model and section 7.4 the outcomes that arise in equilibrium which are followed by a 
discussion in section 7.5. Then in section 7.6, we extend the model by addressing bad 
debts in the real and the financial sector, incorporating, thus, the effect of default on 
loans issued by the financial sector on the latter’s profitability. Section 7.7 states the 
implications of our analysis for monetary policy-making and section 7.8 is the 
conclusion. For comparative reasons we, finally, include an Appendix where we 
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 work out the principal model in terms of a central bank that does not conduct pre-
emptive policy but faces the traditional objectives of price and output-gap stability.  
 
7.2 Preliminaries (method and assumptions) 
We assume that a non-cooperative game is played between a central bank, B, and a 
financial sector, S. This implies that players are not able to make binding agreements 
(or any sort of other commitments), except for the ones which are explicitly allowed 
by the rules of the game (van Damme (1983), p. iii). Each player is assumed to be 
“rational” in the sense that they are aware of the alternatives presented to them, form 
expectations about any unknowns, have clear preferences, and choose their actions 
deliberately after some process of optimisation (Osborne and Rubinstein (1984), p. 
4).  
S chooses a level for the long-term nominal interest rate, R. In a simplified view of 
reality the long-term nominal interest rate is perceived as the price of a main product 
offered by the financial sector (namely loans issued to the real sector). The financial 
sector is modelled in the aggregate, as ‘one agent’ that represents the consolidation 
of the financial intermediaries (i.e. financial firms and institutional investors) which 
operate in purely competitive markets. Such a seemingly strong assumption is 
deemed necessary for modelling purposes. Nevertheless, it seems to be justified by 
the fact that strong competition between financial-market participants makes the 
‘leaders’ in the markets (for example financial firms with considerably high levels of 
capitalisation) not prone to maintain their identity as price-makers (with respect to 
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 the pricing of financial assets) over a long horizon. The increasingly rapid 
dissemination of information in addition to the speed characterising financial 
transactions makes it considerably difficult for financial firms to maintain 
competitive advantages (which are known to give the ability to a firm to act as a 
price-maker) at least without an incessant effort of differentiation in the product 
offered. A second reason is that financial markets have proven to act almost in 
unison at times of turbulence. Therefore, a crisis’ intensely rapid contamination of 
financial-market participants can give credence to our view of the financial sector as 
acting under pure competition. For the above reasons we also abstract from 
modelling S with respect to the behaviour of a representative agent instead. 
S increases welfare when its survival is guaranteed and profits are increased. As 
explained in detail in the following sections profits are perceived in terms of the 
margin between the rates charged on illiquid and relatively liquid financial assets 
(the former represented by loans to the real sector and the latter by interbank-market 
funds). S’s ‘survival’ implies a level of profits low enough to cover the costs of 
firms’ entering and operating in the sector. In accordance to the theory on pure 
competition, at this lowest level of profits the number of firms entering the market 
and those ceasing operation (referring in this model to bankruptcy rather than 
insolvency) are up to a minimum acceptable number.     
B controls inflation by choosing the degree of accommodation of the shocks to 
inflation, which is termed as x. Therefore, the choice variable of B is x. The central 
bank, B, is assumed to be independent and solely responsible for monetary policy. 
The instrument it uses is assumed to be a short-term nominal interest rate, interpreted 
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 as the overnight interbank-offered rate, which can be described in terms of x. In the 
interbank-funds market the central bank is essentially a price-maker, and while 
financial firms resort to this market in order to satisfy their demand for liquidity, the 
central bank’s policy choice influences the behaviour of the financial sector.  
The model refers to a closed economy (therefore, exchange rates are not considered 
as asset prices) with an implicit real sector (thus, only financial assets are under 
consideration).  Since the behaviour of the real sector is not modelled, consumption 
and investment decisions made by firms and households are reflected in the workings 
of the financial sector that allocates funds from savings to investment projects. The 
model, further, presents no role for a government. The latter assumption implies the 
absence of fiscal policy considerations and, also, that government securities181 are 
traded through financial intermediaries in secondary markets, which are, thus, 
encompassed in the sum of the financial securities.  
Time is discreet and t denotes a point in time. The information that each player faces 
is complete, in that the full description of the game is common knowledge and 
perfect, in that when each player has to make a move they know exactly what 
happened in previous moves. The game is sequential, in that the strategic interaction 
between the two players takes place in a sequence of moves, one by each player. S 
makes the first move, then, B moves second and ends the game. Play in a sequence 
of moves arises from the presence of a second-player advantage, which the second 
player, B, would otherwise give-up if the strategic interaction between the two 
                                                 
181 For arguments for and against the purchase of government bonds, see respectively Oda and Okina 
(2001) and the comment by Beebe (2001), especially p. 366. 
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 players were simultaneous. This advantage stems from the control B has over 
inflation, conducting monetary policy so as to counter inflation shocks, and from the 
fact that S’s profits are bound in long-term contracts that cannot rapidly change in 
response to new information. 
 
7.3 The Model 
 7.3.1 The economy 
A simplified structure of the economy is modelled through the following three 
equations: 
t t tE xtπ π ε= + −     for   tε ~ ( )2iid 0,N εσ     (7.1)   
 ,         1tt
r rx ββ
∗−= >
t
      (7.2) 
 t ti r π= + .        (7.3) 
Briefly, (7.1) describes inflation. Inflation, π, is a linear function of, first, the 
financial sector’s inflation expectations, Eπ, formed at t = 0 with respect to all the 
available information and, second, an inflationary shock, ε, that is observed at t = 1, 
can be positive or negative and is assumed to follow a white noise (stochastic) 
process. The equation does not give rise to inflation inertia. The third term is the 
level of accommodation of the shock, x, that is achieved through monetary policy. 
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 (7.2) captures the transmission of monetary policy to the real short-term interest rate, 
r. (7.3) describes what is known as the Fisher identity (termed after Fisher (1896)), 
the (approximately) one for one adjustment of nominal interest rate, i, to the level of 
inflation (in a steady state). This equation is used in a way that describes actual 
inflation and the ex post real interest rates. 
(i) Inflation equation 
In greater detail, equation (7.1) is similar to the inflation equation used in Blanchard 
and Fisher (1989) that models shocks to inflation as any deviation of rational 
expectations of inflation from its actual level, namely as: Eπ − π ϕε=
1
 (quoted in 
McCallum, 1997). In our framework, however, since the real sector is exogenous, Eπ 
denotes the financial sector’s expectations. However, the inflation expectations of the 
real sector that shape its investment and saving behaviour can be supposed to be the 
same as the expectations of inflation of the financial sector. Expectations are formed 
rationally182  and we assume that the full effect of the shock ε is transmitted to 
inflation (i.e. ϕ = ). As the behaviour of the real sector is implicit in this model, 
decisions about consumption and investment are reflected in the variations in Eπ and 
their effect to inflation.  
The shock to inflation reflects any variability in inflation that is not comprised in 
expectations and, therefore, it stems from new information about the economy. The 
monetary response to a shock to inflation, the term x, is optimally chosen in 
equilibrium. In choosing x, B can control the outcome for the rate of inflation. The 
                                                 
1tE
182 Rational expectations are defined in the standard manner, in that 
tπ− is equal to the mathematical 
expectation of πt conditional on variables observable at time t-1 (including past data).  
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 way B actually controls inflation is not modelled explicitly. However, B uses the 
short-term interest rate i as its instrument and equation (7.2) gives a simple 
functional form of the monetary transmission. Therefore, the actual rate of inflation 
at time t is determined by Eπ formed at t-1, ε realised at some time between t-1 and t, 
and x applied after the observation of ε, at t.  
By taking expectations in equation (7.1) we obtain   
Ex = 0,     (7.4) 
where E is the expectations operator. 
This result shows that on average monetary policy is just neutral. This result stems 
from the definition of the stochastic process that the shocks are assumed to follow 
and from the additive effect of the shock to inflation.    
The model does not incorporate any ‘lender of last resort’ behaviour on the part of 
the central bank. Such a shortfall in the model is deemed appropriate because, even 
though central banks are apt and willing to exercise such behaviour183, they refrain 
from making any explicit mention in their official statements for fear of giving rise to 
‘moral hazard’ in the financial sector.    
 
                                                 
183 For instance, in the case of the ECB, Article 3.3. of the Protocol on the statute of the European 
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank states: “…., the ESCB shall contribute to 
the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system” (quoted in Buiter (2007), p. 
2). 
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 (ii) The monetary policy effect   
To specify how the short-term rate of interest, i, determines monetary stance, 
assume: 
      ( )t tx F r=   ( )0 1F ′< < ,  (7.5) 
where rt is the real short-term rate of interest, as in (7.2). The restriction on F' means 
that, first, r and π are inversely related and second, that in order to raise r and lower 
π, it is necessary to raise i. We are supposing the transmission mechanism from i to π 
is via r and its effect on the real economy. A higher value for r encourages saving, 
raises the cost of borrowing short in order to fund business activity or inventories, 
influences sentiment and so, in various ways, increases the output gap (if the latter is 
negative and vice versa) and reduces π. 
Substituting (7.3) into (7.2) and (7.2) into (7.1) shows that, given F, Eπ and ε, the 
choice of i determines π, r and x. In determining strategy, B could as equally set a 
target for r, or for x, as well as choose the level of its instrument, i.       
Recalling that, from (7.4), the central bank’s monetary stance is on average neutral, 
let 
          ( )* 0F r = ,        (7.6) 
235 
 where r* can be thought of as the ‘natural’ real rate of interest184.  
If r>r*, monetary policy is restrictive and, if r<r*, it is expansionary. Therefore, by 
linearising (7.5) for simplicity, we assume the resulting equation (7.2): 
           *tt
r rx β
−=   )1( >β .  (7.2) 
Here, β is an inverse measure of how effectively the real short-term rate of interest, r, 
controls inflation. The restriction on β follows from the restriction on F in (7.5). 
Since r denotes the ex post real short-term interest rate it incorporates the effect of x. 
(iii) The Fisher effect 
Equation (3), the Fisher identity, describes, in this version, the relation between the 
rates of change of the ex post real interest rate, the nominal interest rate and the rate 
of inflation. In a steady state, where r=r*, this implies the long run homogeneity of 
nominal variables, namely that nominal interest rates and inflation change 
proportionally in response to a nominal shock185. Out of the steady state, however, 
there is no longer any presumption that short-run variations in expected inflation will 
leave the real rate unaffected (Walsh (2000), p. 57). In the present model we use 
                                                 
184 Woodford (2003), (pp. 21, 49-55) provides an analysis on Wicksell’s notion of the natural real rate 
of interest, i.e. the rate of interest required for equilibrium with stable prices. It is also referred in the 
literature as the neutral or the equilibrium real rate of interest. 
185 Equation (3) is derived from the following approximation. Consider the nominal interest rate that 
an asset must yield if it is to give a real return of r in terms of the consumption good. That is, consider 
an asset that costs 1 unit of consumption in period t and yields (1+rt) units of consumption at t+1. In 
units of money, this asset costs pt units of money at time t. Since the cost of each unit of consumption 
at t+1 is pt+1 in terms of money, the asset must pay off an amount equal to (1+rt) pt+1. Thus, the 
nominal return is [(1+rt) pt+1 – pt] / pt = (1+rt) (1+πt+1) – 1≡ it, where πt+1 denotes the inflation rate 
between t and t+1. Because (1+r)(1+π) – 1 ≈ 1 + r + π – 1= r +π, the nominal rate of interest in 
discrete time is often written as i = r + π, (Walsh (2000), p. 57). 
236 
 instead a relation between the ex post level of the real rate and actual inflation. The 
steady state in the present analysis is described by the outcome of the game if that is 
a (unique) perfect Nash equilibrium. The latter shows a tendency of every player not 
to change their behaviour (ceteris paribus). 
 
7.3.2 The game – structure 
A way to describe a game can be a summary of the rules of the game by indicating 
“the choices available to each player, the information a player has when it is his turn 
to move, and the pay-offs each player receives at the end of the game” (van Damme 
(1983), p. 3).  In this section we introduce these aspects that are necessary to define 
the game. The next subsection describes in detail the pay-off functions for each 
player. A pay-off function is the function that determines each player’s pay-off from 
the combination of actions chosen by the players (Gibbons (1992), p.1) 186. Then a 
subsection follows presenting the sequence of events in our analysis. The word 
‘event’ is used rather arbitrarily, as it does not represent the notion of ‘a subset of the 
set of states of nature’ that the term ‘event’ usually denotes in decision theory (see 
eg. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Chapter 6). By describing a ‘sequence of events’ we 
rather portray every occurrence that may take place in the context of the analysis at 
any time (in this fashion following Walsh (2000), p. 328). In this way, we present the 
                                                 
186 The term ‘pay-off function’ is common in game theory while in economics the term ‘objective 
function’ is more commonly used. An ‘objective function’ is associated with an optimisation problem 
and it determines how good a solution can be to the pertinent agent or agents. Since each player in the 
game faces an optimisation problem with respect to the other player’s optimisation problem, both 
terms can be used.   
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 information each player has when it is his turn to make a move. Finally, a compact 
description of the game is given in the last subsection. 
(i) Objective functions 
R is competitively determined. The welfare of S (the consolidated, competitive, 
financial sector) increases with profits. Through competition expected profits of S 
are driven down to a minimum level that makes the risk of non-survival just 
acceptable. 
We model the profitability of S in terms of a loan issued (to the real sector) over a 
two-period horizon. The rate charged on this loan, R, constitutes income earned on 
every period the loan is serviced. In order to finance the loan the financial sector 
needs funds in order to meet its liquidity needs (or operating costs) during each 
period of the loan. The charge on these funds each period, is the per-period level of 
nominal short-term interest rate, it. Competition among investment projects 
(affecting R), as well as in the interbank market (affecting it on every period) will 
determine the profit ‘margin’.  
We consider three points in time, t = 0, 1, 2. Let i0 be the short-term rate of interest at 
t=0, and i the short-term rate of interest at t=1187.  Assume i0 (but not i) is known to S 
when S chooses the long-term rate of interest, R, at t=0. At t=2, S obtains profits per 
unit of currency as: 
                   ( ) ( )( )2 01 1 1P R i= + − + + i
                                                
.   (7.7) 
 
187 For simplicity we exclude subscript 1 throughout the analysis. 
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 P in (7.7) being positive implies that the efficient market hypothesis does not hold 
(see Shleifer (2000) for a detailed account) and, therefore that the long-term rate is 
not the sum of future short-term rates. Equation (7.7) is constructed using a simple 
compounding-interest formula. It gives the spread between the income earned on 1 
unit of currency after two periods and the income paid-out on 1 unit of currency over 
two consecutive periods. This margin is assumed to measure the operational profits 
of the financial sector.      
For the sake of simplicity, and because nothing essential is involved, the following 
linear approximation is used: 
          iiRP −−= 02 .     (7.8) 
Taking expectations in (7.8), and using (7.1), (7.2), (7.3), (7.4) S’s expected profits 
can be described as: 
EiiREP −−= 02  
                                        .*2 0 πEriR −−−=     (7.9) 
We assume that competition drives the expected value of profits as in (7.9) to a 
minimum level, which we term Q, at which all the firms operating in S can only 
cover their operating costs. Q is the level of expected profits at which the market 
finds the chances of a number of firms operating in S going bankrupt just acceptable. 
It is illustrative to view Q as a safety-net to the financial sector. If expected profits 
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 fall below this level then the number of financial firms that may go bankrupt is high 
enough to create instability in the sector.  
From (7.1), (7.2), and (7.3) we can describe (7.8) as follows: 
( )02P R i r E x1π β∗ ε= − − − − − − .    (7.10) 
As is evident from (7.10), P varies with x and ε. Therefore, it is appropriate to define 
a minimum level for expected profits in terms of the variability of P. Choosing from 
the measures of dispersion of a distribution of a random variable over its population 
mean we contend that the standard deviation is the most convenient one to use. The 
standard deviation in contrast especially to the variance is a useful measure of spread 
of a distribution in part because it is mathematically tractable.  
Describing, thus, Q in terms of the variability of P, we model it as a function of the 
standard deviation of P. In detail, let Pσ  denote the standard deviation of P, the 
profits obtained by S, then 
  ( )                  0PQ k kσ= > .     (7.11)  
Coefficient k in (7.11) describes any structural features of the financial sector 
affecting its competitive level of profits, like administrative costs, psychological 
factors, or the presence of economies of scale. Since by construction Q is positive, as 
well as Pσ  is by definition, k is assumed to be positive. 
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  As the variability in S’s profits in this model stems from the monetary policy 
reaction, x, and the shock to inflation, ε, letting ‘var’ denote variance, we note, from 
(7.1), (7.2), (7.3), (7.4) and (7.8), that: 
( ) ( )
( )
var var
var
P i
r π
=
= +      
( )var 1 .xβ ε⎡= − +⎣ ⎤⎦       (7.12) 
We assume competition drives the expected value of P to Q as in (7.11), so the 
assumption is for: 
QEP =         
      Pkσ=   ( )0k > .    (7.13) 
Therefore, (7.13) determines the optimal level of R under competition, as a function 
of i0, r*, Eπ, x, and ε. 
Turning to the objective function of the central bank, B, we define B as choosing x 
by optimising over the following utility function: 
( ) ( )2 2* *U Pπ π α= − − − − P      ( )0α > ,  (7.14) 
where π* and P* are targets for the rate of inflation and profits, respectively. The 
central bank has two concerns: (i) the value of the currency and (ii) the stability of 
the financial system.  
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 The financial stability objective is defined in terms of the level of profits in the 
financial sector (as in (7.8)) and a corresponding target faced by the central bank. We 
take a low value for P (with reference to the target) to mean insolvency in the 
financial sector, and too high a value to imply a ‘bubble’ in asset prices, namely the 
accommodation of speculative behaviour from certain financial sector participants in 
excess to the market fundamentals. As the financial sector is modelled in aggregate 
terms, the former is not desired as too low a value of P could even imply a collapse 
of the financial system, namely that a considerably high number of financial firms 
would seize operation. On the other hand, neither the latter is desired since the level 
of P that is justified by fundamentals is the one set as the target. The higher the level 
of P above its target the more a bubble would be accommodated causing strains in 
the economy and, thus, increasing the likelihood of acute economy-wide instability 
after the bubble collapses (as described in Chapter 5).   
The traditional output gap objective, the percentage difference between actual output 
and output consistent with the natural rate of unemployment, is replaced by a 
financial stability objective. This can be justified by the scepticism expressed in 
recent literature about the inclusion of an output gap measure in a central bank’s 
objective function. 
Meltzer (2001) claims that “using the output gap as an objective of the central bank 
is problematic” since, primarily it can “arise for reasons unrelated to monetary policy 
actions – for example, an oil shock, reductions in employment and output resulting 
from provisions of the welfare state, or other real events”. He also contends that the 
way to overcome this problem as proposed by McCallum (2001a), namely to 
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 redefine the natural rate so as to take account of non-monetary effects, can be done in 
principle, but is difficult to do accurately in practice (Meltzer (2001), p. 122).  
The difficulty of the precise measurement and the lack of agreement on the value of 
the natural rate of output and the related problems posed to policymakers have been 
stressed, among others, by McCallum (2001b), Orphanides (2003), Orphanides and 
Williams (2004)  and FRB of Cleveland ed. (2000). 
In addition, while Jordan (2006) claims that real rapid growth and low 
unemployment cannot cause inflation and that there is no trade-off between inflation 
and employment, Bernanke (2006) and Poole (2008) claim that price stability 
supports both strong growth and stability in output and employment not only in the 
long-run, but also in the short run.  
Meltzer (2001) further points out that central banks aiming mainly and principally at 
price stability should not preclude concern for the cost of achieving the target rate of 
inflation and that this cost should appear in the objective function replacing the 
output gap. This implicit cost function should include the costs of maintaining or 
restoring financial safety or solvency, avoiding a credit crunch, or increasing 
unemployment (Meltzer (2001), p. 122). The above helps motivate the use of (7.14) 
as the objective function of B. 
Furthermore, we work through the model using x as B’s choice variable. Even 
though the use of r or i instead could have been equivalent, it is deemed rather 
inappropriate because the actual strategic action of a central bank is the ‘level’ of 
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 control over inflation, while changes in the policy rate as a lever on an array of 
interest rates are the workings of the instrument employed.  
Finally, as a caveat we refer to Eichberger’s (1993) remark that the common practice 
in economics is to take the curvature of an expected utility function to represent the 
corresponding agent’s attitude towards risk, while “in game theory it is usually 
assumed that pay-offs represent the subjective evaluation of the outcome of a play by 
the agent (emphasis not in the original text)188. This means that the pay-offs are 
assumed to reflect a player’s risk attitudes. Consequently, attitudes to risk are rarely 
explicitly considered in game-theoretic analysis” (Eichberger (1993), p. 22). Hence, 
we refrain from making such considerations in the current analysis.  
(ii) The sequence of events 
The strategic interaction between the two players takes place between points in time t 
= 0 and t = 1. Before the interaction takes place, at t = -1, B sets a target for inflation, 
π*, with the aim to anchor S’s expectations of inflation around the target, and a target 
for the level of profitability of S, P*. P* reflects the level of P that the central bank 
                                                 
188 In game-theoretic models individuals often have to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
referring to the objective parameters of the environment, imperfect information about events that 
happen in the game, actions of the other players that are not deterministic, or even the reasoning of the 
other players. To model decision-making under uncertainty, almost all game theory uses the theories 
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954). That is, if the consequence (or pay-off) 
function is stochastic and known to the decision-maker (i.e. for each action a A∈  the consequence ( )g a
:
 
is a lottery (probability distribution) on C, the set of possible consequences of actions) then the 
decision-maker is assumed to behave as if he maximises the expected value of a (von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility) function that attaches a number to each consequence. If the stochastic connection 
between actions and consequences is not given, the decision-maker is assumed to behave as if he has 
in mind a (subjective) probability distribution that determines the consequence of any action. In this 
case the decision-maker is assumed to behave as if he has in mind a “state space” Ω, a probability 
measure over Ω, a function g A C×Ω→ : →, and a utility function u C   ; he is assumed to choose an 
action α that maximises the expected value of ( )( ),au g ω with respect to the probability measure 
(Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), p. 4).  
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 views as sufficient to guarantee S’s survival and proper functioning, in terms of 
channelling funds from savings to investments. B also defines and announces a 
positive level for α, the weight assigned on the financial stability objective, denoting 
the preferences of the central bank for the stability of the financial sector. The level 
of the short-term nominal interest rate that resulted from past policy, i.e. , and the 
level of the ‘neutral’ real interest rate r*, are, also, predetermined and known to both 
players at t = -1, as well as the form of the monetary policy rule, which is set and 
announced at t = -1. The level of Q, at which S finds the chances of bankruptcy of 
some firms in the sector just acceptable, is known to both players at t = -1, before the 
start of the game. In particular, as Q is a function of the monetary policy reaction x, it 
is its functional form that is known before the interaction takes place.  
0i
At t = 0, B is confronted with two alternatives, namely (i) to commit to the rule for 
monetary policy or (ii) to ignore the announced rule and, eventually, act with 
discretion after a shock to inflation has been realized and observed. If B commits to 
follow the rule, then it announces the corresponding x as a function of the 
distribution of shocks to inflation ε prior to S’s making a choice of R. Therefore, at t 
= 0, B, first, sets x with respect to the rule and the anticipated choice of R by S, S 
forms its expectations for inflation Eπ anticipating B’s behaviour and then at t = 0, S 
makes a choice of R. The crucial issue in the case of B’s commitment to a rule is that 
B makes the announcement before S makes its strategy-choice. At t=1 after the 
realisation of the shock to inflation ε B applies x of the level determined by the rule.  
If, at t = 0, B chooses not to follow the rule and act with discretion, then after the 
shock to inflation, ε, is realised (sometime between points in time t = 0 and t = 1) it 
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 defines x at t=1 on a discretionary basis (i.e. by maximising its objective function in 
actual rather than expected terms). Defining x is equivalent to defining r or i. 
Furthermore, Eπ are determined with respect to equilibrium behaviour in each case 
and at t = 1 the actual level for π is realized. 
At t = 0, S determines R competitively by setting its expected profits EP to equal Q. 
Therefore, R is a function of Eπ and x. Under complete information, S is informed 
about B’s behaviour, being either commitment to the announced rule or not, when 
determining a level for R. Therefore, in essence we model two games of complete 
information, one for B committing to a rule and another for B acting with discretion. 
As both Eπ and x assume different levels under the two forms of policy, thus 
affecting R, at t = 0 S is, actually, confronted with the choice either to believe and 
anticipate the announced monetary policy rule, and choose the competitive level of R 
(Rr), in one game, or not and choose the pertinent competitive level of R (Rd), in the 
other game. 
We, further distinguish between two cases for B’s target for financial stability, 
namely for P*=Q and for P* >Q. Since central banks care for the safety and smooth 
functioning of the financial sector they tend to be either more prudent than the 
financial system participants (the case for P* >Q) or willing to let the markets 
function at their own pace (the case for P*=Q) . Therefore, we do not consider the 
case of B choosing P* < Q.  
Figure 7.1 below gives a graphic representation of the sequence of events in our 
model. 
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Figure 7.1: The sequence of events 
 
 t = -1    t = 0   t = 1   (t = 2) 
 
io, r*                xrule   ε   P 
π*, P*, α  Eπ   xdisc   U 
 Q, β           Rr, Rd       r, i 
 Rule for x     π 
             
A point in time t = 2 is used for modelling purposes, as it is necessary for the 
definition of a long-rate that is earned after two periods.   
Throughout the analysis the subscript ‘d’ denotes the outcomes in the first game Γ1, 
when B is acting with discretion, and ‘r’ the outcomes in the second game Γ2, when 
B is following a rule. 
 
(iii) Game description 
A compact description of game Γ1 is as follows: 
[1] B expresses the preference to conduct monetary policy with discretion upon 
receipt of new information at any time. 
[2] Eπ are formed rationally. 
[3] S chooses R with respect to Eπ and discretionary monetary policy.  
247 
 [4] B receives information about the choice made by S 
[5] B observes the shock to inflation ε. 
[6] B chooses x with respect to R and Eπ. 
 
In turn, a compact description of game Γ2 is as follows: 
[1] B commits to a certain kind of a rule for x 
[2] Eπ are formed rationally 
[3] S chooses R with respect to Eπ and the monetary policy rule. 
[4] B receives information about the choice made by S 
[5] B observes the shock to inflation ε. 
[6] B chooses x with respect to R and Eπ. 
 
7.4 Equilibrium Outcomes 
The outcome of each game is derived using a simple optimisation method. We derive 
Nash equilibria in that players are assumed to behave optimally with regard to their 
beliefs about their opponents’ behaviour, and in equilibrium these beliefs have to be 
correct (as in Nash (1951)). They are also sub-game perfect equilibria in that players 
carry out their planned strategies without error (namely that no strategy will ever be 
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 played with zero probability)189 in every sub-game identified. Each game has two 
sub-games, one that starts at t=1 with the choice of x from B, and one that starts at 
t=0 with the choice of R from S. Since information is complete and perfect in both 
games, they are solved using backwards induction. 
 
7.4.1 The case of monetary policy under discretion (Γ1) 
Choice of x 
It is convenient and inessential as stated above, to regard B as choosing x rather than 
i, on observing Eπ, ε, i0, r*, β and R. Substituting from (7.1), (7.2), (7.3) and (7.10) 
into (7.14): 
          
( )
( )
2
2
0
*
2 *
U E x
R i r x E x P
π ε π
α β π ε
= − + − −
− − − − − − + − * .
)*
   (7.15) 
Differentiating (7.15) with respect to x and equating to zero: 
     ( )( 0* 1 2 *
0
E x R i r x E x Pπ ε π α β β π ε+ − − + − − − − − − + −
=  
Since in equilibrium EP=Q, and using (7.9), we get     
                                                 
189 This supplements the assumption of Nash equilibrium (in each sub-game) that where a player’s 
strategy is optimal, Nash equilibrium is reached only if the other players follow exactly their 
equilibrium strategies. The latter assumption renders a player’s strategy chosen in equilibrium 
suboptimal after the slightest deviation (eg. a small error) of the other player (Eichberger (1993), p. 
111). 
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 ( )
( )(
21 1
* 1
x
E Q
α β
π ε π α β ε
⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦
= + − + − − − )* .P 7.16) 
Let                  .      (7.17) 
 Then, from (7.9), (7.14) and (7.15): 
            
  (
( )21 1H α β= + −
( ) ( )( )1 1 1 ** .Q PEx
H H H
α β ε α βπ π ⎡ ⎤− − − −− ⎣ ⎦= + +    (7.18) 
This is the value B chooses for x under discretion. Note that x tends to Eπ + ε − π* as 
Taking expectations in (7.18), using (7.4): 
α tends to 0 or as β tends to 1, so in the limit, π = π*. The rate of inflation equals its 
target value when B does not care about the profitability of the financial sector (i.e. 
when α tends to 0), and also tends to this value as the power of the instrument, i, goes 
to infinity (i.e. when β tends to 1). 
  ( )( )* 1 *E P Qπ π α β= + − −      (7.19) 
        
( )1 1
.d
x
H
α β ε
ω ε
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦=
=
     (7.20) 
Note that: (i) although inflationary expectations are given when B chooses i, they are 
in fact endogenous, formed, prior to B’s choice of i, on the basis of rational beliefs 
about future monetary policy. (ii) If, in particular, P*=Q, then, from (7.19): 
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               *ππ =E .       (7.21) 
Choice of R     
Let σP denote the standard deviation of 
competition drives the expected value to Q = kσP, so 
       (7.22) 
P, the profits obtained by S. We assume 
QEP =
PkEP σ=      ( )0k > .    (7.23) 
At this level for expec
acceptable. 
From (7.9), (7.19), (7.22) and (7.23), choice of R is governed by: 
ted profits, the market finds the chances of bankruptcy just 
( )( )
( ) ( )
0
0
0
2 *
2 * * 1 *
* * 1 * 1 1
 
2
P
Q R i r E
r P Q
i r P k
π
R i π α β
R
π α β α β σ
= − − −
− − − − −
⎡ ⎤+ + + − + − −⎣ ⎦
   (7.24) 
From (7.11) and (7.20):  
= −
=
.εσβσ HP =        (7.25) 
.25) we get: From (7.20), (7.24) and (7
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 ( ) (0 )
2
1where  A 1      A>0 .
2
d d
i r P
ε
π α β∗ ∗ ∗⎡ ⎤= + + + −⎣ ⎦
  (7.26) 
In choosing R under discretion, which we term as Rd, S takes into account the effect 
of B’s choice of x on Eπ and, through σP, on Q. Note that, because the financial 
Informally, we suppose the choice of R is optimal for individual financial 
this value for R. 
rium
1A ,R kβω σ= +
sector is consolidated, the optimisation process is implicit rather than modelled. 
institutions. In other words, because of competition, they cannot do better than adopt 
In Γ1 the equilib  ( ),d dR ω   is as in (7.26) and (7.20). As both represent unique 
solutions to the pertinent optimisation problems, both (7.26) and (7.20) are 
undominated, representing, thus, a sub-game perfect equilibrium (see eg. Eichberger 
7.4.2 The case of commitment to an instrument rule (Γ2) 
Under B d, in choosing the 
rule, takes account of the effect the rule will have on S’s choice of R. In choosing R, 
S takes the rule for x as fixed. 
(1993) for a detailed proof of the statement that “every perfect equilibrium strategy is 
undominated” (Eichberger (1993), p. 115), and van Damme (1987) for a 
comprehensive account of this point). 
 
rules,  pre-sets the way x will be determined at t = 1 an
252 
 We define the rule190 as: 
         ( )2 0ω >ωεπωω ++= E2x 1    .  (7.27) 
ting inflation by controlling S’s expectations and by 
accommodating perceived shocks to inflation at a constant rate. The choice of a rule 
as in (7.27) is justified by (7.1) the equati g inflation
The rule aims at affec
on drivin .   
Taking expectations in (7.27), using (7.4): 
      
.0
2
1
ω
ωπ −=E
     
ω=
 (7.28) 
Thus, inflationary expectations are again endogenous and controlled by the monetary 
policy rule. Th nstant term
in the adjustment of the monetary policy instrument. From (7.27) and (7.28): 
e co  ω1 qualifies for a definition of a degree of smoothing 
               x ωε= .      (7.29) 
Under the commitment of a rule B is actually making the first move by announcing 
and committing to a rule as in (7.28) and (7.29). Then S forms Eπ with respect to 
(7.28), anticipa
x as in (7.29).  
                                                
tes x as in (7.29) and determines R accordingly. Then at t=1 B applies 
 
 
190 This is an instrument rule since from (7.3), equation (7.27) can be written as a rule for the short-
term nominal rate, i. 
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 Choice of R 
From (7.9), (7.11), (7.22), (7.23), (7.28) and (7.29), R is now, under rules, given by: 
.( )
0 02 *
1 1
P
R i r Q
k
k ε
ω
σ
β ω σ
− − − =
=
⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦
      (7.30)  
        
( )0 0* 1 .
2r
i r k
R
1 εω β ω σ⎡ ⎤+ + + − +⎣ ⎦=     (7.31) 
In supposing S’s choice of R is determined by (7.31), we take it that B is committed 
to the rule, and S is rational in believing the rule will be enforced. 
Choice of x 
B maximises expected utility, which from (7.14) is: 
 
( )
( )
2
2
0
*
2 *
EU E E x
E R i r x E x P
π ε π
α β π ε
= − + − −
− − − − − − + − * .
   (7.32) 
ith ω. Substituting again from 
(7.28), (7.29) and (7.30) into (7.32): 
*
    
Suppose P* is fixed, i.e. does not, like Q, vary w
( )
( ){ }
2
0
2
0 0
1 *
2 * 1 1
EU E
E R i r P
ω ω ε π
α ω β ω ε
⎡ ⎤= − + − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − − − − − + −⎣ ⎦
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.P
  
Differentiating (7.33) with respect to ω0 and ω, and equating to zero: 
   
( )
( ) ( ){ }
2
0
2
1 *
1 1 *
E
E k ε
ω ω ε π
α β ω σ ε
⎡ ⎤= − + − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎣ ⎦
  (7.33) 
*0 πω =       (7.34) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ( )
0
2 2 2
1 * 1 1 1
1 1 1
0
*
) ( ){ }1 1 *
E E k k P
k
ε ε
ε
ε ω ω ε π α β σ ε β ω σ ε
ω σ α β σ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − − − − − − + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
= − − − +
=
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
k Pε εβ ω σ⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦  
2 2 2
2 2 2
1 1 *
1 1 1
k k P
k
ε ε ε
ε
σ α β σ σω α β σ
⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤+ − +⎣ ⎦
.    (7.35) 
Let 
εθσkP =*    )0( ≥θ ,   (7.36) 
and define: 
                      ( ) ( )2 21 1H kα β= + − +% 1 .     (7.37) 
Substituting (7.36) and (7.37) into (7.35): 
                  
( )( )2 21 1 1k k
H
α
.r
β θω − − + −= %     (7.38) 
ω=
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 In Γ2 the equilibrium ( ),r rR ω   is as in (7.31) and (7.38). Similar to the reasoning in 
Γ1, since both equilibrium strategies show unique solutions to the pertinent 
optimisation problems in each sub-game, both (7.31) and (7.38) are undominated, 
b-game
Under rules if P*=Q, substituting from (7.27), (7.28) and (7.29) into (7.32): 
representing, thus, a su  perfect equilibrium. 
( ) 2
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0
2 2
0
1 *
1 1
* 1 1 1
EU E
E
22 2 2 2.ε ε
ω ω ε π
α β ω ε
ω π ω σ α β ω
⎡ ⎤= − + − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − +
⎡ ⎤= − − − − − − +⎣ ⎦ σ
   (7.39) 
Differentiating (7.39) with respect to ω0 and ω, and equating to zero: 
  *
⎣ ⎦
       (7.40) 
1 0
0 πω =
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1ω α β β ω⎡ ⎤− − − − + =⎣ ⎦  
 ( )1 1 .
H
α βω − −=       (7.41) 
Comparing (7.40) and (7.41) with (7.19) and (7.20), noting (7.28) and (7.29), we see 
that, in this case, the results unde
The fact that B sets P* = Q indicates that it accepts the “safety net” S imposes on 
itself, i.e. the competitive outcome at which the levels of bankruptcy of firms in the 
financial sector are just acceptable. In this case, any perceived risks to financial 
stability are encountered almost solely by S, so long as B identifies and announces 
r rules are the same as under discretion. 
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 the presence of an explicit objective for financial stability (α>0). The level of Q is a 
function of ω and, therefore, B’s concerns for financial stability are incorporated in 
the behaviour of S. As a consequence S’s expectations of inflation are anchored to 
B’s target π* even when B is acting with discretion. This is the case when B contends 
that S can impose a discipline on itself through pure competition. We contend that 
for the particular case of P* = Q our model yields similar results to the literature 
assessing pre-emptive monetary policy against financial imbalances reviewed in 
Chapter 6. 
If B finds the level of Q as too lax, it sets P Q> . Since we model B as conducting 
monetary policy in order to pre-empt imbalances in the financial sector that are 
perceived a
∗
nd have not yet been reflected in the relevant indicators used, which, 
nevertheless, carry the potential of large detrimental economy-wide effects, then by 
oses on
An initial evaluation of the two styles of policy determined by the equilibria as 
Γ1 and Γ2 is that commitment to a rule (Γ2) is better than discretionary 
assumption B can view the discipline S imp  itself through pure competition as 
insufficient. This can be interpreted as a level of Q that is lower than the level B 
views as more appropriate. We view this case as the presence of significant risks to 
financial stability that B is aware of and is trying to address. Therefore, B sets its 
target for S’s profitability P* at a level higher than Q. 
 
7.5 Discussion  
analysed in 
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 monetary policy (Γ1) in terms of better control of inflation expectations and 
effectiveness of policy. Comparing Eπ from (7.19) and (7.34), and for P*>Q, it is 
ent to a rule.  
From (7.29) Definition 1 can be expressed in terms of ω, the proportion of B’s 
    Proposition 1:  For α>0 and β>1, monetary policy is more effective in 
*>Q. 
a
 
evident that by following a rule as in (7.27) B can anchor inflation expectations to its 
target for inflation π*. 
This result in favour of the commitment to a rule is reinforced by the fact that pre-
emptive monetary policy as described by our model is more effective in affecting 
inflation under commitm
    Definition 1:  Monetary policy is more effective in controlling inflation when it 
results in a higher level for x. 
offsetting ε. 
controlling inflation under commitment to a rule as in (7.27) than under discretion if 
and only if P
    Proof: On comp ring ωr in (7.38), obtained under rules, to ωd in (7.20), which is 
optimal under discretion, and for Definition 1, ωr ≥ ωd is equivalent to: 
( )( ) ( )2 21 1 1 1 1k kα β θ α β− − + − −
H H
−≥  %
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( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
22 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
k k
k
α β θ α β
α β α β
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− − + − + −⎣ ⎦ ≥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− − + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 32 2 2 2 2
2 32 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
k k k k
k k
1 α β θ α β α β
α β α β α β
− + − + − − − + −
− − + − + − − +
 
− θ ≥
        
H
βθ ≥ .        (7.42) 
From (7.11), (7.25) and (7.36), the result in (7.42) is equivalent to P*≥Q. Both cases 
give identical results, r dω ω= , when H
βθ =  or equivalently when *P k
H ε
β σ= . The 
latter can be expressed as ( )* 1 1P k d εβ ω σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦
o
, which is the level of Q when ω 
is equal to ωd as in (7.20), or in other w rds when r dω ω= . The etary 
policy is more effective und etion if and only if P*>Q. +  
From the proof of Proposition 1, we can also show that un  can exercise 
more discipline to S by inducing a higher level for Q. Since Q is a function of ω and
refore, mon
der rules B
 
ω is higher under rules than under discretion, then the level of Q is higher in the 
former case driving, thus, expected profits EP to a higher level as well.  
presented in 
Chapter 6) that calls for more flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy. 
er rules than under discr
These results in favour of commitment to a rule in cases of monetary policy with 
risks to financial stability contrast the main result in the literature (as 
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 Finally, in order to evaluate the behaviour of S and B, namely whether they will 
actually play their equilibrium strategies when they are to take an action, we need to 
discuss their pay-offs in turn.  
The expected pay-offs to B are computed using the following: 
Substituting (7.29) into (7.32), using (7.9) and (7.22): 
,
( )*EU E E xπ ε π= − + − −
 ( )
2
2
02 * 1 *E R i r E x Pα π β ε⎡ ⎤− − − − − − − −⎣ ⎦
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 22
* 1
1 1 *
E
Q P
ε
ε
π π ω σ
α β ω σ α
= − − − −
⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎣ ⎦ .
   (7.43)  
From (7.30) and (7.36): 
( )
( )
1 1
1 1 .
P Q k k
k
ε ε
ε
θσ β ω
θ β ω σ
∗ σ⎡ ⎤− = − − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦
    (7.44) 
We have, on substituting (7.44) into (7.43): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 22 2
* 1
1 1 1 1
EU E
k
ε
2.ε ε
π π ω σ
α β ω σ α β ω θ σ
= − − − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  (7.45) 
In addition, for (7.29), (7.36) and for ωd as in (7.20) and for 
( )1 1Q kd d εβ ω σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦  the following result holds: 
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 ( ) )
( )
(
( )
*
2
2
1 1
1 1
1 1
             
1 1
             .
dP Q k k
k
k
H
ε
ε
ε
α βθ εσ β σ
βθ σα β
βθ σ
α β
⎡ ⎤− −− = − − +⎢ ⎥+ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥+ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  (7.46) 
The expected pay-offs to S are computed using:  
     .P
EP Q
kσ
=
=  
From (7.29) and (7.30), in both games: 
.( )1 1EP k εβ ω σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦      (7.47) 
Let   
( )( )1 dP Q
H
α βφ
∗− −= ,  
where  ( )1 1d dQ k εβ ω σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦ . 
We can cluster the expected pay-offs to each player, with respect to , for each 
 Γ2. 
under consideration in Table 1 below: 
 
P Q∗ >
of Γ1 and
From (7.47), we can present the expected pay-offs to S in the four distinct cases 
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Table 1: Pay-Offs to S 
 
From (7.47) and for ωr as in (7.38) we determine A1. Turning to A2, if S believes the 
rule and B acts with discretion, S perceives the pay-off to be Α1 but the true pay-off 
is A2. Q is determined at t=0 by S’s beliefs about future policy (the choice of ω or x 
t=1). Since Eπ differs from the level defined in equilibrium under discretion (i.e.  at 
( )( )1E P Qπ π α β∗ ∗= + − − ) then x in this case differs from x=ωdε, for ωd as in 
(7.20) (the level of x defined in equilibrium under discretion). In particular, from 
(7.18), in this case dx ω ε φ= − . Moreover, this case does not constitute an 
equilibrium and, therefore, (7.4) does not hold, i.e. Ex ≠ 0. Thus, from (7.10) the 
expected profits to S are: 
( )02 1EP R i r E Eπ β∗= − − − − − x . 
                            B    
          S Rules Discretion 
( )
( )
2 1 1
       1
rA k εβ ω σ
β φ
⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦
+ −
 Eπ π ∗=  ( )1 1 1rA k εβ ω σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦  (S believes the rule) 
+
( )( )1E P Qπ π α β∗ ∗= + − −  
 (S does not believe the 
rule) 
(indeterminate) 
A3 ( )4 1dA k 1 εβ ω σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦  
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  For Eπ=π* and dx ω ε φ= − , EP in A2 takes the following level displayed in Table 1: 
( )
( ) ( )
0
2
2 1
     1 1 1 ,r
EP R i r
k ε
π β φ
β ω σ β
∗ ∗= − − − − −
⎡ ⎤= − + + −⎣ ⎦
 φ
A3 in Table 1 is i te because the rule is indeterminate in the case described. ndetermina
If S does not believe the rule, then it perceives A4 as the true pay-off. Since B wants 
to enforce the rule through the optimisation process it can only determine the ratio of 
ω1 to ω2. Finally, from (7.47) and for ωd as in (7.20) we determine A4. 
layer in two different games. 
We only use the two tables to present our main results in a compact, illustrative way. 
ey may be, 
possess several fundamental similarities, we can make comparisons in the resulting 
behaviour for each player created from the distinct forms of interaction.  
 
For P*>Q, from Proposition 1 we have ωr>ωd and since >0 and β>1, then 
A2>A1>A4. Therefore, S will always believe the rule if a rule is announced and play 
as in the interaction described by game Γ2. In this model S would prefer B to commit 
to a rule of the style proposed than act with discretion. 
Table 2 below gives the expected pay-offs to B in the four distinct cases. 
It is important to stress that Table 1 and Table 2 are not “pay-off matrices” of a 
game, since each displays expected pay-offs for each p
We contend that since the two games (Γ1 and Γ2), different though th
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 Table 2: Pay-Offs to Β 
 
Fro ωr as in (7.38) we define A5 as:  
21 .r
m (7.45), for Eπ=π* and for 
( ) ( ( )2 22 2 2 21 1 1 1k )rEU rε ε εω σ α β ω θ σ α β ω σ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= − − − − + − − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣  ⎤⎦
From (7.43), for Eπ=π*, dx ω ε φ= −  and for ωd as in (7.20) we define A6 as:  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( )
222 2
2 2         1 1 .d ε
φ
α β ω σ
− −
⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦
 
1 1 1d rEU kε εφ ω σ α β ω θ σ β⎡ ⎤= − − − − − + − +⎣ ⎦ 1
From (7.46) the formula above becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
22 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
         1 1 .
d r
d
EU k H
Hε ε
ε
βφ ω σ α β ω θ θ σ
α β ω σ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= − − − − − + − + − − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦
 
2
                            B    
          S Rules Discretion 
Eπ π ∗=  
(S believes the rule) 5
A  6A  
( )( )1E P Qπ π α β∗= + − −  ∗
 (S does not believe the 
rule) 
7 
(indeterminate) 
A
8A  
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  A7 is indeterminate for the same reason as A3 explained above.  
From (7.45), for E Hπ π φ∗= +  and for ωd as in (7.20) we define A8 as:  
Comparing B’s expected pay-offs in Table 2 above, we conclude that A6>A5>A8. This 
implies that even though B does better when facing the interaction described in game 
Γ2 as opposed to Γ1, it prefers at t=1 to deviate from applying optimal x as 
determined in equilibrium by the rule but act instead with discretion applying x as in 
(7.20), the optimal outcome under discretion.  
In game Γ2 the rule is always believed under the assumption of common knowledge 
(of rationality), which implies in this point that B follows the rule, S knows that B 
follows the rule, B knows that S knows that B follows the rule and so on ad infinitum 
(see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 541-547, for two equivalent definitions and a 
discussion of the subtle notion of common knowledge in game theory). Since the 
In particular, for P*>Q and for play as in Γ2 (which is preferred to Γ1) the resulting 
policy is time inconsistent similar to the type of models of monetary policy that 
( ) ( )
( )
222 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1
         1 1 .
d d
d
EU H kε ε
ε
φ ω σ α β ω θ σ
α β ω σ
⎡ ⎤= − − − − − + − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦
 
beliefs of S about B’s behaviour have to be consistent with B’s actual behaviour in 
equilibrium (as the second basic assumption for the definition of a Nash equilibrium 
postulates), B’s choice of ωd when S anticipates a rule does not constitute an 
equilibrium and, therefore, cannot be maintained in future periods.  
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 initiated with the work of Barro and Gordon (1983a) (see the Appendix for a 
presentation of our model similar to the latter for B targeting inflation and growth). 
e 
to new information that remains the optimal response once the new information 
e system are still under operation to the 
detriment of the sector itself and the economy as a whole) the optimal policy is time 
2
E
A policy is time-consistent if an action planned at time t for time t+i remains optimal 
to implement when time t+i actually arrives. Irrespective of state contingency 
(namely that policy can depend on the realisations of events unknown at time t when 
policy is originally planned) a time consistent policy gives rise to a planned respons
arrives. A policy is time inconsistent if at time t+i it will not be optimal to respond as 
originally planned (Walsh (2000), p. 321). 
Our results show that when there is substantial threat of financial instability, the 
central bank has sensitivity over signs of financial fragility and it is believed by the 
central bank that the financial sector cannot guarantee stability (since a number of 
financial firms that should have exited th
inconsistent. In Γ , S will anticipate the announced rule for monetary policy, 
anchoring its expectations around the central bank’s target for inflation191. Then for 
π π=  S determines the competitive level for the long-term interest rate 
ingly. If, however, B anticipates that and has an objective function that (under 
risks to financial stability) reveals the willingness to induce some prudence in S by 
setting the target for financial stability as P*>Q, B will not follow the rule and apply 
the optimal policy under discretion instead in order to yield a higher pay-off . If the 
same two-period game is played again (starting straight after t=1), S, after learning 
                                                
∗
accord
 
191 This result stems from the forward-looking aspects of the model. 
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 from this experience of t=1, will not believe the announced rule. If in game Γ2 B 
deviates from the equilibrium-path and chooses ωd instead, then when the game is 
repeated B cannot induce S to believe that the rule will be enforced in the next period 
irrespective of the fact that both players yield higher pay-offs in this case. S will 
expect discretionary monetary policy from B, i.e. play as in Γ1, and, therefore, give 
rise to a sub-optimal outcome since in equilibrium both players receive lower pay-
offs compared to the equilibrium outcomes in Γ2. 
The main policy implication of our model is that this dynamic inconsistency of pre-
emptive monetary policy justifies the necessity of the commit ent to a rule by the 
central bank in a similar fashion to the extant literature on time inconsistent monetary 
policy that initiated with the seminal contribution of Barro and Gordon (1983a).  
m
setting he models the behaviour of households, firms and a central bank in a sticky 
Finally, our result in favour of commitment is similar to Dupor (2005) who 
investigates whether monetary policy should respond to movements in asset prices 
that are driven by irrational expectational shocks to future returns to capital and 
compares optimal policy under commitment and under discretion. In contrast to our 
price, imperfect competition model with capital accumulation and investment 
adjustment costs. He concludes that “lack of commitment has a much larger effect on 
the optimal policy response to non-fundamental asset price movements. Optimal 
policy under discretion generates a longer and deeper recession in terms of 
consumption than under commitment” (Dupor (2005), p. 747). 
 
267 
 7.6 Extended Model 
We extend the model to include default on loans issued by the financial sector. Such 
an extension seems appropriate mainly for two reasons: 
a) default on loans issued by the financial sector determines the profitability of the 
ent in our model, and  
tability objective. This is so 
because the decision to default on (corporate or household) debt rests with the agents 
As the real sector is not explicitly modelled, the levels of default, which we term as 
latter, which is a main elem
b) it reinforces our argument for the substitution of the macroeconomic objective in 
the central bank’s objective function with a financial s
in the real sector and strongly reflects the prevalent economic conditions.   
λ, are for simplicity modelled as a random variable (drawn from a population that 
includes elements of the structure and the behaviour of both the financial and the real 
sector, as well as the design and conduct of monetary policy). We assume that ε and 
λ are jointly independent. In particular, λ is identically and independently distributed 
with a constant mean and a constant variance, ( )2iid ,λ λλ μ σ  . The distribution of λ 
is common knowledge, and at t=1 its value is realised, prior to B’s choice of x. The 
inclusion of λ in the model affects the profitability of S, P. In fact, it is assumed to 
decrease P as in (7.7) by a level ( )1 Rλ + for only the first period. From the latter it is 
evident that ( )0,1λ∈ . In our two-period extended model P is defined as: 
  ( )( ) ( )( )2 01 1 1 1P R i iλ= − + − + +     (7. 48)  
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 Equivalently the linear approximation of (7.48) is: 
  02P R i i λ= − − − .       (7.49) 
From (7.10), (7.49) can be expressed as: 
( )02 1P R i r E xπ ε β λ∗= − − − − − − −    (7.50) 
The analysis unfolds in the same manner. We thus directly report the equilibrium 
 extended model. 
y under discretion (Γ1) 
The optimal levels of Eπ and x are derived from the u
as in (7.14), substituting for (7.1) and (7.50), which is of the following form: 
outcomes in the
 (a) The case of monetary polic
nconstrained optimisation of U 
( ) ( )( )2 202 1R i r E x Pπ ε π α π ε β λ∗ ∗= − + − − − − − − − − − − −U E x ∗ . 
orF 02 EP R i r E Eπ λ∗= − − − −  and since EP=Q in equilibrium, the above is equal 
to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22 1U E x Q P E xπ ε π α λ λ β ε∗ ∗⎡ ⎤= − + − − − − + − − − −⎣ ⎦ , (7.51)  
which we optimise in the similar fashion as in the main model to get the fo wing 
result: 
llo
( )( )1E Pπ π α β∗ ∗= + − −Q ,    (7.52) 
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 ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )2 2
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
dx E
α β α βε λ λα β α β
− − −= ++ − + − .and  −   
The result in (7.53) can be expressed compactly as  
(7.53) 
( )1 1,       0.d dx Eω ε φ λ λ φ= + − >  
For  and S optimally setting P Q∗ > EP Q= , for dx  as in (7.53), the optimal 
S is to determine R com  antic tiresponse of ng  petitively ipa dx . S determines the 
optimal level for R by equating EP with Q, where Q is affected by the level of x 
 determined in equilibrium, as in 
(7.52).  
l of  the fo
for x as in (7.53): 
chosen by B, and EP is affected by the level of Eπ
The leve Q is as in (7.11), which takes llowing form for P as in (7.50) and 
( ) ( ){ }12 2 22 21 1 1 1Q k β ω σ β φ σ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + + − − ,  (7.54) 
which ca
1d ε λ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
n also be expressed substituting for 1 from (7.53) as: 
( )
1
22 1⎧ ⎫2 2
21 1dQ k Hε λ
β ω σ σ⎡ ⎤= − + +⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭ . 
R is thus determined in the following way:  
Q( )( )1
EP Q
E Pπ π α β∗ ∗
⎫=
⎪= + − − ⎪⎭
(7.54)
02EP R i r E Eπ λ∗
⎪⎪= − − − − ⇒⎬  
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 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0
1
2 2 22 2
1
1 1
2
              1 1 1 1 1 1 .
d
d
R i r E P
k ε λ
π λ α β
α β β ω σ β φ σ
∗ ∗ ∗⎧= + + + + − +⎨⎩
⎫⎪⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − − − + + − − ⎬⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎪⎭
(7.55) 
Comparing the main model under discretion with the same case in the extended 
model, we realise that even though inflation expectations are formed in the same 
manner, in the extended model the monetary stance, x, is more muted when λ is 
higher than its expected level and more contractionary when λ is less than its 
expected level. In addition, Q is different, in fact higher, in this extended model also 
driving EP at a higher level. 
(b) The case of commitment to an instrument rule (Γ2) 
For the rule U as in (7.51), becomes:  
1
If B commits to a rule of the same style as in the main model, i.e. as in (7.27) which 
controls inflation expectations and accommodates shocks to inflation at a certain 
rate, the results for B are the same as in subsection 7.4.2: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 221 1U Q P E0ω ω ε π α λ λ β ω ε∗ ∗⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + − − − − + − − − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ,  
And we, therefore, get the result as in (7.34), (7.35), which are the same as in the 
principal model: 
0ω π ∗= , 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 2 2
1 1
1 1 1
k k
k
ε ε
ε
σ α β σ σω α β σ
*Pε⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤+ − +⎣ ⎦
.    and  
By letting   *P k εθσ=  for 0θ > , we get the result as in (7.38): 
                  
( )( )
( ) ( )
2 2
2 2
1 1 1
.
1 1 1
r
k k
k
α β θω α β
− − + −= + − +      
 S fIn this case orms Eπ π ∗=  and by anticipating rx ω ε=  as above, determines R 
accordingly in the following way: 
( )
0
1
2 22 2
2
1 1r
EP Q
EP R i r E E
Eπ π ∗
Q k ε λ
π λ
β ω σ σ
∗
= ⎫⎪= − − − − ⎪⎪⇒= ⎬⎪⎪⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + +⎣ ⎦ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎭
 
( )
1
2 22 2
0
1R i r E kπ λ∗ ∗⎧⎪ 1 1 .
2r r ε λ
β ω σ σ ⎫⎪⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− + +⎣ ⎦= + + + +⎨ ⎬   ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
  (7.56) 
For P*=Q, in this case x=ωε for ω as in (7.20), which is now different from x under 
discretion. Both under rules and under discretion inflation expectations are anchored 
to B’s target and x under rules is lower to x under discretion by the term 
( )
( ) ( )2
1
1
E
α β λ
1
λα β
− − . Since the rule does not counter the potential levels of default 
on loans it produces a more muted monetary policy response than under discretion 
+ −
when λ is lower than its expected level and more contractionary policy when λ is 
higher than its expected level. 
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 If the rule B announces and commits to aims also to counter the levels of default (a 
random variable), it can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )1 2 3 2,       0x E Eω ω π ω λ λ ωε ω= + + − + > .  (7.57) 
In a similar manner, taking expectations in (7.57), using (7.4): 
E 1
2
ωπ ω
0     .ω=
      (7.58)  
= −
Substituting (7.58) in (7.57): 
( )3x Eωε ω λ λ= + − .     (7.59) 
λ
For P*=Q, B’s expected utility can be expr
Substituting (7.58) and (7.59) in (7.51) : 
(
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
2
0 3
2*
3      1 1 1 1 .
U
Q P E
ω ε ωε ω λ
α β ω ε β ω λ
⎡= − + − −⎣
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − − + − − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
)Eλ π ∗ ⎤− − −⎦  (7.60) 
essed as: 
( ) ( )2 2
( ) ( )
2 2
2 22 2
31 1 1 1
λ
2
3
.
0 * 1EU ε
ε λ
ω σω π ω σ
α β ω σ α β ω σ
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
= − − − − −
   (7.61) 
Differentiating (7.61) with respect to ω0, ω and ω3, and equating to zero: 
0ω π ∗= , 
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 ( )
( )
( )
( )
2
1 1
,
1 1
1
α βω α β
α β
− −= + −
−
     (7.62) 
Comparing (7.62) with (7.53), we conclude that for P*=Q both types of pre-emptive 
monetary policy (under rules and under discretion) produce the same level for x in 
the extended model when the rule counters λ, the random levels of default on loans 
issued by the financial sector. The reasoni
the main model. Since B defines its financial stability objective in terms of Q, the 
level of S’s expected profits that guarantees the sector’s survival and since Q is 
The case for P*>Q is not discussed because of the complexity in the derivation of 
the result and since no significant contribution is provided. For a rule which is better 
defined and, thus, counters both ‘shocks’ as in (7.57) the extended model results in 
3 2 .1 1
ω α β= − + −
ng is the same as in the equivalent case in 
affected by the monetary policy reaction, under common knowledge S incorporates 
B’s anticipated countering of random ε and λ (from the form of the rule) at time t=1 
when it determines its behaviour at t=0. In this case, any perceived risks to financial 
stability are encountered principally by S, so long as B identifies and announces the 
presence of an explicit objective for financial stability (α>0). Even though, B’s 
reaction to the inflation shock ε and to levels of default λ, i.e. x, is the same as under 
discretion, commitment to the rule manages to anchor inflation expectations to B’s 
target making the latter the preferred policy. 
the same type of time-inconsistent policy as in the main model.  
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 Therefore, the main result is similar in both the extended model and the model 
excluding λ, which is that the superior monetary policy for B is the commitment to a 
rule in contrast to discretionary policy-making. 
plications generated refer 
both to the design and the conduct of such monetary policy.  
Considering the design of monetary policy, we show that when the monetary policy-
e effects on policy-making of the strategic interaction 
between itself and the financial sector, and passes forward clear announcements of 
 
y it is based on) and 
economy). The shift of focus in the interaction as of above will affect the behaviour 
 
7.7 Policy Implications 
The analysis solely addresses monetary policy that is known to aim at the pre-
emption of the growth of perceived financial imbalances, positive or negative 
(present in the financial sector), and the main policy im
maker takes into account th
this concern, the resulting policy is optimal when it follows a rule contrary to the
literature on pre-emptive monetary policy which neglects (to our knowledge) the 
crucial effect of such interaction. A central bank recognising, first, that its primary 
tasks are to support the value of the currency (of the econom
guarantee the efficient operation of the system it supervises (namely the banking 
system – and overall the financial system), and second, that the effect of its policy is 
transmitted to the varied parts of the real economy through the financial system, can 
evaluate that its strategic interaction with the financial sector will determine the 
context in which the real sector operates (irrespective of the structure of the 
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 of both the central bank and the financial sector, each, in turn, affecting several 
segments of the real economy.  
A further implication of our work referring to the design of pre-emptive monetary 
policy is the proposition of a financial stability objective in terms of the profitability 
of the financial sector; the latter modelled with respect to the spread between the rate 
on long-term financial instruments and rate of the instrument of monetary policy. 
Considering the conduct of monetary policy, we contend that discretionary monetary 
policy when B aims to pre-empt perceived financial imbalances in the financial 
sector is not the optimal style of policy. A further policy implication of our model is 
inal 
contribution of Barro and Gordon (1983a). The analysis highlights the well-
that the chosen pre-emptive monetary policy (deviation from the rule on the receipt 
of new information after the rule is believed) is time inconsistent, which justifies the 
necessity of the commitment to a rule by the central bank in a similar fashion to the 
extant literature on time inconsistent monetary policy that initiated with the sem
articulated in the previous decades need of a central bank to build credibility, yet in 
this context referring to the achievement and maintenance of financial stability, as an 
explicit monetary policy objective.  A definition of credibility given by Blinder 
(1999) involves “words matching deeds”: “A central bank is credible if people 
believe it will do what it says” (quoted in Svensson (1999), p. 217). When a central 
bank has announced a policy goal then credibility will boil down to private 
expectations being consistent with the goal. On a practical policy level, Svensson 
(1999) states that when a central bank has an explicit inflation target, then credibility 
can be defined as private inflation expectations coinciding with the inflation target, 
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 while lack of credibility can be identified as any deviation of private inflation 
expectations from the inflation target (be it for inflation expectations above or below 
the target). Since inflation expectations can be measured or estimated (eg. from 
surveys or yield curves), the degree of central bank credibility can also be explicitly 
measured (Svensson (1999), p. 217). The argument can be directly extended for the 
addition of a target for the financial stability objective. 
 
7.8 Concluding Remarks 
Following the debate on the inclusion or not of perceived financial imbalances in the 
conduct of monetary policy before the forecasts to inflation are affected, we evaluate 
monetary policy that is conducted pre-emptively against financial instability in a 
simple model analysing the strategic interaction between a central bank and a 
financial sector. 
We model the central bank as having the objectives of price stability and financial 
unction of the profitability of the financial sector 
onetary policy we assess monetary policy under discretion and 
under commitment to an instrument rule.     
stability, where the latter is a f
against a benchmark. In line with the results proposed in the extant literature in 
favour of pre-emptive monetary policy (for example as in Borio (2005), Borio and 
Lowe (2002), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Cecchetti et al. (2003), White (2006)) that 
(to our knowledge) calls for more flexibility and the use of longer time-horizons in 
the conduct of m
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 In contrast to the relevant literature, but similar to the literature that initiated with 
Barro and Gordon (1983a), yet in the new context proposed, our analysis concludes 
that when a central bank addresses financial stability as a main and systematic 
component of its decision making process, namely as an explicit monetary policy 
objective, then policy yields better results in terms of controlling inflation, anchoring 
inflation expectations to the central bank’s inflation target and enhancing financial 
sector profitability when conducted under commitment to a rule. As the monetary 
policy rule in this model is actually one that aims to control inflation expectations, 
commitment to it accomplishes this aim. Turning to the fact that commitment to the 
rule enables monetary policy to enhance the financial sector profitability this is so 
because in this case the monetary policy reaction is higher leading, thus, the financial 
sector to face a higher level of minimum expected profits. Since the expected profits 
faced by financial firms are higher, a stimulus is provided to the latter in order to 
increase their profitability and avoid seizing operation. Therefore, under substantial 
threat of financial instability the proposed policy induces the financial sector to 
impose more prudence on its operation. 
 
Appendix 
In order to compare the design of optimal pre-emptive monetary policy in the context 
proposed with the standard style of policy that aims at the two objectives of 
stabilising inflation and the output-gap, we operate the model proposed for the 
central bank, B, aiming at the above objectives.  
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 A simplified structure of the economy is modelled through four equations, where the 
first three are identical to the structure of the economy employed in the main model 
 fourth is an equation describing the growth in 
t
as in (7.1), (7.2), and (7.3) and the
output.  The last equation is the following: 
t t ty g xη γ= + −     for   ηt ~ ( )2iid 0,N ησ  and 0.γ >   (A.1) 
Equation (A.1) defines growth in output as a function of sustainable growth of 
output, g, a shock, η, and the reaction of the central bank, x.  Let y denote the growth 
rate of output at t=1. For simplicity we exclude the subscript 1 denoting time t=1. In 
(A.1) η is a random shock of mean zero and variance ση . Since the real sector is still 
implicit in this model g is determined exogenously. The inclusion of the real sector 
(the public) as a third player is deemed as inappropriate, because it would complicate 
the analysis without contributing at this level to t alysis
the level at which B offsets the shock to inflation, namely x, affects the growth in 
y
2
he an  to a great extent. Finally, 
output adversely at a rate γ.  We assume that ε and η are jointly independent and are 
observed during the same period, namely they have both been observed prior to t=1, 
when B applies x.   
Referring to (7.1), recall that x describes monetary stance and, from (7.3), determines 
the real short-term rate of interest, r. From (7.4): 
gEy = .      (A.2) 
An alternative interpretation can be that  measures the output gap: 
*
*
Y
YYy −= ,      (A.3) 
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 where Y is output, Y=Y* is its natural level and g=0. 
The objective function of B is defined as: 
( ) ( )2 21       U y yπ π α∗ ∗= − − − − ( )0α >1 ,  (A.4) 
Thus, y* is the target value for the rate of growth of output or, in the alternative 
B can conduct monetary policy ei
shocks or by committing to a rule that counters ε and η. This rule can be of the 
interpretation, the output gap. 
ther on a discretionary way after observing the two 
following form: 
( )2    0ω1 2 4   x Eω ω π ωε ω η= + + + > .   (A.5) 
The equilibrium outcomes are determined in the same manner as in Section 7.4.  
2Define 11L α γ= + . For the case of monetary policy under discretion, differentiating 
(A.4) with respect to x and equating to zero: 
( )111 .g yEx
L L L L
αα γπ π ε η
∗∗ −−= + + +    (A.6) 
Taking expectations in (A.6), using (A.2): 
( )1E g yπ π α∗ ∗= − −       (A.7) 
280 
 11
dx L L
α γε η+       (A.8) =
For the case of monetary policy under commitment to a rule, first consider the utility 
for B from (A.4), using (7.1), and (A.1) which is: 
( ) ( )2 21 g x yη γ+ − −U E xπ ε π α∗= − + − − − ∗   (A.9) 
Taking expectations in (A.5) we can express Επ as: 
1
2
E ωπ ω
0       ,ω
= −
     (A.10) 
=
and from (A.10) and (A.5):  4x ωε ω η= + .     (A.11) 
Substituting (A.10) in (A.9) and for the rule as in (A.5), (A.9) becomes: 
   (A.12) 
Taking expectations in (A.12): 
( )
( )
2
1 4
1
      1 .
U
g y
ω ω ε ω η π
α γωε γω η
∗
∗
⎡ ⎤= − + − − − −
⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎣ ⎦
0 4
2
⎣ ⎦
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2
0 4
2 2 2
1 1 1 4
1
1 .
EU
g y
ε η
2 2 2
ε η
ω π ω σ ω σ
α α γ ω σ α γω σ
∗= − − − − −
− − − − −∗
  
Differentiating the above with respect to ω0, ω, and ω4 and equating to zero, we get 
the following results for: 
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 0ω π ∗= ,      (A.13) 
1
L
ω =  ,      (A.14) 
1
4 .L
α γω =       (A.15) 
Therefore, under rules 11rx L L
α γε= + . Comparing (A.13) with (A.7), we see that, 
when y*=g, the results under rules are the same as under discretion. As before, when 
e, while xr = xd, they control inflation expectations better; in 
fact under commitment to a rule inflation expectations are anchored to the central 
bank’s targeted level. Admitti
as an exogenous term, they still demonstrate the optimality of commitment to a rule 
as a form of monetary policy not contradicting the conventional view.  
 
y*>g, i.e. a higher rate of growth for output is preferred to its average rate, rules do 
better than discretion sinc
ng that our results are governed by the definition of g 
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 C H A P T E R  8  
T H E  C A S E  O F  I N C O M P L E T E  I N F O R M A T I O N  
  
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we extend the two-player game presented in Chapter 7 by modelling 
one player, the financial sector, as being confronted with incomplete information 
about the preferences of the other, the central bank. The model analysed in this 
chapter incorporates a central bank that can either aim at the objective of low and 
stable inflation (solely) or be of the style analysed in Chapter 7, and, thus, have the 
dual objective of price and financial stability.  
The analysis in this chapter aims to evaluate the effect of vagueness about the central 
bank’s preferences with respect to financial stability both in the behaviour of the 
central bank and the financial sector. In this context it is investigated whether central 
banks should state clearly their intention to conduct monetary policy pre-emptively 
against perceived financial imbalances, or in contrast exercise ‘strict inflation 
targeting’. This kind of extension is justified by the fact that central banks have in 
general been reluctant to publicize any explicit objective function used as a guide for 
policy, and also because central banks, even though have serious concerns about the 
stability of the financial system, they fail to adopt and aim at financial stability as an 
explicit objective. 
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 Furthermore, the strategic interaction in this chapter is repeated infinitely with the 
aim to evaluate the role of reputation by an
rro and Gordon (1983b). One of the earliest models of monetary policy set as 
repeated games of incomplete information is Backus and Driffill (1985), which, 
owever, describes the interaction between the monetary authorities and the public 
izon. To our knowledge, the extant literature on pre-emptive 
monetary policy against financial instability as analysed in Chapter 6, does not 
incorporate the above concerns of a strategic interaction between the central bank 
and the financial sector, the uncertainty of the financial sector about the central bank 
preferences, and the role of reputation of the central bank in the conduct of policy 
and, thus, does not unfold in a similar manner.  
ays the seminal work of Barro and 
Gordon (1983a, 1983b), to incorporate the effect of uncertainty of one player about 
an aspect of the other player’s behaviour, but in a context analysing the interaction 
between the monetary authorities and the public. Among others, for example, Backus 
and Driffill (1985), Barro (1986), Vickers (1986), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), 
Tabellini (1988), Andersen (1989), Cukiernan and Liviatan (1991), Ball (1995), 
Drazen and Mason (1994), Nolan and Schaling (1996), Briault, Haldane and King 
(1997) build models in which the public is uncertain about the central bank’s 
preference for the conduct of monetary policy, either as the preference between 
output and inflation stabilisation or its ability to commit. In these types of models the 
uninformed player (the public) is trying to infer the type the informed player (the 
central bank) may be from the actions taken by the later. When the central bank 
chooses its actions takes into consideration the uncertainty faced by the public and it 
alysing a repeated game in the lines of 
Ba
h
over a finite time-hor
However, a vast literature extended various w
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 may also conceal its true preference from the public by mimicking the behaviour of a 
different type of central bank.        
In this model since the financial sector does not know what type of central bank it 
faces, even a central bank that prefers to pre-em
These issues are also investigated in the model in this chapter, yet we refrain from 
using the assumption that the uninformed player (the financial sector) can draw 
inferences about the central bank’s behaviour by viewing the central bank’s actions. 
In other words, we do not allow in this model for any signalling behaviour from the 
part of the central bank. Finally, we do not make the assumption that the central bank 
can accept or be presented with the option to sign any binding contracts of any form. 
pt financial instability may choose in 
equilibrium, for suitable levels of parameters, to mimic a ‘strict inflation targeting’ 
central bank in order to built its reputation as such, and thus, affect inflation 
expectations in the future, and have an impact on the stability of the financial sector.  
 
We assume that a non-cooperative game is played between a central bank, B, and a 
financial sector, S. This implies that players are not able to make binding agreements 
The organization of the chapter is as follows: the next section 8.2 presents the 
method used in the analysis and the assumptions made. Section 8.3 describes the 
model and section 8.4 the outcomes that arise in equilibrium which are followed by a 
discussion in section 8.5. Section 8.6 states the main policy implications of the 
analysis and section 8.7 is the conclusion.  
8.2 Preliminaries (method and assumptions) 
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 (or any sort of other commitments), except for the ones which are explicitly allowed 
by the rules of the game (van Damme (1983), p. iii). 
 
deemed necessary for modelling purposes. Nevertheless, it seems to be justified by 
the fact that strong competition between financial-market participants makes the 
‘leaders’ in the markets (for example financial firms with considerably high levels of 
capitalisation) not apt to maintain their identity as price-makers (with respect to the 
pricing of financial assets) over a long horizon. The increasingly rapid dissemination 
of information in addition to the speed characterising financial transactions makes it 
ation of financial-market participants can 
give credence to our view of the financial sector as acting under pure competition. 
For the above reasons we also abstract from modelling S with respect to the 
S chooses a level for the long-term nominal interest rate, R. In a simplified view of 
reality the long-term nominal interest rate is perceived as the price of a main product 
offered by the financial sector (namely loans issued to the real sector). The financial 
sector is modelled in the aggregate, as ‘one agent’ that represents the consolidation 
of the financial intermediaries (i.e. financial firms and institutional investors) which 
operate in purely competitive markets. Such a seemingly strong assumption is
considerably difficult for financial firms to maintain competitive advantages (which 
are known to give the ability to a firm to act as a price-maker) at least without an 
incessant effort of differentiation in the product offered. A second reason is that 
financial markets have proven to act almost in unison at times of turbulence. 
Therefore, a crisis’ intensely rapid contamin
behaviour of a representative agent instead. 
286 
 S increases welfare when its survival is guaranteed and profits are increased. As 
explained in detail in the following sections, profits are perceived in terms of the 
margin between the rates charged on illiquid and relatively liquid financial assets 
(the former represented by loans to the real sector and the latter by interbank-market 
funds). S’s ‘survival’ implies a level of profits low enough to cover the costs of 
firms’ entering and operating in the sector. In accordance to the theory of pure 
competition, at this lowest level of profits the number of firms entering the market 
and those ceasing operation (referring in this model to bankruptcy rather than 
insolvency) are up to a minimum acceptable number.     
The model refers to a closed economy (therefore, exchange rates are not considered 
as asset prices) with an implicit real sector (thus, only financial assets are under 
consideration).  Since the behaviour of the real sector is not modelled, consumption 
and investment decisions made by firms and households are reflected in the workings 
of the financial sector that allocates funds from savings to investment projects. The 
model, further, presents no role for a government. The latter assumption implies the 
B controls inflation by choosing the degree of accommodation of the shocks to 
inflation, which is termed as x. Therefore, the choice variable of B is x. The central 
bank, B, is assumed to be independent and solely responsible for monetary policy. 
The instrument it uses is assumed to be a short-term nominal interest rate, interpreted 
as the overnight interbank-offered rate, which can be described in terms of x. In the 
interbank-funds market the central bank is essentially a price-maker, and while 
financial firms resort to this market in order to satisfy their demand for liquidity, the 
central bank’s policy choice influences the behaviour of the financial sector.  
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 absence of fiscal policy considerations and, also, that government securities192 are 
traded through financial intermediaries in secondary markets, which are, thus, 
encompassed in the sum of the financial securities.  
Time is discreet and t denotes a point in time. The information that each player faces 
is incomplete, in that certain aspects in the description of the game are not known to 
both players. As described in detail in the following sections, these aspects refer to 
the preferences of the central bank, player B, which determine its behaviour and, in 
turn, the behaviour of the other player, S. The game is sequential, in that the strategic 
interaction between the two players takes place in a sequence of moves, one by each 
In contrast to the analysis in Chapter 7, we assume that B always conducts policy 
player. The uninformed player, S, makes the first move; then, B moves second and 
ends the game. Play in a sequence of moves arises from the presence of a second-
player advantage, which the second player, B, would otherwise give-up if the 
strategic interaction between the two players were simultaneous. This advantage 
stems from the control B has over inflation, using monetary policy to counter 
inflation shocks, and from the fact that S’s profits are bound in long-term contracts 
that cannot rapidly change in response to new information. 
optimally in the receipt of new information after the realisations of shocks (acts with 
discretion) and, thus, will not choose to commit to a rule of any form. Allowing B the 
choice of commitment to a level of x by following a rule would have been innocuous, 
yet it would render the argument in the current model ineffective, as it would reveal 
B’s preferences to S prior to S’s making its move. The reason for analysing the case 
                                                 
192 For arguments for and against the purchase of government bonds, see respectively Oda and Okina 
(2001) and the comment by Beebe (2001), especially p. 366. 
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 of S’s facing incomplete information about the way B makes a strategy-choice lies 
mainly in the fact that central banks are in effect characterised by a certain vagueness 
as to an actual objective function they may obey to. In addition, financial stability 
has not been accounted for as an explicit objective (other than a well-articulated 
concern) by the mandates of central banks to date. However, as the analysis in 
Chapter 6 demonstrates, the proposed ways for policymakers to conduct monetary 
policy so as to address incidents (ex ante or ex post) of financial instability (or even 
the maintenance of its ‘positive’ counterpart) involve discretionary judgement when 
circumstances necessitate it. It is, therefore, contended that it is worth analysing how 
the reaction of the financial sector to such uncertainty about central bank behaviour 
affects the way a central bank would conduct its policy under discretion.  
the effective conduct of 
monetary policy and the efficient operation of the financial system are crucial 
components of a healthy economy, it is important to build a model that addresses 
these issues over a longer horizon than a one-off interaction.  In addition, as 
Eichberger (1993) points out “repeating a game substantially increases the set of 
possible strategies because actions, that is, strategies of the stage game, can be made 
conditional on the observed behaviour of other players in previous stages of the 
game. This makes possible strategies that enforce a particular behaviour in the stage 
Finally, it is assumed that the game can be repeated infinitely. A repeated game is 
designed in order to “examine the logic of long-term interaction. It captures the idea 
that a player will take into account the effect of his current behaviour on the other 
player’s future behaviour, and aims to explain phenomena like cooperation and 
threats” (Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), p. 133). Since 
game by threatening to choose some other action if the opponents do not follow the 
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 prescribed behaviour” (Eichberger (1993), p. 213). Infinite as opposed to finite 
repetition of the game is viewed as more appropriate, because in essence the strategic 
interaction aims at defining optimal monetary policy (in the context analysed and 
which is state-contingent), which, once applied, should give no reason to be 
abandoned from policy-makers, ceteris paribus. 
8.3 The Model 
8.3.1 The economy 
The structure of the economy is the same as in Chapter 7.  In particular, a
 
 simplified 
structure of the economy is modelled through the following three equations: 
t t t tE xπ π ε= + −     for   tε ~ ( )2iid 0, εσ     (8.1)   
 ,         1ttx ββ= >       (8.2) 
 t t ti r
r r∗−
π= + .        (8.3) 
Briefly, (8.1) describes inflation. Inflation, π, is a linear function of, first, the 
financial sector’s inflation expectations, Eπ, formed at t = 0 with respect to all the 
available information and, second, an inflationary shock, ε, that is observed at t = 1, 
can be positive or negative with a zero mean, a constant variance 2εσ and support 
( ),−∞ ∞ . The third term is the level of accommodation of the shock, x, that is 
achieved through monetary policy, which is applied after the observation of ε, at t=1. 
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 In the absence of a shock (i.e. the absence of new information) and for a monetary 
stance that is ‘neutral’, the array of prices are raised in line with inflation 
expectations. The random shock ε disturbs this behaviour and is countered by x. 
By taking expectations in equation (8.1) we obtain   
Ex = 0,     (8.4) 
tor. This result shows that on average monetary 
policy is just neutral. 
(8.2) captures the transmission of the effect of monetary policy to the real short-term 
erest, r, 
controls inflation. To specif
monetary stance, assume: 
where E is the expectations opera
interest rate, r, where r* can be thought of as the ‘natural’ real rate of interest193 and 
β as an inverse measure of how effectively the real short-term rate of int
y how the short-term rate of interest, i, determines 
( ) ( )       0 1r F ′< < ,    (8.5)  x F=
w l short-term rate of interest at t=1, as in (8.3). The restriction on F´ here r is the rea
means first, r and π are inversely related and second, in order to raise r and lower π, 
             
it is necessary to raise i. It is supposed that the transmission mechanism from i to π is 
via r and its effect on the real economy. Substituting (8.3) in (8.5) and (8.5) in (8.1) 
shows that, given F, Eπ and ε, the choice of i determines π, r and x. Therefore, in 
determining strategy, B could as equally set a target for r, or for x, as choose the 
                                    
of interest, i.e. the rate of interest required for equilibrium with stable prices. It is also referred in the 
literature as the neutral or the equilibrium real rate of interest. 
193 Woodford (2003), (pp. 21, 49-55) provides an analysis on Wicksell’s notion of the natural real rate 
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 level of its instrument, i. From (8.4), the central bank’s monetary stance is on 
average neutral. Let ( ) 0F r∗ = . If r>r*, monetary policy is restrictive and, if r<r*, it 
is expansionary. Then for simplicity we assume that x is as in (8.2). 
(8.3) describes what is known as the Fisher identity (termed after Fisher (1896)), the 
(approximately) one-for-one adjustm
inflation (in a steady state). We use this equation in a way that describes actual 
n Chapter 7.  For simplicity in notation subscript 1 for time t=1 
o players, S, is assumed to face incomplete information 
about the preferences of the other player, B. In particular, B can obey to a utility 
function that is unknown to S, and which can be of two particular forms, discussed in 
                                                
ent of nominal interest rate, i, to the level of 
inflation and the ex post real interest rates. The detailed account of these three 
equations remains as i
is excluded throughout the chapter. 
 
8.3.2 The game-structure 
In this game one of the tw
the next subsection. Therefore, S has incomplete information about the pay-offs B 
receives for each strategy-combination and, thus, S cannot predict B’s behaviour, 
which in turn affects S’s own behaviour. The information S has with respect to this 
issue is the exact form of each utility function B may be facing, as well as the 
probability assigned to B’s facing each utility function. It is assumed that S has full 
information about the strategy-sets that both players are facing194. 
 
194 It is contended as more appropriate to define the lack of information faced by S in terms of 
incomplete information about pay-offs since one can transform a game with incomplete information 
about strategy sets into a game with incomplete information about pay-offs by expanding the strategy 
spaces of the players accordingly, as in Harsanyi (1967). 
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 In order to evaluate the behaviour of each player, we use the method proposed by 
Harsanyi (1967) so as to transform a game of incomplete information to a game of 
imperfect information , which is a type of strategic interactio195 n for which the 
players’ best responses and equilibrium behaviour are well defined. In this case, S 
e. Information is imperfect because the player 
at moves right after nature, namely S, cannot observe the move of nature. 
Therefore, the incompleteness of information about pay-offs is transformed into 
uncertainty about the move of nature. As noted in Eichberger (1993) nature can play 
“the choices available to each player, the information a player has when it is his turn 
to move, and the pay-offs each player receives at the end of the game” (van Damme 
the game. The next subsection describes in detail the pay-off functions for each 
that faces incomplete information about B’s pay-offs is treated as if he were 
uncertain about the type of B he will face during the interaction. In our model, B can 
be of two types, one for each form of utility function, while S can be of one type, so 
we address S’s case with certainty. An artificial player is introduced, called ‘nature’ 
that moves first in the game and chooses according to some probability distribution 
the type of B that will play the gam
th
a unique mixed strategy which is the probability distribution over types and, thus, a 
pay-off function need not be introduced for nature (Eichberger (1993), p. 126).   
 A way to describe a game can be a summary of the rules of the game by indicating 
(1983), p. 3).  In this section we introduce these aspects that are necessary to define 
player. A pay-off function is the function that determines each player’s pay-off from 
                                                 
195 Imperfect information implies that when each player has to make a move they do not know exactly 
what happened in previous moves. 
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 the combination of actions chosen by the players (Gibbons (1992), p.1) 196. Then a 
subsection follows presenting the sequence of events in our analysis. The word 
‘event’ is used rather arbitrarily, as it does not represent the notion of ‘a subset of the 
set of states of nature’ that the term ‘event’ usually denotes in decision theory (see 
eg. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Chapter 6). By describing a ‘sequence of events’ we 
rather portray every occurrence that may take place in the context of the analysis at 
any time (in this fashion following Walsh (2000), p. 328). In this way, we present the 
information each player has when it is his turn to make a move. Finally, a compact 
description of the game is given in the last subsection. 
(ii) Objective functions  
 
The objective function of player S is the one described in Chapter 7. R is 
competitively determined. The welfare of S (the consolidated, competitive, financial 
sector) increases with profits. Through competition expected profits of S are driven 
                                                
down to a minimum level that makes the risk of non-survival just acceptable, which 
is termed as Q. The profitability of S, P, is modelled in terms of a loan issued (to the 
real sector) over a two-period horizon. Let i0 be the short-term rate of interest at t=0, 
and recall that i is the short-term rate of interest at t=1. Assume i0 (but not i) is 
known to S when S chooses the long-term rate of interest, R, at t=0. At t=2, S obtains 
profits per unit of currency: 
 
196 The term ‘pay-off function’ is common in game theory while in economics the term ‘objective 
function’ is more commonly used. An ‘objective function’ is associated with an optimisation problem 
and it determines how good a solution can be to the pertinent agent or agents. Since each player in the 
game faces an optimisation problem with respect to the other player’s optimisation problem, both 
terms can be used.   
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    ( ) ( )( )2 01 1 1P R i i= + − + + .    (8.6) 
However, for simplicity, and because nothing essential is involved, the following 
linear approximation is used: 
   02P R i i .     (8.7) 
   
= − −
 Substituting (8.1), (8.2) and (8.3) in (8.7): 
( )02 1P R i r E xπ β∗= − − − − − −ε .   (8.8) 
Taking expectations in (8.8) using (8.4), expected profits can be described as: 
   02EP R i r Eπ∗= − − − .    (8.9)                
Through competition EP is set equal to Q mentioned above. Q is defined as a 
function of the standard deviation of profits P, which, as is evident from (8.8), is 
affected by the variation of x and ε. In particular: 
   ( )                 0PQ k kσ= > .    (8.10)  
Coefficient k in (8.10) describes any structural features of the financial sector 
affecting its competitive level of profits, like administrative costs, psychological 
factors, or the presence of economies of scale. Since by construction Q is positive, as 
well as Pσ , k is also assumed to be positive. Letting ‘var’ denote variance, we note, 
from (8.4) and (8.8), that: 
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 ( ) ( )var var 1P .xβ ε⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦     (8.11) 
We assume competition drives the expected value of P to Q as in (7.10), so the 
assumption is for: 
QEP =         
        ( )0k >Pkσ= .    (8.12) 
 R under competition, as a function 
Turning to the objective function of B, we model B as choosing x by optimising 
 
p
Therefore, (8.12) determines the optimal level of
of i0, r*, Eπ, x, and ε. 
using the following utility function: 
( )⎧ = −
( ) ( )
2
1
2 2
* ,                            with prob.      ,
* * ,   with prob.  1 .
U p
U
U P P
π π
π π α
−⎪= ⎨
2 = − − − − −⎪⎩
  for 
  
[ ]0,    0,1pα > ∈ ,      (8.13) 
where π* and P* are the central bank targets for the rate of inflation and financial 
ectively.  
in Chapter 6). Strict inflation-targeting 
sector profitability resp
In the above, U1 is the objective function of a ‘strict inflation-targeting’ central bank 
(as eg. in Svensson (1999c)) caring only for price stability, while U2 describes a 
central bank having the objectives of price stability and financial stability (as in the 
model analysed in Chapter 7), conducting, thus, pre-emptive monetary policy against 
perceived financial imbalances (as described 
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 is used as a borderline case197. The probability p 
U1 is known to both players198. In particular, in this game, as in Backus and Driffill 
n needed by the players to make optimal decisions” (Backus and 
Driffill (1985), p. 533). 
As a caveat, s r to is in Cha
the corresponding agent’s attitude towards risk, while “in 
game theory it is usually assumed that payoffs represent the subjective evaluation of 
eflect a player’s risk attitudes. Consequently, 
attitudes to risk are rarely explicitly considered in game-theoretic analysis” 
ichberger (1993), p. 22). Hence, we refrain from making such considerations in the 
current analysis.  
 
 
The strategic interaction between S and B takes place between points in time t = 0 
and  = 1. Before the interaction takes place, at  = -1, B sets a target for inflation, , 
of B facing a utility function as in 
(1985) “the probability p, is a sufficient statistic for past play and contains all the 
relevant informatio
imila the analys pter 7, we refer to Eichberger’s (1993) 
remark that the common practice in economics is to take the curvature of an expected 
utility function to represent 
the outcome of a play by the agent (emphasis not in the original text). This means 
that the payoffs are assumed to r
(E
(iii) The sequence of events 
t t π*
                                                 
197 See Svensson (1999b) for a discussion of this case as a form of a monetary policy rule. 
198 The important issue is the assumption that all players agree on a certain prior distribution on the 
initial states (from which nature will make a choice). This is implicitly defined by assigning a single 
probability, here  for 1 and (1- ) for 2. Kreps (1990) remarks that there is no reason to make this 
assumption in theory and that we could assume that different players have different priors over 
p U p U
nature’s initial move, although we would still assume that each player is aware of the priors assessed 
by the other (Kreps (1990), p. 467). We though contend that jettisoning the assumption would 
complicate the analysis while making a marginal contribution.  
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 with the aim to anchor S’s expectations of inflation around the target, and a target for 
the level of profitability of S, P*. P* reflects the level of P that the central bank 
views as sufficient to guarantee S’s survival and proper functioning, in terms of 
channelling funds from savings to investments. The level of the short-term nominal 
interest rate that resulted from past policy, i.e. , and the level of the ‘neutral’ real 
objective, in U2, denoting the preferences of the central bank for 
the stability of the financial sector and a level for p, the probability that B faces U1, 
etween the values zero and one, inclusive. The joint probability distribution over the 
players
for B from the set of types, which includes the two alternatives of B exercising strict 
imperfect information).  
0i
interest rate r*, are predetermined and known to both players at t = -1, as well as the 
distribution of the shock ε. The level of Q, at which S finds the chances of 
bankruptcy of some firms in the sector just acceptable, is known to both players at t = 
-1, before the start of the game. In particular, as Q is a function of the monetary 
policy reaction x, it is its functional form that is known before the interaction takes 
place. Both players know before the interaction that B can be of two certain types 
that are also known. Therefore, before the game starts B and S know that B can face 
either U1 or U2 as in (8.13) for a positive level for α, the weight assigned on the 
financial stability 
b
’ types, μ, is also given at t = -1.      
Just before the interaction starts, the artificial player ‘nature’ makes a move and 
determines which types of players will actually play the game. Nature chooses a type 
inflation targeting or B conducting pre-em
types of B has two elements and the set of types of S has one element (denoting 
certainty about S). After nature makes a move each player receives information only 
about their own type and not that of the other player (
ptive monetary policy. Formally, the set of 
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 After nature reveals the corresponding type to each player, i.e. (τ) to S and any of (U1, 
U2) to B with respect to the joint probability distribution μ, each player updates their 
beliefs about the opponent’s type after learning the type assigned to them. The 
updating method is of a standard Bayesian style and the resulting conditional 
probability distribution over type-combinations si μ′ . In our simple model, though, 
since there is no uncertainty about the type of S, μ′  corresponds to the joint 
probability distribution μ, and the updating of beliefs is rather trivial. In particular, 
using Bayes’ rule the conditional probability distribution on TS (the set of types for S) 
is: 
(( ) )( ) ( )1S 1 1 2 ,  , ,U pU Uμ τ
,Uμ τ
μ τ μ τ′ ≡ =+  
( ) ( )( ) ( )2S 2 1 2
,
and  1 .
U
U p
μ τμ τ′
, ,U Uμ τ μ τ≡ = −     (8.14) 
It is evident, therefore, that S learns nothing about B’s type by observing its own type. 
In addition, since the type of S, τ, is common knowledge, there is nothing to be 
learned for B of any type either. In fact, the
+
 conditional probability distribution on TB  
(the set of types of B) is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2Β 1 Β 21 2
, ,
1,    and    1.
U U
U U
μ τ μ τμ τ μ τ′ ′′≡ = ≡ =  
Since B can be of either of the two types in T , and once nature has made a move, B 
is confronted with two alternative choices when it is its turn to move. These are 
either to behave according to its type or mimic the equilibrium behaviour of the other 
, ,U Uμ τ μ τ
B
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 type. In this model such a choice is governed by rational behaviour. If in equilibrium 
B of any type chooses the optimal action according to its type then the equilibrium is 
defined as ‘separating’. Conversely, if B of at least one type mimics the equilibrium 
behaviour of the other type of B, then the equilibrium is termed as ‘pooling’.  
After the move of nature, S makes a move at t=0. Apart from the uncertainty about 
the move of nature (dealt by the distribution μ), S also forms beliefs about B’s 
‘separating’ or ‘pooling’ when it moves at t=1. These beliefs are described by a 
subjective probability q for a rise of a ‘separating’ equilibrium, and (1-q) for 
‘pooling’. As a reminder, every aspect in the game other than the actual choice of 
nature is common knowledge.  
Since after the shock to inflation, ε, is realised (sometime between points in time t = 
0 and t = 1) B defines x at t=1 on a discretionary basis (i.e.  max ts 
objective function in actual rather than expected terms), Eπ are determined with 
 of Eπ and x. Under complete information, S is informed 
about B’s behaviour when determining a level for R. Then, at t=1, B chooses x after 
observing ε and R. Defining x is equivalent to defining r or i. Furthermore, at t = 1 
the actual level for π is realized. 
Two cases for B’s target for financial stability are further distinguished, namely for 
P*=Q and for P* >Q. Since central banks care for the safety and smooth functioning 
of the financial sector they tend to be either more prudent than the financial system 
by imising i
respect to equilibrium behaviour.  
At t = 0, S determines R competitively by setting its expected profits EP to equal Q. 
Therefore, R is a function
300 
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participants (the case for P* >Q) or willing to let the markets function at their own 
pace (the case for P*=Q) . Therefore, we do not consider the case of B choosing 
P*<Q.  
Figure 8.1 below gives a graphic representation of the sequence of events in our 
Figure 8.1: Sequence of events  
o                
 Επ, x   U 
   Rd r, i 
 P*≥Q,  player  B π 
 
ed after two periods.   
ge-game’. This chapter considers, without loss of 
generality and avoiding unnecessarily complicated notation, an infinitely repeated 
game with identical discount factors 
model. 
 
      t = 0   t = 1        (t = 2) 
 
 i , r*  nature    μ, q,   ε,   P 
 π*, P*,  selects  
 Q, β, α a type for
 
   
       
   
 p, δ 
A point in time t=2 is used for modelling purposes, as it is necessary for the 
definition of a long-rate that is earn
At t=1 the whole interaction described above is repeated, over t=1 and t=2. At t=2 
the same style of interaction is taking place. This process is repeated to infinity. A 
discount factor, δ, is attached to the ‘per-interaction’ values in this process and is 
known to both players before the start of the game. Every single interaction is 
conventionally termed as a ‘sta
( ) for all players. We exclude that such a 
discount factor covers the extreme cases when players care only for the present (δ=0) 
0,1δ ∈
 and when there is no discounting of the future (δ=1). Exclusion of the latter is 
important for the existence of equilibrium, while of the former is vital for the 
important assumption that at least one player, namely the central bank, cares about its 
reputation. This latter consideration necessitates that this player cares about the 
 
(iv) Game description 
 compact description of the game is the following: 
e se typ
s beliefs μ about B’s type and q about B’s equilibrium behaviour. 
[3] Eπ are formed rationally. 
[4] S chooses R with respect to Eπ, μ, and q. 
[5] B chooses x with respect to R and Eπ after observing ε. 
8.4 Equilibrium Outcomes 
a solution (as in the games in Chapter 7 which incorporated complete and perfect 
information). Because the moves in every per-period game are made sequentially, the 
future to some extent. 
A
[1] Nature se  type for p r B t of es.  lects a laye from th
[2] S forms it
 
The behaviour of each player in this game is described by the definition of the 
pertinent equilibrium. Because of the incomplete information the game does not have 
properly defined subgames and therefore subgame perfection cannot be used to reach 
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 concept of equilibrium used is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium (i) players maximise their own objective functions 
independently choosing a strategy given their assessment of the opponent’s 
behaviour at each information set199 given the beliefs at each information set and (ii) 
beliefs are consistent with equilibrium strategies (Eichberger (1993), p. 167). In this 
model the second requirement for equilibrium is justified by the fact that, first, a 
belief at an information set is simply a probability distribution over the possible 
moves ormation sets where one move is possible 
s it is possible to evaluate the 
optimality of the strategy combinations at every information set. What is optimal at 
eld by the player. To 
e 
to be satisfied. In particular, as stated above, beliefs must be consistent with the 
strategies played in equilibrium 0 (Eichberger (1993), p. 166). Finally, for infinite-
-offs is defined as the limit of the 
sequence of payoffs in the repetitions of the game as the time-horizon diverges to 
infinity201. 
                                              
 in this information set (while at inf
the probability assigned is one). Given such belief
an information set, however, depends on the particular beliefs h
avoid complete arbitrariness of these beliefs, certain consistency requirements hav
20
horizon games the sum of per-period game pay
   
199 The notion of an information set implies that certain subsets of decision nodes (in a game-tree – the 
graphing representation of a sequential-move game as the current model) are such that the player 
does not know which of those nodes he is at (Kreps (1990), p. 
200 Nevertheless, this requirement does not impose a restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, namely 
for equivalent restrictions have been proposed (see eg. the definition of ‘sequential equilibrium’ by 
201
to infinity provided that the discounting factor is strictly less than one, δ<1 (see Eichberger (1993), p. 
choosing the action at one of the nodes 
367).  
beliefs about play at information sets with zero probability. Different notions of equilibria accounting 
Kreps and Wilson (1982) among others). It is contended, however, that advancing the definition of 
equilibrium would necessitate a considerable amount of technicality, that does not contribute to a 
great extent to the main conclusions of the analysis. To this point it is worth mentioning, though, that 
imposing further such restrictions would reduce the multiplicity of equilibria that arise in the model.  
This limit is well defined. Pay-offs of the stage-game are bounded (from the definitions of the 
objective functions), and thus the sequence of average pay-offs will converge as the time-horizon goes 
211, for more general comments on this point).      
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 The equilibrium outcomes are presented in terms of pure strategies202 – so as to 
convey the insights of the analysis more promptly avoiding complex notation that 
may not contribute much to the analysis. Before presenting the equilibrium outcomes 
in each stage-game, it is important to note that inflation expectations Eπ that are 
formed at t=0, are defined in equilibrium, and B’s choice of x at t=1 affects σP which 
determines Q. In addition, σP is a function of p, q, α, β and σε. S chooses R at t=0 by 
setting EP=Q. EP is affected by Eπ. Therefore R is determined by Eπ, the beliefs of 
S for the choice of nature (μ, i.e.  p, 1-p) and the choice of B of type 2 to pool or 
separate (from type 1’s optimal strategy) (q, 1-q).  
Finally, let 1π π= for B of type 1 and 2π π=  for B of type 2. In addition, for x 
measuring B’s monetary stance, then 1x x=  for type 1 and 2x x=  for type 2. 
Assume: 
,E x1 1π π ε= + −     (8.1a)203 
2 2.E xπ π ε= + −     (8.1b)  
According to the move of nature, B is of type 1 or type 2, with probabilities p and 1-
p, respectively. From (8.14) describing the beliefs of S about B’s type, μ′ , these 
coincide with the above. Since Eε=0, it follows from (8.1), (8.1a) and (8.1b) that: 
                                                 
202 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are defined in terms of ‘behaviour strategies’. In the latter agents are 
allowed random choices at each information set at which they have to make a move. In contrast to a 
pure strategy combination, a behaviour strategy combination will not determine a unique path of play 
in the game, but rather will induce a probability distribution on agents’ payoffs (these payoffs being 
determined by pure strategy combinations). Therefore the expected payoff of a player from a 
behaviour strategy combination is the expected value of payoffs given the probability distribution on 
asoning also lies behind the numbering of (8.4a).  
the terminal nodes (when the game ends) induced by the relevant behaviour strategy combination 
(Eichberger (1993), p.23). 
203 To avoid confusion the same number is used as in equation (8.1), since, in essence (8.1a) and (8.1b) 
represent the same structure as in (8.1). The same re
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 ( )1 21 0.pEx p Ex+ − =    (8.4a) 
Choice of x at t=1 
It is convenient and inessential as shown above, to regard B as choosing x rather than 
i, on observing Eπ, ε, i0, r*, β and R. Substituting from (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.8)  
into (8.13): 
( )1 1U E x 2π ε π= − + − −      (8.15a) 
2
∗
( )
(
2 2
      
U E xπ ε π
β
∗= − + − − −
⎡− ⎣
  ){ }20 2  2 1 .R i r E x Pα π ε∗ ∗⎤− − − − − + −⎦ (8.15b) 
B of Type 1 
When B is of type 1 by differentiating (8.15a) with respect to x1 and equating to zero, 
the following holds: 
1x Eπ ε π∗ ∗= + −       (
       (8.17) 
i.e. 
zero) since its objective function is a negative quadratic function. From (8.16), we 
8.16) 
1 0.U =∗
From (8.17) it is evident that in this case B can receive the highest level of utility (
see that in this case (for B being of type 1 with certainty) B has perfect control over 
inflation expectations as Eπ π ∗= , and completely offsets the shock to inflation, as 
for x as in (8.16), 1x ε∗ =  for Eπ π ∗= . Therefore, when B is of type 1, it will always 
choose to reveal its type in equilibrium, which implies that it will always choose x as 
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 in (8.16). In this case, however, at t=1 actua l, if 
not only B, but also S knows that B is of type 1. Yet, this is not the case, and, thus, 
the inflation expectations are not equal to 
l inflation will reach its targeted leve
Eπ π ∗= . Eπ is determined in equilibrium 
 at t=1 in each case. The leve al inflation takes, respectively, is 
given below after we present the choice of  when B is of type 2.  
B of Type 2 
When B is of type 2 it is confronted with the alternative to act according to its type, 
i.e. choose the relevant level of x ally (separating equilibrium), or 
ue identity and act as if ype 1 and, thus, choose x as in (8.16) 
(pooling equilibrium). In the latter, S will re in uncertain about the true identity of 
Pooling: In this 
with respect to the alternative equilibria that may arise and the beliefs S holds for 
each one arising. This is presented after the investigation of the optimal level of x 
chosen by B l that actu
x
 defined optim
 it were of t
ma
conceal its tr
B. B may choose to pool in order to induce S to expect low inflation in the future.  
case 1 2x x
∗ ∗= , and so: 
( ){ }22 02 1U R i r Eα π ε∗ ∗ ∗= − − − − − − −  1xβ⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦
( )6
P∗
( ){ }211P Q xα β ε∗ ∗⎡ ⎤= − − − − + ⇒⎣ ⎦  
( )( )
8.1
{ }
( )
2
1 ( ){ }
2 1
    .
U P Q E
P Q E
2
α β π ε π ε
α β π π βε
∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗
⎡ ⎤= − − − − + − +⎣ ⎦
⎤= − − − − + ⎦
   (8.18) 
⎡ −⎣
306 
 The level of utility in (8.18) represents the disutility faced by B of type 2 for 
choosing only to meet the target for inflation, while it also shares concerns about 
financial stability (defined as an explicit ob   
Separation: Optimal x for B of type 2 in a separating equilibrium is derived as in 
Chapter 7. Differentiating (8.15b) with respect to x  and equating to zero: 
( ) ( )
jective).
2
{ }2 0 21 2 1E x R i r E xπ ε π α β π β∗ ∗ ⎡+ − − + − − − − − − +⎣ 0Pε ⎤ − =⎦  ∗
  (8.19) 
Let .         
( )2 2xα β ⎤+ − =⎣ ⎦1 1⎡
( )( )01 2 .E R i r E Pπ ε π α β π ε∗ ∗ ∗= + − + − − − − − −
Then, from (8.19) and for H as above: 
( )21 1H α β= + −
( ) ( )( )
2 H
11 1 P QEx
H H
α βα β επ π ∗∗∗∗ − −⎡ ⎤− −− ⎣ ⎦= + − ,  (8.20) 
( )
( )
2
2 2
2
2         1 ,
U E x
P Q x
π ε π
α β ε
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
∗ ∗∗
= − + − − −
⎡ ⎤− − + − +⎣ ⎦
     (8.21) 
where 2x
∗∗ is given by (8.20).  
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 Eπ at t=0 
Assume at t=1 type 2 chooses ‘pooling’ with probability q and ‘separation’ with 
probability 1-q, and, as stated above, B is believed to be of type 1  with probability p 
2
and of type 2 with probability (1-p). From (8.4a), (8.16) and (8.20): 
( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 1
0 1
1 1
pEx p Ex
pEx p qEx q Ex∗ ∗
= + −
∗∗⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎣ ⎦
 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )(
1
  1 1 1
p p q E
p q E P Q
π π
π π α β
∗
∗ ∗
⎡ ⎤= + − − +⎣ ⎦
) .  ⎡ ⎤+ − − − − − −⎣ ⎦
Therefore, 
  ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 ,E p q P Qπ π α β∗ ∗− = − − − −    (8.22)  
where   ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1p q P Qα β ∗ 0.− − − − ≥   
From (8.22) we observe that for higher levels of q, S’s beliefs that B of type 2 will 
choose ‘pooling’ at t=1, Eπ would be lower, hence B of type 2 exercises better 
control over inflation expectations when it chooses ‘pooling’.  It is also worth noting 
that (8.22) results from the equilibrium relationship (8.4) and equivalently (8.4a). 
e E  x on the equilibrium-path, then, by definition, (8.22) 
plies that we refrain from modelling irrational or out-of-equilibrium behaviour. 
 (8.22) and the discussion about the choice of x when B is of type 1, it is 
concluded that actual inflation in this case equals from (8.1a): 
Becaus x=0 holds only for
im
From
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 ( )( ) ( )( )1 11 1 1p q P Qπ π α β ε∗ ∗= + − − − − + − x∗ . 
1x εSubstituting for ∗ =  in the above, the following is derived: 
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 .p q P Qπ π α β∗ ∗= + − − − −    (8.23a) 
For α>0 and β>1, which hold by assumption, from (8.23a) it is concluded that  
1π π ∗> . Therefore, even a central bank that is exercising strict inflation-targeting 
monetary policy, cannot exercise perfect control over inflation expectations and 
actual inflation eventually, unless it can convince the financial sector that does so 
(leading to p=1, or q=1). This result demonstrates that uncertainty about the way a 
 conducts its policy may prove detrimental204.  
ype 2, and is either on a pooling or a sep
inflation will respectively take the following levels, using (8.1b) and (8.22): 
central bank
When B is of t arating equilibrium, actual 
( )( ) ( )( ) 2 11 1 12 2 x xp q P Q xπ π α β ε ∗ ∗=∗ ∗= + − − − − + − ⇒  ∗
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 ,2 p q P Qπ π α β∗ ∗= + − − − −     (8.23b)  
and 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )8.202 21 1 1p q P Q xπ π α β ε  ∗ ∗= + − − − − + − ⇒∗∗
                                                 
 (1991), where “imperfect 
credibility [of the ‘strong’ policymaker (similar to B of type 1)] turns out to be partially self-fulfilling 
in the sense that the strong policymaker does not deliver the target inflation it would have delivered 
under perfect credibility” (Cukierman and Liviatan (1991), p. 101).  
204 This result is similar to the main conclusion of Cukierman and Liviatan
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }22 1 1 1 1 1p q P QHα β .π π α β∗ ∗− ⎡ ⎤= + + − − − − +⎣ ⎦ βε  (8.23c) 
e(8.23b) gives the sam  result as in (8.23a). In (8.23c), 2π π ∗>
g
 for α>0, and β>1, 
which hold by assumption, the latter at all times, and th
2. Comparing (8.23b) with (8.23c) for ε equal to its avera e value (of zero), it is 
equilibr
e former for B being of type 
concluded that in a separating equilibrium B of type 2 inflates more than in a pooling 
ium for ( )1 0p q q− + > , which holds by assumption for all ( ], 0,1p q∈  and 
for 0 and 0,p q= ≠  as well as 0 and 0q p= ≠ . The last two conditions identify 
respectively the cases when S is certain that B is of type 2 and will never choose a 
‘pooling’ equilibrium, and that B will never pool in equilibrium whichever type it 
may be of. 
 
Choice of R at t=0 
We assume competition drives the expected value to Q=k P, for σP denoting the 
standard deviation of P, the profits per unit of currency obtained by S.  At this level 
for expected profits, the market finds the chances of bankruptcy just acceptable. 
From (8.9) and (8.12), the choice of R is governed by: 
σ
( )
( )
8.12
0
1
02
2
.P
Q R i r E
R i r E k
π
π σ
∗
∗
= − − − ⇒
= + + +
     (8.24)  
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 In choosing 
will choos
: 
R, S takes into account the effect on σP, and therefore on 
e x.  
8.16)
Q, of how B 
For B of type 1, and for S assigning p=1, from (8.11) and (
P εσ βσ= .       (8.25a) 
x is as in (8.2 h probabil
. Therefore, al
When B is of type 2, S believes that, with probability q, x is as in (8.16) and with 
probability (1-q), 0). S believes that B is of type 1 wit ity p 
and of type 2 with probability 1-p so using (8.11), the variance of P is 
generally determined as following: 
( )2
2 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 2
var 1
var 1 1 1 1 1
P
P
x
p p q x p q x
σ β ε
β β∗ ∗
⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦
ε∗⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + − + − − − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 σ
from (8.16) and (8.20), the above becomes205: 1x
∗and 2x
∗∗Substituting for 
( ) ( )21 1P p q pq β .σ εHα β σ⎡ ⎤= + − + −     (8.25b) 
will 
                                                
⎣ ⎦
Comparing (8.25a) with (8.25b) we conclude that for p=1 in (8.25b), σP is equal to 
(8.25a), which is also the case for q=1, i.e. when S believes that a type 2 B 
 
205 The actual computation is: 
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( )22 221 8.25b .q H ε
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 always pool. For both p, q equal to zero, S believes that B is of type 2 and will 
always separate. In this case: 
.P H ε
βσ σ=        (8.25c) 
For any levels of p and q less than 1 (and for p and q non-zero and always positive), 
of prudence to S. In these cases, S will estimate a 
higher level for σP and, thus, evaluate a higher level for Q. This will necessitate 
higher expected profits to guarantee S’s survival. This result implies that other than 
better control over inflation expectations B will have more incentives to pool in 
 s a
Above we have presented the equilibrium outcomes of the first stage-game. The 
state-game starting at t=0 is repeated infinitely, at t=1, t=2, …, with a discount factor 
option of B to pool in the future will affect its current behaviour, as well as the 
formation of Eπ and the behaviour of S overall. If B pools in the first stage then it 
‘keeps the option’ in the next stage-games. If B chooses to play the ‘separating’ 
equilibrium, its identity is revealed. Then there is no uncertainty in the future and S 
will receive complete information about the central bank it interacts with.  Therefore, 
B chooses the ‘separating’ equilibrium ever after. 
σP lies between the levels in (8.25a) and (8.25b). Therefore, when B is of type 1, or 
when B manages to make S believe that it is of type 1 (p=1), as well as when it 
makes S believe that it will always pool in equilibrium (q=1) if it is of type 2, B 
succeeds in imposing a higher level 
equilibrium when it aim t the objective of financial stability.  
of δ per period. Pooling in each stage-game improves control of inflation 
expectations defined at t=1 and maintains an option to pool in the future. Thus, the 
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 Let the option to pool have value V. It follows that the option to pool at t=2, when the 
second stage-game (the first repetition of the game) ends with the move of B, 
discounted to t=1 has value δV. For type 2, pooling compared to separation lowers 
inflation expectations and
chooses pooling in the first stage-game at t=1 if and only if: 
When the equality holds in (8.26) B is indifferent between pooling and separating. 
This case still constitutes an equilibrium. Different equilibria may arise for different 
levels of the parameters. 
8.5 Discussion 
In this section we discuss the different equilibria that may arise for different values 
of the determinants of (8.26). The most important case is the effect ε has on (8.26) 
determining thus equilibrium behaviour. Initially, we need to consider the following. 
 maintains the option to pool in the future. B of type 2 
    2 2 0.U U Vδ∗ ∗∗− + ≥      (8.26) 
  
Lemma 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,U U A E A A P Qπ π ε∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗− = − − − − −    (8.27) 2 2 1 2 3ε∂∂
where .  
Proof: Recall 0, 1,
1 2 3, , 0A A A >
α β> > and so 1H > , while also P Q∗ > . Applying the envelope 
theorem: 
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Substituting from (8.20): 
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On the right hand side, the coefficients of 
⎡ ⎤= − − − +⎣ ⎦
, ε and P QEπ π ∗− ∗ −  are negative, which 
the lemma.  
We can use the lemma in order to present the relationship between the variation of 
(8.26) with respect to the shock to inflation, ε. This is depicted in the following graph 
in Figure 8.2. The figure shows how the choice of B to pool or not is affected by the 
proves 
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 level of the shock to inflation. In particular, (8.26) has one term ( )∗ ∗∗ plus a 
constant. According to the lemma, integrating the right hand side of (8.27) with 
respect to ε, leads to a quadratic function. Therefore, the graphical representation of 
(8.26) is as the graph in Figure 8.2.   
Figure 8.2 
 
 2 2U U−
U2*-U2**+δV
ε*ε** ε
 
According to the lemma, there exist critical values for the shock to inflation, 
∗∗ , and 0ε ε= < ε ε= ∗ , such that type 2 chooses pooling for ε ε ε< <∗∗ ∗  and 
or separation f ε ε ∗∗<  or ε ε ∗> . Intuitively, separation is trigg eme 
e special case of 
ered by extr
∗ = , that alsoshocks, more especially positive shocks. For th P Q  
results in Eπ π ∗= , the function depicted in Figure 8.2 is symm
letely below the horizontal axis, w
etric about the point 
ich implies that (0,0) and w
2 2U U
ould lie comp h
Vδ∗ ∗∗− + is always negative. Therefore, in this case B would always choose to 
separate, irrespective of the shock ε. In addition, as P* increases above Q, the graph 
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 in Figure 8.2 moves upwards and shifts to the left, increasing ber of 
‘pooling’ equilibria. 
The option value V is determined by: 
 the num
( )
( )
2 2
2 2 .1
V q E U U V
qV E U U
q
ε ε ε δ
ε ε εδ
∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
⎡ ⎤= − < < +⎣ ⎦
= − < <−
   (8.28) 
For the special case of V as in (8.28) is equal to zero. This is the case when 
q, the probability of B to 
pool is in fact the probability that ε lies between
P Q∗ = , 
B is indifferent between pooling and separating. In (8.28), 
 ( ),ε ε∗∗ ∗ .  From (8.26) and (8.28) it 
is concluded that as q increases the graph in Figure 8.2 shifts upwards increasing 
obviously the number of pooling equilibria. 
 
8.5 Policy Implications 
Modelling everal ins
viour ompet
ation
preferences over aiming at financial stability in addition to low and stable inflation 
that the financial sector may face. It is shown that when suitable, a central bank that 
conducts pre-emptive monetary policy may prefer to pretend to act as a strict 
inflation targeting one. Pooling in this model is useful to a central bank because it 
a situation of incomplete information can generate s ights 
concerning beha in c itive situations. Initially, it is evaluated whether a 
central bank shares a benefit in exploiting the lack of inform  about its 
succeeds in better control over inflation expectations. Similarly, a rule for monetary 
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 policy as the one defined in Chapter 7 is another way to achieve that control. 
Therefore, over the time-horizon that the true type of the central bank is not revealed 
the central bank can take advantage of this reputation without any binding 
commitment to a rule. The control over inflation expectations can be exercised 
because the financial sector is forward-looking and also aware of the presence of an 
‘option’ (with value V) that may be exercised by the c
Nevertheless, central banks tend not only to be concerned with inflation. When a 
ainta
overall macroeconomic stability, as explained in Chapter 7), then for small shocks to 
inflation hitting the economy, the central bank prefers to build or retain a reputation 
as a strict- inflation targeting one. Conversely, when inflation shocks (positive or 
 a more muted reaction and accepting 
flation higher than the targeted rate. We may, in turn, consider the growth of a 
bubble to be possibly reflected in a negative inflation shock. According to this 
pre-empt this adverse situation only when the shock 
when it aims at the objective of financial stability, because in this way it results in the 
entral bank. 
central bank cares to m in financial stability (as a foundation that enhances 
negative) have a large effect to inflation, the central bank reveals its additional 
concerns for financial stability by allowing
in
model, a central bank can 
becomes very large. This result may qualify for a reluctance of central banks to 
deviate to a great extent from their targeted rate of inflation, unless adverse 
circumstances force them to use their instrument in order to reach their 
macroeconomic objectives (in our context defined in terms of financial stability). 
Other than better control over inflation expectations this model shows that a central 
bank will also have more incentives to mimic in equilibrium a strict-inflation targeter 
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 financial sector being stricter in its operations (imposing a competitive requirement 
of higher expected profits to firms that want to remain in the sector).  
Furthermore, the model demonstrates that even a central bank that is exercising strict 
inflation-targeting monetary policy, cannot exercise perfect control over inflation 
expectations and actual inflation eventually, unless it can convince the financial 
sector that it does so. This result demonstrates that uncertainty about the way a 
 
ach 
central bank conducts its policy may prove detrimental and advocates (the now 
consensus view) that communication of central bank’s preferences over the conduct 
of policy is important, also when central bank conducts pre-emptive policy (in a 
discretionary way). 
8.7 Concluding Remarks 
The analysis in this chapter is an extension of the two-player game presented in 
Chapter 7 by modelling one player, the financial sector, as being confronted with 
incomplete information about the preferences of the other, the central bank. The 
model, in particular, incorporates a central bank that can either aim at the objective 
of low and stable inflation (solely) or face the dual objective of price and financial 
stability. The interaction can be repeated infinitely and, thus, the concerns that 
current behaviour affects future outcomes impose an effect on the choices of e
player.  
In this model since the financial sector is partially informed about the way the central 
bank conducts monetary policy, even a central bank that prefers to pre-empt financial 
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 instability may choose in equilibrium, for suitable levels of parameters, to mimic a 
‘strict inflation targeting’ central bank. The aim is to build its reputation as such in 
stead of behaving in a way that would reveal its identity by choosing the strategy that 
maximises its objective function. In this way, it manages to better control inflation 
expectations, and have a firmer guarantee of the stability of the financial sector. It is 
finally proven that only for considerably large shocks to inflation, is the ‘pre-
emptive’ central bank willing to exercise more muted control to inflation in order to 
reinforce the safety of the financial sector. 
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C H A P T E R  9  
C O N C L U S I O N S  
 
 
9.1 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter summarises the most important conclusions of the thesis while making 
an effort to discuss the relevance of this analysis within the context of the current 
 affected the economies around the world. 
A principal issue in the theories of the channels of transmission is the extent to which 
a policy-induced change in the official rate affects all short-term money market 
interest rates, and spreads, in turn, to the entire spectrum of interest rates, having an 
effect particular on the long-term interest rates that are most relevant to investment 
(including housing) or to purchases of durable goods. In fact, several factors affect 
the propagation of monetary policy actions along the term structure, including the 
organisation of financial markets and the state of expectations. 
It appears plausible that monetary policy is able to have an effect on the real 
economy primarily because of interest rate effects and also, to a certain extent, 
because of asset-price effects. However, the recent empirical literature argues that in 
reality the effects of monetary policy, in particular those of a monetary contraction, 
are stronger than those which could be expected if the interest rate and asset-price 
channels were the only relevant mechanisms, and also that they exhibit a different 
global financial crisis that has severely
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 pattern than the effects one would expect to encounter if these were the only 
pertinent mechanisms (Schmid
ter 2 involves a number of different 
echanisms and actions undertaken by economic agents at various stages. 
ions need a considerable time to have an impact 
on price developments. Moreover, the size and intensity of the effects can differ with 
nd to consider some 
simple rules of thumb in order to guide or cross-check their action. 
on price stability emerged as a result of the practical experience in conjunction with 
t (2001), p. 212). 
The dynamic process described in Chap
m
Consequently, monetary policy act
respect to the state of the economy, which renders the estimation of the precise 
impact considerably difficult. Central banks, thus, are facing long, variable and 
uncertain lags in the conduct of monetary policy. A further issue that complicates the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy is that, in practice, a large number of 
shocks from several sources influence economic developments. Thus, in addition to 
monitoring the monetary transmission mechanism central banks need also to 
consider all other developments relevant to future inflation so as to prevent those 
from having an impact on longer-term inflation trends and expectations in a way 
inconsistent with price stability (ECB (2004), p. 47). As central banks face a 
complex environment of economic interactions, they often te
A convergence in the theory and practice of monetary policy has taken place since 
the early 1980s. On the policy side, there is a widely accepted desirability and 
feasibility of central banks to use monetary policy in order to achieve and maintain 
low inflation over time, and that such commitment to price stability enhances the 
power of monetary policy to stabilize employment over the business cycle. The focus 
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 the theory developed since late seventies (Goodfriend (2005), p. 250). Furthermore, 
the old tradition of central banks of opaqueness in their statements has been replaced 
with the widely accepted trend towards greater transparency, which enhances the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. 
tions between the 
policy rate and market rates (and asset prices), the consensus model (and proposed 
extensions), to our knowledge, fails to provide a widely accepted structural 
representation of the monetary and financial system and of their role in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
The ‘benchmark model’ (and the broad set of extensions) suggests a set of major 
conclusions about the role of monetary policy. A set of four main conclusions are  
emphasised by Goodfriend and King (1997): (i) “Monetary policy actions can have 
an important effect on real economic activity, persisting over several years, due to 
gradual adjustment of individual prices and the general price level. (ii) Even in 
settings with costly price adjustment, the models suggest little long-run trade-off 
between inflation and real activity. (iii) The models suggest significant gains from 
eliminating inflation, which stem from increased transactions efficiency and reduced 
relative price distortions. (iv) The models imply that credibility plays an important 
role in understanding the effects of monetary policy” (Goodfriend and King (1997), 
p. 232).  They find these issues to be consistent with monetary policymakers’ 
statements in several countries. Nevertheless, while it is deemed crucial for the 
monetary authorities to monitor developments regarding the connec
Furthermore, a generally accepted definition of the stability of a financial system has 
not yet emerged in the literature. Besides a tendency to define financial instability 
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 instead, there exists a clear distinction between definitions that refer to the volatility 
of directly observable financial variables and those that are based on a system 
approach. The latter tend to broadly follow Mishkin’s (1991a), which can be adapted 
according to Issing (2003) to a broad, but intellectually convincing definition of 
financial stability as “the prevalence of a financial system which is able to ensure in a 
lasting way, and without major disruptions, an efficient allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities” (Issing (2003), p. 16). The degree of financial fragility can 
then be viewed as the proximity of the economy to a critical point, exceeding which 
would impair the efficient allocation of savings (Issing (2003), p. 16). 
According to Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003) asset price bubbles can (at 
least partly) be attributed to “wealth effects in household consumption – rising 
Volatility in asset prices seems to be a symptom rather than a cause of the boom-bust 
cycle, and, therefore, monetary policymakers need principally to address any 
monetary policy problems that may potentially create economic instability. It is 
argued (see Goodfriend (2001)) that equity prices, in fact, constitute a misleading 
guide for interest-rate monetary policy, which needs to protect market liquidity and 
maximise a central bank’s leverage over longer-term interest rates and aggregate 
demand. Monetary policy is also argued to be a fundamental source of deflation and 
stagnation risk in a regime of fully credible price level stability. A central bank can 
actually be insufficiently pre-emptive in a business expansion, being misled by its 
own credibility for low inflation. 
perceptions about the future growth of incomes, increasing creditworthiness of 
households, and changes in corporate investment as a result of falling cost of new 
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 capital, rising expectations about future growth of earnings, and greater perceived 
creditworthiness of firms” (Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003), p. 26)206.  
Mishkin and White (2003) suggest that “because stock-market crashes are often not 
followed by signs of financial instability, we must always be cautious about 
assigning causality from timing evidence, while certainly, one cannot make the case 
that stock-market crashes are the main cause of financial instability” (Mishkin and 
White (2003), p. 73). In fact, in several such episodes it is argued that the source of 
financial instability might have been other factors, such as the collapse of the 
banking system or the severity of the economic contraction. The theory of how 
Asset-price booms and busts have, historically, suggested that their impact on the 
real economy varies. The most costly episodes in social and economic terms tended 
to be those accompanied by high leverage and a large build-up in credit. Asset-price 
bubbles are an especially difficult topic as they tend to be difficult to explain, in part 
stock-market crashes can interfere with the efficient functioning of financial markets 
suggests that the impact of a stock market crash will be very different depending on 
the initial conditions of balance sheets in the economy. 
                                                 
in the following manner. Stemming from either excessive optimism about economic prospects or 
which leads to higher demand for certa
latter raises the values of those assets, 
206 As Mishkin (2008) points out, financial history shows a sequence of events that typically proceed 
fundamental changes in the structure of the financial system, a boom in credit provision takes place, 
in assets and, in turn, to higher prices for those assets. The 
consequently, promoting further issuing of credit backed by 
those assets, which further raises demand and, thus, the prices of those assets. Such a reinforcing 
than on the borrowers’ ability to repay the debt issued to them. When the bubble (inevitably) bursts 
result of the decline in lending. In turn overall economic activity deteriorates and macroeconomic risk 
health of financial institutions following the collapse of an asset price bubble can endanger the 
operation of the financial system as a whole” (Mishkin (2008), p. 2). 
mechanism can create a bubble. The latter can encourage lax credit standards since lenders rely more 
on the further appreciation of the pertinent assets (in order to shield themselves from potential loss) 
the mechanism described above works backwards. The drop in asset prices causes a decrease in the 
supply of credit, and as the demand for assets continues to fall their prices drop further. Loan defaults 
and the slump in asset prices deteriorate the balance-sheet positions of financial institutions leading to 
a further decrease in credit supply and investment. Business and household spending shrinks as a 
in credit markets increases. Finally, “in the extreme, the interaction between asset prices and the 
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 just as history is difficult to explain, since a huge variety of forces shapes historic 
events. Bubbles are also difficult to explain, relative to other historic events, since 
they involve a complex interaction in which people try very hard to outsmart each 
other. Notably, Shiller (2003) points out differences in approach to research on asset-
price bubbles when he writes “microeconomists still rarely cite macroeconomists, 
economists rarely site psychologists, and academics rarely site news media stories.” 
Therefore, he further remarks that the research on asset-price bubbles, in general, 
yields fragmentary conclusions (Shiller (2003), p. 36). 
e reasons are, first, that asset 
prices are difficult to determine scientifically, and, second, that if they were to 
constitute indicators of monetary policy, since they are highly volatile, they would 
render the implementation of sound monetary policy very difficult207.  
Because of their potential effect on price and financial stability the developments in 
asset prices are a serious cause of concern for monetary policymakers. Nevertheless, 
at least two main reasons stand out against the introduction of asset prices into a 
central bank’s monetary policy reaction function. Thes
It has been presented that a hotly debated issue for both policymakers and academics 
is the relationship between asset prices and monetary policy. It does not seem to be 
disputed that a sharp decline in asset prices can be disruptive. In addition, for 
example, Bernanke (2000), and Kohn (2006) point towards a broad agreement that 
failure to deal decisively with financial system weakness is a major policy mistake. 
                                                 
207 As Trichet (2003), for example, emphasizes, other than using monetary policy, the functioning of 
the financial system can be improved through measures enhancing market transparency and reducing 
herding behaviour. Propositions include improvements on regulatory accounting measures, tax rules 
and regulations, as well as of codes of good conduct and good practice. 
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 Yet, Gaspar and Kashyap (2006) remark that the issue of what to do when faced with 
a large increase in either equity prices or house prices still remains contentious. 
On this issue, Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003) send potentially vital 
messages to monetary policymakers in their effort to devise a monetary policy plan 
of action, so as to protect against asset-price bubbles or mitigate their impact. They 
arrive at the following general conclusions: (i) It is very difficult for monetary 
policymakers to identify asset-price bubbles when they develop, due to constraints of 
imperfect information, downside risks of misusing instruments, limited effectiveness 
here financial 
markets tend to be more opaque, supervision and regulation are rather poor, and 
lending is mainly based on collateral instead of expected cash flow projections (as a 
result primarily of poor accounting standards). (iii) Weak macroeconomic policies, 
insufficient policy transparency and micro-structural weaknesses encouraging the 
development of asset-price bubbles, tend to exist in economies that experience 
crashes that last longer, bear higher costs and are more destabilising. This points 
towards the establishment of an effective prudential regulatory regime to safeguard 
of policy instruments, and time constraints. (ii) Even though crises frequently follow 
asset-price bubble collapses, not all cases result in crises that create financial system 
instability. Financial systems, which operate (before the development of a bubble) 
under solid supervisory and regulatory institutions and macroeconomic stability have 
proven to be more resilient to the unwinding of a bubble than systems not having the 
above features. In this respect, asset-price bubbles followed by costly crashes tend to 
be more frequent in emerging, rather than developed, economies w
the financial system from the adverse consequences of a crisis, rather than attempts 
at an appropriate and prompt identification of asset-price bubbles. (iv) Potential 
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 agency problems and information asymmetries are minimised by transparency. Thus, 
it is important to enhance the development and enforcement of accounting and 
auditing standards, including the frequency and means of dissemination and the 
quality of disclosure. (v) More diversified financial systems tend to spread risks and 
counter the consequences of the unwinding of bubbles better than less diversified 
ones. It thus seems important to encourage the development of risk-transfer 
instruments, like index funds, securitized assets, stock borrowing, lending, and short-
selling regimes, and regulated futures and derivatives markets, in order to allow for 
heterogeneity in investors’ attitudes and enable investors’ hedging against asset-price 
bubbles. (vi) Since solid regulatory and supervisory institutions tend to be the ‘best 
line of defence’, it is important for a central bank to maintain its credibility and 
reputation in executing its core function of preserving macroeconomic stability 
(Hunter, Kaufmann and Pomerleano (2003), p. 25). 
In the thesis, after debating the inclusion or not of perceived financial imbalances in 
the conduct of monetary policy before the forecasts to inflation are affected, we 
evaluate monetary policy that is conducted pre-emptively against financial instability 
Historical episodes illustrate the challenges bubbles in asset prices pose to monetary 
policymakers, since they tend to evolve quickly and produce very high costs to the 
overall economy when they burst. As they are difficult to recognise promptly, they 
tend to be identified only ex post. Nevertheless, even though research provides 
conflicting tools enabling the early identification of asset-price bubbles, it is still vital 
for monetary policymakers to monitor movements in asset prices in an attempt to 
preserve consumer-price stability over longer horizons.  
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 in a simple model of the strategic interaction between a central bank and a financial 
sector. The central bank has the objectives of price stability and financial stability, 
and the latter is a function of the profitability of the financial sector relative to a 
benchmark. In line with the results proposed in the extant literature in favour of pre-
emptive monetary policy that calls for more flexibility and the use of longer time-
horizons in the conduct of monetary policy, we assess monetary policy under 
discretion and under commitment to an instrument rule. Similar to the literature 
initiated with Barro and Gordon (1983), yet in the new context proposed, the analysis 
concludes: The optimal policy should be conducted under commitment to a rule, 
contrary to the propositions of the relevant literature. In this case, policy is more 
effective in controlling inflation, and given substantial information on risks to 
financial stability, induces the financial sector to impose prudence on itself.       
The model is extended to incorporate uncertainty about the objectives of the central 
olicy pre-emptively against 
financial instability, it may choose in equilibrium, for suitable levels of parameters, 
to mimic a ‘strict inflation targeting’ central bank. The aim is to build its reputation 
as such, thus affect inflation expectations in the future, and have an impact on the 
stability of the financial sector. It is finally shown that only for large shocks to 
bank. In a model where the player making the first move, i.e. the financial sector, is 
uninformed about whether the central bank faces the objective of price stability or 
the dual objective of price and financial stability (where the latter is described in the 
basic model in Chapter 7 as monetary policy which is ‘pre-emptive’ against financial 
imbalances), different kinds of equilibrium are derived. The main conclusion reached 
in the extended model is that, since the financial sector does not know what type of 
central bank it faces, when the central bank conducts p
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 inflation is the ‘pre-emptive’ central bank willing to exercise more muted control 
over inflation in order to reinforce the safety of the financial sector.  
9.2 The Global Financial Crisis 
In the following analysis we discuss the relevance of our conclusions in the light of 
the current global financial crisis initiated in August 2007 that is “weighing heavily 
on economies around the world” (Kohn (2008), p.1), and which severely affected the 
cost and availability of credit to firms and households in several countries. Economic 
and financial linkages across countries rendered the current crisis global in scope, 
having a severe impact on both developed and developing economies. The 
worldwide economic disruption is thus deemed to be considerably more severe
 
 than 
in similar episodes in the past. Especially in the US, from where it initiated, it is 
considered “the worst [financial crisis] since the Great Depression” resulting in 
extensive constraints in the flow of credit, termed “the lifeblood of market 
economies”, and immense overall damage to the economy208 (Bernanke (2009), p.1). 
In particular, being in the midst of the global financial crisis, most economies are 
currently facing a major shock to the financial system that started from the problems 
inherent in the US subprime mortgage market (where subprime is the term for 
mortgages offered to less-creditworthy borrowers), and which eventually 
contaminated securitization products and credit markets more generally. Currently, 
                                                 
or property foreclosure, while several enterprises cancelled construction projects and shut down 
Finally, the impact that the crisis is having almost everywhere in the world should not be overlooked 
(Bernanke (2009), p. 1). 
208In particular, in the US several families are struggling with lost employment and depleted savings 
factories. In addition, local governments and municipalities hardly manage to fund critical services. 
329 
 banks face the need to absorb a higher amount of risk than has typically been the 
case (by moving off-balance sheet assets onto their balance sheets), yet the losses 
suffered already limit their ability to do so. Aggregate risk capacity in the financial 
system has eventually been reduced – a bank credit crunch caused by a scarcity of 
 urge those typically used to absorbing risk to 
similar situation from happening again” (Kohn (2008), p. 1), since as it unfolds “it 
equity capital in banks – since losses
face the need to limit such exposures. A significant amount of capital has been raised 
by banks in order to partly offset write-downs and credit losses. However, “credit 
losses in the banking book will begin to rise… and banks are entering this phase with 
weakened balance sheets. Alongside a rise in credit related losses, the outlook for 
bank profitability is poor” (Draghi (2008), p. 1). 
Despite the highly uncertain outlook, it is recognized that the financial system 
fragility and the weakness in real activity are likely to persist for a while.  As private 
lenders have become unable or even reluctant to enable the flow of credit in several 
economies, central banks in the pertinent countries have responded by easing 
monetary policy to a great (at times unprecedented) extent and expanded their 
lending so as to promote maximum sustainable economic growth and price 
stability. Furthermore, extraordinary actions have been taken by governments around 
the world in order to strengthen financial systems and preserve firms’ and 
households’ borrowing and spending ability (see e.g. the Report on the G20 meeting 
on April 2, 2009). It is now the common view that “the current situation is so severe 
that it calls for careful review of how such a crisis evolved and how we can prevent a 
has evolved into an even more complex combination of rising inflation, declining 
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 growth, tightening credit conditions, and widespread liquidity tensions pervading the 
global financial industry” (Draghi (2008), p. 1). 
Nevertheless, we must admit that only a complex answer can be given in any effort 
to find out the causes of such an extensive financial and economic system collapse. 
While there is considerable disagreement about the weight that can be given to every 
explanation, Bernanke (2009), for example, stresses that “to understand its 
international scope, we need to consider how global patterns of saving and 
investment have evolved over the past decade or more, and how those changes 
affected credit markets in the U.S. and some other countries” (Bernanke (2009), p. 1). 
Accepting that in a global financial system, saving can be generated from foreign as 
well as domestic sources, he contends that “much of this foreign saving came from 
fast-growing emerging market countries in Asia and other places where consumption 
has lagged behind rising incomes, as well as from oil-exporting nations that could 
not profitably invest all their revenue at home and thus looked abroad for investment 
opportunities209 … the housing boom in the U.S. being one important consequence, 
and a boom that was fuelled in large part by a rapid expansion of mortgage lending. 
Unfortunately, much of this lending was poorly done”210 (Bernanke (2009), p. 2). He 
further accepts that “regulators did not do enough to prevent poor lending, in part 
                                                 
 According to Bernanke (2009) the net inflow of foreign saving to the U.S. was roughly 1,5% of the 
U.S. national output in 1995, and reached about 6 % of U.S. national output in 2006, an amount equal 
210Bernanke (2009) points out that “lending involved, for example, little or no down payment by the 
payments. Lenders may have become careless because they, like many people at the time, expected 
209
to about $825 billion in current dollar prices (Bernanke (2009), p. 2). 
borrower or insufficient consideration by the lender of the borrower’s ability to make the monthly 
that house prices would continue to rise – thereby allowing borrowers to build up equity in their 
homes – and that credit would remain easily available, so that borrowers would be able to refinance if 
necessary” (Bernanke (2009), p. 2). 
331 
 because many of the worst loans were made by firms subject to little or no federal 
regulation”211 (Bernanke (2009), p. 2). 
Thus, Bernanke (2009), among others, argues that the low interest rates in 2002-2004 
were caused by global factors beyond the control of the monetary authorities, the 
interest rate decisions by the monetary authorities not being the major factor causing 
the boom. Taylor (2009) finds the appeal of such an explanation that focuses on 
global saving to lie in the fact that long-term interest rates were low for a while even 
after the short-term federal funds rate started increasing. The cause identified is that 
there was an excess of world saving, usually termed as a global saving glut, which 
pushed interest rates down in the U.S. and other countries212 (Taylor (2009), p. 4).  
                                                 
caught up in the credit boom. The large flows of global saving into the U.S. drove down the returns 
available on many traditional long-term investments, such as Treasury bonds, leading investors to 
search for alternatives. To satisfy the enormous demand for investments both perceived as safe and 
promising higher returns, the financial industry designed securities that combined many individual 
loans in complex hard-to-understand ways. These new securities later proved to involve substantial 
risks – risks that neither the investors nor the firms that designed the securities adequately understood 
212 Taylor (2009) stresses that “the classic explanation of financial crises, going back hundreds of 
an inevitable bust… in the recent crisis we had a housing boom and bust which in turn led to financial 
turmoil in the U.S. and other countries” (Taylor (2009), p. 1). He argues that monetary excesses were 
the main cause of that boom and the resulting bust and uses Figure 9.1 to illustrate in a simple way the 
story of monetary excesses, in particular examining US Federal R erve policy decisions – in terms of 
Figure 9.1 
211 Bernanke (2009), however, recognises the following: “mortgage markets were not the only ones 
at the outset” (Bernanke (2009), p. 2). 
years, is that they are caused by excesses – frequently monetary excesses – which lead to a boom and 
es
the federal funds interest rate – from 2000 to 2006 (Taylor (2009), p. 1, 2). 
 
Source: Taylor (2009), p. 2. 
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 However, according to Taylor (2009) “the main problem with this explanation is that 
there is actually no evidence for a global saving glut213 … [and] this alternative 
explanation does not stand up to empirical testing using data that have long been 
available” (Taylor (2009), p. 4). Taylor (2009) provides (preliminary) empirical 
evidence that government actions and interventions caused, prolonged, and worsened 
the financial crisis214. He remarks, though, that “there are and will continue to be 
differences of opinion”, while “carefully documented empirical research is needed 
                                                                                                                                          
rule, providing “an empirical measure that monetary policy was too easy during this period… [and 
at 
 y 
monetary policymakers, … [possibly interpreted] as purposeful deviations from the “regular” interest 
rate settings based on the usual macroeconomic variables” (Taylor (2009), p. 3). 
Figure 9.1 demonstrates that actual interest rate decisions deviated to a great extent from the Taylor 
that in fact] there was no greater or more persistent deviation of actual Fed policy since the turbulent 
days of the 1970s” (Taylor (2009), p. 2). Taylor (2009) further remarks that “there is clearly evidence 
that there were monetary excesses during the period leading up to the housing boom” recognising th
“the unusually low interest rates decisions were, of course, made with careful consideration b
213 Figure 9.2 gives simple evidence that there seems to be a saving shortage, showing that the global 
saving rate (measured as global saving being a fraction of world GDP) reached a considerably low 
level during 2002-2004 especially when compared with the 1970s and 1980s.  
Figure 9.2: Global Saving and Investment as a Share of World GDP 
 
d Economic Outlook, IMF Sept 2005, Chapter 2, p. 92 (from Taylor (2009), p. 4). 
Taylor (2009) accepts the presence of a “gap of saving over investment in the world outside the U.S. 
during 2002-2004” and argues that during this period the US was actually running a current account 
deficit, implying that saving was less then investment (Taylor (2009), p. 5). He remarks that a 
negative saving gap in the US was offset by an equal sized positive saving gap outside the US. In this 
case world interest rates would not be expected to change (Taylor (2009), p. 5). 
214 Taylor (2009), recognising that this particular research must be considered preliminary and being 
in the middle of the crisis there is a need to collect and analyse more data, points out that in particular 
“… they caused it by deviating from historical precedents and principles for setting interest rates, 
which had worked well for 20 years. They prolonged it by misdiagnosing the problems in the bank 
credit markets and thereby responding inappropriately by focusing on liquidity rather than risk. They 
made it worse by providing support for certain financial institutions and their creditors but not others 
in an ad hoc way without a clear and understandable framework. While ot er factors were certainly at 
play, these government actions should be first on the list of answers to he question of what went 
).  
Source: Worl
h
 t
wrong” (Taylor (2009), p. 18
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 for sorting out these differences”, and that, finally, “we should be basing our policy 
evaluations and conclusions on empirical analyses not ideological, personal, political, 
or partisan grounds” (Taylor (2009), p. 18). 
The sequence of events relevant to the shock in the US subprime mortgage market as 
well as its spread is described, for example, in IMF (2008), de Larosière Report 
(2009) and several press accounts, that need not be reviewed in this section. Around 
the beginning of 2007 problems surfaced with subprime mortgages and house prices 
used in order to 
 the evaluation of the 
precise size of the future loss (Gorton (2008)) and, in addition, these new products 
have limited track records, especially in a declining house price environment. 
Greenspan (2009) gives the following account of the story: “all the sophisticated 
mathematics and computer wizardry essentially rested on one central premise: that 
in parts of the U.S. began to fall215 (Bernanke (2009), p. 2). Essentially, it became 
evident very quickly during the late summer and early fall of 2007 that rapid losses 
were increasingly taking place on the large amount of subprime mortgages that had 
been originated in the previous three years, and that the models 
estimate the risks on those mortgages had hugely underestimated potential losses. 
The structures of the securities are too complex to enable
the enlightened self-interest of owners and managers of financial institutions would 
lead them to maintain a sufficient buffer against insolvency by actively monitoring 
                                                 
215 Bernanke (2009) gives a briefing of the sequence stating in the following: “Mortgage delinquencies 
ough the first months of 2009” (Bernanke (2009), p. 2). 
and defaults rose, and the downturn in house prices intensified trends that continue today. Investors, 
stunned by losses on assets they had believed to be safe, began to pull back from a wide range of 
credit markets, and financial institutions – reeling from severe losses on mortgages and other loans – 
cut back their lending. The crisis deepened in September 2008, when the failure or near-failure of 
several major financial firms caused many financial and credit markets to freeze up. Stock prices fell 
sharply as investors lost confidence in the financial sector and became gloomy about economic 
prospects. Declining stock values, a teetering financial system, and difficulties in obtaining credit 
triggered a remarkably rapid and deep contraction in global economic activity and employment, a 
contraction that has persisted thr
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 their firms’ capital and risk positions. For generations, that premise appeared 
incontestable but, in the summer of 2007, it failed. It is clear that the levels of 
complexity to which market practitioners, at the height of their euphoria, carried risk-
management techniques and risk-product design were too much for even the most 
sophisticated market players to handle prudently” (Greenspan (2009), p. 1). 
In fact, both the current financial turmoil and the subsequent contraction in economic 
activity are a major concern to economic policymakers216. However, as Bernanke 
(2009) remarks, due to the problems credit markets in most economies experience, 
conventional monetary policy alone seems inadequate to bolster the economy now 
that is most necessary (Bernanke (2009), p. 2). 
The important lesson gained from the current events is the inability of financial 
regulators to fully or accurately forecast the depth and extent of financial fragility or 
even the advent of a financial crisis. According to Greenspan (2009) supervision and 
examination can implement and enforce, for example, capital and collateral 
requirements, in addition to other rules that are preventative and do not require the 
anticipation of an uncertain future. In particular, it has been successful in restraining 
certain types of bank lending, such as commercial real estate. Mishkin (2009) points 
                                                 
216 Greenspan (2009) further argues that “even with the breakdown of self-regulation, the financial 
system would have held together had the second bulwark against crisis – i.e. the regulatory system – 
functioned effectively; but, under crisis pressure, it too failed” (Greenspan (2009), p. 1). He states that 
just a year before the crisis started the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had noted that “more 
than 99 per cent of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regulatory 
capital standards” (quoted in Greenspan (2009), p.1) and remarks that even though banks in the US 
operate under rather severe regulation and also 10 to 15 of the largest ones had daily operations 
overseen by on-site examiners, still many of them “took on toxic assets that brought them to their 
knees” (Greenspan (2009), p. 1). He further highlights that “the UK’s heavily praised Financial 
Services Authority was unable to anticipate and prevent the bank run that threatened Northern Rock, 
[while] the Basel Committee, representing regulatory authorities from the world’s major financial 
systems, promulgated a set of capital rules that failed to foresee the need that arose in August 2007 for 
large capital buffers” (Greenspan (2009), p. 1). 
335 
 out that “the focus on individual institutions can also cause regulators to overlook 
important changes in the overall financial system” and as an example he states that 
“although the markets for securitised assets and the shadow banking system of 
lightly regulated financial institutions grew dramatically in the years before the 
current crisis, the existing regulatory structures did not evolve with them” (Mishkin 
(2009), p. 1)217.  
Nevertheless, as Greenspan (2009) argues “competition, not protectionism, is the 
source of capitalism’s great success over the generations … [and, therefore] 
regulation should enhance the effectiveness of competitive markets, not impede 
them”218 (Greenspan (2009), p. 2). Reshaping financial regulation with the aim to 
stabilise the system is certainly of primary concern. However, it is argued that “ill-
thought-out calls in the heat of the moment for more safeguards and expensive 
compliance may tend mainly to increase concentration and reduce competition. The 
trend is clear: two years ago Europe’s 45 biggest banks held 66% of bank deposits. 
Now 40 of them hold 70%” (The Economist, 6th June 2009, p. 35). 
It is important to stress, however, that bubbles (that at some point tend to be driven 
by euphoria) seem to require prolonged periods of low long-term interest rates, 
damped inflation and prosperity overall. Greenspan (2009) elaborating on this point 
                                                 
217 Greenspan (2009) remarks though that typically regulation, apart from often being costly and 
counterproductive, tends to fail the test of improving the ability of financial institutions to direct a 
nation’s savings into the most productive (welfare improving) capital investments (Greenspan (2009), 
p. 2). 
218 Recent experience shows that certain financial institutions are in fact ‘too big to fail’ since their 
failure would potentially give rise to adverse systemic consequences. This experience gives rise to 
new regulatory challenges according to Greenspan (2009). Such a status provides these institutions 
with a competitive advantage in pricing their debt and equities that he views as “highly market 
distorting”. The solution he suggests is graduated regulatory capital requirements that may discourage 
these institutions from becoming too big and that will offset their competitive advantage. Nevertheless, 
such remedial action should not be rushed upon private markets that are currently imposing far greater 
restraint than any of the current regulatory proposals would (Greenspan (2009), p. 2). 
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 emphasizes the following: “History also demonstrates that under-priced risk – the 
hallmark of bubbles – can persist for years. I feared irrational exuberance in 1996, 
but the dotcom bubble proceeded to inflate for another four years. Similarly, I opined 
in a federal open-market committee meeting in 2002 that it’s hard to escape the 
conclusion that ... our extraordinary housing boom ... financed by very large 
increases in mortgage debt, cannot continue indefinitely into the future. The housing 
bubble did continue to inflate into 2006” (Greenspan (2009), p. 2). He further 
stresses that, traditionally, it is not demanding to judge when risk is historically 
underpriced, since a reliable guide is given by credit spreads. Informational 
disadvantages, however, render impossible to date an accurate anticipation of the 
onset of a crisis. Greenspan (2009) highlights that “financial crises are defined by a 
sharp discontinuity of asset prices…that requires that the crisis be largely 
unanticipated by market participants” and it is worth mentioning that “it was the 
excess securitisation of US subprime mortgages that unexpectedly set off the current 
solvency crisis” (Greenspan (2009), p. 2).  
According to Greenspan (2009) an event needs to run counter to conventional 
wisdom on the ‘appropriate’ workings of the financial system in order to shock the 
markets. Being confronted with uncertainty, the financial community tends to resort 
to dramatic sales and, therefore, lower prices of goods and assets. He points out that 
“we can model the euphoria and the fear stage of the business cycle”, even though 
“their parameters are quite different” and concludes that, nevertheless, “we have 
never successfully modelled the transition from euphoria to fear” (Greenspan (2009), 
p. 2). 
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 According to Ferguson (2004), public-policy action should address market volatility 
and institutional stresses need only when the latter are resulting from, and interact 
with, more-fundamental market failures which are highly likely to impair real 
macroeconomic performance. He stresses that when public policies constitute of 
increased regulation of financial markets, institutions and instruments in order to 
avoid the likelihood of financial stress “almost surely entail a significant cost 
measured in terms of increased moral hazard, lower economic growth, and financial 
markets that do not always allocate resources to their most productive use” 
(Ferguson (2004), p. 2). 
The health of the financial system is an inherent concern of central banks. Since the 
financial system allocates capital and risk to the economy, it affects the achievement 
of primary macroeconomic objectives, such as stable prices and sustained growth. It 
is also key to the effective transmission of monetary policy decisions to the real 
economy (Draghi (2008), p. 9).  
In addition, as Ferguson (2004) remarks “central banks have a long history of 
working to foster efficiency and stability in the global financial system, … [and, in 
fact] that traditional role has become more complex over time as the institutional and 
market realities of the financial system have evolved” (Ferguson (2004), p. 7). 
Greenspan (2009) adds on this point: “I do not question that central banks can defuse 
any bubble. But it has been my experience that unless monetary policy crushes 
economic activity and, for example, breaks the back of rising profits or rents, policy 
actions to abort bubbles will fail. I know of no instance where incremental monetary 
policy has defused a bubble” (Greenspan (2009), p. 2). Therefore, it is vital to work 
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 towards the recovery of the financial system before devising the optimal type of a 
new regulatory structure219.  
According to Kohn (2008), however, “the severe fallout may indicate a larger 
potential gain than anticipated to leaning against excess exuberance in asset markets 
… realising [though] that potential rests on meeting the two further conditions … 
[namely] the timely identification of the bubble, and the ability of a central bank to 
materially influence the trajectory of the speculative component of asset prices” 
(Kohn (2008), p. 3). The way events have unfolded urge one to the conclusion that 
some kind of pre-emptive monetary policy as modelled in the thesis is necessary so 
 identification of a bubble in a timely manner, we 
show that central banks will benefit from defining an appropriate monetary policy 
rule that will give them the ability to influence the behaviour of the financial sector. 
Since a rule that is well defined is a considerably operational tool for central banking 
practitioners, future research is necessary on that direction.     
                                                
as to lessen the likelihood of similar crisis episodes occurring in the future, after the 
pertinent economies recover from the current crisis. Moreover, our results, especially 
the superiority of such monetary policy when conducted under commitment to a rule 
(as analysed in Chapter 7), render the above two conditions highlighted by Kohn 
(2008) redundant. Instead of the
 
219 Greenspan (2009) views that the recovery of the banking system in the US is essential to global 
rebalancing. He accepts that the troubled asset relief programme (following the Lehman Brothers 
default), the actual purchase of $250bn (€185bn, £173bn) of preferred stock of US commercial banks 
under from the US Treasury had been successful in reducing the risk of US bank insolvency. Yet, the 
improvement has stalled at the absence of further investments from the US Treasury. He argues that 
“the restoration of normal bank lending by banks will require a very large capital infusion from 
private or public sources” and reports that the US consolidated bank balance sheet shows a future loss 
of at least $1,000bn of US commercial bank assets at original book value out of the more than 
$12,000bn (Greenspan (2009), p. 2). 
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 In fact, ECB policymakers are currently debating whether ‘to lean against the wind’. 
Papademos stresses: “The conclusion, that we have incorporated into our thinking, is 
that development in asset prices should be monitored very closely… a policy of 
leaning against the wind of excesses deserves close thinking”. He also remarks: “The 
current ECB price stability objective would allow raising rates if an asset price 
bubble were forming, even if inflationary pressures were subdued” (reported from 
Reuters, Jun 2, 2009). Weber, who heads the German Bundesbank, also agrees that 
leaning against the wind could help to avoid a boom-and-bust cycle and adds that 
“such an approach could be used when money and credit growth is dynamic, asset 
prices go up and risk perceptions decline… [additionally] central banks should take a 
longer-term perspective which takes due account of the future inflationary 
consequences of such unfavourable developments… [which] could be achieved by 
monetary and credit analysis” (reported from Reuters, Jun 2, 2009). 
ural representations of 
the real sector so as to demonstrate a certain measure of the costs of pre-emptive 
monetary policy in terms of real activity, they generate some insights into the 
The common objection to ‘leaning against the wind’ is the considerable costs it may 
incur in terms of real economic activity (as, for example, a significant damage to 
collateral values). However, the advocates of this style of policy refute this by 
proposing that policymakers should look at inflation over longer horizons. While the 
models analysed in Chapters 7 and 8 do not incorporate struct
pertinent issues of concern to policymakers.  
In particular, Chapter 8 shows that ‘leaning against the wind’ is not optimal when the 
financial sector is uncertain as to whether the central bank will conduct such a policy, 
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 indicating also the importance of transparency in monetary policy. The policy of 
‘leaning against the wind’ implies raising interest rates in order to deflate asset price 
bubbles before they burst, even though consumer price inflation does not pose a 
significant threat. This policy is similar to what we term ‘pre-emptive policy under 
discretion’ in Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 8 shows that when a central bank prefers to 
conduct the above style of policy but is not willing to publicly announce it, the 
agents that are strategically interdependent with it and are prone to aptly adjust their 
behaviour, i.e. the financial sector, will be worse off than in the absence of such 
uncertainty. Chapter 8 also demonstrates that, even when the central bank projects its 
behaviour to a long time horizon (mathematically infinite) – to the knowledge of the 
participants of the financial sector – it is only when large shocks to inflation occur 
that a central bank inclined to ‘lean against the wind’ is actually expected to do so.  
Otherwise, this style of policy will not be chosen and the central bank will mimic the 
inflation targeting central bank. Therefore, without a clear commitment to ‘leaning 
against the wind’ central banks will be expected to conduct this style of policy only 
when large inflationary shocks are likely. Yet, for a central bank to consider ‘leaning 
against the wind’ of excess exuberance in financial markets, inflation forecasts, the 
traditional monetary policy indicator, should not signal any threat. Therefore, this 
type of policy is sustainable only when the central bank credibly commits to it. 
ubstituting the central bank objective of 
macroeconomic stability by an effective financial stabilisation objective220 that does 
                                                
Additionally, Chapter 7 extends the analysis in considering not only an operational 
‘leaning against the wind’ monetary policy (s
 
‘gap’ that relates the profitability of the financial sector measured as a spread between long and short 
rates and a reference level. 
220 The financial stabilization objective proposed in Chapter 7, also used in Chapter 8 concerns the 
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 not necessitate the identification of bubbles), but also a simple rule for monetary 
policy. The results in Chapter 7 in favour of commitment to a rule show that a central 
bank can conduct pre-emptive monetary policy in a way that avoids the hazard of a 
longer policy horizon.  
Even though a short-term interest rate is under the direct control of central banks, 
long-term interest rates and other asset prices are largely determined by future policy 
expectations. A clear understanding of the central bank objectives and the way it 
implement future policy in response to economic developments are necessary for 
these expectations to be formed. Furthermore, when the central bank operates in a 
predictable way in response to economic developments, market expectations tend to 
remain anchored in the face of various shocks. Investors understand and take account 
of the central bankers’ commitment to key long-run objectives such as price stability 
and sustainable economic growth (Ferguson (2004), p. 4). Ferguson (2004) makes an 
early remark of current concerns for monetary policy makers, which is: “Although 
central bankers can use predictable policy actions and the forward-looking nature of 
financial prices to their advantage, they must also be mindful of the potential market 
reactions to policy actions that are not fully anticipated or that may be 
misinterpreted. This, too, is an aspect of monetary policy that may become more 
prominent given the evolution of financial markets in recent years” (Ferguson 
(2004), p. 4). Commitment of the central bank to a rule similar to the one proposed in 
Chapter 7 should at least discourage the financial markets from any behaviour 
stemming from such misinterpretations.   
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 Another important issue highlighted by the recent experience and relating to the 
procyclicality characterising the financial system is according to Draghi (2008) “the 
role that unusually easy global credit conditions over many years had in the build up 
of the current turmoil” (Draghi (2008), p. 10). There is a clear asymmetry between 
the two phases of boom-bust cycles. Even though the adverse consequences of the 
bust phase always tend to be obvious, it is difficult for policymakers to identify the 
build-up of imbalances during the boom phase. The underlying reason is that several 
factors, which are not necessarily related to imbalances, influence asset prices and 
balance sheet positions, and, in addition, not all booms result in a bust. It thus seems 
common to central banks to devise appropriate ways to intervene after the crash, by 
injecting liquidity in order to avoid a financial crisis, or even loosening monetary 
policy so as to avoid deflation, but remain passive during the boom phase (Draghi 
(2008), p. 10). The problem posed by a monetary policy with such a passive role is 
that it may increase moral hazard and increase the potential of further and more acute 
imbalances in the future. According to Draghi (2008) “the key challenge is therefore 
to understand whether monetary policy can or should be more proactive and ‘lean 
against the wind’ also in periods of growing financial imbalances in a pre-emptive 
manner, even in the absence of immediate threats to price stability – this is an open 
issue on which opinions diverge” (Draghi (2008), p. 11). Our results in favour of 
commitment to a rule demonstrate a symmetry in the policy design (similar to all 
styles of rule-based policy) reducing the likelihood of moral hazard behaviour. 
central banks to achieve a clear separation 
of roles and a correct assignment of instruments to objectives, due to the occurrence 
of inflationary pressures combined with weaker economic activity and financial 
Currently, it is particularly important for 
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 turbulence. Draghi (2008) emphasises this in the following: “it is precisely in these 
difficult situations that the benefits of a sound monetary framework become apparent. 
Only by ensuring a return to price stability in a reasonable time frame we will be able 
to control inflation expectations, reduce uncertainty and risk premia, sustain longer-
term financing and purchasing power and thus reinforce the prospects for real 
activity and financial stability” (Draghi (2008), p. 10). The results in Chapter 7 show 
that one instrument may be sufficient to make central bank policy effective in 
anchoring inflation expectations, controlling inflation and, given substantial 
information on risks to financial stability, it induces the financial sector to impose 
prudence on itself. One may therefore conjecture that central banking practice in 
accordance with this analysis proposing the benefits of clear announcements (as 
shown in Chapter 8) and rule-based policy (as shown in Chapter 7) may facilitate the 
transitional period as mentioned above. A main insight highlighted in this analysis 
and verified by current events is that the strategic interaction between the central 
bank and the financial sector needs to be taken into account when designing optimal 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, further research is needed extending our work to 
incorporate the effectiveness of a second instrument used for monetary policy. The 
latter may, for example, incorporate appropriate definitions of capital adequacy or 
liquidity ratios (affecting the financial stabilisation objective of the central bank as 
proposed in our analysis). 
Thus, as the crisis unfolds policies are taking a variety of shapes that can be grouped 
within two broad categories: emergency and structural responses. Until now, the first 
remained typically national since each crisis was unique to the financial structure of 
the country and so were the remedies. However, as Draghi (2008) remarks: “If the 
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 crisis were to become systemic – and beginning of September 2008 has shown just 
how sudden and dramatic the turn of events can be – it is believed that an 
internationally coordinated effort will be necessary” (Draghi (2008), p. 2). He further 
comments that “if the market turbulence tells us anything, it is that the pace of 
financial innovation in recent years, the volume of transaction in certain markets, the 
amount of embedded leverage in the system, and the global nature of finance, have 
transformed the functioning of the international financial system, … [and] these 
transformations were not fully appreciated in their implications for monetary policy 
making” (Draghi (2008), p. 8).  
Ferguson (2004) remarks that monetary policy has been used to counter financial 
instability when the latter has been great enough for the financial markets to 
intermediate effectively. At times when the economic outlook is revised down 
sharply reflecting large the downside risks, the functioning of the financial markets 
becomes a clear focus for policymakers (Ferguson (2004), p. 4). Ferguson (2004) 
stresses before the crisis surfaced that “he cannot leave the subject of supervision 
without a brief comment on the trend to remove supervision from the responsibility 
of central banks and to create an overarching single supervisory authority for all 
financial institutions and markets” adding that “such a structure may well be 
appropriate for the jurisdictions that have adopted such regulatory frameworks, given 
their history and institutional development” (Ferguson (2004), p. 5). He certainly 
respects the decision of countries that have adopted the Financial Supervisory 
Authority model, and have thus excluded their central banks from the direct 
supervision and regulation of their banks. However, he believes that such a decision 
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 has the potential to undermine a central bank’s ability to manage financial crises 
(Ferguson (2004), p. 5). 
Smaghi (2009) remarks that even though “many of the risks that have materialised 
during the recent crisis had been signalled earlier on, in the public communications 
by relevant policy authorities, such as the ECB (in its Financial Stability Review and 
in speeches by Executive Board members), the Bank for International Settlements (in 
its Quarterly Review of Financial Market Developments and Annual Report), the 
Bank of England or the International Monetary Fund (in its Global Financial 
Stability Report), … we can perhaps acknowledge that these communications were 
The institutional framework necessary to support the implementation of macro-
prudential supervision mainly involves a central bank and an authority in charge of 
regulating and supervising financial markets and institutions. The former hosts the 
analytical capabilities for assessing global financial market developments and 
macroeconomic risk and the latter is responsible for the stability of individual 
institutions and has the information on individual participants and market 
developments. A full flow of information is necessary for a properly functioning 
system. The supervisory authority provides all the relevant information to the central 
bank so as to monitor and analyse risk, while the central bank provides information 
to the micro-prudential supervisor on the results of the risk analysis so as to ensure 
not effective in changing the behaviour of financial market participants, nor of the 
supervisory authorities” (Smaghi (2009), p. 3). This argument points towards the 
benefits that can be obtained by credible rule-based policy, as the findings of our 
analysis emphasises.  
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 that appropriate measures are implemented. A distinct allocation of responsibilities 
and accountability is also vital, according to Smaghi (2009) in order “to ensure that 
the right incentives are in place for the achievement of results in a cooperative 
manner rather than inter-institutional fighting, which is a recipe for disaster” (Smaghi 
(2009), p. 3). 
According to our definition of financial stability, the latter requirement is implicit (as 
Smaghi (2009) divides the models of monetary policy implications of macro-
prudential regulation recommended by the Turner Review into three groups (see 
Smaghi (2009), p. 4 for a summary). The models developed in our analysis can be 
considered as variants of Smaghi’s Model 2, namely models where “the central bank 
is not only in charge of identifying risks, but is also able to take specific macro-
prudential measures or to require the authority in charge of micro-prudential 
supervision to do so” (Smaghi (2009), p. 4).  
it does not necessitate the addition of an extra instrument) but distinctive in our 
model and incorporated in the shift in the behaviour of both the central bank and (in 
anticipation) also of the financial sector caused by any changes between the actual 
and the reference level for financial sector profitability, P and P*. This reference 
level is determined by several factors of the economy as a whole and may, for 
example, account for the profitability of the financial sector under full employment, 
but which cannot be captured in this analysis and needs further research. However, in 
an effort to make our definition of the financial stabilization objective operational we 
may consider a simple computation of P* as discussed in Chapter 7.   
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 As in equation (7.8) the financial sector’s profitability P is measured 
as, iiRP −−= 02 . For example, the nominal short-term interest rate directly 
influenced by the monetary policy, i0, can be represented by the 3-month money-
market yield, while a proxy for the long-term nominal interest rate, R, can be the 30-
year bond yield. As an example, using daily data from the US for a time period 
 
 
differing maturities held by the financial sector, in particular the effect on expected 
 
between 1.1.2000 to 18.8.2009 (data provided by the Financial Times database), we
may compute average values of the parameters in (7.8) in order to use average P as a 
proxy for P*. The level derived is approximately equal to 4 percent, which can be a 
useful guide for pre-emptive monetary policy. Nevertheless, further empirical 
research on the proposed definition is certainly necessary taking account of several 
related issues as, for example, the fact that interest rate series are cointegrated, as 
well as the effect changes in i may have on the aggregate value of the assets of
future short rates. 
As Smaghi (2009) points out, the de Larosière Report (2009) instead proposes Model 
1, according to which “the central bank identifies systemic risks and makes 
recommendations to the authority in charge of micro-prudential supervision, which 
sets out the main actions to be taken to address these risks” (Smaghi (2009), p. 4). It 
suggests the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC), embedded in the 
ECB and corresponding to the General Council that will make recommendations 
aimed at identifying and correcting systemic vulnerabilities. The responsibility of 
implementation will remain to national supervisors (Smaghi (2009), p. 5).
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 In sum, Smaghi (2009) argues that there seem to be greater conflicts of interest 
between the objectives of micro and macro prudential supervision than between price 
stability and macro-prudential supervision. He further remarks: “this is the reason 
why I tend to consider that Model 2, in which the central bank is given two 
instruments in order to achieve two distinct objectives is more appropriate, especially 
within the European framework, and even more so for the euro area; this seems to be 
the model that will be implemented in the US” (Smaghi (2009), p.5). In particular, he 
reports that “the US administration has proposed to give the Fed powers to address 
the build up of risks that threaten the financial system as a whole, with a focus on 
core institutions and markets; the creation of a Council of regulators has been 
proposed, but the Fed will not need to seek the council’s approval to act against 
systemic risks” (Smaghi (2009), p. 5).  
Draghi (2009) in his remarks on the Turner review rollout on the 27  March 2009 th
applauds the proposals for enhancing macroprudential analysis, assessing the 
implications of macroeconomic trends for financial stability. He stresses that 
“indeed, it is precisely in this area that we have the most to learn from the experience 
of this crisis, [and] we need to think hard and carefully about how to put these 
lessons into practice in formulating policies that incorporate financial stability 
concerns into traditional macroeconomic policy levers as well as regulatory rules and 
approaches” (Draghi (2009), p. 2).  
In addition, Mishkin (2009) states that “an important lesson from the current crisis is 
that we desperately need a systemic regulator and the Fed is the only logical choice” 
(Mishkin (2009), p. 2). Nevertheless, he briefly outlines three dangers that such a 
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 shift in policy may incorporate, in that, “first, additional [emphasis not in the 
original] objectives may blur the clear focus on achieving output and price stability”, 
second, the potentially increased political pressure on the Fed could “subject it to 
attacks on its independence”, and, third, the lack of resources necessary for a central 
bank (the Federal Reserve in this case) in order to assume the additional role of 
(macroprudential) systemic regulator. However, Mishkin (2009) makes the following 
remarks: “Despite these dangers, given the importance of the financial stability goal 
and the fact that some institution must play the role of the systemic regulator, I 
strongly believe that the Fed should take on this new task in spite of the difficulties 
this will pose. Some safeguards can mitigate the difficulties. For example, some 
central banks have used explicit, numerical long-run inflation objectives to keep the 
price stability goal firmly in view. As I have argued before on this page, the Fed 
should head in this direction. Congress also needs to support the Fed’s independence 
and funding” (Mishkin (2009), p. 2).  
 as an example the following statement from the 
IMF Global Financial Stability Review (GFSR) of April 2006: “There is growing 
recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and more diverse 
group of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on their balance sheets, has 
helped make the banking and overall financial system more resilient. The improved 
The Turner Review published in March 2009 states: “Indeed, it is important to note 
that not only was there a failure to identify hugely increased risks, but a widely held 
and authoritatively asserted conventional wisdom that the financial system had 
become more stable, and the amplitude of economic cycles less pronounced, 
precisely because of the financial market developments which we now believe led to 
crisis” (FSA (2009), p. 85). It gives
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 resilience may be seen in fewer bank failures and more consistent credit provision. 
Consequently the commercial banks may be less vulnerable today to creditor 
economic shocks” [quoted from FSA (2009), p. 86]. Nevertheless, it is also stressed 
that “intellectual challenge to conventional wisdoms is therefore essential, but so too 
is freedom from political pressure” (FSA (2009), p. 86). 
On the above issue of the adverse effect the political context can impose, we contend 
that our analysis shows that the political context can on the contrary prove beneficial 
if the latter possibly undertakes the difficult task of enabling the central bank’s 
communication of a potential monetary policy shift from the achievement of a 
macroeconomic objective towards a financial stabilisation objective and the 
establishment of rule-based policy. Former US Fedreral Reserve Chairman Volcker’s 
appointment in 1979 can be an example of a helpful political action. Central bank 
independence seems to be in jeopardy through the events since August 2007. In 
March 2008 with the rescue of Bear Stearns hopes were high of an imminent 
establishment of financial stability; however, the events in September 2008 and 
onwards dashed these hopes. Central bank independence as it has emerged during the 
period of the ‘Great Moderation’ refers to the fact that central banks’ control over 
inflation can at times be exercised with some flexibility in order to ‘lean against the 
wind’ of imminent recession (see, for example, Mervyn King’s complaints Sunday 
Telegraph 30 May 2009). However, the results in Chapters 7 and 8 bring forward the 
widely accepted merits of commitment to a rule. In particular, they highlight the 
merits of a central bank’s pre-emptive intervention in the financial system while 
committed to a monetary policy rule that accounts for financial stability. Our results 
reinforce the argument for preserving central bank independence not only over the 
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 control of inflation but also over the soundness of the financial system. Further 
research is, nevertheless, necessary on this issue, as well as on the appropriate design 
of rules in the same way that the Taylor rule emerged from the literature stemming 
from the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon paradigm.  
Finally, we contend that further extending the extended model in Chapter 7 
 
(subsection 7.6) to introduce the effect of debt default on the financial sector’s 
profitability over a number of periods may produce useful results in the debate over 
the timely identification of bubbles and its effect on monetary policy making. 
Extending this model over time and taking account of the expectations formed about 
potential levels of default may add to our analysis a comprehensive representation of 
boom and bust cycles. Further theoretical and empirical work is necessary on this 
issue.  
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